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It is an old trick of the contemporary media theorist (and 
indeed, of the contemporary “interdisciplinary” academ-
ic) to take ideas from one discipline and cross-apply them 
to another discipline. At best the results can be invigorat-
ing and generative; at worst the results can seem shoe-
horned, awkward, irrelevant, and scatological. In this 
book, I apply ideas from quantum mechanics and nega-
tive theology to a small group of contemporary artworks 
– artworks that succeed by a variety of means to make a 
variety of flavors of qualitative nothing. From quantum 
mechanics, the model of an experimental apparatus be-
comes a useful way of understanding how these particu-
lar works of art (and indeed, all works of art) function. 
And from negative theology, the practice of apophatic 
writing (a writing that perpetually unsays itself) helpful-
ly informs the goals and tactics of these particular works 
of art. So, quantum apparatuses apply to all works of art, 
but apophatic writing only applies to a particular subset 
of artworks, individual examples of which I analyze here.
I didn’t choose quantum mechanics or apophasis for 
their own novel or culturally current qualities. Indeed, 
not being all that mathematically gifted, I would have 
avoided quantum mechanics if at all possible; and apo-
phasis, often associated with both deconstruction and 
God, is hardly culturally current these days. (Admittedly, 
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the topic of nothing is always hot: a perennial classic.) In-
stead, I began with the works of art themselves, and tried 
to let what they were doing inform and determine the 
way I chose to approach them. Rather than begin with 
the theory and let the specific examples of artwork stick 
or fall through the cracks, I have begun with the specific 
examples of artwork and have let the theory stick or fall 
through the cracks. The theory that has stuck is surprising 
and relevant to me, because it addresses long-standing 
questions that have always bothered my own art practice 
and research: What is the actual force of language in the 
real world? How malleable is material? How do humans 
and objects access each other? In making the truly new, 
how much agency do I have, and how much of my agency 
is contingent on the history of the world? How might I 
halt becoming? If the universe generally tends toward 
something rather than nothing (Heidegger), and if it 
always tends toward something new (Whitehead), then 
what is the ethical value making a new nothing?
In cross-applying these disciplines (physics, philoso-
phy, literary criticism, theology, media theory, art criti-
cism, art history), I hope to avoid a number of pitfalls. 
Regarding quantum mechanics, it would be a failure if 
all I accomplished was a “mere” analogizing of quantum 
mechanical behavior to art apparatuses that aren’t really 
behaving in any way actually relevant to their science 
laboratory counterparts. In order to avoid this pitfall, I 
enlist contemporary decoherence theory (from quantum 
mechanics) and the cosmology of Alfred North White-
head to provide an explanation of how these works of 
art are “really” (not just analogically or metaphorically) 
making nothing. In this sense, “real” does not necessarily 
mean “scientific.” It doesn’t even solely mean “actual.” But 
“real” does mean both “actual” and “virtual/potential,” 
both of which comprise the real. All of these concepts 




Additionally, Chapter 1 makes clear the ways in which 
scientific apparatuses designed to “measure” quantum 
behaviors are relevant to art apparatuses. Briefly, quan-
tum-behavior-measuring apparatuses are most notable 
for creating a specific and intentional cut in the holistic 
universe which invites the “thing” they are “measuring” 
(be it proton, electron, or molecule) to manifest a particu-
lar, heretofore not-yet-existent “observable” value (posi-
tion value, momentum value, charge value, spin value). 
Which type of observable is in part determined by the spe-
cific “measurement bias” of the apparatus itself. Indeed, 
the very particle-ness of the “thing” being measured, its 
thing-, object-, or noun-ness, has arguably yet to emerge 
prior to the measurement event itself. Philosopher and 
physicist Karen Barad (following her interpretation of 
Niels Bohr) usefully refers to this entire congregation 
(apparatus, measurement event, quarantined system, 
measured thing) as a singular “phenomenon.” Addition-
ally, Whitehead’s idea of “negative prehension” and con-
temporary quantum decoherence theory both take into 
account the entire rest of the universe which surrounds 
this cordoned-off “apparatal”1 phenomenon, and treat it 
as an implicit component of the overall measurement 
event.
All well and good, but what has any of this got to do 
with art? If every work of art acts in some ways like a 
quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus (and I’m claim-
ing this is true), then a number of relevant observations 
follow: 
1. Works of art don’t merely reveal the pre-existent prop-
erties of the materials they incorporate. If they did, 
they would be functioning according to the classical/
Newtonian model of measuring apparatuses, a model 
1 Here I coin the neologism “apparatal,” simply to keep from having 
to repeatedly say “apparatus-like.”
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which presumes a world of determined objects that 
inherently pre-possess measurable properties. Instead, 
works of art invite material properties to co-emerge as 
part of apparatal entanglements, and the works of art 
themselves co-emerge along with these material prop-
erties;
2. Works of art don’t have a pre-determined outcome. 
Again, if they did, they would be functioning accord-
ing to the classical/Newtonian model of measuring 
apparatuses, a model which presumes a world full 
of forces acting determinately and inevitably within 
a knowable system. Instead, works of art collaborate 
with their materials. The materials enact their own 
agency which is not wholly pre-determined or ever 
fully predictable beforehand, and which co-emerges 
as part of the entire apparatal phenomenon (a holis-
tic phenomenon which includes the art object and any 
participants, viewers, patrons, users, humans, non-hu-
mans determined to be part of the apparatal system); 
3. Although the outcome of a work of art is not pre-de-
termined, neither is it fully random. Its outcome is in 
part contingent on all prior historical “decisions” (by 
art critics, electrons, weather systems, economic mar-
kets, oil paints, and all the other “enduring objects” in 
the history of the universe), and in part determined by 
the relevant desire for novelty manifested by all the 
participants involved in the apparatal phenomenon 
that is the work of art; and
4. Every art apparatus (in other words, ever work of art) 
is itself a kind of actualizing provocation that invites 
(sometimes more courteously, and sometimes more 
insistently) an evolution, reduction, or change in the 
universe. These assertions and others will be consid-
ered more fully in Chapter 1.
19
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Moving on from quantum mechanics to negative theol-
ogy, in regards to apophatic writing, it would be a failure 
if all I accomplished in this book was to approach the ac-
tual physical world analogically as if it were itself a “text,” 
the better to apply my readymade literary critical theory 
to it. A few decades ago, this would have been a standard 
approach, and it would have failed to take into account 
the very real and pragmatic decision-making capacity 
of materials (from photons to oil paints to weather sys-
tems). So, although I will address Derridean deconstruc-
tion, I will do so mostly to talk about the ways in which 
deconstruction differs from apophatic writing. I will also 
call upon Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of the utterance, J.L. 
Austin’s classic “speech acts,” and Derrida himself (in 
“dialogue” with John Searle) to account for the ways in 
which “language” informs and in-forms the actually real. 
I will also consider Karen Barad’s provocative concept of 
the “discursivity” of materiality, and I will detail the ways 
in which this concept relates to the theoretical toolset 
I am attempting to construct. All of these negotiations 
will occur in “Chapter 2: Regarding Apophasis.”
Ultimately this is a book about art. So, another great 
way I could fail is to reduce the affect and ineffability of 
art to a kind of utilitarian scientific explanation, or to 
some sort of literary critical explanation, or to both. In 
What Is Philosophy? (and elsewhere), Deleuze and Guat-
tari propose a cosmology of undifferentiated everything 
(a.k.a. the plane of immanence, the rhizome, the body 
without organs) probed and accessed by three major hu-
man approaches – science, philosophy, and art. These 
three approaches all access the same cosmos, but by dif-
ferent means. With quantum mechanics, science has out-
paced the other two approaches and found itself in dire 
need of some philosophy. Sadly, many scientists prove to 
be awkward, gee-whiz speculative philosophers (when 
they even dare to try), and many philosophers skimp on 
the math and head straight toward broad theoretical ex-
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planations without attending to the detailed, nuanced 
implications of the actual experiments. The goal of this 
book is not to bridge science and philosophy regarding 
quantum mechanics. Its goal is simply to celebrate and 
open up a few wonderful works of art. But in order to ac-
complish this goal, I’ve had to venture into scientific and 
philosophical realms. Perhaps by injecting the third ap-
proach (art) into the current fracas between science and 
the more speculative flavors of contemporary philosophy, 
some clarity or truce will be brokered between the two. 
But, probably I will just further muddy and problematize 
the waters, which would be a perfectly acceptable side-
effect of a book about making nothing.
The theory I’m proposing may well prove valuable in 
and of itself. For example, an understanding of how every 
artwork functions as a kind of apparatus could provide 
the theoretical foundations of an entire mfa program (if 
one were so inclined). But the primary goal of my theory 
is to invent useful ways of opening up and dialoguing 
with the works of art I wish to discuss. So, in explicating 
my theory, I will try to be as direct as possible in order 
to construct a vehicle that does what I need it to do. In 
so doing, I will necessarily oversimplify Whitehead’s rig-
orously exhaustive speculative cosmology. I will commit 
myself to certain quantum theories that are still being 
debated and ironed out. In all of this, I will try to be trans-
parent and straightforward, particularly when I know I’m 
marginalizing some alternate theory, or oversimplifying 
some more complex nuance.
Having established a theoretical framework in the first 
two chapters of the book, the following four chapters dis-
cuss particular works of art, and the ways they make vari-
ous kinds of nothing. My thinking about the pieces of art 
actually occurred prior to (and then concurrent with) my 
thinking about the theory, but it makes sense to reverse 
the order for this book (à la Derrida’s Of Grammatology). 
One could read the theory chapters and then stop, but 
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that would be like waxing down your surfboard and not 
going surfing. Chapter 3 primarily discusses Mechanism of 
Meaning by Arakawa and Gins, contrasting it with Rob-
ert Fludd’s famous 1617 diagram of the pre-creation void. 
Chapter 4 discusses the aleatoric animation series Stop 
Motion Studies by the artist David Crawford, comparing 
it to the (in)famous “delayed choice quantum eraser” ex-
periment. Chapter 5 focuses on two works: Joshua Cita-
rella’s Compression Artifacts project and William Pope.L’s 
Black Factory project. Finally, Chapter 6 considers the 
shelf-based, found-object ensembles of Haim Steinbach.
After spending four chapters considering these apo-
phatic art apparatuses, some broader conclusions are 
drawn. “Chapter 7: Toward an Ethics of Nothing” con-
siders why one might want to make nothing in the first 
place (the last place, or at all).
The figures in this book were draw by my seventeen-
year-old son, Jordan. These drawings are in the spirit of 
physics textbook diagrams. Since I intend to focus less on 
what these artworks look like and more on the apparatal 
entanglements and emergences they invite, these drawn 
diagrams are a way to dampen and de-prioritize the mere 
visuality of the artworks. Furthermore, some of the works 
(particularly Mechanism of Meaning and Compression Arti-
facts) themselves purposefully problematize their own 
documentation, so documenting them photographically 
here in this book as an attempt to clearly “represent” 
them would either halt their exponential chain of in-
tended problematization, or only awkwardly (at a thrice 
remove) “illustrate” this chain of intended problematiza-
tion. The drawn figures are thus meant in the spirit of 
these artworks to further (d)evolve them, injecting new 
levels of abstraction into their foregone degradations to-
ward nothingness.
Having delineated what types of failures this book 
could be, I should mention some ways I hope it will suc-
ceed. There is a kind of cosmology which believes the 
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universe is at every instance fully malleable, that indi-
vidual personal agency abounds, and that every move one 
makes matters a great deal. This optimistic cosmology is 
admittedly in short supply these days, but it can still be 
found amongst sophomore undergraduate art students 
at liberal arts universities. This kind of cosmology can 
lead to windmill-tilting, wheel-reinventing, bad art that 
claims to be mattering more than it actually matters. Yes, 
everything matters, but some things matter so little to 
so few so as to more or less not matter all that much to 
anyone at all. I don’t wish to defeat this hopeful cosmol-
ogy or the idealism that accompanies it. Instead, I want 
to inject this cosmology with a care and attention to past 
historical decisions (human and non-human) that have 
also come to actually matter. There is another kind of 
cosmology that believes in a universe of bare, utilitarian, 
pre-determined efficacy. Such a cosmology can lead (and 
has led) to an array of art so desperate it is largely indis-
tinguishable from direct political action. I don’t wish to 
defeat this realpolitik cosmology or the earnestness that 
accompanies it, but rather to suggest the possibility that 
less direct, more speculative flavors of art apparatuses do 
really, actually matter in the world, in ways beyond mere 
allegory and analogy. 
The goal of this book is to motivate artists to make 
art that more fully and ingeniously exploits what art ap-
paratuses are actually (capable of) doing. Art apparatuses 
(a.k.a. “artworks”) are still commonly considered as ob-
jects and pieces of media, but they are more fruitfully un-
derstood as vehicles that collaborate with the universe to 
co-constitute new becomings. The apophatic art appara-
tuses considered in this book are unique case studies that 
particularly foreground this co-constituting function of 
art. By purposefully refusing to co-constitute much of 
anything, they open out onto the idiosyncratic contours 
of nothing at all.
I








My goal in this book is to consider some ways of making 
nothing. In order to do that, I will consider several pieces 
of contemporary art, each of which ingeniously makes 
one flavor or another of nothing. These artworks make 
nothing because they behave as apophatic apparatuses – 
in other words, they instigate a kind of coherent event 
that results in the production of nothing. How do they 
do this? I could simply begin by discussing each art appa-
ratus individually to discern how it functions. But before 
we dive into the artworks themselves, I want to lay some 
theoretical groundwork. In this chapter, my goal is to ar-
rive at a general understanding of what an art apparatus 
is. I will defer to the next chapter my discussion of apo-
phasis, ways of making nothing, and the different kinds 
of nothing that may be made. In this chapter we will sim-
ply concern ourselves with all art apparatuses (whether 
apophatic or otherwise).
In order to explain what I mean by art apparatuses, I 
first have to explain the way apparatuses have come to 
be understood in quantum mechanics. And in order for 
that explanation to make any sense, I have to explain 
some of the unique aspects of quantum mechanics. And 
in order for that explanation to make the sense I feel it 
needs to make, I have chosen to also consider aspects of 
the decoherence theory that has arisen within the field of 
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quantum mechanics. And in order for an explanation of 
all those quantum topics to make the sense I want them 
to make, I have chosen to begin with a brief explanation 
of the cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead. So that is 
quite a tall order for the first chapter of a book that mere-
ly intends to talk about a few pieces of contemporary 
art, but it probably needs to happen. Every piece of art 
– every painting, sculpture, installation, video, genera-
tive software, interactive online environment, ephemeral 
conceptual provocation, tactical media wearable biotech 
psychogeographic event, etc. – is an apparatus. So, when 
I talk about art apparatuses, I am simply talking about 
art; which is why it is worth spending so much time un-
derstanding apparatuses in general.
If this were a book about quantum mechanics, or even 
about the philosophy associated with it, I would prob-
ably begin with a discussion of the seminal double-slit 
experiment and work my way out and around from there. 
That would be a kind of inductive approach – begin with 
the experiment itself, measure the results, and then in-
fer what the results seem to imply. The problem is, the 
“results” of this particular experiment imply the need 
for a fundamental re-understanding of experimentation, 
measurement, results, and inductive reasoning itself. 
In my own personal chronological history, I began with 
Whitehead’s cosmology, and ran the rest of the voodoo 
down from there. But Whitehead himself began with 
(or was at least fully aware of and conversant with) the 
quantum physics of his time, and so we are not really by-
passing quantum physics by starting with Whitehead. In-
deed, Whitehead himself cautioned, “Philosophers have 
worried themselves about remote consequences, and the 
inductive formulations of science. They should confine 
attention to the rush of immediate transition.”1




Whitehead’s cosmology is more about process than 
stasis (although it is also about stasis, or at least endur-
ance), more about verbs and events than nouns and ob-
jects (although it presents the most reasonable expla-
nation of objects I have ever encountered), more about 
speculation and adventure than ontological categoriza-
tion and mathematical proof (although Whitehead was 
an extraordinary mathematician and, to me, one of the 
most straightforward and readable philosophers of the 
twentieth century). He was primarily concerned with the 
emergence of the new and how it happens.
Whitehead’s cosmology has been directly (and pains-
takingly) correlated with quantum mechanics,2 but it 
doesn’t merely reduce to a philosophical quantum me-
chanics. Whitehead speculates about the behavior of the 
entire universe from an arguably quantum perspective. 
Whitehead’s cosmology, along with discoveries and in-
sights from the (post-Whitehead) field of quantum deco-
herence will help us bridge the gap (which is not really a 
gap at all) between delicately prepared and isolated indi-
vidual electrons and photons, and more complex entities 
like rocks, plants, dogs, humans, and planets. This bridge 
will be crucial to my discussion of art apparatuses, since 
none of the art apparatuses I discuss involve isolated, sin-
gle electrons. If I intend to claim (and I do) that art ap-
paratuses “really” (and not just metaphorically) behave 
in some way similar to scientific apparatuses which have 
been constructed to measure quantum behavior, then I 
need to explain the relationship between single, isolated 
electrons in a laboratory, and rocks just lying outside in 
a field on the ground. Whitehead’s idea of “negative pre-
hension” and his overall theory of concrescence, coupled 
2 For example: Michael Epperson, Quantum Mechanics and the Philoso-
phy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2004), and Timothy E. Eastman and Hank Keeton, eds., Physics and 
Whitehead: Quantum, Process, and Experience (Albany: suny Press, 
2004).
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with the theory of quantum decoherence, provides such 
an explanation.
We will begin with a general explanation of (my idi-
osyncratic version of) Whitehead’s process philosophy. 
This will lead into a consideration of the dual nature of 
becoming: 1. the historical contingency to which it is al-
ways beholden; and 2. the ongoing, decision-mattering 
aspects of process which bring the new into the world. 
We will then consider the concept of quantum decoher-
ence, and the behavior of “large” (better understood as 
“complex” or “well-decided”) objects. Finally, before mov-
ing on to apparatuses proper, we will revisit the idea of 
what “really real” means, what “merely metaphorical” 
means, and the ways in which prior decisions (least of all 
human decisions) must be allowed to “actually” matter.
We will next revisit quantum undecidability and 
“measurement” before (finally) proceeding to appara-
tuses proper! We will consider the two most famous 
quantum apparatuses (the original “double slit” and its 
“which-path” counterpart). We will then proceed to the 
relevant similarities between quantum-behavior-meas-
uring scientific apparatuses and what I am calling art ap-
paratuses. At that point, we will briefly distinguish our 
use of the term “apparatus” (as derived from quantum 
mechanics) from other more media-theoretical uses of 
the term (in film theory, and by Althusser, Flusser, and 
Ulmer, respectively). This will be followed by a more de-
tailed consideration of art apparatuses. The chapter will 
end with a consideration of epochs and futures.
My Condensed and Slightly Modified 
Whitehead-Derived Cosmology
Whitehead wrote several books explaining his cosmology 
in detail, the most rigorous of which is Process and Reality. 
My own Whitehead-derived cosmology is supplement-
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ed by Gilles Deleuze, (early) Henri Bergson, and Marcel 
Proust. Whitehead’s own cosmology is much more com-
plex than what I am presenting here, but I only need to 
explain my version of it as will be eventually relevant to 
my treatment of quantum mechanics and art apparatus-
es. Any omissions, simplifications, purposefully idiosyn-
cratic modifications, and outright misreadings of White-
head are solely my own doing.
Instead of starting with a universe full of objects 
(nouns) with associated properties (adjectives) that oc-
cupy space and time (a ground or a stage) and occasion-
ally act upon each other (verbs), Whitehead begins with 
the actions and events (verbs) and deduces everything 
else from there (or, more properly, from “then”). White-
head doesn’t concern himself terribly with the question 
of origins (which came first, the event or the result of the 
event?). Since the main way the universe proceeds is by 
a perpetual and ongoing series of becomings, Whitehead 
just begins in the middle of this perpetual and ongoing 
series of becomings and unpacks one of these becomings. 
The becoming event doesn’t happen in a void. It is not 
ahistorical. Indeed, the becoming event (which white-
head calls an “actual entity” or “actual occasion”) is pre-
ceded by a number of things. The actual entity/occasion 
is not preceded by “time” (which itself winds up being 
a byproduct of these irreversible becomings), nor is it 
preceded by space (which is merely the result of the re-
lationships formed and maintained by these becomings), 
nor is it preceded by “objects” per se (which are really just 
themselves the result of all of these becomings). Each ac-
tual entity/occasion is preceded by other actual entities 
(other prior becoming events like itself), and by “eternal 
objects,” which Steven Shaviro describes as the adverbs 
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of Whitehead’s scheme (“They are adverbial, rather than 
substantive”3).
My own cosmology modifies and supplements White-
head’s “eternal objects,” because I find them problemat-
ic. Whitehead means them to be like qualia or potentia 
which always influence (ingress into) actual entities/
occasions, but which are themselves indifferent to and 
uninfluenced by these actual occasions. Because eter-
nal objects always desire to increasingly complexify the 
universe via their ingressions, this is one of the ways in 
which novelty enters the world. Whitehead’s concept of 
eternal objects supplies his cosmology with two requi-
sites: 1. the concept of fundamental potentia; and 2. an 
explanation for why the world always strives toward new-
ness. I want to keep both of these requisites, but I want to 
modify “eternal objects” so that they are only responsible 
for the second requisite. To handle the first requisite, I 
supplement Whitehead’s cosmology with the concept of 
the virtual from (mostly) Gilles Deleuze. 
Whitehead’s cosmology contains something called the 
“extensive continuum,” which he describes as, “one rela-
tional complex in which all potential objectifications find 
their niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, 
and future.”4 He calls it “the potentiality for division.”5 
Although Whitehead’s extensive continuum is somewhat 
analogous to Deleuze’s virtual, I find it an awkward anal-
ogy without the attendant functioning of Whitehead’s 
eternal objects. So rather than awkwardly attempt to map 
Whitehead’s “extensive continuum” directly to Deleuze’s 
“virtual,” I will take the bolder step of altogether replac-
ing Whitehead’s eternal objects with Deleuze’s virtual. If 
you like, you might say that Deleuze’s virtual combines 
3 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aes-
thetics (Cambridge: mit Press), 38.




elements of both the extensive continuum and the eter-
nal objects. Like Whitehead’s eternal objects, Deleuze’s 
virtual may still be thought to ingress into actual occa-
sions, but (unlike eternal objects) Deleuze’s virtual is also 
subsequently colored and influenced by all prior actual 
occasions. I modify the nature of Whitehead’s eternal ob-
jects here once and for all in order to introduce Deleuze’s 
virtual on its own terms into (my version of) Whitehead’s 
cosmology, without having to perpetually shoehorn it 
into or awkwardly correlate it with Whitehead’s eternal 
objects.
Whitehead’s eternal objects never change. According 
to Whitehead, “There are no novel eternal objects […]. 
The eternal objects are the same for all actual entities.”6 
They are like generic qualities without particular in-
stances. They perpetually exist, awaiting particular in-
stantiations in the actual world. They change the actual 
world, not by ever changing or adding variety to them-
selves outside of actuality, but by the different ways in 
which they ingress into the actual world. In any theory in-
volving emergence, there is always the nagging problem 
of how emergence itself emerges. The fact that there is 
a universe in which emergence and novelty occur at all 
must in some way be explained (since the universal pro-
pensity toward auto-emergence cannot itself have auto-
emerged without there already having been a propensity 
toward auto-emergence in the universe). But Whitehead 
himself is less concerned with this question of origins. 
His operative question is not “Why is there always some-
thing new?” but rather “How does the new come about?” 
Eternal objects play a part in Whitehead’s cosmology, his 
system of how novelty enters the universe. Where or how 
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Unlike Whitehead’s eternal objects, Deleuze’s virtual 
does change. The virtual is like an unactualized cloud of 
potentia, conditioned by and contingent upon the ongo-
ing history of the actual world, awaiting ingression into 
the present actual world. Deleuze’s virtual is a two-way 
street. It both receives from and feeds into the actual 
historical world. In this sense, Deleuze more successfully 
displaces the nagging question of origins. The present 
virtual is conditioned by the past actual, which itself was 
conditioned by a prior virtual, which was in turn condi-
tioned by a prior actual, backwards toward the dawn of 
time. Throughout this book, I will substitute Deleuze’s 
virtual for Whitehead’s eternal objects.
In addition to all the prior actual entities that have 
occurred historically, the virtual participates in every 
immediate actual occurrence (every becoming). The vir-
tual is related to what the medieval scholastic scholars 
translated into Latin from Aristotle as “potentia.” Proust 
famously describes the virtual as “real without being 
actual, ideal without being abstract.”7 Not incidentally, 
Whitehead describes “the future” similarly: “The future 
is merely real, without being actual; whereas the past is a 
nexus of actualities.”8 The virtual is not simply anything 
that could ever possibly happen at any time in any place. 
It is itself contingent on all prior actual entities (becom-
ings) up to that point. The virtual is not determined, or 
even pre-formed. It is not like a number of alternate fu-
tures all lined up and waiting to be selected. The virtual 
is more like a cloud of facts that could connect in any 
number of ways but which have not yet connected in 
any ways, and may never connect. The total “real” is thus 
comprised of both the virtual and the actual. “Actually 
7 Marcel Proust, Time Regained, trans. Stephen Hudson (1931; Paris: 
Feedbooks, 2014), 142, http://www.feedbooks.com/book/1453/time-
regained.
8 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 214.
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real” means historically actualized, having come to pass. 
Every new historical actualization generates new poten-
tia for the virtual real, which may then (or may never) be 
subsequently actualized. The virtual is thus never “actu-
ally real” (until it has been actualized, at which point it 
stops being virtual and starts being actual), but the vir-
tual is nonetheless always “real.”
It is not such a stretch to swap Deleuze’s virtual for 
Whitehead’s eternal entities. Whitehead himself ex-
plains:
The definite ingression [of an eternal entity] into a par-
ticular actual entity is not to be conceived as the sheer 
evocation of that eternal object from “not-being” into 
“being;” it is the evocation of determination out of in-
determination. Potentiality becomes reality […]. If the 
term “eternal objects” is disliked, the term “potentials” 
would be suitable.9 
Whitehead’s term “potentials” is not so far from Deleuze’s 
term “virtual,” in the sense that both are “real,” just not 
“actual.” There is, however, the important distinction 
that, whereas Deleuze’s virtual both receives from and 
feeds back into the actual, Whitehead’s potentials are a 
one-way street, always feeding into but never receiving 
from the actual. 
Having injected Deleuze’s virtual into Whitehead’s 
scheme, I will continue to explain the scheme. All prior 
actual entities/occasions color but don’t absolutely de-
termine the present actual entity/occasion. The present 
actual entity decides the way in which it will go based on 
which prior actual entities it positively prehends, which 
it negatively prehends, which aspects of the virtual it 
positively prehends, and which it negatively prehends. 
From this perspective, we are thinking of the actual occa-
9 Ibid., 149.
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sion/entity as a kind of deciding subject-in-the-making, 
where its decisions will constitute the subject that it be-
comes. As it decides and prehends, all relevant prior ac-
tual entities and all relevant virtual potentia enter into 
that present tense actual entity, and it emerges as a kind 
of decided historical entity which then will have a subse-
quent effect on other actual entities to which it is ante-
cedent. These “prehensions” (from the perspective of the 
event as subject) and “ingressions” (from the perspective 
of the rest of the universe as object) all constitute the act 
of “concrescence” (from both subject and object perspec-
tives). Whereas Whitehead reserves the term “ingression” 
for eternal objects only, I will simply use “ingression” as 
the inverse of “prehension.” In my use of the term, the 
virtual may ingress into a present actual entity, and other 
prior actual entities may also ingress into a present actu-
al entity. The act of concrescence is the immediate event 
of the actual entity that results in its new availability to 
be prehended by subsequent actual entities in their own 
immediate processes. Or, to get inordinately ontological 
about it, the act of concrescence “is” itself the actual en-
tity/occasion.
Additionally, Whitehead’s cosmology includes the 
concept of “propositions,” which are like lures to feel-
ing and becoming. A proposition exerts a kind of affec-
tive, aesthetic pull on the actual entity. The proposition’s 
most prized characteristic is not that it is true, but that it 
is interesting. (Indeed, according to Whitehead, “The im-
portance of truth is, that it adds to interest.”10) From this 
perspective, a proposition is less like a “thing” and more 
like a force. To further modify Whitehead’s cosmology, 
I am going to bracket his use of the term “proposition,” 
and set it aside for later to describe a particular function 




the world, its very existence becomes a kind of proposi-
tion-generator, a lure for future becomings.
If all of these descriptions seem maddeningly vague, 
it is in part because our language cannot even begin to 
speak without first presuming a pre-existent subject act-
ing on a pre-existent object. What is required is not mere-
ly the linguistic substitution of verbs for nouns, but the 
rethinking of our fundamental cosmology. Whitehead 
himself cautions that his cosmology is bound to seems 
paradoxical and nonsensical 
if you will persist in thinking of the actual world as a 
collection of passive actual substances with their pri-
vate characters or qualities […]. So long as this concep-
tion is retained, the difficulty is not relieved by calling 
each actual substance an event, or a pattern, or an oc-
casion.11 
And so, we must not merely re-phrase the world, we must 
re-think the world according to process philosophy.
Whitehead’s actual entity/occasion is both subject 
and object, emerging as a “superject.” It is not totally free 
to determine its own becoming (since it must necessarily 
respect the prior decisions of other actual entities that 
have preceded it), but neither is it totally bound and de-
termined to become a certain way. It is able to enact a 
kind of real-time decision in terms of the way it becomes; 
and in so doing, it exercises its own agency and causes 
the new to enter into the world. The becoming of an ac-
tual entity/occasion is its concrescence. Whitehead suc-
cinctly sums up the dual subject/object nature of the 
concrescence of each actual entity: 
11 Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 26.
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Every condition to which the process of becoming 
conforms in any particular instance has its reason ei-
ther in the character of some [other] actual entity in 
the actual world of that concrescence, or in the charac-
ter of the subject which is in process of concrescence.12
In Whitehead’s scheme, all prior actual entities through-
out the entire universe are potentially relevant to the 
decision of every immediate actual entity. Most of these 
prior actual entities are “negatively prehended”: they are 
simply ignored as not mattering and thus do not ingress 
into the current actual entity. Nevertheless, according 
to Whitehead, “If we allow for degrees of relevance, and 
for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual 
entity is present in every other actual entity.”13 In being 
negatively prehended, these prior actual entities don’t 
disappear from the universe. They just remain and await 
future ingression (or negative prehension) by any subse-
quent actual entities. The only actual entities that do not 
play a part (via either ingression or negative prehension) 
are concurrent actual entities, since they are happening 
at the same time, and have thus not yet made their deci-
sion to become anew, in which case they cannot yet have 
emerged to become relevant (or irrelevant) to any other 
actual entities concurrently becoming with them. They 
can’t yet matter (or even not matter). Also, technically, 
future actual entities are irrelevant to current actual en-
tities; but since virtual potentia are arguably relevant to 
any future actual entities that have not yet emerged, fu-
ture actual entities (although non-existent) are implicitly 
relevant to present tense actual entities via the potentia 
of the virtual.
The becoming of an actual entity does not always re-
sult in radical novelty. As a matter of fact, most becom-




ings do not lead to radical novelty. Most actual entities 
choose to negatively prehend the novel options provided 
them by a universe of prior actual entities coming into 
contact with virtual potentia. In other words, most actual 
entities choose merely to prehend and thus replicate the 
bare facts of the relevant actual entities that preceded 
them, without adding much novelty to their own con-
crescences. But to choose to duplicate the past without 
adding relevant novelty is still an active decision.
Before continuing, a couple of obvious questions natu-
rally arise. Frist, what on earth are actual entities, actu-
ally? Give me an example? Actual entities are also known 
as actual occasions, and to me, they make most sense 
when thought of as occasions. An actual entity/occasion 
is a tiny decision. An aggregate number of related actual 
occasions may accrete over time to form an “enduring ob-
ject.” Electrons, molecules, rocks, animals, humans, and 
planets are all enduring objects (more or less).
Whitehead considers electrons and humans in this 
same ontological category, namely that of “[enduring] or-
ganisms [with a life-history] which have attained to uni-
ty of experience.”14 He explains, “A nexus of many actu-
alities [actual occasions] can be treated as though it were 
one actuality. This is what we habitually do in the case 
of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of rock, or 
of a human body.”15 And again, “A historic route of actual 
occasions, each with its presented duration, constitutes a 
physical object.”16
Regarding humans, Whitehead cryptically explains, 
“Each time [a human] pronounces, ‘I am, I exist,’ the ac-
tual occasion, which is the ego, is different; and the ‘he’ 
which is common to the two egos is an eternal object or, 
14 Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, 28.
15 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 287.
16 Ibid., 321.
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alternatively, the nexus of successive occasions.”17 Since I 
have chosen to remove eternal objects from my adapta-
tion of Whitehead, we are left with his alternative expla-
nation that a persistent human ego (whatever an “ego” 
even actually is) is a nexus of successive actual occasions. 
Similarly, regarding very large rocks, Whitehead less 
cryptically explains, “The Castle Rock at Edinburgh ex-
ists from moment to moment, and from century to cen-
tury, by reason of the decision effected by its own historic 
route of antecedent occasions.”18 In other words, a rock is 
a series of historically related and self-similar actual oc-
casions that have accreted over time.
Regarding molecules, Whitehead says:
A molecule […] is not an actual occasion; it must there-
fore be some kind of nexus of actual occasions. In this 
sense it is an event, but not an actual occasion. The 
fundamental meaning of the notion of “change” is 
“the difference between actual occasions comprised in 
some determinate event.”19 
And again: 
A molecule is a historic route of actual occasions, and 
such a route is an “event.” Now the motion of the mol-
ecule is nothing else than the difference between the 
successive occasions of its life-history in respect to 
the extensive quanta from which they arise; and the 
changes in the molecule are the consequential differ-







So, over the aggregate life-history of an enduring object, 
the difference between one of its discrete actual occa-
sions and another of its discrete actual occasions con-
stitutes what we would call “change” in that enduring 
object. Actual occasions aggregate to form what we rec-
ognize as enduring objects, but no single actual occasion 
is itself an enduring object.
Regarding electrons, Whitehead says that “each elec-
tron is a society of electronic [actual] occasions, and each 
proton is a society of protonic [actual] occasions.”21 In 
other words, although there exist protonic and electronic 
actual occasions, electrons and protons themselves are 
not actual occasions. Whitehead comes closest to giving 
a specific example of an actual occasion in the following 
passage: “This epoch is characterized […] by yet more ul-
timate actual entities which can be dimly discerned in 
the quanta of energy.”22 So, discrete quanta of energy, the 
charge differences between an electron’s states, “dimly” 
reveal actual entities/occasions, but these quanta of en-
ergy are still not themselves actual entities/occasions.
So, what might an actual occasion actually be? When 
an isolated photon in a double slit apparatus commits to 
manifesting a particular observable value, that moment 
of commitment seems (to me) to be an actual occasion. 
Or so I infer. Whitehead himself never explicitly states 
this. He avoids so explicitly correlating his philosophy to 
quantum mechanics. Indeed, although Whitehead tells 
us what kinds of objects aggregated actual occasions be-
come over time, and although he explains in detail the 
becoming process of actual occasions, he never gives us 
an explicit example of an actual occasion. This is be-
cause actual entities/occasions are not really “nouns” 
or “things” as we understand “things.” Over time, ac-
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we humans “symbolically” (Whitehead’s term) interpret 
as things, but actual occasions themselves are not these 
things. That the fundamental building-blocks of the uni-
verse would not be “blocks” or “stuff” at all, but rather 
moments of aesthetic decision – this is the radical as-
sertion of process philosophy. According to Whitehead, 
“’Actual entities’ – also termed ‘actual occasions’ – are 
the final real things of which the world is made up. There 
is no going behind actual entities to find anything more 
real.”23 Personally, I find it thrilling (and terrifying) that 
the fundamental unit of Whitehead’s entire cosmology 
(and, if he is to be believed, our entire universe) is noth-
ing one can ever explicitly point to and say, “See there? 
That’s it.”
So, an isolated electron in a laboratory experiment is 
not an actual entity/occasion, and a rock in a field is not 
an actual entity/occasion. Instead, electrons and rocks 
are enduring objects, societies of actual historical occa-
sions whose unity is due to the persistent relatedness of 
their individual occasions. The Great Pyramid of Giza is 
one such enduring object. Each of its actual occasions 
have decided, moment-by-moment, time-after-time, to 
(continue to) be, more or less (a bit of sand gained here, a 
bit of brick lost there), a big giant pyramid.
Why do we humans perceive a world full of persistent 
enduring objects rather than a world full of fleeting mo-
mentary actual occasions? Truth be told, some neurodi-
verse humans don’t perceive a world full of persistent 
enduring objects. They perceive the world altogether dif-
ferently. But for me at least, it is easier to pick up a ham-
mer and use it to hammer a nail if I read the hammer 
and nail as discrete objects rather than as aggregate so-
cieties of momentary occasions. But quantum mechan-
ics problematizes our anthropocentric, classical/Newto-




the world. As Whitehead observes, “Mankind made an 
unfortunate generalization from its experience of endur-
ing objects. Recently physical science has abandoned this 
notion.”24 And elsewhere, “We find ourselves in a buzz-
ing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, 
under some disguise or other, orthodox philosophy can 
only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an 
illusory experience.”25
Another obvious question is, how on earth can an oc-
casion “decide” anything? This question arises from the 
inherent subject/object divide built into our language, 
and from a kind of anthropocentrism that associates “de-
cision” with “human decision.” But according to quan-
tum mechanics, a single isolated electron, when “invited” 
by a particular apparatus (double-slit, pre-which-path) 
to “commit to” a definite position, is left largely to its 
own devices to “decide” where it might land. Granted, 
it is not totally free to land anywhere. It is (somehow) 
constrained by the quantum waveform equation. But 
within the range of the predictable waveform pattern of 
position probabilities, each individual electron may land 
anywhere it chooses. In other words, once the predictive 
waveform pattern has done its generalized predicting, 
there is no further predicting exactly where that exact 
particle position might be.
So “decide” turns out to be a fairly decent word to 
describe such human-undecidable behavior. Whereas 
Newtonian (classical) mechanics claimed that the exact 
measurement of an object’s position could be determined 
if only we had enough input data, quantum mechanics 
(or at least the most convincing interpretations of it) 
claims that we can have all the data available in the uni-
verse about an isolated particle’s observable “properties” 
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we are not able to predict beforehand the precise value 
of those properties. This is because the “properties” do 
not yet exist until the particle (having been insistently 
invited by the measuring apparatus to do so) “decides” 
what those properties are.
Another obvious question is, how exactly does a “pre-
hension” function? Whitehead explains, “I have adopted 
the term ‘prehension,’ to express the activity whereby an 
actual entity affects its own concretion of other things.”26 
According to Whitehead’s cosmology, there are two kinds 
of prehensions: conceptual prehensions and physical pre-
hensions. Physical prehensions happen when a present-
tense actual occasion simply incorporates into itself the 
bare, factual data that are the other prior actual occa-
sions relevant to it. Conceptual prehensions involve nov-
elty and virtual potentia. Conceptual prehensions imag-
ine how things may have been otherwise. They affect the 
quality, the affective ways in which physical prehensions 
occur. They involve what whitehead calls “mentality,” 
but this is by no means an exclusively human mental-
ity related to conscious human thought, any more than 
Whitehead’s term “decision” is an exclusively human ac-
tion related to conscious human will. 
Whitehead explains, “Here I am using the term ‘mind’ 
to mean the complex of mental operations involved in 
the constitution of an actual entity. Mental operations do 
not necessarily involve consciousness.”27 He elaborates: 
A single [actual] occasion is alive when the subjective 
aim which determines its process of concrescence has 
introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be found 
in the inherited data of its primary phase. The novelty 





“responsive” adjustment of subjective forms. It alters 
the “values,” in the artist’s sense of that term.28 
And finally: 
Each actuality [actual occasion] is essentially bipolar, 
physical and mental, and the physical inheritance is 
essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction 
partly conformed to it, and partly introductory of a 
relevant novel contrast, but always introducing em-
phasis, valuation, and purpose. The integration of the 
physical and mental side into a unity of experience is 
a self-formation which is a process of concrescence.29
As I interpret these passages, actual occasions inject a 
kind of aesthetic choice (a desire, a valuation of options, 
a preferential opinion) into their own self-becomings; 
and in so doing, they add novelty to the world. Novelty is 
injected not by the lockstep repetition of prior data, but 
by the aesthetic arrangement of prior data into new con-
stellations. These new aesthetic arrangements emerge as 
their own new data, to be further “remixed” (my term, 
not Whitehead’s) by subsequent actual occasions. Novel-
ty enters the world not by means of the noun, or even by 
means of the verb, but by means of the adverb, the how, 
the way-in-which. Or, as Brian Massumi concisely asserts, 
“To explain away the qualitative factors of experience is 
to explain away potential.”30
Whitehead, more rigorous and specific than I, de-
scribes his own philosophy best in the following passages 
[my comments in brackets]:
28 Ibid., 104.
29 Ibid., 108.
30 Brian Massumi, “Virtual Ecology and the Question of Value,” in 
General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm, ed. Erich Hörl (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017), 350.
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Regarding starting with becomings (verbs) rather than 
objects (nouns), he states: 
The philosophies of substance [Newtonian-based 
philosophies] presuppose a subject which then en-
counters a datum, and then reacts to the datum. The 
philosophy of organism [Whitehead’s philosophy] pre-
supposes a datum which is met with feelings, and pro-
gressively attains the unity of a subject.31
Regarding the defining role that process plays in reality: 
“Nothing is finally understood until its reference to pro-
cess has been made evident.”32 And again, “Existence’ (in 
any of its senses) cannot be abstracted from ‘process’.”33
Regarding the dual role that prior historical decisions 
(permanence) and immediate novel decisions (flux) play 
in reality: 
In the inescapable flux, there is something that abides; 
in the overwhelming permanence, there is an element 
that escapes into flux.34 
The creativity transcends the world already actual, 
and yet remains conditioned by that actual world in 
its new impersonation.35 
Order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness 
of order does not degenerate into mere repetition; and 
so that the novelty is always reflected upon a back-
ground of system.36 
31 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 155.
32 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free 
Press, 1968), 46.
33 Ibid., 96.





Finally, there are two ultimate types of existence im-
plicated in the creative process, the eternal forms with 
their dual existence in potential appetition and in re-
alized fact, and realized fact with its dual ways of exis-
tence as the past in the present and as the immediacy 
of the present. Also, the immediacy of the present har-
bours an appetition towards the unrealized future.37 
Freedom, givenness, potentiality, are notions which 
presuppose each other and limit each other.38
Whitehead’s cosmology does indeed provide a kind of 
exciting freedom (a sense of adventure) from an overly 
deterministic Newtonian universe, but the freedoms 
Whitehead posits are always contingent upon the prior 
decisions that the rest of the universe has made, deci-
sions which were themselves also contingent upon prior 
decisions, etc. The entire universe simply takes its own 
self into account from an infinite number of different 
perspectives, moment by moment by moment.
To think of it from a particularly human perspective 
(since humans are themselves ever-becoming enduring 
objects in the universe), If an immediate decision of mine 
is to become actually real, if it is to actually matter in the 
universe, then it must have some bearing on subsequent 
decisions made by subsequent actual entities in the uni-
verse. My immediate decision may be ignored (negatively 
prehended) or factored into (prehended by) a future ac-
tual occasion in some remote way as to be practically in-
consequential, but it must be an actual part of the overall 
environment of the universe, an environment which is 
itself collaboratively and perpetually being made by the 
immediate decisions of all the actual entities in the uni-
verse. Just as my immediate decision must be given care 
37 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 84–85.
38 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 133.
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by those subsequent to me (however remotely, obliquely, 
or even negatively), I too must necessarily give care to all 
of the immediate decisions of others (and myself) made 
prior to me (however remotely, obliquely, or even nega-
tively). According to Whitehead’s cosmology, that is the 
way the universe proceeds.
Fortunately, “giving care” to all the prior immediate 
decisions in the universe doesn’t happen human-con-
sciously. That would be an impossible and exhausting 
ethical task. For “me” as a human (a “human” being a 
large, clumped, well-decided, ongoing society of actual 
occasions), most of the immediate decisions “I” enact in 
micro-second actual occasions never reach the level of 
my consciousness.
Contingency upon History
The contingency of immediate actual entities upon past 
actual entities cannot be overemphasized. Arguably, this 
contingency aspect of Whitehead’s process philosophy is 
the least sexy, least novel, least experimental, least lib-
erating aspect of the concrescence event. It seems like 
some drab and deterministic holdover from the world 
of Newtonian cause-and-effect law. Experimenting with 
isolated particles in well-prepared and shielded apparatal 
environments measuring brave new quantum superpo-
sition behaviors, one is tempted to believe that all elec-
trons inherently want to remain in undecided states of 
quantum superposition, and if we would just stop impos-
ing our human will on them by forcing them through our 
scientific apparatus obstacle courses, a much more mal-
leable universe would emerge. Unfortunately (and fortu-
nately), this is simply not the case.
The majority of rocks that have become rocks didn’t 
become rocks solely because of human observation, 
measurement, or interference. They themselves decided 
to become rocks (in their own rocky and particulate way 
47
regarding apparatuses
of “deciding”). Most of the molecules in a rock are not 
perpetually desiring to be free of their aggregated rock 
state. Indeed, moment by moment, actual occasion by 
actual occasion, most rock molecules choose to ignore 
the opportunity to be elsewhere and instead choose to 
remain in their molecular societies within their larger 
rocky societies. The size, scale, and singular position of 
a rock are a byproduct of prior decisions made by the 
society of occasions that are the rock, in collaboration 
with the rest of the (observing, semi-ingressing, mostly 
negatively prehended) universe. The successive actual oc-
casions in any society known as rock choose to remain 
relevant to each one another, and subsequently grow, 
coalesce, cool, and compress – all depending on the past 
activities of the rock and its collaborations with the rest 
of the universe via the process of moment-by-moment 
concrescence. I may do what I want with a rock (throw it, 
break it up, use it to build a monument), but I may not re-
turn it to its elementary particles simply by replacing my 
old Newtonian cosmology with a more accurate quantum 
cosmology. The rock has its own history (one which does 
happen to include me, however obliquely, at least for the 
past few decades since I’ve had my own history in our 
shared universe), and the universe impels “me” to attend 
to the rock’s history.
Even in the scientific laboratory, most experiments 
which mean to “measure” quantum behavior must care-
fully prepare their own initial states. For example, in cer-
tain experiments, pairs of photons are initially entangled 
via spontaneous parametric down conversion so that 
their polarizations become correlated. This is achieved 
by sending a laser beam (itself already a kind of prepared 
photon entanglement) through a beta-barium borate 
crystal. Thus, in most cases, for quantum behavior to be 
experimentally “observed,” a kind of ideally “measurable,” 
neutral, non-contingent, “coherent” initial state must be 
created. Particles must be disentangled from any prior, 
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relevant, contingent histories they have developed with 
other entities, themselves, and the rest of the universe, 
in order to afford them the kind of free agency that quan-
tum-behavior-measuring apparatuses intend to measure. 
Once that ideal initial state is achieved, all sorts of sur-
prising and novel “quantum” behaviors become measur-
able. By “measurable,” I simply mean that the particles 
and the measuring apparatus prehend and are prehended 
by one another, and this mutual prehension itself consti-
tutes the act of “measurement.” Once this new prehen-
sion occurs, in order for any of those same particles to be 
re-measured (with any “meaningful” “measurement” out-
come), they must again be re-prepared in a newly quaran-
tined “initial state.”
These experimental initial states are rarely found 
readymade, unshielded, unentangled, and cohered in the 
universe proper. They must be carefully prepared. If this 
preparation were not so vital and precarious to “observ-
able” quantum behavior, we would have already easily 
developed a powerfully functional quantum computer. 
Since these initial states must themselves be prepared, 
they are not technically “initial.” They are initial to the 
overall phenomenal context of the measuring apparatus, 
but beyond that context, they themselves are also con-
tingent to the prior decisions of the other actual enti-
ties in the universe. If this were not so, their quarantined 
self-cohesion would not have to be purposefully prepared 
from a prior state of entanglement with the rest of the 
universe.
Once these initial experimental states have been pre-
pared, Karen Barad may indeed claim that “relata do 
not preexist relations; rather relata-within-phenomena 
emerge through specific intra-actions.”39 But, prior to a 
prepared experimental state, it may not be claimed that 
39 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 140.
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relations precede relata, else there would be no need 
for the preparation of a coherent “initial” experimental 
state. All the universe would be a ready-made laboratory 
of pure potentia and pure relations (prepositions, if you 
will) waiting to manifest themselves in subsequent relata 
(nouns). Instead, according to Whitehead, all of the prior 
actual entities/occasions and decisions in the universe 
come to bear and are relevant upon each new, immedi-
ate act of concrescence. Prior actual entities do not fully 
determine each new act of concrescence, but neither are 
they irrelevant to each new act of concrescence. If prior 
actual entities were irrelevant, if their historically con-
cresced relations (their chosen societies) had no bearing 
or precedence on new, immediate decisions being made 
by other actual entities/occasions, then electrons out in 
a field of rocks would be completely free, always and per-
petually, to determine whether or not they manifested 
themselves as having momentum or position; we would 
live in a world of perpetually undecided and superim-
posed waves/particles; and each present decision would 
be eternally reversible – fully malleable and thus fully 
inconsequential.
Whether or not, at the dawn of time, the universe it-
self began with relations (prepositions) or relata (nouns) 
is a chicken or egg question of cosmological origins 
which we will briefly address (and fail to answer) later 
in this chapter. But whichever came first cosmically and 
historically, the two have been cycling into one another 
ever since: prior relata (past actual entities) ingressing 
into new relations (immediate actual entities/occasions) 
which themselves then emerge as new relata (recently ac-
creted actual entities and communities of entities) which 
are then further ingressed into new relations (the next 
wave of immediate actual entities/occasions), etc. Ac-
cording to Whitehead, 
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It must be remembered that just as the relations mod-
ify the natures of the relata, so the relata modify the 
nature of the relation. The relationship is not a univer-
sal. It is a concrete fact with the same concreteness as 
the relata.40 
Martin Savransky further elucidates: 
It’s not just, then, that the world is relational, that re-
lationality is original whereas societies are derivative 
[…]. Rather, to resist the danger of relational reduc-
tionism, I suggest we must come to terms with a world 
made, dynamically, of the shifting modes of mattering 
of societies-and-relations all the way down, all the way 
back. Paying close attention to those modes or man-
ners, and to their dynamic natures, becomes, thus, the 
task of an ethics concerned […] with the fragile and dy-
namic problem of co-existence of the many modes of 
mattering that compose the world in its becoming.41
For a contemporary artist, it is standard operating pro-
cedure to take into account the prior history of her ma-
terials, and to purposefully prepare the initial states of 
her materials (or to purposefully leave their initial states 
unprepared, depending on the conceptual goals of the 
artwork). Materials have their own agency, as the saying 
goes. I may not simply impose my human will on them 
at will. I may cut against the grain of wood if I wish, but 
my blade will get some push-back from the wood. The 
common admonition to the contemporary artist is to “let 
matter matter.” The more nuanced Whiteheadian ver-
sion might be: “let the prior decisions of the rest of the 
40 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free 
Press, 1967), 157.
41 Martin Savransky, “Modes of Mattering: Barad, Whitehead, and So-




universe matter, and co-negotiate with these decisions, 
keeping in mind that ‘matter’ is less of a noun object and 
more of an accreted series of collaborative events.” Not 
quite as catchy, but this fine-grained awareness of mat-
ter as an ongoing series of accreting, concrescing events 
will become important as we begin thinking about art 
apparatuses. Without a care for the prior decisions of ac-
tual entities/occasions, I risk acting with a sense of faux-
agency, believing in a universe more malleable than it ac-
tually is (or malleable in ways it simply is not), and I risk a 
kind of discourtesy toward the prior historical decisions 
of actual entities.
Before proceeding to the much more exciting and 
theoretically radical aspects of the concrescence event 
(namely the immediate act of decision made during the 
actual occasion), I must here allow Whitehead a few fi-
nal, clarifying comments on historical contingency and 
its relationship to novel creation: “The process creates 
itself, but it does not create the objects which it receives 
as factors in its own nature.”42 “No event can be wholly 
and solely the cause of another event. The whole ante-
cedent world conspires to produce a new occasion.”43 “In 
the full concrete connection of things, the characters of 
the things connected enter into the character of the con-
nectivity which joins them.”44 And, relevant even to pre-
pared and quarantined individual photons, “There is no 
element in the universe capable of pure privacy.”45
Immediate Decisions That Matter
Fortunately, the act of concrescence is not wholly de-
pendent upon and totally determined by the prior histor-
42 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 179.
43 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 164.
44 Ibid., 58.
45 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 212.
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ical decisions of prior actual entities; for, as Whitehead 
explains, “’Decided’ conditions are never such as to ban-
ish freedom. They only qualify it. There is always a con-
tingency left open for immediate decision.”46
Whitehead occasionally uses the term “decision” when 
describing the freedom of actual entities to positively 
prehend and negatively prehend that which ingresses 
into them and thus creates the new. From an artistic, 
curational, and DJ/remix perspective, these types of “de-
cisions” seem most analogous to creative curatorial re-
mix choices which, when integrated in a rigorous, fine-
grained way, result in a novel output that becomes more 
than the mere sum of its sources. From this remix culture 
perspective, such prehensions and ingressions are “aes-
thetic” choices. If the terms “decision” and “aesthetic” 
seem problematically anthropocentric when applied to 
non-human entities, then Whitehead’s regular use of 
the terms “zest,” “appetition,” and “feeling” will seem 
even more problematic. But, in the same way that Niels 
Bohr inherited terms from classical Newtonian physics 
(“cause/effect,” “object,” “property,” “observable,” “parti-
cle,” “wave,” “measurement,” “outcome”) and was forced 
to re-apply them in new ways to describe radically new 
quantum behaviors, Whitehead is simply using terms 
that have historically been applied to humans and re-
applying them to describe behaviors not previously at-
tributed to non-human entities.
So, for instance, Whitehead (re-)defines “appetition” as 
“the feeling of determinate relevance to a world about to 
be.”47 He describes actual entities as having “a zest for the 
enhancement of some dominant element of feeling.”48 







scribes the act of concrescence as an event whereby “a 
feeling appropriates elements of the universe, which in 
themselves are other than the subject; and absorbs these 
elements into the real internal constitution of its subject 
by synthesizing them in the unity of an emotional pat-
tern expressive of its own subjectivity.”50
To rightly understand the role that immediate deci-
sion plays in concrescence/becoming, it is essential to 
understand that, in Whitehead’s cosmology, the universe 
and all of its actual entities are perpetually striving for 
novelty. The universe inherently wants to become new. 
Whitehead describes the entire universe as “a creative ad-
vance into novelty.”51 In order for this advance to happen, 
real difference must actually be allowed to differ. The 
“subjectivity” of the actual entity enters into play and 
makes novel decisions that are truly unforeseeable. These 
decisions result in its own self-constitution. 
In the following passage, Whitehead explains the free-
ranging subjectivity that “any one actual entity” has in 
the exercising of its own immediate prehensions: 
Any item of the universe, however preposterous as an 
abstract thought, or however remote as an actual en-
tity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, 
in the constitution of any one actual entity: it might 
have had more relevance; and it might have had less 
relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in 
the negative prehension; but in fact it has just that 
relevance whereby it finds its status in the constitu-
tion of that actual entity […]. In the constitution of an 
actual entity: whatever component is red, might have 
been green; and whatever component is loved, might 
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To rephrase this passage from the perspective of DJ/re-
mix culture, each actual entity of the universe samples 
and remixes into itself those prior aspects of the universe 
it finds most relevant.
Whitehead further elaborates on this subjective ap-
propriation-as-(self-)becoming process: “Dead datum” 
from the past is met and “universalized into a character of 
creativity by the vivifying novelty of subjective form se-
lected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality.”53 (Here 
“pure potentiality” might be interpreted to correspond 
with Deleuze’s “virtual.”) Whitehead continues, “They are 
the creation of their own creature […]. The actual entity, 
in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, 
determines its own ultimate definiteness.”54 “What was 
received as alien, has been recreated as private.”55
To proceed with the DJ/remix analogy (and in all ear-
nestness), it is as David Bowie observes, “I am the DJ / I 
am what I play.” Or, as composer and musician Ornette 
Coleman noted regarding the elements which emerge 
during improvisational free jazz performances, “None of 
these forms existed before their relation to each other.”56 
In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze speaks of “that 
precise point at which the determined maintains its es-
sential relation with the undetermined.”57 In Whitehead’s 
cosmology, that point is the creative act of concrescence. 
What emerges each time is a novel actual entity/occa-
sion, which is immediately added back the universe from 




56 Ornette Coleman, liner notes of Naked Lunch: Music from the Original 
Motion Picture Soundtrack, Milan America, 1992, quoted in Timothy 
S. Murphy and Daniel W. Smith, “What I Hear is Thinking Too: 
Deleuze and Guattari Go Pop,” ECHO: A Music-Centered Journal 3, no. 
1 (Spring 2001): 9. 
57 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 47.
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concrescence, novelty is perpetually added to the uni-
verse.
Even immediate decisions to remain more or less the 
same are never decisions to remain exactly the same. 
With every new actual entity (even one that decides to re-
main the same), the universe itself is always made new, if 
for no other reason than that it is now comprised of one 
additional actual entity that has decided to remain the 
same. Like Melville’s Bartleby, actual entities may prefer 
not to decide, but they cannot avoid deciding that they 
would prefer not to. As Marjorie Perloff observes of Ger-
trude Stein’s prose, “Repeat the same and it is no longer 
the same.”58
According to Whitehead’s cosmology, then, how to ac-
tualize the virtual is no great pressing ethical issue, be-
cause the virtual is being actualized non-stop. I can’t help 
but actualize the virtual, always already and evermore. 
The more pressing ethical question is: how to actualize 
the virtual in ways that matter (and to whom)? Some-
times the most ethical decision is simply to endure and 
remain. Yet even this seemingly “conservative” decision 
must be “progressively” made (and remade and remade) 
in an ongoing series of immediate decisions which con-
tinually make anew the same enduring society of enti-
ties (this rock, this tree, this swamp, these frogs, these 
humans, this home, this Large Hadron Collider).
Decoherence and Negative Prehension
According to quantum mechanical experimental results, 
certain properly prepared and isolated particles are de-
duced to be in a state of undecided superposition. They 
are undecided as to any specific “observable” “property” 
58 Marjorie Perloff, “‘Grammar In Use’: Wittgenstein/Gertrude Stein/ 
Marinetti,” South Central Review 13, nos. 2–3 (Summer–Autumn, 
1996): 42.
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– position and momentum being the most famous of the 
observables. In this properly prepared state, an electron, a 
photon, and sometimes even fairly large molecules have 
not yet committed to being in any particular position. 
Some people like to think they are in all possible posi-
tions simultaneously, but even that interpretation seems 
a bit too “decided.” This raises the relevant and quite fair 
question, can a particle without a particular position 
even be considered a particle? Is a noun, thing, or object 
which is not yet located any single “where” even a noun 
yet? Furthermore, in the absence of any other environ-
mental particles, to whom would it even be a noun? To 
itself?
More questions immediately arise. If these tiny parti-
cles are the fundaments of larger particles, then is this 
undecided superposition state the fundamental way in 
which larger particles behave? This must certainly not be 
the case, since all the rocks I have observed are in single, 
decided states rather than several superpositions simul-
taneously. Why? Maybe the rocks are really in multiple 
positions just like the isolated electrons, and my con-
sciousness just makes them seem like they are in a singu-
lar state to me? No, that’s hermetic solipsism, and stupid. 
(I have just dismissed the “many minds” interpretation 
of quantum behavior in a single sentence!) Perhaps we 
should return to our isolated and prepared electron and 
experiment on it a bit more. We discover that, if we con-
struct the proper apparatus to measure electrons for 
rock-like behavior, that apparatus causes(?) the electrons 
to behave more like rocks. So, given this experimental re-
sult, maybe when I look at the rocks, my “measurement/
observation” of them causes them to immediately decide 
to settle down and commit to a single position. No, that’s 
anthropocentric, human-consciousness magic, and stu-
pid. (I have just dismissed the consciousness collapse in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics in a single sentence!) 
Maybe each one of the myriad of possible rock superposi-
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tions does actually, ontologically exist in a myriad num-
ber of simultaneous, alternate, and perpetually multiply-
ing and diverging worlds, and “I” just happen to be one of 
many alternate versions of myself, the one who just hap-
pens to be residing in this particular world. No, that’s too 
mathematically convenient, and just plain stupid. (I have 
just dismissed the many worlds/universes interpretation 
of quantum mechanics in a single sentence!) Maybe there 
is no real quantum superposition state and we just think 
there is because we haven’t yet discovered some currently 
hidden variables which would explain this behavior in 
terms of more normal (classical/Newtonian) physics. No, 
because increasingly sophisticated quantum-behavior-
measuring experiments continue to indicate an increas-
ingly definitive “no.” (I have just dismissed the De Bro-
glie–Bohm hidden variables interpretation of quantum 
mechanics in a single sentence!)
So what explanations remain? Maybe there is some 
discrete, universal, built-in, limit law on this type of su-
perimposed behavior related to size, and once objects 
get above a certain specific size, they are forced to decide 
upon a singular position. No, because experiments on 
the border of microcosmic sizes and macrocosmic sizes 
(the “mesocosmic border”) show no clear-cut line above 
which superposition stops (and things commit to being 
in one place) and below which superposition continues 
to be present. (I have just dismissed the scale-induced 
collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics in a sin-
gle sentence!) Maybe these superpositions just sort of 
spontaneously decide of their own volition to collapse 
into a single position? No, because decoherence experi-
ments are able to discern particular environmental fac-
tors which increase and decrease rates of decoherence. (I 
have just dismissed the spontaneous collapse interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics in a single sentence!)
The remaining (satisfactory) explanation is known 
as decoherence theory, an explanatory theory to which I 
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subscribe. I will describe my understanding of it in terms 
of Whitehead’s cosmology, and in terms that will become 
particularly relevant to our pending consideration of art 
apparatuses. I begin with an explanation of “the meas-
urement problem” in quantum mechanics; followed by 
a general philosophical observation that is not exactly 
from Whitehead, nor is it part of decoherence theory 
proper, but it is simply my own attempt to connect the 
two via some personal observations.
In quantum mechanics, there is something called 
“the measurement problem.” The “problem” is that you 
can’t measure a quantum entity without “causing” it to 
behave a certain way. You don’t cause it to manifest a 
specific measurement outcome value (to land in a single 
specific position, for example). If you did, then scientific 
“measurement” (and, by extension, “science”) as we have 
known it since Newton would be irrelevant, since out-
comes would be completely subjective depending on the 
measuring apparatus you chose to use. Quantum behav-
ior doesn’t eradicate scientific measurement altogether, 
but it does change our fundamental understanding of 
“measurement.” If I choose one type of apparatus, I cause 
the particle on which I am experimenting to manifest 
one observable (for example, position). If choose anoth-
er type of apparatus, I cause the particle to manifest its 
complementary observable (the complementary observ-
able of position is momentum). I can even set up a sin-
gle apparatus which is able to measure the position of a 
particle with 75% certainty and its momentum with 25% 
certainty, or vice-versa, or 50/50, 60/40, etc. But if I am 
able to measure a particle’s position with 100% certainty, 
I am 0% certain of its momentum.
This uncertainty is not the result of me being igno-
rant of inherent properties that the particle already 
possesses but which I am unable to fully measure (that 
would be the old Newtonian understanding of probabil-
ity). This uncertainty is instead based on the fact that 
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the “particle” has not itself decided on its own proper-
ties until my measurement apparatus “invites” it to do 
so, however gently (as in the 50% certain position/50% 
certain momentum measuring apparatus) or insistently 
(as in the 100% certain position/0% certain momentum 
measuring apparatus). Neither is this uncertainty due to 
the clumsiness of the apparatus itself. The apparatus is 
not physically, mechanically, or thermodynamically (in 
an old Newtonian sense) disrupting the particle. My un-
certainty is not simply a technical problem of apparatus 
construction and set-up (although it is often also that). 
My uncertainty is a novel, quantum-specific, non-New-
tonian kind of “problem.” The cause of my uncertainty is 
neither solely ontological (what is the nature of the thing 
I am observing?) nor solely epistemological (what is the 
nature of the way in which I am observing?). The cause of 
my uncertainty is both ontological and epistemological 
at the same time. According to prior philosophical mod-
els of substance, identity, property, space, and time, I’m 
not supposed to have a single problem that is both onto-
logical and epistemological at the same time. So, the fact 
that my problem is truly ontico-epistemological implies 
that the prior philosophical models which classified cer-
tain topics as ontological and others as epistemological 
were based on prior, Newtonian-esque understandings of 
subject/object, cause/effect, thing/event – understand-
ings which need revisiting and revising.
Having said all that, I propose that the “measurement 
problem” arises as a “problem” at all because to “measure” 
is necessarily to break off a part out of a continuously 
flowing and ever becoming holistic unity (the universe). 
No measurement, no problem. If we could step outside of 
the universe (a model Newtonian physics inherently pre-
sumes), we would be able to observe it as a holistic system 
without having to take a cut out of it. But, since we can’t 
get outside of the universe, the best we can do is cut into 
it from where we are within it, and then make mathemat-
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ical and philosophical allowances for the fact that we are 
ourselves a part of the thing into which we are cutting. As 
science writer Jim Baggott observes, “We obviously have 
no way of observing an observer-independent reality.”59 
The best we can hope for as human quantum scientists is 
to negotiate and account for the subject–object (super-
ject) entanglements that arise within whatever particular 
chunk of the universe (i.e., the contextual phenomenon 
comprised of our apparatus, our measured particle, our 
contained system, and the surrounding universal envi-
ronment) we choose to cut out and observe.
The problem gets even more difficult because (per 
Whitehead) the universe is verb-centric rather than 
noun-centric. If the unity of the universe were noun-
based (comprised of discrete static objects), the meas-
urement problem would merely be ontological. We could 
stand on one part of the universe as we cut out and ob-
served another part of the universe. But since the unity 
of the universe is fundamentally verb-based (an ongoing, 
interconnected, holistic event/process of becoming), in 
order to carve out a “part” of it and “observe” that “part,” 
we have to enact a measurement event that itself then im-
mediately becomes a decision-making occurrence which 
immediately enters the rest of the holistic universe and 
becomes relevant to all of it, including the “part” we are 
trying to measure. You can stand on one part of a noun 
in order to observe and measure another part of the same 
noun without too much difficulty, but you cannot so eas-
ily stand on one part of an event in order to observe and 
measure the same event that you are measuring (an event 
which is, itself, your very act of measurement). 
It would almost seem that quantum-behavior-meas-
uring apparatuses would have to freeze time in order to 
59 Jim Baggott, Beyond Measure: Modern Physics, Philosophy, and the 




make accurate measurements. But this won’t do either, 
because “time” is not really a continuous, flowing, dura-
tional container which contains sequential events (that 
is the old Newtonian understanding of time). Instead, 
“time” itself is actually the byproduct, creation, result 
(and thus not merely the “container”) of irreversible de-
cision events (immediate actual entities) themselves. So, 
it is a tautology to appeal to time to resolve the meas-
urement problem, since “time” itself is the result of ir-
reversible decisions, one of which is “measurement” (by 
definition).
The point of thinking through these implications of 
a cosmology which considers the universe to be a con-
tained holistic system in process is to foreground the 
important and fundamental fact that the measurement 
problem only emerges as a “problem” when we divide the 
holistic universe into sub-systems. Noted physicist and 
key developer of decoherence theory Wojciech H. Zurek 
observes, “In the absence of systems […] the problem of 
interpretation [how to explain why the act of measure-
ment forces certain observables to emerge] seems to 
disappear. There is simply no need for “collapse” [of the 
quantum wave function and its superposition of states] 
in a Universe with no systems.”60
Physicist Maximilian Schlosshauer takes up Zurek’s 
point and elaborates, “Moreover, terms like “observation,” 
“correlation,” and “interaction” will naturally make little 
sense without a division into systems. [Physicist and “fa-
ther” of decoherence theory H. Dieter] Zeh has suggested 
that the locality of the observer defines an observation 
in the sense that any observation arises from the igno-
60 Wojciech H. Zurek, “Decoherence, Einselection, and the Quantum 
Origins of the Classical,” Reviews of Modern Physics 75, No. 3 (2003): 
718, doi:10.1103/RevModPhys.75.715. [Bracketed comments are mine.]
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rance of a part of the universe, and that this locality also 
defines the “facts” that can occur in a quantum system.”61
Schlosshauer goes on to cite mathematician N.P. 
Landsman for further clarification: “The essence of a 
“measurement,” “fact” or “event” in quantum mechan-
ics lies in the non-observation, or irrelevance, of a cer-
tain part of the system in question […]. A world without 
parts declared or forced to be irrelevant is a world with-
out facts.”62
In other words (and to reiterate): no measurement, 
no problem. Here is Schlosshauer again, this time on the 
mathematics involved in a quantum-behavior-measuring 
apparatus: “Once the measurement axioms (and thus the 
trace rule [the mathematical trick which crosses-out all 
the “negatively prehended” potentia of the rest of the 
universe]) are dropped, we are left with a global entan-
gled system-environment state that, according to the 
standard [quantum mechanical] interpretation, does not 
allow us to say anything about the physical state of the 
system or to assign a particular outcome (i.e., a definite 
value of a physical quantity) to the system.”63
Returning now to Whitehead (indeed, I already took 
the liberty of inserting his concept of negative prehen-
sion into the preceding citation), a measurement made 
by a quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus might be 
said to constitute a nexus of actual entities/occasions 
wherein apparatus, particles, and sub-system all pre-
hend one another and ingress into one another in an 
61 Maximilian Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical 
Transition (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 102. [Bracketed comments are 
mine.]
62 N.P. Landsman, “Observation and Superselection in Quantum Me-
chanics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26, no. 1 
(1995): 45–46, quoted in Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-
To-Classical Transition, 102.
63 Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition, 
333. [Bracketed comments are mine.]
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irreversible event. During this singular “measurement” 
event, all of the possible measurement outcomes (even 
the bizarre and logically contradictory ones) other than 
the actual(ized) measurement results are negatively pre-
hended (“traced over” in quantum mathematical terms), 
and thus a specific concrescence occurs. According to 
Whitehead, “The togetherness of things involves some 
doctrine of mutual immanence. In some sense or other, 
this community of the actualities of the world means 
that each happening is a factor in the nature of every 
other happening.”64
All well, good, and cosmic, but what still needs ac-
counting for is all those rocks out sitting in that field! We 
didn’t measure them with our scientific apparatuses in a 
way that helped actualize their singular, stable positions, 
so why are they sitting still? Why have they committed 
to a single, non-superpositional position? The answer 
which decoherence theory provides is that we humans 
and our scientific apparatuses are not the only things in 
the universe with magical “measuring” powers. Different 
parts of the universe take other parts of the universe into 
account perpetually. As Karen Barad profoundly and po-
etically observes, “Only part of the world can be made in-
telligible to itself at a time, because the other part of the 
world has to be the part that it makes a difference to.”65 
In this sense, the universe effectively auto-measures it-
self, part by part. “Measurement” then, becomes kind of a 
silly, human-science-specific term for this process of tak-
ing-into-account. Whitehead’s much more rigorous and 
precise words would be “prehension” (from the perspec-
tive of the immediate actual entity and what it decides to 
take into account as mattering in that moment), “nega-
tive prehension” (from the perspective of the immediate 
actual entity and what it decides to not take into account 
64 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 164.
65 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 432.
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as mattering in that moment), “ingression” (from the 
perspective of those other prior actual entities which are 
taken into the account by the immediate actual entity as 
mattering in that moment), and finally “concrescence” 
(the name of this entire “measuring” event).
According to Zurek, 
Quantum theory has simultaneously deprived the 
“conscious observer” of a monopoly on acquiring and 
storing information: Any correlation is a registration 
[…]. Moreover, even a minute interaction with the en-
vironment, practically inevitable for any macroscopic 
object, will establish such a correlation: The environ-
ment will, in effect, measure the state of the object, 
and this suffices to destroy quantum coherence.66
I am inclined to call this measuring event a “taking-into-
account,” or more precisely (and more Appalachian) – a 
“reckoning.” Not “reckoning” in the sense of a final, sum-
mative, doomsday tally, because these concrescent reck-
onings are happening every micro-second and lead into 
subsequent reckonings which lead into subsequent reck-
onings “to the crack of doom”67 (in Whitehead’s evocative 
prose). Instead, “reckoning” in the sense of being asked, 
“Would you like some of this pie?” and answering, “I reck-
on I would.” In this kind of reckoning event, I take a reck-
oning of my appetite for pie at that moment; I eyeball 
and reckon the potential tastiness of the pie; I reckon I 
don’t have too many chores left to accomplish that day; I 
reckon whether or not my waistline can handle the blow; 
I re-reckon the potential tastiness of the pie and reckon 
that I don’t care about my waistline right now; and ulti-
mately I decide that I would like to take that piece of pie 
66 Wojciech H. Zurek, “Decoherence and the Transition from Quan-
tum to Classical – Revisited,” Los Alamos Science 27 (2002): 105.
67 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 228.
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into my mouth and make it a part of me. Of course, this 
drawn out description of micro-reckonings actually oc-
curs (more or less) as one single instantaneous reckoning. 
And of course, in this particular example, I’m describing 
a human-involved measuring event which would include 
some form of human consciousness; although, the more 
tasty-looking and tasty-smelling the pie, the more this 
particular reckoning event heads toward the proto-con-
scious, visceral, and affective.
But humans are not the only ones who may reckon. To 
Whitehead, consciousness is just the apex of being, but 
most things are “decided” in a human without ever reach-
ing the level of consciousness. And in this Whiteheadian 
sense, particles, air molecules, rocks, and stomachs may 
also decide and reckon. It is curious that my reckoning 
of the pie would somehow make the pie a part of “me” 
before I ever even “physically” ate the pie. Newton would 
not be happy about this curiosity (all apple puns aside). 
But in the universe of quantum reckonings, everything 
takes everything else into account. Why was my reckon-
ing of the pie not required in order to stabilize the po-
sition of the pie? Because different parts of the pie had 
already “self-reckoned” other parts of the pie all the way 
down to the molecules in the chemical ingredients used 
to make the pie.
Philosopher Michael Epperson’s Whiteheadian inter-
pretation of Quantum Mechanics (Quantum Mechanics and 
the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead) seems to suggest 
that all of these quantum reckonings “really” do affect 
the “potentia” of every other entity in the universe (recall 
that potentia are “real” but not “actual” in a Proust–Berg-
son–Deleuze sense), but that such quantum reckonings 
don’t yet affect the “actual” real of every other entity in 
the universe. So, my reckoning of the pie has changed the 
virtual real relevant to the pie and myself. Some things 
are now able to happen in the world that were not able 
to happen prior to my reckoning of the pie; and (equally 
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as important) some things are now not able to happen in 
the world. Furthermore, some things are more likely to 
happen; some things are less likely to happen; and most 
things in the universe will remain pragmatically (almost 
totally and utterly, but never wholly) indifferent to my 
reckoning of the pie. True, my immediate reckoning of 
the pie has not yet changed my waistline, because I have 
not yet actualized (in a Newtonian, thermodynamical 
sense) the ingression of the pie into my stomach. But my 
hankering for the pie has been actualized, whether or not 
I ever proceed to eat the pie. My hankering is no longer 
virtual potential. It is now actual potential.
The fact that virtual changes do really matter, even if 
they may never come be actualized, is a challenging con-
cept from a Newtonian perspective. Prior to discovering 
and confirming quantum superimposition behavior, one 
could think of the real world as being solely comprised of 
that which is actual. The virtual was not real. There was 
no virtual. Any single outcome in the actual real world 
was bound and determined to actually happen. If you had 
enough actual real-world data, you could exactly predict 
any such single outcome, but your prediction would not 
determine the outcome. If you lacked enough actual real-
world data, you could make a range of predictions based 
on the limited data you had, but the outcome was already 
going to happen regardless of your estimated range. Your 
probabilistic (non-deterministic, non-real) range would 
not affect the outcome. But according to quantum me-
chanics, the virtual probabilities accounted for in the 
quantum wave function are no longer non-real guesses. 
They are, instead, understood as a determined range of 
possible outcomes. An outcome in the overall range is 
bound to happen, but which single outcome will actu-
ally happen in each individual instance is impossible to 
pre-determine (even with all the data in the universe), 
because the exact outcome is not decided until that in-
dividual instance. The virtual (in the form of the quan-
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tum wave function) is actualized in each actual instance 
of decision. To me, such instances of immediate decision 
are examples of Whitehead’s actual occasions/entities.
Newton underestimated the “reality” of the virtual 
because he misunderstood what “measurement” actually 
is. Measurement is cutting out one part of an ongoing, 
holistic universe event, and inviting it to return a spe-
cific measurable result. The “result” of the event is bet-
ter understood as the concrescence, outcome, or having-
become of a new actual occasion. As with all other actual 
occasions/entities in the universe, this “measurement” 
event is co-determined by its constituent participants. In 
the case of a laboratory measurement event, the partici-
pants are: the experimental apparatus, the quarantined 
sub-system, the participant particles, and the (negatively 
prehended) rest of the universe. It is wrong-headed to 
think that the experimental apparatus alone is solely 
responsible for the results. This would be uber-anthro-
pocentric. It would mean we humans and our scientific 
apparatuses solely make the world. But it is also wrong-
headed to think that the particles being “measured” alone 
are solely responsible for the results.
This latter flavor of wrong-headedness (attributing all 
the agency to the objects being measured) was Newton’s 
mistake, and it is easy to see how he made it. Newton was 
(mostly) measuring complex, well-decided, apple-pie-
type objects which had already measured themselves and 
been measured by their environment a billion times over. 
These objects had already experienced quantum decoher-
ence. They had already chosen (and chosen and chosen) 
to remain together as enduring objects. Newton was not 
“freshly” measuring them in isolated, carefully prepared, 
pre-measurement states. He “ignored” the effect which 
his measuring apparatuses were having on these already 
well-decided, measured, and reckoned (societies of) en-
tities because his measuring apparatuses were having a 
negligible effect on them. By “overestimating” the agency 
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of the entities he was measuring, he was actually cour-
teously “respecting” all of the prior decisions they had 
already made. Newton’s objects sure seemed like they al-
ready knew what they wanted to be and do. A rock didn’t 
need to be “invited” by a scale apparatus to know what 
it wanted to weigh. It already weighed what it weighed. 
At its well-decided, rock-level of entanglement and con-
crescence, its superpositional days were (almost entirely) 
over.
Newton’s least forgivable (but still perfectly under-
standable) mistake was to impute these well-decided, 
rock-level characteristics to less decohered particles (like 
quantum-behaving photons) which were not so well de-
cided. Yes, a rock seems to be a noun, with adjectival, pre-
existent properties. But a photon of light is not so much 
a noun with pre-existent, adjectival properties; as it is 
a particle/wave, verb/noun, entity/occurrence that still 
has all sorts of decisions to co-make with the rest of the 
universe regarding which property values it might even 
manifest at all. It took the development of quantum-be-
havior-measuring apparatuses (both gedanken and phys-
ical) to properly reckon what measurement itself even is.
What else must be said about decoherence theory? A 
proper definition might finally be in order: “The practi-
cally irreversible delocalization of phase relations into 
the composite system-environment state induced by in-
evitable and ubiquitous environmental monitoring con-
stitutes precisely the process of decoherence.”68 Zurek 
most concisely defines decoherence as “environment-
induced superselection.” He explains, “Decoherence 
destroys superpositions. The environment induces, in 
effect, a superselection rule that prevents certain super-




positions from being observed.”69 I would modify “being 
observed” to “actually existing,” because I don’t believe 
that the other unobserved superposition options are be-
ing observed in alternate universes, or by alternate states 
of mind. If the eigenstates (possible but as of yet unmani-
fested states) of the quantum waveform fail to ultimately 
manifest during environmentally induced superselec-
tion (i.e., decoherence), then they are nowhere else being 
“observed” by anyone or anything. They simply “remain” 
within the virtual real.
It is important to reiterate that decoherence is not 
solely (and certainly not inherently) based on an object’s 
size or scale. Whether or not decoherence occurs, and 
even the rate at which it occurs, are contingent upon a 
number of actual factors. The size and number of parti-
cles in the environment which does the “measuring” do 
indeed factor into the rate of decoherence of the “meas-
ured” particle. But these are not the only factors. For ex-
ample, it has been experimentally observed that “cryo-
genic temperatures suppress decoherence.”70 The colder 
the temperature, the larger an object can exist without 
decohering, so much so that “a cryogenic version of the 
Weber bar – a gravity-wave detector – must be treated 
as a quantum harmonic oscillator [exhibiting a quantum 
superposition of wave states] even though it may weigh 
a ton.”71 In 2002, Zurek and Harold Ollivier even devised 
an experimental means of measuring the relative quan-
tumness (superpositional quantum behavior) vs. quasi-
classicality (superselected and decohered “classical” be-
havior) of a single system.72 Such experimental results 
on the “mesocosmic border” (the border between the 
microcosmic and the macrocosmic) indicate that deco-
69 Zurek, “Decoherence and the Transition from Quantum to Classical 
– Revisited,” 105.
70 Ibid., 98.
71 Ibid., 88. [Bracketed comments are mine.]
72 Ibid., 95.
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herence is a contingent and gradual (although, in most 
cases, near-immediate) process. In other words, there is 
no static, magical dividing line between quantum and 
classical behavior.
Still, as stated earlier, if quantum superposition hap-
pened all the time and all over the place at all scales, it 
would be quite easy to shield large objects from the ef-
fects of decoherence, and we would already have a work-
ing quantum computer. It is not and we don’t. Yes, we live 
in a quantum world, all the way up and all the way down. 
But no, once decoherence has occurred, I can’t treat a 
rock which has decided to decohere as if it could at any 
time be in a state of quantum superposition. Actually (or 
rather, virtually), there does exist a near-infinitely remote 
possibility that a rock sitting in a field could immediately 
change its position without anybody kicking it or throw-
ing it in a Newtonian fashion, but this possibility is so 
remote as to be pragmatically nil.
An additional point to be made is that decoherence 
is itself a kind of quantum mechanical behavior. Thus, 
decoherence theory is not really a philosophical “inter-
pretation” of quantum mechanical behavior. As explained 
by Schlosshauer, “Since decoherence is simply a conse-
quence of a realistic application of the standard quantum 
formalism, it cannot by itself give an interpretation or 
explanation of this formalism.”73 As with a child perpetu-
ally asking “why?” about every subsequent answer she is 
given, eventually, all explanations of quantum mechani-
cal behavior arrive at one of two places: 1. circular/tauto-
logical explanations (“it is this way because the abstract 
math by which we have chosen to understand it works 
out this way”); or 2. fundamental mystery and wonder 
73 Maximilian Schlosshauer and Kristian Camilleri, “What Xlassical-
ity? Decoherence and Bohr’s Classical Concepts,” American Institute 
of Physics Conference Proceedings 1327 [International Conference on 
Advances in Quantum Theory] (2011): 30.
71
regarding apparatuses
(“it behaves this way, but we don’t know why”). Scientists 
are historically hesitant to accept result #2 without first 
rigorously researching all the unknown hidden variables 
until they discover a deeper layer of why. But when you 
finally get all the way to the bottom of physical behavior, 
and there are no more hidden variables, sometimes all 
you are left to do is speculate and wonder.
It is fascinating to me the particular kind of inexplica-
ble wonder left standing when one pursues decoherence 
theory to its limits: namely, the wonder that measure-
ments should have any outcomes at all. Again, I defer to 
Schlosshauer for a clear and concise explanation of this 
situation:
The measurement problem, and the more general 
problem of the quantum-to-classical transition, is 
composed of three main issues:
 — The preferred-basis problem (what determines the 
preferred physical quantities of our experience?).
 — The problem of the nonobservability of interference 
(why is it so hard to observe interference effects?).
 — The problem of outcomes (why do measurements 
seem to have outcomes at all, and what selects the 
particular observed outcome?).
[…] It is reasonable to conclude that decoherence is ca-
pable of solving the first two problems, whereas the 
third problem is intrinsically linked to matters of in-
terpretation that are mostly outside of the scope of 
decoherence.74
Problem #1 (the preferred-basis problem, i.e., in the wild 
universe, beyond the quantum physics laboratory, why 
74 Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition, 
112–13.
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does the position observable manifest itself more readily 
than the momentum observable?) is particularly relevant 
to art apparatuses, because it pertains to the role appa-
ratuses play in the overall collaborative measurement 
event. A quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus does 
not get to determine the particular measurement value 
(the particular momentum of the particle, or the particu-
lar position of the particle). But the apparatus does get to 
determine (with greater or lesser degrees of insistence) 
which of these two complementary observables (mo-
mentum or position) emerges. The quantum-behavior-
measuring apparatus plays a part (the nature of what to 
measure), and the particle plays a part (the value of the 
actual measurement result).
But (asks the child) why? Why does the universe, when 
it goes to measure or observe other parts of itself, beyond 
the shielded and prepared environment of the quantum-
behavior-measuring apparatus, always seem to prefer 
the position observable over the momentum observable? 
In other words, why do we live in a universe of mostly 
solid objects rather than a universe of mostly ephemeral 
events? Decoherence theory provides the circular, tauto-
logical explanation: During the decoherence event, the 
preferred-basis of “position” (usually) decoheres more 
quickly than the preferred-basis of “momentum.” But 
why? And here decoherence theory is at a loss, and we 
arrive at fundamental mystery or wonder: The universe 
seems to want to behave this way (usually, at human-
scale, in our corner of the universe), but we don’t know 
why.
Problem #2 (the problem of nonobservability of in-
terference, i.e., why do rocks in a field remain in a single 
position instead of bouncing around in superpositional 
flux?) is also relevant to art apparatuses, because it sug-
gests that we must be careful and courteous toward our 
materials. Materials themselves measure each other and 
are measured by each other in ways that cause them to 
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decohere and thus stop exhibiting interference effects 
(i.e., superpositionality). This is the answer that decoher-
ence theory provides. But why? And here, decoherence 
theory is at a loss, and must turn to Whitehead, and to 
quantum consistent-history theories: Because imme-
diate, actual occurrences/entities, when they prehend 
and negatively prehend the rest of the universe, make 
irreversible historical decisions which must be honored 
by all subsequent actual occurrences/entities. But why? 
Because, in the words of process philosopher and theo-
logian George Hartshorne, “An actual world cannot be 
all possible worlds […]. To be actual is to exclude some 
possibilities.”75 But why? Because the universe seems to 
want to behave this way, but we don’t know why.
Problem #3 (why do measurements have outcomes at 
all, and what chooses these outcomes?). This is such a rich 
and peculiar question. I grudgingly admire the discipline 
of science for coming to the bottom of itself and arriving 
at such an unlikely, post-structuralist type of question. I 
suppose Whitehead would answer that it is because actu-
al entities have appetitions and affections and affinities, 
and that they respond to lures and provocations in novel 
and original ways. But why? Because the universe seems 
to want to be new, but we don’t know why.
Well-Decided Objects (Societies of Entities)
Whitehead has a special category for actual entities that 
have formed societies and endured. They are special not 
because they are large or even because they have deco-
hered, but because they are (and this is my own term) 
“well-decided.” With every new immediate actual occa-
sion, each of these occasions has decided to continue to-
75 Charles Hartshorne, “Bell’s Theorem and Stapp’s Revised View of 
Space-Time,” Process Studies 7, no. 3 (1977): 188, quoted in Epperson, 
Quantum Mechanics and the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 144.
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gether as a society. More technically, each of these actual 
occasions has decided to attend to and replicate prior 
forms of being inherited from the bare factual, physical 
pole of antecedent actual occasions; rather than inject-
ing novel inflections of being, via the mental pole, which 
could have been ingressed from the fecund potentia of 
the virtual. A rock is a society of entities, a human is a 
society of entities, and there is no special qualitative di-
viding line that makes one of these societies categori-
cally different than the other. In other words, Whitehead 
didn’t coin a new ontological category to describe a hu-
man; he kept using the same rock category. In his own 
words, “An ordinary physical object, which has temporal 
endurance, is a society.”76
Of course, there are qualitative differences between 
these two enduring societies (rocks vs. humans), but as 
Martin Savransky explains:
Societies are not grouped together just because they 
happen to have common characteristics, and their 
contrast with actual entities is not simply a matter of 
scale, or of mere quantity, but of organizational com-
plexity – of modes of existence.77 
Whitehead himself lists some of these different modes 
of existence: 
There is the animal life with its central direction of a 
society of cells, there is the vegetable life with its orga-
nized republic of cells, there is the cell life with its or-
ganized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale 
inorganic society of molecules with its passive accep-
tance of necessity derived from spatial relations, there 
76 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 35.
77 Savransky, “Modes of Mattering,” 7.
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is the infra-molecular activity which has lost all trace 
of the passivity of inorganic nature on a larger scale.78 
Although Whitehead refers to scale, the “actual” differ-
ences are relational rather than volumetric. Indeed, one 
could say that “size” is simply the byproduct of a well-
decided and well-committed society of occasions, occa-
sions that share a common history.
If decoherence theory explains the ways in which iso-
lated individual entities lose their quantum superpo-
sitional behavior and enter into a kind of concrescent 
collaboration with the rest of the (observing) universe, 
then the theory of quantum mechanical “histories” ex-
plains the way a sequence of those decohered occasions 
persist as a single enduring object. In a sense, enduring 
societies of entities share a common history which con-
tinues to persist and endure due to an ongoing series 
of collective re-honorings of these common prior deci-
sions. Or, in Whitehead’s own words, “A vegetable is a 
democracy.”79 Let us return to the rock lying in the field. 
Each new occasion of the enduring object known as rock 
is not deterministically bound to honor the prior occa-
sions of the rock; but ordinarily, in an enduring object 
like a rock, most new occasions do choose to re-honor 
these prior histories. To put it another way (in keeping 
with my Whitehead–Deleuze amalgamated cosmology), 
although each present-tense rock occasion could always 
be lured into activating its mental pole and ingressing 
novel potentia from the virtual into the concrescence of 
its own actual self-becoming, most rock occasions simply 
attend to the physical pole of the prior, actual, historical 
rock occasions, prehend them into itself, ignore (nega-
tively prehend, fail to ingress) the novel virtual options, 
and perpetuate (more or less) the consistent history of 
78 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 164.
79 Ibid., 24.
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the rock. To humans, such a series of ongoing decisions 
to re-up and re-integrate prior decided actual occasions 
without injecting virtual novelty into the present occa-
sion appears exactly like a rock remaining in a field. But 
according to Whitehead’s cosmology (and to quantum 
mechanics), a rock remaining in a field is actually a se-
ries of active decisions; whereas, according to Newtonian 
physics, the same rock remaining in a field exhibits an 
inert absence of action.
Whitehead’s way of thinking is a very non-Newtonian 
way of thinking about large objects, particularly organic 
objects. But, to Whitehead, macroscopic and microscopic 
objects all participate in the same moment-by-moment 
process of concrescence. Michael Epperson describes the 
concrescence process from a “quantum histories” per-
spective: “A macroscopic material object […] becomes 
characterized most fundamentally as a history of evolu-
tions of discrete facts or events – evolutions from actual-
ity to potentiality to actuality.”80 Epperson later describe 
the same process from (his version of) a Whiteheadian 
perspective: 
Classically described objects are more fundamentally 
described as historical routes of atomic events, where 
past events influence but do not determine future 
events. The universe is a multiplicity of such events, 
each of which evolves or becomes via a process of pre-
hending and integrating all the antecedently actual-
ized events (data) that the universe comprises. Some 
data are, of course, more relevant than other data; and 
indeed, most data once brought together by prehen-
sion are further integrated largely by elimination.81





How do these larger societies of entitites (rocks and 
such) stay together? By (mostly) ignoring all of the vir-
tual potentia available, moment-by-moment, to each of 
their immediate actual entities, individually and collec-
tively. They decide to remain and endure. But this is not 
a one-time decision. It is actively re-made moment-by-
moment. Which means a variant decision may be made 
at any time, albeit contingent upon all prior actual enti-
ties in the universe. The new, variant decision may not 
vary wholly from the prior decisions. True, it is not slav-
ishly bound to simply repeat the prior decisions exactly, 
but neither is it free to radically veer from the path of 
the prior decisions. The particular quality, flavor, and 
amount of novel potentia it may inject and inflect into 
its own present-tense self-becoming is itself conditioned 
by prior actual occasions on two counts: 1. because the 
present-tense occasion in question must begin with and 
can only “launch or veer from” the prior actual occasions 
leading up to it; and 2. because the virtual potentia it-
self (according to Deleuze’s scheme, not Whitehead’s) is 
conditioned by the prior actual history of the entire uni-
verse. Each present-tense actual occasion is constrained 
in these two ways, locally (from whence it begins, in the 
actual, according to its physical pole) and universally 
(from whence the rest of the universe begins at the time 
of its concrescence, in the virtual, according to its mental 
pole). Each present-tense actual occasion may be said to 
have a modicum of freedom and agency, which is directly 
derived from, contingent upon, and made possible by its 
own inherent conformity to the prior actual histories of 
“itself” and of the rest of the universe.
By ethical implication, then, to imagine that a rock 
(society) somehow desires to return to the primordial in-
determinate state of its individual electrons, and that I 
(a human society) am its ethical ally in helping it return 
to that “liberated” state of increased undecidability, is 
to discourteously ignore the prior, historical (co-)affec-
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tions/decisions of the (society known as) rock. Indeed, I 
will have to work hard against the rock to return it to that 
dis-integrated state. An isolated electron, on the other 
hand, is more playfully indifferent (open?) to my experi-
mental interferences.
“Entity” in Whitehead’s sense doesn’t really mean 
“thing” in any sort of noun-y, Heideggerian sense (how-
ever orthodoxically or inventively Heidegger is inter-
preted). “Entity” means close to what Barad calls “phe-
nomenon,” and aspects of that phenomenon.82 So, the 
noun-ness of the “entity” is not the issue. Indeed, to 
Whitehead, entities are mostly occasions (although they 
are also sometimes ideas and sometimes societies of 
occasions, both of which may be thought of as noun-y 
things). The noun-ness of entitites matters less to White-
head than what Barad might call agential cuts – entan-
gled historic ingressions. These ingressions must be re-
spected, because they have historically occurred, in the 
actual real (and not just the virtual real).
A brief word about humans. Because humans are also 
well-decided, enduring objects, and because books like 
this are usually written by and for humans, we humans 
tend to have a kind of vested interest in ourselves. I have 
and will continue to use “actual entities” and “actual oc-
casions” interchangeably, occasionally combining them 
into “actual entities/occasions.” Each term describes the 
same “thing,” but there is a kind of anthropocentric ten-
dency, when talking about humans, to shift toward “ac-
tual entities” and away from “actual occasions.” Think-
ing of myself as an enduring society of actual entities is 
destabilizing enough; thinking of myself as an enduring 
society of actual occasions is even more disturbing. But 
in Whitehead’s scheme, both terms (entity and occasion) 
mean exactly the same thing. Toward the beginning of 
82 Barad’s “phenomenon” should be distinguished from the much 
more human-centric “phenomenon” of Husserl and company.
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Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson states, “We change 
without ceasing.”83 Similarly, toward the beginning of 
Relationscapes, Erin Manning states, “We are going, al-
ways already.”84 These becomings that “I” am perpetually 
becoming won’t be halted by “my” cognitive inability to 
comprehend them.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, consciousness to White-
head is merely the apex of experience. A rock doesn’t 
need “consciousness” to decide to remain a rock (or to 
decide to become a rock), and my body doesn’t need “con-
sciousness” to decide most of the things it decides either. 
In Whitehead’s own words, “Consciousness flickers; and 
even at its brightest, there is a small focal region of clear 
illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience 
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. 
The simplicity of clear consciousness is no measure of 
the complexity of complete experience. Also, this charac-
ter of our experience suggests that consciousness is the 
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its 
necessary base.”85 “Intellectual feelings are not to be un-
derstood unless it be remembered that they already find 
at work ‘physical purposes’ more primitive than them-
selves. Consciousness follows, and does not precede, 
the entry of the conceptual prehensions of the relevant 
universals.”86
I myself suspect that “consciousness” is just a stand-in 
word for something that we don’t really understand yet, 
like “instinct.” “Consciousness” is involved in writing, so 
whenever humans write books they tend to overvalue 
consciousness in their books. (Fortunately, art appara-
tuses are not books.)
83 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1911), 12.
84 Erin Manning, Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy (Cambridge: 
mit Press, 2009), 14.
85 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 267.
86 Ibid., 273.
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Real (Not Metaphorical) Art Apparatuses vs.  
Rivers of Fundament
Why is any of this important to an understanding of art 
apparatuses (a.k.a. works of art)? Because if I want to be 
efficacious in my art making, I need to take into account 
the real world, in all of its actuality and virtuality, in all of 
its quantum-behaving undecidedness and its quasi-New-
ton-behaving well-decidedness. It would be a mistake to 
conclude that my art work (my art apparatus) was merely 
passively receiving the materials I was using, and rigor-
ously arranging them to accurately represent some fact 
which then emerged as a true measurement of reality (as 
if it were some sort of Newtonian scientific apparatus). 
Of course, nobody in their right mind would think like 
this about a painting anymore, and even few of Newton’s 
contemporaries would have thought of painting in this 
way. Many people in the 1800s did think of the photo-
graphic camera as a kind of scientific Newtonian appara-
tus, but most 20th century theorists of photography have 
tended to challenge and problematize that interpretation 
(Barthes, Sontag, and Flusser, to name just three). But it 
would also be an oversimplification to conclude that my 
art work (my art apparatus) was behaving as an actual, 
literal, physical, quantum-behavior-measuring appara-
tus, observing my materials as if they were isolated and 
prepared individual photons in a shielded laboratory en-
vironment. So, what is the proper way to think about my 
art apparatus?
If matter is meant to actually matter (as it is and must 
in contemporary art), then I am not authorized to treat 
quantum behaviors (such as superposition and indeter-
minacy) as fundamentally relevant to contemporary art 
criticism, contemporary media theory, or contemporary 
artmaking practices simply because these behaviors are 
“fundamental” to all matter. What does that mean, fun-
damental to all matter? Fundamental in what ways? Un-
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der what conditions? In what contexts? The soles (funda-
ments) of my shoes are made of rubber, but that doesn’t 
mean that my standing and my locomotion are radically 
and fundamentally indebted to the chemical properties 
of rubber. My standing and my locomotion in these shoes 
are indeed in some oblique capacities entangled with the 
chemical properties of rubber, but the specific nature of 
those entangled capacities is going to require some rigor-
ous working through. Humans could choose to radically 
alter the entire infrastructure of their city’s transporta-
tion systems based on the fundamental chemical prop-
erties of rubber, but that would probably be a bad idea. 
Fundament is as fundament does, to those for whom the 
fundament is fundamental.
A fundament can only matter “all the way up” (from 
quarks to quasars, as the saying goes) to the exact de-
gree that it remains relevant to those actual entities/
occasions that themselves remain relevant all the way 
up. Whitehead gives us a cosmology of concrescence, a 
process philosophy, that is relevant all the way up and 
down. His cosmology is admittedly speculative, but he 
still means it to be taken as real (and not metaphorical). 
An actual entity is to be understood as actually real, not 
as some subjective, human-invented phylum or class. As 
Whitehead explains: “The appeal to a class to perform the 
services of a proper entity is exactly analogous to an ap-
peal to an imaginary terrier to kill a real rat.”87 Granted, 
due to the very real and universal effects of decoherence, 
superpositional behavior and quantum indeterminacy 
themselves do not remain all that relevant all the way 
up (at least to a human observing a field of rocks). And 
yet (according to Whitehead’s cosmology), ongoing im-
mediate prehensions and negative prehensions and reck-
onings do still remain relevant all the way up and down. 
Indeed, this ongoing process of perpetual reckoning and 
87 Ibid., 228.
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deciding, occasion by occasion, is the very description of 
how anything becomes and remains relevant to anything 
else at all, always already, in the first place and evermore. 
The beginning of each concrescence event is primed by 
the inheritance of prior actual occasions along the physi-
cal pole. These occasions suggest propositions and in-
voke lures for new ingressions of virtual potentia along 
the mental pole. The result of this concrescence event 
is a newly emerged and fully formed actual occasion/
entity (a bare fact) that itself feeds forward into subse-
quent present-tense concrescence occasions. This pro-
cess of concrescence is not only fundamental; more im-
portantly, it is all-pervasive. And well-decided histories, 
those enduring societies of actual entities/occasions (per 
both Whitehead and theories of quantum histories) are 
inherently relevant (and indeed, relevance-preserving) 
aspects of this all-pervasive process by which relevance is 
perpetually manufactured.
So, even though art apparatuses (works of art) are bet-
ter understood in terms of quantum-behavior-measuring 
apparatuses than in terms of Newtonian apparatuses, 
this is not due to the all-pervasive authority of quantum 
fundament. Quantum mechanics alone is not sufficient 
for a proper theory and practice of the art apparatus (the 
work of art), much less is it sufficient for a holistic cosmo-
logical understanding of the universe. Quantum super-
position may indeed always be mathematically occurring 
in some near-infinitely miniscule degree to large, well-
decided entities throughout the entire universe, but to 
whom does this fact really matter? To mathematicians 
and theoretical physicists, it may matter a lot. To the 
materials with which I am pragmatically engaged as an 
artist, it matters remotely little. I can’t make the facts of 
quantum undecidability matter any more than they actu-
ally matter in any particular material engagement simply 
because they are supposed to “fundamentally” matter. 
Those facts and forces and processes have to work their 
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way into and through the histories of the materials with 
which I am engaging, and they have to persist as relevant 
in those materials, in order for them to be relevant to my 
artwork’s apparatal engagement with those materials.
For a practicing contemporary artist, what actually 
winds up mattering depends on the nature of my materi-
als and the way in which I construct my apparatus (as any 
proper study of quantum-behavior-measuring appara-
tuses says it should). For example, if my material is fabric, 
I must understand that my fabric is already well-decided 
in terms of the properties it wishes to exhibit. But I may 
enter into a kind of collaborative dialogue with these 
properties and modulate them. I may wish to consider 
(to reckon, to prehend) the history of the fabric I have 
chosen to use. If the fabric is cotton, and I am an artist in 
the southeastern United States, such historical consid-
erations enter into an entanglement of slavery, factories, 
child labor, women’s labor, men’s and women’s fashions, 
technological ginning apparatuses, crop rotation prac-
tices, plantation economics, the gender-determined roles 
of German artisans and its effect on the marriage of Jo-
sef and Anni Albers, the Albers’s respective pedagogical 
roles at the Bauhaus and Black Mountain College, and the 
subsequent influence of Anni Albers on the perceived le-
gitimacy of fabric arts in a contemporary gallery setting. 
Note that, as a practicing artist, I am led to reckon all of 
these historical considerations because they are still vir-
tually real to the actualized bolt of cotton I intend to use.
True, according to decoherence theory, by the time I am 
holding the bolt of cotton in my hands, it is not behaving 
quantum-mechanically (in any way relevant to my appa-
ratal collaboration with it). I may not engage with it elec-
tron by electron by electron. Quantum mechanics alone 
does not directly legitimize or authorize my engagement 
with these prior-decided histories of cotton. But neither 
am I constrained to apply quantum mechanics to art-
making “merely” metaphorically or analogically. To do so 
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would risk being discourteous to the actual historical de-
cisions cotton has made in collaboration with the rest of 
the universe up to the immediate apparatal event which 
is my artwork. In order to get from quantum mechanics 
to a properly courteous treatment of my materials, I must 
go by way of Whitehead’s cosmology of concrescence, by 
way of decoherence theory, and by way of Deleuze’s (Ar-
istotle’s, Proust’s, Bergson’s, Massumi’s) virtual potentia. 
I must allow the ingressed and decohered quantum his-
tories of the material I am using to really matter, actually 
and virtually, at the well-decided and well-inhered “scale” 
(level of complexity) at which we are both collaborating, 
keeping in mind that the way in which I construct my art 
apparatus will also come to (really) matter in the result-
ant artwork, concrescence, “measurement” which even-
tually emerges.
Martin Savransky’s reading of Karen Barad is particu-
larly insightful and relevant to these issues of funda-
ment, scale, and historical contingency: 
What is at stake, I think, is that even though, as Barad 
argues, we should not confine the potential lessons 
of Bohr’s quantum mechanics to some “microscopic” 
scale beyond which Newtonian (meta)physics may 
prevail unchallenged, we also should not be too quick 
to reduce the requirements of other practices to the 
lessons of supposedly “more fundamental issues of 
principle” (Meeting the Universe Halfway 110). We must 
honor Bohr’s lessons, but not as something that the 
entire world must comply with as a matter of prin-
ciple. Rather, if an attention to relationality is such a 
lesson, we must take the risk of extending it, of pro-
posing it, as a question to which each practice has to 
find its own mode of response, for which each practice 
has to learn how to become responsible.88
88 Savransky, “Modes of Mattering,” 6.
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According to Deleuze and Guattari (in What Is Philoso-
phy?), there is just one universe, one undifferentiated 
plane of immanence. There is just one real (actual and 
virtual). It is traversed by philosophy, science, and art, 
but it is the same plane of immanence. No approach has 
a monopoly of access to the plane; each approach finds its 
own way, not in isolation from the other approaches, and 
not subservient to them, but in correlation with them, 
contingent to the reality of the plane itself.
Matter must be allowed to matter to those entities 
for whom it matters in the ways in which it decides to 
matter. I can’t constrain matter to perpetually matter in 
a quantum or exact way any more than I can constrain it 
to matter in a Newtonian or approximate way. But I may 
construct apparatuses that invite matter to collaborate in 
various ways. Such is the object lesson (no pun intended) 
of quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses. 
And now, we continue our descent into fundament, 
beyond the (imaginary) classical–quantum divide, fur-
ther down and further in.
Indeterminacy
Quantum “indeterminacy” or “undecidability” or “com-
plementarity” or “uncertainty” has been touched upon 
throughout this chapter, but it bears solid reiterating here, 
because it is the one truly radical and novel “challenge” 
that quantum physics poses to “western” philosophy. A 
prepared and isolated particle prior to “measurement” 
(whether measurement by a human-designed quantum-
behavior-measuring apparatus, or measurement by some 
other part of the universe) exists in a state of superposi-
tion. Said particle is not an entity containing properties. It 
has no properties. It may only be assigned a mathematical 
“waveform” function (which is not itself a physical wave) 
from which its properties will eventually be derived. But 
no properties exist prior to measurement. It is not solely 
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the case that no measurement values of properties yet ex-
ist (although this is also the case). Until the particle is 
invited to manifest a particular property (i.e., an “observ-
able”), that property itself doesn’t even exist.
For example, in the case of complementary spin states 
(spin is one kind of quantum observable), W.H. Zurek ex-
plains, “The states of the two spins in [a quantum-entan-
gled two particle system] are not just unknown, but rath-
er they cannot exist before the “real” measurement.”89 
Werner Heisenberg unfortunately chose to called this 
indeterminate complementarity “uncertainty,” but we 
are not merely uncertain about the value of a property 
that already exists; prior to measurement, there is noth-
ing about which to be certain or uncertain. As Karen 
Barad insightfully clarifies, “We can’t know something 
definite about something for which there is nothing def-
inite to know.”90
The measurement apparatus (or the “measuring” envi-
ronment, if no apparatus is present) invites the particle to 
manifest one property or its complement, depending on 
the particular nature of the apparatus (or environment). 
The particle itself then manifests a measurement value 
of that property, observable according to the measure-
ment “bias” of the apparatus. Position and momentum 
are complementary observables. A single apparatus may 
measure both, but it may not measure both with 100% 
certainty. This is not because there is anything techni-
cally deficient with the state of our current technical 
apparatuses. This is because the particle simply cannot 
manifest both complementary observables simultane-
ously with 100% commitment.
89 Zurek, “Decoherence and the Transition from Quantum to Classical 
– Revisited,” 93. [Bracketed comments are mine.]




The two most famous quantum experiments are the dou-
ble-slit experiment, and the related which-path double-
slit experiment. Physicist Richard Feynman famously 
and regularly said that the double-slit experiment “con-
tains the only mystery”91 of quantum mechanics. The 
double-slit experiment was initially performed with light 
by Thomas Young in 1801, well before the advent of quan-
tum mechanics. It has since been performed with single 
photons (of light) as well as single electrons (of matter). 
It has even been performed with large molecules com-
prised of numerous atomic particles.
Having taken the time in this chapter to establish a 
Whiteheadian cosmology inspired by the behavior ex-
hibited in these experiments, they should not seem as 
“weird” to us as they did to those who initially observed 
them, namely, scientists coming from the perspective of 
Newtonian physics. Since the behavior manifested by 
these apparatal configurations confounds Newtonian 
physics, even the basic, generic, functional language one 
uses to describe these experiments can’t help but belie 
the chosen interpretive perspective of the person doing 
the describing. Indeed, the terms “object,” “apparatus,” 
“measure,” “property,” “experiment,” “interact,” and “ob-
serve” belie one (more classical) perspective; while the 
terms “apparatal phenomenon,” “particle,” “observable,” 
“manifest,” “intra-act,” “invite,” and “detect” belie an en-
tirely different (more “quantum”) perspective. And even 
then, there are numerous individual interpretive models 
within quantum mechanics. Is the particle a “wave/par-
ticle”? Is the particle following a “pilot wave”? Does the 
91 Richard P. Feynman, “Lecture 37: Atomic Mechanics,” in The Feynman 
Lectures on Physics, Volume I: Mainly Mechanics, Radiation and Heat 
(Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 2013), 1–1: Atomic 
mechanics, http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/III_01.html.
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“waveform collapse”? Does it “decohere”? Do we simply 
see one particular history or eigenstate while others are 
manifesting in alternate universes, alternate worlds, or 
alternate mental states? The fundamental way in which 
our very descriptive language is so indebted to a New-
tonian way of thinking about the universe plays havoc 
with even the simplest descriptions of these (decidedly 
non-Newtonian) phenomena. I will not bother to explain 
these apparatal experiments from alternate interpretive 
perspectives, but will instead explain them from the per-
spective of decoherence theory (the interpretive perspec-
tive I have been following thus far).
One final note: the quantum behavior described below 
is not inherently “weird.” One might fairly ask, “Weird to 
whom?” Nor is it any more inherently “amazing” than the 
fact that humans are able to isolate a single proton or a 
single electron at all, or that a single experiment may be 
made to return consistent results, or that any given ex-
periment may be made to return any measurable results 
at all. As G.K. Chesterton observers, “A child of seven is 
excited by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw 
a dragon. But a child of three is excited by being told that 
Tommy opened a door.”92 When it comes to the double-slit 
experiment, we humans are more like the three-year-old.
The Double-Slit Experiment  
(The Quintessential Quantum Apparatus)
A single particle (a photon or, more “weirdly,” a single 
electron) is shot toward a barrier with a single slit. If it 
passes through that barrier (some don’t, and are bounced 
back off the barrier), it moves on toward a second barrier 
with two slits spread a particular distance apart from each 
other. If it passes through that barrier, it winds up being 




detected in a single particular location behind the second 
barrier. A bunch of particles are passed through this ap-
paratus, one at a time. Eventually, when all the individual 
locations are examined together, they form a “diffrac-
tion” pattern (See Fig. 1). This diffraction pattern seems 
weird, because if we were shooting tennis balls toward 
a barrier with two holes, we would expect to find a big 
clump of marks behind one of the holes, and a big clump 
of marks behind the other one of the holes. We wouldn’t 
expect to find any marks behind the barrier between the 
two holes. And yet most of the marks in the diffraction 
pattern are behind this middle barrier. The diffraction 
pattern is actually what we would expect to find if we 
sent a wave of water through the two holes in the bar-
rier. The water would split up and go between both holes, 
and then on the other side of the barrier, the water from 
one hole would interfere with the water from the other 
hole, and a diffraction pattern would be detected when 
this pair of interfering waves hit the far detector. But 
(and this is important) the apparatal arrangement didn’t 
send the particles through all at the same time. They 
went through one at a time. So unlike well-decided, mac-
rocosmic, Newtonian-behaving waves at the beach, the 
one-at-a-time individual particles couldn’t have physi-
cally interfered with each other. Each one decided where 
to land independently of the other ones being sent. And 
only after we looked at all of these individual decisions 
together did we see a wave(-like) pattern.
Some people like to interpret this behavior as each sin-
gle particle splitting up, going between both holes, and 
then interfering with itself. But if we are going to leave 
Newtonian physics behind (and we must), then the parti-
cle is not really required by the two slits to manifest itself 
as a physical wave any more than it is required by the two 
slits to manifest itself as a physical particle. The particle 
is not a physical wave, although neither is it a decohered, 
well-decided, tennis-ball-type of particle. (As we previ-
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ously mused, is a particle without any decided position 
even properly considered a “particle?” But we must call 
it something if we are to keep talking about it, so I will 
continue using the noun “particle.”) The particle is in a 
state of quantum superposition, the probability distribu-
tion of which happens to form a wave-like pattern. The 
particle may be predicted to land somewhere along that 
wave-like pattern, but where exactly it lands is up to each 
single particle.
The two slits (gently, but not insistently) invite the su-
perpositioned particle to semi-commit to a kind of partial, 
wave-patterned proto-decision. This gentle, two-slit invi-
tation is the reason why we don’t see a big clump of marks 
detected behind each slit (which we would see if this were 
a less gentle, more insistent, single-slit invitation).93 “And” 
(not “then,” because the entire apparatal event is more ho-
listic than micro-sequential) the final far-detector “wall” 
(not really a wall, but a position-measuring device behind 
the two-slit wall) more insistently invites the particle to 
commit to a single (“superselected” is Zurek’s term) po-
sition. Thus, in this particular apparatal configuration, 
each particle is gently invited to semi-commit to a kind 
of wave-patterned distribution behavior which manifests 
in the permanent, irreversible commitment (particle by 
particle) to a single, specific location.
According to my application of Whitehead’s cosmol-
ogy to quantum mechanics, each of these discrete meas-
urement events (particle by particle), is its own actual oc-
casion/entity.
93 “Gentle invitation” and “insistent invitation” are my own terms, not 
actual terms from the field of quantum mechanics.
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The Which-Path Double-Slit Experiment  
(The Plot Thickens)
The same basic apparatal set-up is constructed, but this 
time a (non-physically interfering) mechanism is added 
which is meant to detect which of the two slits the parti-
cle went through, or whether it went through both slits at 
the same time. With this which-slit detector in place, the 
particle is insistently invited by the entire apparatus to 
commit to one slit or another. As a result, the particle does 
commit to one slit or another (but never both), and is de-
tected by the far detector “wall” in tennis-ball-like fash-
ion, appearing behind one slit or the other. Once a bunch 
of particles are shot through the apparatus, one at a time, 
the aggregate pattern that emerges is one big clump be-
hind one slit, and one big clump behind the other slit (in 
“normal,” “quasi-classical” fashion). The prior diffraction 
pattern is no longer detected. In other words, the distri-
bution pattern detected by the far detector “wall” is now 
entirely different than it was in the gentler, less insistent, 
non-which-path apparatus. This new which-path appara-
tus still does not determine where exactly each particular 
particle is detected. According to my own interpretation, 
that particular specific decision is still made by each in-
dividual particle. But this new which-path apparatus (the 
whole entire apparatal configuration) more insistently 
invites each particle to semi-commit to a non-wave-like, 
decidedly clump-like distribution pattern. And then, as 
before, the far detector “wall” quite insistently invites 
each particle to commit to a single, permanent, irrevers-
ible position.
The Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser Experiment  
(Too Much Too Soon)
The so-called “delayed choice quantum eraser” experi-
ment is the mind-blower of all quantum-behavior-meas-
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uring experiments. It serves to problematize our prior 
ideas of “time” altogether. I will thus defer discussion of 
it until Chapter 4, where we will consider it in conjunc-
tion with David Crawford’s equally time-problematizing 
Stop Motion Studies project. Both apparatuses (the delayed 
choice quantum eraser apparatus and Crawford’s aleato-
ric, micro-animation art apparatus) will be considered 
from an apophatic perspective as mechanisms of defer-
ment.
Some Implications of Quantum-Behavior-Measuring  
Apparatuses
“The oddness of a quarry whose species does not preex-
ist its capture, a prey whose determinate existence re-
sults from the casting of the hunter’s net.”
– Brian Massumi94 
What to make of these two experiments – the double-
slit experiment and its which-path counterpart? Karen 
Barad emphasizes a key interpretation of both: “It is im-
portant to realize that in the absence of an experimen-
tal arrangement that gives meaning to the notion of 
“which-slit” – that is, an experimental arrangement that 
makes it possible to determine which slit a particle goes 
through… – this information is not just unknown; it is 
ontologically indeterminate.”95 When the nuanced differ-
ences between “unknown” and “indeterminate” are not 
merely semantic but are experimentally demonstrated, 
enacted, elucidated, and enunciated, then we are author-
ized to pragmatically and “really” revisit and examine our 
habitual usage of these terms, and to revisit and examine 
94 Brian Massumi, “Introduction: Like a Thought,” in A Shock To 
Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi 
(London: Routledge, 2005), xx. [Regarding the arbitrary nature of 
Louis Hjelmslev’s concept of “purport.”]
95 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 268.
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our habitual ways of thinking about the universe based 
on these terms (and not only the terms “unknown” and 
“indeterminate,” but also the terms “ontology,” “informa-
tion,” “experiment,” and “knowledge.”)
As we move toward art apparatuses, let us take with 
us from these quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses 
three key interpretations, each intrinsically related to the 
others. Karen Barad’s insights and her careful and origi-
nal reading of Niels Bohr prove indispensable to these 
interpretations.
1. The apparatal phenomenon is holistic.
The best way to understand the “measurement results” of 
a quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus is to consider 
the entire apparatus (the way in which it is arranged, the 
materials from which it is made, and the materials it is 
“measuring”) as a single, holistic phenomenon. Accord-
ing to Barad, “The boundary between the “object of ob-
servation” and the “agencies of observation” is indetermi-
nate in the absence of a specific physical arrangement of 
the apparatus.”96 “A condition for objective knowledge is 
that the referent is a phenomenon (and not an observa-
tion-independent object).”97
Conditioned by Newtonian physics, we are prone to 
think about “the experiment” in parts: a measuring de-
vice, a measured particle, an inherent property of that 
particle, the value of that property, a measurement event, 
and a measurement outcome. In actuality, the entire as-
semblage is itself a holistic phenomenon, and that ho-
listic, singular occurrence (that apparatal phenomenon) 





2. Human intention alone is not enough to determine which 
type of observable is observed. Material intervention is 
required.
As a scientist, I can’t simply “look” and subjectively de-
cide to see a particle’s position or its momentum, since 
these have yet to be determined. I must meticulously 
construct a specific material apparatus in a specific ma-
terial way so that the apparatus invites the particle to 
manifest or make one or the other kind of complemen-
tary “observable” I wish to observe. The apparatus doesn’t 
invite the exact, singular, specific measurement value 
(that is up to the particle), but it does invite (more or less 
insistently) a particular kind of observable (or a particu-
lar ratio of complementary commitment – for example, 
25% position certainty/75% momentum certainty). In 
other words, all relevant material aspects of the holistic 
apparatal phenomenon matter – not just the “material” 
of the particle, but also the material configuration of the 
“measuring” apparatus, and both in relation to the sur-
rounding “environment” of the rest of the universe.
Schlosshauer explains: 
Measurements must be of such a nature as to establish 
robust records, that is, the system-apparatus correla-
tion ought to be preserved in spite of the inevitable 
interaction with the surrounding environment […]. 
The ‘user’ cannot choose the observables arbitrarily, 
but must design a measuring device whose interaction 
with the environment is such as to ensure stable re-
cords (which, in turn, defines a measuring device for 
this observable).98 
Barad herself states:
98 Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition, 
334.
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Given a particular measuring apparatus, certain prop-
erties become determinate, while others are specifically 
excluded. Which properties become determinate is 
not governed by the desires or will of the experimenter 
but rather by the specificity of the experimental ap-
paratus.99 
Furthermore, “The nature of the observed phenomenon 
changes with corresponding changes in the apparatus.”100 
When the double-slit apparatus is modified to become 
the which-path double-slit apparatus, and an entirely dif-
ferent set of “outcomes” is “observed.”
3. Apparatuses are made to mean, and they mean what they 
have become.
The “measurement outcome” of each holistic apparatal 
phenomenon (the reckoning of the “particle” by the 
“measuring” device, and vice versa) is itself the “meaning” 
of that singular phenomenon. This is a difficult concept 
to explain, because we are used to Newtonian subject/ob-
ject distinctions, where an active subject acts upon a pas-
sive object and the result is a predicated outcome. This 
Newtonian kind of thinking fails to get at what is actual-
ly happening in an apparatal phenomenon. Karen Barad’s 
neologism for describing this new quantum relationship 
between measuring device, particle, and surrounding en-
vironment is “intra-action.” Not “interaction,” because 
the key involved entities (“measuring” device and “meas-
ured” particle) are neither fully determined “subjects” or 
“objects” prior to their “intra-action.”
What exactly is the “measurable outcome” of any giv-
en holistic apparatal phenomenon? In the case of the two 
double-slit experiments above, the particle leaves a mark 
on a detector. Is this mark “knowledge” or “information?” 




Or is it both? A “measurable” outcome may be defined 
as a (not necessarily human-)legible, singular, irrevers-
ible, and thus “meaningful” outcome. So then, one way 
of “making meaning” is by reckoning, valuing, including 
(via prehension), and excluding (via negative prehen-
sion) that which matters and that which doesn’t matter. 
Such meaning-making is done by the holistic apparatal 
phenomenon itself prior to (and indeed, apart from) any 
humans reading any meters or observing any results. Re-
turning to and slightly modifying our David Bowie lyric, 
“I am the DJ / I mean what I play.”
The result of this apparatal process of measurement 
doesn’t have a meaning (something which must be se-
mantically and interpretively deduced and supplied post-
facto). The measurement itself is the meaning. It means 
what it has become. It is its own meaning. The apparatal 
phenomenon has intra-actively, collaboratively decided 
to mean itself.
So then, in terms of an art apparatus (a.k.a. a work of 
art), here is how to make a work of art mean something: 
you simply get some materials and make a work of art. As 
long as the material entities involved are apparatally in-
vited to take part in their own intra-active becoming, the 
work of art will mean what it has collaboratively decided 
to become. (Granted, how to make an apophatic work of 
art mean or become nothing rather than mean or become 
something is a bit trickier; but one step at a time!)
The work of art “means” what it has become (and like-
wise, the measurement outcome of an apparatus “means” 
what it has become), because “measurement” and “mean-
ing” are, by definition, the very act of cutting yourself 
out from the holistic universe, and then reckoning an-
other part of the universe from your cut-out part of the 
universe. You reckon that other part of the universe by 
prehending it into yourself, and in so doing, you become 
something new. Here “you” can mean “you human,” but it 
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can also mean “you apparatus,” or “you work of art.” Be-
cause we are all societies of actual entities/occasions.
“Meaning” is not merely contingent upon the results of 
reckoning (i.e., “measurement”), meaning itself is the act 
of reckoning. This is true not only for humans, but for 
our stand-in apparatuses. As Whitehead makes clear:
However far the testing of instruments is carried, fi-
nally all scientific interpretation is based upon the 
assumption of directly observed unchangeability of 
some instrument for seconds, for hours, for months, 
for years. When we test this assumption we can only 
use another instrument; and there cannot be an infi-
nite regress of instruments.101 
Barad likewise observes, “A ‘measuring instrument’ can-
not characterize (i.e., be used to measure) itself.”102
So then, apparatuses cannot step outside of the ho-
listic universe and look back on it “objectively.” The best 
they can do is purposefully cut into different parts of the 
universe in different ways. Since apparatuses are made to 
mean, and since they mean what they become, the ways 
in which I construct my art apparatus (my work of art) 
matters a great deal. Art apparatuses are not merely ob-
jective divining rods pointing toward permanently de-
cided materials with permanently decided properties. Art 
apparatuses and their materials co-decide what winds up 
mattering. Furthermore, the entire art apparatus is itself 
that which comes to matter. It means what it becomes.
On this particular point (and countless others), White-
head and Barad are so close (although Barad, in her semi-
nal text Meeting the Universe Halfway, never once cites 
Whitehead). Whitehead writes, “How an actual entity be-
comes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the 
101 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 127.
102 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 274.
99
regarding apparatuses
two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. 
Its ‘being’ is constituted by its ‘becoming’.”103 This is so 
similar to Barad’s idea that the apparatal phenomenon 
means what it becomes. Whitehead writes, “The word 
‘decision’ does not here imply conscious judgment […]. 
The word is used in its root sense of a ‘cutting off’.”104 This 
is so similar to Barad’s idea of “agential cuts” as irrevo-
cable, meaning-making decisions. These similarities are 
presumably due to the fact that both thinkers are engag-
ing theoretically with the same quantum phenomena.
From Quantum-Behavior-Measuring 
Apparatuses to Art Apparatuses
From our consideration of quantum-behavior-measuring 
apparatuses, it is apparent that “reckoning” and “measur-
ing” are not as far from “collaborating” and “making” as is 
generally thought. From a classical/Newtonian perspec-
tive, scientists were merely objectively measuring phe-
nomenon, but from a quantum mechanical perspective, 
it turns out scientists were really intra-acting and co-
making all along. This paradigm shift involves a change 
from measuring to making.
Historically, artists have experienced a similar para-
digm shift, but in the opposite direction. Artists (of the 
mostly white, male, European flavor) have transitioned 
from the “artist as hero” Renaissance paradigm (where 
humans were the measure of all things and material was 
wrested into the form the artist desired by his determined 
will), toward a paradigm where the artist is in a kind of 
collaborative dialogue with her materials, respecting and 
minding their material-ish contributions and propensi-
ties. In this sense, artists have moved from making to-
103 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 23.
104 Ibid., 43.
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ward a kind of reckoning or measuring. Both shifts (the 
scientific shift toward making and the artistic shift to-
ward measuring) meet somewhere in the middle, at a 
place where materials collaboratively become along with 
other materials, contextual environments, and humans; 
a place somewhere between reckoning and making. This 
middle ground is the ground of the apparatus as a singu-
lar, holistic phenomenon. This apparatal middle ground 
is a place between discovery and creation. It demands a 
lifelong practice (one apparatus at a time) of invention; 
but also of attention, listening, and respect toward pri-
or historical decisions (both human decisions, material 
decisions, and entangled human/material decisions), so 
that what emerges may somehow matter better.
As Martin Savransky asserts: 
Mattering always entails taking risks. Thus, in order 
to entertain the challenge of an ethics of worlding, 
we need to attend to the specific manners of creating 
delicate contacts between the mode of mattering of an 
entity and the mode of invention of a practice, so that 
the obligations posed by the former may be inherited 
in a way that forces the practice to invent a way of be-
coming responsible for it.105
Such attention to actually real historical decisions neces-
sarily demands a recognition of the real and relevant dif-
ferences between quantum-behavior-measuring appara-
tuses and art apparatuses. One relevant difference is not 
just in “scale” (per se), but in the well-decided, “societal” 
nature of most art materials (clay, oil, wood, felted wool) 
vs. the superpositioned proto-nature of most quantum 
particles (photons, electrons, and even c70 fullerene car-
bon molecules). The manifested behaviors, propensities, 
tendencies, and appetitions of more well-decided, endur-
105 Savransky, “Modes of Mattering,” 10.
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ing societies of entities (from rocks to wool to planetary 
ecosystems) are materially relevant and may not be ig-
nored (although they may be induced, lured, tempted, 
teased out, modulated, and negotiated).
Each apparatal arrangement or engagement demands 
its own unique treatment and approach. In the same way 
that I can’t simply feed felted wool into a double-slit ap-
paratus and expect meaningful results, I can’t make an 
installation from felted wool and claim that it behaves 
like a quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus simply by 
analogy. Again, Savransky cautions: 
The mode of relationality that characterizes an experi-
mental practice cannot simply be extended by analogy. 
Rather, the relational proposition needs to be posed as 
a question to which practices of social inquiry [and I 
would add, practices of art] must find their own way 
of responding.106
Each apparatal configuration demands its own kind of 
attention, including attention to the ways in which the 
construction of that apparatus is influenced by the goals 
of the discipline in which it finds itself (art, science, soci-
ology, culture theory, philosophy), as well as attention to 
the ways in which that apparatus in turn influences the 
future development and goals of that discipline. Of all 
these disciplines (these human-invented ways of access-
ing the immanently real universe), art and science are 
unique in that they both construct physical apparatuses 
which are meant to engage directly with physical materi-
als. Both art and science apparatuses enact apparatal cuts, 
and in so doing, they carve out apparatal contexts from 
the rest of the universe. Both art and science apparatuses 
are surrounded by unique external “environments” – the 
laboratory and the studio, the cryogenic chamber and the 
106 Ibid., 11. [Bracketed comments are mine.]
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art gallery. So, the similarities and differences between 
these particular, actual types of apparatuses (scientific 
and artistic) must be treated with particular, actual, non-
metaphorical care.
So, for instance, not all scientific apparatuses are the 
same. There are scientific apparatuses for measuring the 
emergent position of individual photons (for example, 
a double-slit apparatus), and scientific apparatuses for 
measuring the weight of individual rocks (for example, 
a scale). It follows, then, that one relevant difference be-
tween a scale for weighing rocks and an art apparatus 
(i.e., any work of art) is that the scale is constructed to 
be pragmatically unconcerned with the infinitesimal 
influence it is having on the infinitesimal quantum su-
perpositional behavior of the already well-decided and 
well-decohered rocks it is measuring; whereas the art 
apparatus is purposefully constructed to enter into an 
intra-active phenomenon with its materials so that new 
outcomes collaboratively emerge. The rock-measuring 
scale intends to extract value from the measurement in-
tra-action without contributing to it, whereas the art ap-
paratus intends to dialogue with, modulate, and be mod-
ulated by its materials via intra-action. In this sense, the 
art apparatus has more in common with the double-slit 
apparatus than it does with the rock-weighing scale, be-
cause the double-slit apparatus is invited by the diffrac-
tive behavior of its “measured” particles to become aware 
of its own intra-action with said particles, whereas the 
rock-weighing scale is constructed to be largely indiffer-
ent to the intra-active influence it has on its rocks. (The 
rock-weighing scale is not totally indifferent, however. 
Indeed, the measurement value of the weight of the rock 
is itself the exact “difference” to which the scale cannot 
be indifferent.)
One relevant similarity between the rock-weighing 
scale and the art apparatus is that both are (usually) deal-
ing with well-decided, well-decohered societies of enti-
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ties (like rocks) at a level of abstraction courteous toward 
and relevant to the well-decided histories of those enti-
ties. (In this sense, the art apparatus has less in common 
with the double-slit apparatus than it does with the rock-
weighing scale). All that to say, if matter is meant to mat-
ter (and it means to), then it must be allowed to matter 
as it means.
Another exciting similarity between artistic and sci-
entific apparatuses is that both instigate actual phenom-
ena. Both apparatuses (when implemented) are more 
than mere thought experiments. They have actually been 
instantiated in the world in real ways that have actually 
come to matter. The best scientific and art apparatuses 
stay with you, and they invite you to stay with them, to 
consider and reconsider them. They gnaw at you. You 
keep returning back to them, working them through, try-
ing to figure and fold them into your daily world, your 
own cosmology. They oblige you to account for them, to 
reckon with them, however casually or insistently. 
The goal of an art apparatus is in some sense the goal 
of a scientific apparatuses – not necessarily to demon-
strate or explain why something occurs, but simply to 
cause something to occur. This is a primary function of 
both artistic and scientific apparatuses – not necessar-
ily to establish new paradigms of thought (although that 
could also happen), but to persist as undeniable provoca-
tions that must then be chewed on and wrestled with, 
explained away or embraced, but which insistently refuse 
to be ignored as having not actually happened. Artistic 
and scientific apparatuses may not be fully understood, 
but they have undeniably occurred.
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The Individual Work of Art as a Singular 
Apparatus vs. Generic Media as Apparatus
I am claiming that each individual work of art functions 
as its own kind of apparatus. I am borrowing the concept 
of apparatus from laboratory science, and more particu-
larly from quantum mechanics. The term “apparatus” has 
been used in media studies before to describe the overall 
behavior of an entire medium as it relates to the culture 
in which it is situated. Louis Althusser introduced the 
concept of an ideological state apparatus; Vilém Flusser 
uses the term apparatus to describe not only the photo-
graphic camera but the entire cultural regime it enforces; 
and Gregory Ulmer has also used the term to delineate 
and describe differences in particular historical media 
regimes. “Apparatus theory” in film studies is similarly 
related to the ways in which the apparatus of the film 
camera itself enforces and informs a particular kind of 
human reception of film as a medium. Media historian 
Jussi Parikka has even suggested a “new apparatus the-
ory” of media be developed based on Karen Barad’s in-
terpretations of quantum apparatuses, while noting that 
theorists “from Jonathan Crary to Henning Schmidgen” 
have already interpreted laboratory apparatuses in the 
context of media history.107
All of these theoretical projects address media in a 
broad sense, from the perspective of media theory and 
its relevance to human culture. I have no problem with 
the use of the term “apparatus” to describe and analyze 
the general ways in which media function to define and 
modulate eras of human culture, but that is not my own 
particular project with this book. Instead, I mean to ad-
107 Jussi Parikka, “Apparatus Theory of Media à la (or in the wake of) 
Karen Barad,” Machinology: Machines, Noise, and Some Media Archaeol-




dress singular art apparatuses, one at a time, across a va-
riety of different media – each work of art understood as 
a single, functional apparatus. Will the singular art appa-
ratuses I choose to examine necessarily be influenced by 
the media materials with which they engage? Of course. 
Will these local apparatal engagements be relevant to 
broader contemporary human cultures? One would cer-
tainly hope so. Will these local apparatal engagements be 
entirely constrained and defined by the media materials 
they use? One would certainly hope not. Could these local 
apparatuses be so influential that they alter the course of 
media studies, art history, and the way in which humans 
and materials collaborate in the future? With the con-
struction of every new art apparatus, this possibility is 
always implicitly assumed.
A singular art apparatus may indeed move its own 
era past a state change threshold and into a new era, 
but only by itself being well aware of its own materials, 
their histories, and their surrounding cultural context(s). 
Marcel Duchamp’s (R. Mutt’s) Fountain and John Cage’s 
4’33’’ eventually breached their eras. They were the dou-
ble-slit and which-path apparatuses of their time. And 
like Thomas Young’s original 1801 double-slit apparatus, 
none of their contemporaries knew quite what to make 
of them.
According to my local/individual use of the term, an 
art apparatus is a singular, contrived event with a de-
limited boundary. Where the artist chooses to draw the 
boundary in part determines the event. Although the 
art apparatus must certainly be aware of the human and 
material histories involved in its contrived phenomenon, 
the goal of an art apparatus is not merely to problema-
tize or deconstruct the media genre in which it has been 
produced (a de rigueur move at this point in art history). 
Instead, the goal of an art apparatus is to generate an ap-
paratal situation in the world that results in something 
more (or less) than the material sum of its parts.
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So, for instance, I am more hopeful than Flusser 
(which may not be saying much). In Towards a Philosophy 
of Photography, Flusser suggests that all one can do with a 
photographic apparatus is exhaust its possible combina-
tory outputs within the prescribed program defined by 
the apparatus of the camera, like playing a variable but 
pre-defined game. I am suggesting that an ethical appa-
ratal art practice co-makes a new game, together with its 
media materials, one apparatus at a time. Flusser asserts, 
“[Apparatuses’] intention is not to change the world but 
to change the meaning of the world. Their intention is 
symbolic.”108 I am asserting something slightly (but fun-
damentally) different: Any art apparatus worth its ma-
terials actually does change the world, and this actual 
change of the world is itself an immediate change in the 
meaning of the world.
The Art Apparatus (The Work of Art) Proper
Turning fully to the art apparatus proper (but not yet ful-
ly to the particular type of art apparatus known as apo-
phatic), I will just reiterate that every work of art, from 
Michelangelo’s David to a Dan Flavin neon light instal-
lation may be considered an art apparatus. The medium, 
genre, historical era, and social context of the work of art 
are of course relevant to the functioning of the apparatus, 
but all works of art may still be understood to function as 
apparatuses. Even many works like Andrei Rublev’s Christ 
the Redeemer icon from the 1400s, which we now consider 
to be “artworks” but which at the time were more like 
mechanisms for contemplation and worship, may use-
fully be considered as art apparatuses. My point is not 
to flatten the entire fields of art history, criticism, and 
108 Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, trans. Anthony 
Matthews (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 25.
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theory; or to neutralize the nuance of their various and 
relevant insights. Instead, I simply want to initially ap-
proach all art from this broader apparatal perspective, so 
that I may then focus in on a particular apophatic (noth-
ing-making) type of art apparatus. 
Having established a relationship between art appa-
ratuses and scientific (particularly quantum-behavior-
measuring) apparatuses, I now pivot from Alfred North 
Whitehead and Niels Bohr to Gilles Deleuze, Deleuze and 
Guattari, and philosopher (and Deleuze scholar) Elizabeth 
Grosz. In pivoting to Deleuze, I never really leave White-
head, since Deleuze’s cosmology is in constant implicit 
and explicit contact with Whitehead’s cosmology (as well 
as with Henri Bergson’s and Marcel Proust’s). Deleuze 
(and Deleuze and Guattari) focus more specifically than 
Whitehead on art, which is why Deleuze’s perspective be-
comes particularly relevant here. To me, Deleuze is the 
philosopher of the analog synthesizer – not simply be-
cause he applied his philosophy to the workings of the 
analog synthesizer, but because his entire cosmological 
model of deterritorializations and reterritorializations 
proceeds and behaves like a philosophical version of an 
analog synthesizer. An analog synthesizer is a machine 
which renders the waves of the universe sensory (and 
thus sensible). It generates, gathers, modulates, folds, 
and outputs the chaotic forces of the universe. An analog 
synthesizer is thus a kind of apparatus (although Deleuze 
doesn’t explicitly use that term to describe it) for modu-
lating the standing waves and forces of the universe. It 
acts as a kind of lightning rod or divining rod for these 
forces, and then acts as a rigorous modulation machine 
of them. It bears mentioning that oscillators and wave-
generating devices are a regular part of the experimental 
arsenal of those decoherence-exploring physicists work-
ing at mesoscopic scales, intent on “observing” quantum 
superposition behavior at increasingly larger scales.
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Rather than simply describe the ways in which a work 
of art functions as an apparatus, I will proceed instead 
by explaining to a(n imaginary) practicing artist the 
best ways to take advantage of the apparatal nature of 
the works of art she is making. I will draw on Deleuze 
throughout.
1. Make your art apparatus more about what it causes to 
happen than what it looks like or “represents.”
Even when your work does look like something (and it 
will almost always have some visual appearance), the 
ways in which this look affects what the work is actually 
causing to happen is more relevant to the overall appa-
ratal phenomenon (the artwork) than the look in and of 
itself.
Deleuze, in conversation with Richard Pinhas (experi-
mental musician and former student of Deleuze), states, 
“You don’t live in the same manner according to whether 
you develop a form or you find your way in relations of 
speeds and slownesses among particles, or things func-
tioning as particles, insofar as you distribute affects. It’s 
not the same mode of life at all.”109 Elsewhere, regarding 
Francis Bacon, Deleuze states, “In art […] it is not a mat-
ter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing 
forces.”110 Finally, Deleuze and Guattari on art after Ro-
manticism: “The postromantic turning point: the essen-
tial thing is no longer forms and matters, or themes, but 
forces, densities, intensities.”111
109 Gilles Deleuze and Richard Pinhas, “Vincennes Seminar Session, 
May 3, 1997: On Music,” trans. Timothy S. Murphy, Discourse: Journal 
for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture 20, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 9.
110 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. 
Smith (London: Continuum, 2003), 56.
111 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 343.
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If you proceed by attending to the nature of your ma-
terials rather than solely according to the resultant forms 
you are creating, you will more fully take advantage of 
the art apparatus of which you are a part. What are your 
materials already doing? What might they want to be in-
vited to do? Deleuze exhorts, “It’s not enough to make 
moving shadows on the wall. You have to construct im-
ages that can move by themselves.”112
It is not enough to merely stage your materials to be-
have “as if” they are metaphorically related to the form or 
content of your art. The materials themselves should be 
more fine-grainedly, intrinsically intra-active with the en-
tire function of your holistic art apparatus. For example, 
(post-)internet artist Jon Rafman had a large solo show 
of several installation stations at the Stedelijk Museum 
in Amsterdam.113 Part of Rafman’s practice is finding mar-
ginal, subcultural online video content and re-editing it 
into affectively disturbing video collages. In the Stedelijk 
show, each video collage was screened inside of an instal-
lation environment which metaphorically (albeit affec-
tively) enacted some aspect of the video. So, for example, 
a video with sinking elements was looped above a ball 
pit in which you gradually sank while you watched the 
video. A video with bondage elements was to be watched 
while sitting in a row of claustrophobic sofa seats. A vid-
eo about the isolation of video game addiction was pro-
jected inside of a private viewing booth modeled to look 
like a desktop computer. Each of these stations proceeded 
by metaphor, and each added (somewhat, but not terribly 
much) to the already strong video work screened within 
these viewing environments.
112 Gilles Deleuze, “Mediators,” in Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin 
Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 122.
113 The show was wonderfully entitled I have ten thousand compound eyes 
and each is named suffering.
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The most successful viewing station in the entire show 
(if both video and viewing environment were judged to-
gether and considered as a single holistic apparatus) was 
comprised of a video with jarring jump-cuts projected 
onto a large wall in front of a fairly free-swinging, sin-
gle-person swing hung from the ceiling and several yards 
away from the video wall. While merely standing on the 
floor watching the video, its jump-cuts were not all that 
disturbing; but while swinging on the swing, the entire 
experience was terribly disruptive. On the swing, you 
could never acquire a stable frame of reference. The pro-
jection on the wall was large enough that, while swing-
ing, all four edges of the video never quite came into full 
view. Each jump-cut in the video thus became massively 
disruptive, because on the swing you were trying to stabi-
lize yourself via a steady ground-plane frame of reference, 
which forced you to more fully throw yourself cognitively 
into the video in search of some steadying frame of refer-
ence, which then placed you in an even more vulnerable 
and vertiginous cognitive position where the violence of 
the jump-cuts was able to bodily enact its full force. The 
whole apparatus was made even more disturbing by the 
fact that the swing simply looked like an ordinary swing 
you would find on a playground. Since it was a single-
seat swing at a large and well-visited art museum, eve-
ryone had to wait their turn. And so, prior to getting on 
the swing, you were able to watch other people swinging; 
and from the ground, the whole apparatus looked fairly 
benign and even slightly banal. This apparent simplicity 
of the apparatus made your affective experience all the 
more disturbing once you finally took your own turn on 
the swing.
With this particular viewing station (as opposed to 
the others in the show), the swing set was in no way a 
metaphor of the filmic jump-cut. The swing set was not 
literally sharp. It did not move jerkily (indeed, it moved 
quite continuously and smoothly). It intensified the af-
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fective instability of the filmic jump-cuts by collabora-
tively, intra-actively participating in an overall, holistic, 
apparatal project of instability. This swing set viewing 
station apparatus created a jump-cut experience in the 
viewer’s body. The viewer’s body entered into an appa-
ratal relationship with the swing and the video, the wall, 
the space, and the rest of the viewers waiting in line and 
wondering. I don’t even remember what the “content” of 
the video “represented.” I don’t remember what the video 
was “about.” Instead, it became “about” what the entire 
apparatus was doing. This is not to say that a successful 
art apparatus can only be an abstract installation involv-
ing moving parts and harshly edited video. The Rothko 
Chapel is a successful art apparatus. Seurat’s A Sunday 
on La Grande Jatte painting is a successful art apparatus. 
Rublev’s Christ the Redeemer icon is a successful art appa-
ratus. But the right move to be made is always beyond 
what the art work “represents” and toward what it causes 
to happen.
2. Your art apparatus should open out onto universal 
forces and invite them into itself.
A particularly successful art apparatus will seek to gather 
universal anomalies, those actual entities and potentiali-
ties of the universe that usually fail to ingress with other 
actual entities, those things which get traced-over and 
normalized(-out), those not quite orthogonal, not quite 
orthonormal, yet nonetheless potential vectors (to bor-
row some mathematical terms from quantum mechan-
ics). Your art apparatus should suck the universe into 
itself in ways that cause the improbable and unlikely to 
ingress into the actual real. Your art apparatus should fail 
to negatively prehend (and thus positively prehend, how-
ever fractionally) some unlikely, oblique, prior actual en-
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tity. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “The artist opens 
up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a ‘work’.”114
An art apparatus which takes full advantage of its ap-
paratal nature is one that is able to make much of things 
(forces, entities, potentia) that are “usually” (in our cur-
rent era) negatively prehended. Not to “exploit” these 
anomalies for utilitarian use or gain, but to give them 
their own place at the concrescence table, to invite them 
to matter in new ways normally denied them. This invi-
tation occurs by means of amplification – constructing 
an apparatus that will amplify the influence of a force 
not normally influential. According to Elizabeth Grosz, 
the goal is “above all to generate excess, further vibratory 
forces, more effects, useless effects, qualities that can’t be 
directly capitalized.”115
As an artist who purposefully constructs art appa-
ratuses, you are most efficacious and ingenious when 
you see yourself not as a forger of forms or a maker of 
metaphors, but as a harnesser and modulator of forces. 
Deleuze and Guattari even suggest a new job title: 
The modern figure is not the child or the lunatic, still 
less the artist, but the cosmic artisan […]. To be an ar-
tisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the 
only way to become cosmic, to leave the milieus and 
the earth behind. The invocation to the Cosmos does 
not at all operate as a metaphor; on the contrary, the 
operation is an effective one, from the moment the 
artist connects a material with forces of consistency 
or consolidation.116 
114 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 337.
115 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the 
Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 54.
116 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 345.
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The cosmic artisan does not bother constructing a meta-
phor which offers a means by which humans may under-
stand a world which already exists. Instead, the cosmic 
artisan constructs apparatal invitations which entice uni-
versal forces to become involved in new configurations 
which themselves come to actually matter and make a 
world newly altered by these holistic art apparatuses.
3. Open up the holistic process of your art apparatus to 
purposefully invite humans into it (if humans are in-
deed your “intended” “audience,” however primarily or 
fractionally).
You are not creating a black box apparatus which obscures 
its process and only affords an input hole for materials 
and an output hole for the completed art object. Never-
theless, mind that you do not create a stilted, awkwardly 
staged “interactive” apparatus which so constrains hu-
man participation as to render their decisions largely 
pre-determined and inconsequential. This is the pitfall 
of most self-declared “interactive” art. Just because there 
is a forking narrative or a pushable button does not mean 
that you have automatically achieved the goal of inviting 
the human to participate in your apparatus. Oftentimes 
an awkwardly staged invitation for a “user” to “interact” 
with your work is actually just one more way to overde-
termine and artificially stage their ingression into the 
work. As Jacques Rancière insists throughout The Eman-
cipated Spectator, a painting hanging on a wall in a gallery 
may prove more truly “interactive” than a purposefully 
“interactive,” computer-centric, new media installation.
Process Art as a genre becomes one way to invite the 
“viewer” into the process of the creation of the “artwork,” 
whereby the artwork becomes more about the process of 
its own emergence than about the output of a singular 
art object. Performance Art as a genre becomes another 
means in which an art apparatus may be explicitly con-
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structed to play out, a phase at a time, in relation to its 
human “audience.” Because Process Art and Performance 
Art involve the “audience” in the apparatal process early 
or throughout, there is a potential for their human audi-
ence members to more integrally ingress into the holistic 
apparatal event. But there are other ingenious, non-Pro-
cess-Art, non-Performance-Art means of extending the 
holistic phenomenon of the overall apparatal process out 
into the last-mile, “art object meets art patron” phase of 
the art apparatus.
The standard advice is to make sure that some element 
of the resultant art object reveals the means of its own 
creation. But there are better, more fine-grained ways to 
imbue an art object with the process of its own produc-
tion than simply “revealing” an aspect of the production 
process via some cheeky visual clue in the resultant art 
object. Better to stop thinking of the art apparatus as an 
“art object” altogether. The art apparatus thus continues 
beyond the resultant “art object” to include the event of 
experience that the human art patron has with the art 
object. What kinds of “inclusion” do I mean? I do not sim-
ply mean the final, summative conclusion of interpretive 
completion, à la Marcel Duchamp. Duchamp famously 
asserted, “The creative act is not performed by the artist 
alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the 
external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner 
qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the crea-
tive act.”117 I’m less interested in the role of the “specta-
tor” as a kind of semiotic “reader” or “interpreter” of the 
signifying “meaning” of the work. Instead, I understand 
the “spectator” to be a part of the entire, holistic, actu-
ally real art apparatus. The “spectator” not only “looks” 
and then consciously invents some cognitive interpreta-
117 Marcel Duchamp, “The Creative Act,” in The Essential Writings of Mar-
cel Duchamp, eds. Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1975), 140.
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tion. Instead, the “spectator” intra-acts with the entire 
configuration of the art apparatus and is herself changed 
as a result. She herself now “means” something different. 
The best art apparatuses (even those apparatuses that are 
“merely” paintings) approach their human audiences not 
as semiotic readers who tie-off and finalize the creative 
act with their conscious interpretations, but as enduring 
objects which are themselves involved in the holistic ap-
paratal configuration.
Your art apparatus is able to accomplish results that a 
philosophy apparatus is simply not able to accomplish, 
and you (as a cosmic artisan) should take advantage of 
these strengths. Because the art apparatus deals in mate-
rials, it has access to the affective base of human bodily 
experience which Whitehead describes. This experiential 
base is not necessarily proto-conscious or even the Freud-
ian subconscious, because such affective bodily experi-
ences may never wind up influencing the conscious (or 
subconscious) at all. Indeed, most do not. But neither are 
these affective bodily experiences explicitly a-conscious, 
because they may indeed ultimately fold into conscious-
ness, depending on their particular, eventual relevance to 
consciousness.
Learning to play the drums makes quite plain the ways 
in which such embodied “knowledges” are indifferent to-
ward (or at least not contingent upon) conscious “knowl-
edge.” You can read all the books you want on drumming, 
but without bodily playing the drums on a regular basis, 
you will never actually “know” how to play the drums. As 
Henri Bergson explains, “It is one thing to understand 
a difficult movement, another to be able to carry it out. 
To understand it, we need only to realize in it what is es-
sential, just enough to distinguish it from all other pos-
sible movements. But to be able to carry it out, we must 
besides have brought our body to understand it. Now, 
the logic of the body admits of no tacit implications. It 
demands that all the constituent parts of the movement 
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shall be set forth one by one, and then put together again. 
Here a complete analysis is necessary, in which no detail 
is neglected, and an actual synthesis, in which nothing is 
curtailed.”118
The best art apparatuses purposefully invite their hu-
man “audiences” to bodily, affectively intra-act with them, 
not just to consciously interpret them. Grosz speaks of 
“the non-functional perceptual immersion in things and 
qualities that art generates.”119 Elsewhere she describes 
“the rendering sonorous of forces, ultimately the forces 
of chaos itself, that are themselves nonsonorous.”120 She 
asks, “How does the work of art bring about sensations, 
not sensations of what we know and recognize, but of 
what is unknown, unexperienced, traces not of the past 
but of the future, not of the human and its recognized 
features, but of the inhuman?”121 As the cosmic artisan, 
it is your job to answer this question, to invent art appa-
ratuses that entangle marginalized actual occasions, vir-
tual potentia, and immediate, immanent human bodies.
4. Proceed with care.
Experimental does not mean slack. Quite the opposite. 
This is not to say that a rigorous artistic practice need 
necessarily be “scientific,” but it should proceed with 
care – care toward materials and their histories, and care 
toward the construction of an art apparatus that might 
most matter. Deleuze and Guattari counsel, “Sobriety, so-
briety: that is the common prerequisite for the deterrito-
rialization of matters, the molecularization of material, 
118 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and 
W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 112.
119 Elizabeth Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecom-
ing,” parallax 11, no. 2 (2005): 9.




and the cosmicization of forces.”122 They quote composer 
Karlheinz Stockhausen: “Work with very limited materi-
als and integrate the universe into them through a con-
tinuous variation.”123
5. Trouble Things Up!
Cause trouble within the apparatus. Continually modu-
late and vary. Tweak the heck out of stuff (with great 
care). Construct apparatuses meant to trouble, irk, both-
er, and provoke your materials. Otherwise, only normal-
ized, expected, and already-enacted results will (re-)oc-
cur. No truly experimental scientific apparatus would 
waste its time re-confirming some already known behav-
ior. In experimental science, you are trying to conduct an 
experiment that solves some unknown problem or con-
firms some unproved hypothesis. More often than not, by 
rigorously attending to the unknown problem, your con-
structed scientific apparatus accidentally creates a new 
problem worth exploring. With an art apparatus, you can 
just cut straight to creating the new worthwhile problem, 
but always with attention and rigor, or the problem will 
wind up being not all that worthwhile.
It was Albert Einstein’s own intellectual problems and 
objections with quantum mechanics, and his rigorous 
and careful concern in posing them, that led to the pur-
suit, construction, and verification of a number of worth-
while, actual apparatuses (which subsequently wound up 
further confounding and problematizing Einstein’s origi-
nal problems and objections). It was Bertram Russel’s and 
Alfred North Whitehead’s rigorous pursuit of a contra-
diction-free, hermetically airtight mathematical system 
that led to the proof that no such system could ever ex-
122 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 344.
123 Karlheinz Stockhausen, interviewed in Le Monde, July 21, 1977, quot-
ed in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 551.
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ist, which then led to Whitehead’s pursuit (invention?) 
of speculative philosophy (a flavor of philosophy worth 
having) and Russel’s pursuit (invention?) of analytic phi-
losophy (another flavor of philosophy worth having, I 
suppose). Musician, producer, and artist Brian Eno and 
painter Peter Schmidt collaborated on a series of cards 
meant to provoke inventive solutions. They called the se-
ries “Oblique Strategies: Over One Hundred Worthwhile 
Dilemmas.” One of your goals as a cosmic artisan is to 
create art apparatuses that generate worthwhile dilem-
mas. Worthwhile to whom? In what ways? To what fu-
tures? These are your operative motivational questions.
The nature of your art apparatus may be derived from 
certain theoretical questions, or it may be derived from 
the results of prior apparatuses. The outcomes of your ap-
paratuses (that which emerges from your apparatal cuts 
into the universe) may confirm or disconfirm prior theo-
ries, but these binary confirmations or disconfirmations 
in and of themselves are largely irrelevant. The best art 
apparatuses give rise to new theoretical interpretations, 
which then lead to new theoretical questions, which then 
lead to the creation of new apparatuses. Your apparatus-
es may be created based on hunches, questions, or wild 
conjectures (all carefully pursued). They may be created 
by speculatively treating one thing as if it were another 
thing, just to see what concrescences might emerge. Art 
apparatuses lead to new speculative questions which pro-
voke the construction of new art apparatuses which lead 
to new speculative questions, etc. This ongoing, forward-
feeding art practice is never hermetically sealed, but al-
ways in continuous dialogue with materials and their 
histories in the actual world. If you listen aright, the ma-
terials themselves will pose many of the questions.
Constantly remember, all this experimental troubling 
must nonetheless be done with care and rigor. Deleuze: 
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“A very lengthy preparation, yet no method, nor rules, nor 
recipes.”124
The construction of your art apparatus may initially 
be driven by a theoretical question or provocation, but 
it must immediately become open to the directions in 
which the provocation itself begins to lead (even, espe-
cially, if it begins to lead away from an immediate and 
tidy resolution of the provocation). Filmmaker and theo-
rist Trinh T. Minh-ha cautions, “A creative event does not 
grasp, it does not take possession, it is an excursion.”125
As cosmic artisans, we are authorized to borrow our 
methods of experimental troubling from other disci-
plines, particularly from speculative philosophy. Accord-
ing to Deleuze and Guattari, the process of inventing 
concepts (i.e., philosophy) “implies a sort of groping ex-
perimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are 
not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These meas-
ures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological pro-
cesses, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess.”126 
Note: rigor does not exclude irrationality. There is a kind 
of rigorous irrationality that is particularly relevant to an 
art practice (and not to a scientific practice).
Following Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari continue:
Thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, 
stammers; it talks in tongues and screams, which leads 
it to create, or to try to. If thought searches, it is less in 
the manner of someone who possesses a method than 
that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated 
leaps. We have no reason to take pride in this image 
124 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlin-
son and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), 8.
125 Trinh T. Minh-ha, When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender, 
and Cultural Politics (New York: Routledge, 1991), 26.
126 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 2009), 41.
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of thought, which involves much suffering without 
glory and indicates the degree to which thinking has 
become increasingly difficult: immanence.127 
Note: rigor does not imply a smooth, coordinated proces-
sion of inquiry. There is a kind of rigorous irregularity 
that is particularly relevant to an art practice (and not to 
a scientific practice).
6. Purposefully open your art apparatus out onto the rest 
of the universe, so that your apparatus may act as a 
proposition-generator, a lure for future feeling and be-
coming.
I mentioned earlier that I was bracketing and deferring 
Whitehead’s concept of “propositions” in order to later 
apply it directly to the art apparatus itself. Here we are. 
Your art apparatus is a proposition-generator, a lure for 
feeling. The purposeful, particular way in which you con-
struct it acts as a procedure for drawing out this lure. 
Once your art apparatus has done its work (one human 
“patron” at a time), it remains in the universe as a per-
petual proposition-generator. Your artwork has caused 
something to actually, historically occur in the world, and 
now that occurrence becomes a real proposition which 
attracts, entices, lures, and provokes future becomings. 
Your art apparatus doesn’t prove anything; it lures future 
things to become. Your art apparatus doesn’t end at itself. 
It throws itself forward toward future becomings.
Regarding propositions, Whitehead explains, “A prop-
osition is a new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure 
potentialities and actualities. A ‘singular’ proposition is 
the potentiality of an actual world including a definite set 




pothetical ingression of a definite set of eternal objects.”128 
“A proposition is a complex entity which stands between 
the eternal objects and the actual occasions. Compared to 
eternal objects a proposition shares in the concrete par-
ticularity of actual occasions; and compared to actual oc-
casions a proposition shares in the abstract generality of 
eternal objects.”129 Again, here I will substitute Deleuze’s 
“virtual potentia” for Whitehead’s “eternal objects/pure 
potentialities;” but otherwise, Whitehead’s explanation 
is explicitly relevant to my claims. While the purely phys-
ical pole in an actual occasion is busy merely prehending 
the bare facts of prior actual data, what entices, awak-
ens, and lures the mental pole to consider the ways in 
which things might become otherwise? Propositions. It 
is essential to note that Whitehead’s propositions mostly 
occur at the a-conscious level. Rocks and electrons may 
“mentally” entertain propositions. Whitehead himself 
clarifies, “Finally, it must be remembered that proposi-
tions enter into experience in other ways than through 
judgment-feelings.”130 “Propositions intensify, attenuate, 
inhibit, or transmute, without necessarily entering into 
clear consciousness, or encountering judgment.”131 And fi-
nally, “A verbal statement is never the full expression of a 
proposition.”132 Art apparatuses don’t generate Whitehe-
adian propositions by positing written artist statements. 
Rather, their apparatal engagements with the world are 
purposefully constructed to generate affective propo-
sitions that lure the world into being other than it has 
been before.
Purposefully orient your art apparatus outward and 
forward, that it may most efficaciously entice, snare, and 
entangle future becomings. Deleuze and Guattari advise 






some ways of making nothing
us to “produce a deterritorialized refrain as the final end 
of music, release it in the Cosmos—that is more impor-
tant than building a new system. Opening the assemblage 
onto a cosmic force.”133 Artist and Deleuze scholar Simon 
O’Sullivan observes, “Art is ontologically difficult. It is not 
made for an already constituted audience but in fact calls 
its audience into being.”134 Construct your art apparatus in 
such a way that it may propose, invite, entice, invoke, and 
lure new audiences and new epochs into being.
Epochs and Futures
Art apparatuses are mechanisms which instigate actual 
concrescences which lead the world to be created anew. 
But, according to Whitehead, any and every actual occa-
sion/entity creates the world anew, always already. So, 
there is nothing so very special about creating the new. 
Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible keep from cre-
ating the new (as the rest of this book will explore). The 
actual occasions generated by quality art apparatuses dif-
fer from other “ordinary” actual occasions in that they 
create a new that might somehow be better than the new 
that creates itself by default. Some art apparatuses are 
so ingenious at creating the new that the new they cre-
ate leads to an entirely new epoch. What defines a new 
epoch? According to my understanding of Whitehead, 
when the usual modes of change themselves change, that 
meta-change constitutes the beginning of a new epoch. 
More on this definition later.
I already mentioned that John Cage’s 4’33’’ and Marcel 
Duchamp’s Fountain created a new artistic epoch. Quan-
tum-behavior-measuring apparatuses also created a new 
133 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 350.
134 Simon O’Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Be-
yond Representation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 68.
123
regarding apparatuses
scientific epoch. They foregrounded fundamental, here-
tofore unknown behavioral regularities (like superposi-
tion) that initially seemed like impossibilities. Scientists 
were gradually forced to interpret the implications of 
these behaviors, implications which necessitated a re-
consideration of the nature, function, and boundary of 
the scientific apparatus itself. Due to quantum-behav-
ior-measuring apparatuses, we have been forced to re-
interpret the meaning of measurement, the meaning of 
an object, the meaning of a property, the meaning of a 
behavior, the relationship between objects and their en-
vironments, the meaning of causality and irreversibility, 
and the meaning of time. So, the double-slit apparatus is 
a radical apparatus that re-defined our understanding of 
an apparatus itself. The best art apparatuses do the same. 
Marcel Proust’s intelligent description of the way in 
which art epochs change is worth citing in full:
To succeed thus in gaining recognition, the original 
painter, the original writer proceeds on the lines ad-
opted by oculists. The course of treatment they give us 
by their painting or by their prose is not always agree-
able to us. When it is at an end the operator says to us: 
‘Now look!’ And, lo and behold, the world around us 
(which was not created once and for all, but is created 
afresh as often as an original artist is born) appears to 
us entirely different from the old world, but perfectly 
clear. Women pass in the street, different from what 
they used to be, because they are Renoirs, those Renoir 
types which we persistently refused to see as women. 
The carriages, too, are Renoirs, and the water, and 
the sky: we feel tempted to go for a walk in the forest 
which reminds us of that other which when we first 
saw it looked like anything in the world except a for-
est, like for instance a tapestry of innumerable shades 
but lacking precisely the shades proper to forests. Such 
is the new and perishable universe which has just been 
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created. It will last until the next geological catastro-
phe is precipitated by a new painter or writer of origi-
nal talent.135
New epochs don’t emerge from nowhere, but from the 
epochs which precede them. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, “In a sense, everything we attribute to an age 
was already present in the preceding age.”136 Thus, new 
epochs are never created simply by ignoring prior histori-
cal decisions (whether human-made or material-made), 
but, on the contrary, by closely (and experimentally) at-
tending to them.
Karen Barad insightfully observes that apparatuses 
play an integral part in codifying the disciplinary dis-
tinctions of a particular epoch: “Apparatuses are neither 
neutral probes of the natural world nor social structures 
that deterministically impose some particular outcome. 
Significantly, […] the notion of an apparatus is not prem-
ised on inherent divisions between the social and the 
scientific, the human and the nonhuman, nature and cul-
ture. Apparatuses are the practices through which these 
divisions are constituted.”137 Similarly, if the implications 
of an apparatus are radical enough, prior disciplinary dis-
tinctions may be modulated and redistributed, resulting 
in entirely new epochs. Indeed, according to Elizabeth 
Grosz’s reading of Deleuze, philosophy itself is “the be-
coming-artistic of scientific knowledge and the becom-
ing-scientific of artistic creation.”138 The instigation of 
such cross-disciplinary becomings may rightly be consid-
ered the implicit charge of Deleuze’s cosmic artisan.
135 Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff 
(1925; Paris: Feedbooks, 2014), 296, http://www.feedbooks.com/
book/1449/the-guermantes-way.
136 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 346.
137 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 169.
138 Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming,” 12.
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An epochal shift occurs when the usual modes of 
change themselves change. Whitehead declares that 
“laws of change are themselves liable to change,”139 and 
when they do, we have entered a new epoch. Whitehead 
explains, “The form of process is not wholly dependent 
upon derivation from the past. As epochs decay amid fu-
tility and frustration, the form of process derives other 
ideals involving novel forms of order.”140 “Entities with 
new relationships, unrealized in our experiences and 
unforeseen by our imaginations, will make their appear-
ance, introducing into the universe new types of order.”141 
Himself a renowned mathematician, Whitehead offers 
this (wonderfully self-deprecating) example: “There is no 
difficulty in imagining a world – i.e., a cosmic epoch – in 
which arithmetic would be an interesting fanciful topic 
for dreamers, but useless for practical people engrossed 
in the business of life.”142 According to her own original 
cosmology, Karen Barad proposes a very similar process, 
“Matter’s dynamism is generative not merely in the sense 
of bringing new things into the world but in the sense 
of bringing forth new worlds, of engaging in an ongoing 
reconfiguring of the world.”143
The one thing that doesn’t change, according White-
head, is the general propensity of the universe to always 
strive toward novelty. The modes of change may radi-
cally change from epoch to epoch, but the fundamental 
propensity toward change itself will never change. We 
(and those who survive us) will never find ourselves per-
manently marooned in a new epoch that has changed so 
much it has discarded change altogether and refuses to 
ever change again into the next epoch.
139 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 95.
140 Ibid., 103.
141 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 288.
142 Ibid., 199.
143 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 170.
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The potential of provoking such epochal shifts is ex-
citing, but it is not without a very real element of danger, 
by definition. Following Artaud, Jacques Derrida explic-
itly formulates, “Danger as Becoming.”144 Elsewhere he 
explains, “The future can only be anticipated in the form 
of absolute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with 
constituted normality and can only be proclaimed, pre-
sented, as a sort of monstrosity.”145 Whitehead himself 
soberly observes, “When fundamental change arrives, 
sometimes heaven dawns, and sometimes hell yawns 
open.”146 An ethics of rigorous care coupled with experi-
mental daring is required if we are to invite epochal 
changes that will come to matter to those future socie-
ties of entities (human, material, other) that will come.
Fortunately (and unfortunately), for the cosmic arti-
san, the main challenge is not how to avoid accidentally 
unleashing something hellish, monstrous, and worse 
onto the world. The main challenge is how to unleash 
anything into the world that matters much at all one way 
or another. Yes, all art apparatuses can’t help but make 
something new, but making a flavor of new that matters 
much demands a lifelong practice of rigorous, ongoing 
experimentation.
Here ends our consideration of the artwork as art ap-
paratus, its relationship with the scientific apparatus, and 
how a cosmic artisan might use an art apparatus to make 
a new world. If you are the type of cosmic artisan who 
intends to make something, feel free to stop reading now 
and begin making your next something-making art appa-
ratus. If, however, you are the type of cosmic artisan that 
intends to use your art apparatus to make nothing (or if 
144 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 239.
145 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 5.
146 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 95.
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you are just curious), further inquiry is required – inquiry 






Historically, apophasis is a kind of writing about God 
that purposefully undermines itself in order to avoid the 
heresy of overdetermining God by reducing him to lan-
guage. It functions in conjunction with kataphatic writ-
ing, which is writing about God that straightforwardly 
declares God’s nature and attributes. Without kataphatic 
writing, apophatic writing would have nothing to unsay. 
Without apophatic writing, kataphatic writing would 
quickly reduce God to a series of assertive truth state-
ments. Apophatic writing is found in a number of reli-
gious traditions. It is associated with mysticism, and of-
ten finds itself at the boundary of orthodoxy in each of 
these traditions, since the tenets defining any orthodoxy 
must necessarily be expressed as assertive creeds, and 
apophatic writing is always eating away at the edges of 
credal assertion.
Before I get too far into an explanation of apophat-
ic writing, I should clarify why I am even (re-)opening 
the notoriously problematic can of worms that is apo-
phasis, and how I mean to appropriate apophasis for my 
own project. The goal of this book is to analyze some 
worthwhile ways of making nothing. Initially, it seems 
like “making nothing” should be as simple as abstain-
ing from making something. Just quit your job making 
art apparatuses, and you will have succeeded at making 
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nothing. There is, however, an important difference be-
tween abstaining from making something and purpose-
fully making nothing.
According to Alfred North Whitehead and process phi-
losophy, something is always made. Indeed, one cannot 
refrain from making something. Even my death brings 
something new into the world, and my subsequent and 
ongoing absence from the world is negatively prehended 
by all future actual occasions (becomings) of the world. 
Thus, to refrain from making art apparatuses (as most 
non-artists already do) is still to make something. Even 
when Marcel Duchamp took his famous hiatus from mak-
ing art in order to focus on playing chess, he was none-
theless making something in the world. Had Duchamp 
been an auto mechanic instead of an artist, and had he 
decided to take an obscure hiatus from car repair to focus 
on playing chess, he would still have been making some-
thing in the world. But in neither case would Duchamp 
have been making an apophatic art apparatus – an art 
apparatus with the express intention of making nothing.
It turns out that, since everything is always already 
becoming something new (moment by moment by mo-
ment), there is really no way to make a permanent noth-
ing. In Whitehead’s own words, “You cannot approach 
nothing; for there is nothing to approach.”1 To make a 
permanent nothing would amount to a kind of radical, 
holistic nihilism. I don’t think such permanent, holistic 
nothings are possible; and even if they were, I wouldn’t 
advocate purposefully heading toward them. When I talk 
about making nothing, I am really talking about defer-
ring (however fractionally) the inevitable, headlong rush 
of the universe toward something new. I am talking about 
a kind of braking, munging up, and confounding (howev-




er fractionally) the inevitable becomings of the universe 
– the perpetual concrescences that are bound to proceed.
As in cooking, the pace at which and the order in 
which things come together is often of crucial impor-
tance. Gradually turning down the boil is not at all the 
same as throwing something immediately from a boiling 
pot into a bath of ice-chilled water. In both cases, room 
temperature is eventually reached, but the pragmatic 
effects are qualitatively (and often radically) different. 
Shock blanching something at high heat for thirty sec-
onds is not at all the same as mildly simmering some-
thing on low heat for hours, even if the same quantita-
tive amount of heat is imparted in each instance. Such 
qualitative differences in speed and sequence are never 
inconsequential, and rarely even incidental. In the over-
whelmingly noun-centric history of philosophy, nouns 
and the adjectives that describe their qualities have 
generally been foregrounded; whereas verbs and the ad-
verbs that describe their qualities have generally been 
marginalized. Likewise, the history of art has skewed to-
ward noun-centricity. “Oh, you’re an artist! Do you paint 
or sculpt?” Whereas the nothings we are pursuing here 
are not nouns with adjectival qualities. Instead, they are 
(jarring or confounding) adverbial arrests in verb-cen-
tric becomings that result in the deferred emergence of 
anything at all (whether subsequent nouns, subsequent 
verbs, or the noun–verbs that Whitehead calls “actual en-
tities/occasions”).
So why slam on the brakes of concrescence, actualiza-
tion, and becoming? What is the ethical efficacy of such 
a seemingly punk rock, nihilistic sabotage of emergence? 
I address this question more fully in the final chapter, 
where I approach an ethics of nothing. But a prelimi-
nary answer here may make my incorporation of apo-
phasis more followable and sensible. In a world where 
everything is always already hurtling forward into new 
becomings, the challenge is not how to make something 
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new, but how to make something new that might mat-
ter. Slowing the emergence of things has been advocated 
(by conservation-minded folks), and accelerating the 
emergence of things has also been advocated (by accel-
erationists and capitalists alike). Both approaches can be 
relatively useful or relatively impotent (depending on the 
contexts in which they are deployed). I am simply advo-
cating a third approach of full-on braking (for however 
brief an instant), in order to qualitatively modulate what-
ever eventually emerges subsequent to the braking.
I lived in northern Montana for a year, and I had a 
friend there from northern Saskatchewan who drove 
deftly (but cavalierly) on ice. He used his emergency 
brake to steer. Being from south Alabama where there is 
never any ice, his driving terrified me. But he was actually 
a safer driver than his more cautious southern counter-
parts who were only comfortable gradually accelerating 
or decelerating. His emergency brake was a normal part 
of his driving apparatus. By rigorously engaging it and 
disengaging it at strategic moments during his driving 
process, he was more effectively able to steer on ice. This 
modicum of seemingly nihilistic and jarring stoppage 
was actually just one more tool in his driving toolbox, 
one that better equipped him to co-navigate (and in a 
sense, surf) the trajectory that emerged from his engage-
ment with both ice and car.
In our current era of broadly entangled and accelerated 
co-emergence, we are all driving on ice. This is particular-
ly true given that most of our current cosmological mod-
els of explanation are noun-centric and event-agnostic 
(if not altogether event-blind). And probably, the entire 
history of the universe has always been a kind of driving 
on ice, co-deciding and co-emerging along a perpetually 
recalibrating vector, toward a moving future target-on-
wheels which our ongoing becomings are continually 
repositioning. This is not a bad thing. It is (becoming) 
what it is (becoming). But if this is indeed the way the 
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universe actually unfolds, then adding a nothing-making 
brake mechanism to our ethical and aesthetic tool box 
seems less like nihilistic theoretical wankery, and more 
like a kind of pragmatically useful safe-driving practice. 
I am interested in apophasis because it suggests a means 
of developing such a braking mechanism.
What I term braking, Whitehead himself might term 
“hesitation” or “indecision.” In a sense, hesitation and in-
decision during the actual occasion are what lead to the 
activation of the mental pole and to the ingression and 
actualization of the virtual into the actual. Hesitation 
and indecision are ultimately what lead to conscious hu-
man thought. Whenever something can’t either be dis-
missed out of hand (incompatible opposition negatively 
prehended) or prehended as bare fact without modula-
tion (perfect concordance positively prehended), when-
ever there is “contrast” rather than mere incompatible 
opposition or perfect concordance, then there is hesita-
tion and (potential) ingression of the virtual. Whitehead 
explains that during the actual occasion, things may pro-
ceed according to “yes-form” feelings, “no-form” feelings, 
or “suspense-form” feelings.2 Only suspense-form feel-
ings (may) lead to the ingression of the virtual. During 
the actual occasion, Whitehead says that there are judg-
ments of belief, judgments of disbelief, and “suspended 
judgments.” Suspended judgements allow “concentration 
of attention involving increase of importance.”3 In other 
words, when binary judgments are suspended, qualita-
tive increases or decreases in valuation become possible. 
These re-valuations or re-reckonings are what reconfig-
ure the prior actual, actualizing virtual potentia. From 
a similar perspective, according to Brian Massumi, “’In-
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source for the theory of value.”4 Indecision makes a space 
for non-binary, affective re-valuation to occur. Return-
ing to Whitehead, suspended judgments allow the ac-
tual occasion to prehend “information which is neither 
included nor excluded by our direct perception,” accord-
ing to an “indifference to truth or falsehood.”5 Indeed, as 
previously mentioned, according to Whitehead, the main 
importance of truth is simply that “it adds to interest.”6 
Elsewhere, Whitehead explains that, “eternal objects, and 
propositions, and some complex sorts of contrasts, in-
volve in their own natures indecision.”7 Whitehead says 
that appetition (being lured by a proposition) includes in 
itself “a principle of unrest, involving realization of what 
is not and may be.”8 To be unrestful, to hesitate, is to leave 
the door cracked to what is not yet but may yet become. 
Braking is the means by which apophatic art apparatuses 
invite (however insistently or courteously) such promis-
ing hesitations.
Art apparatuses that make nothing never simply cre-
ate an absence, a vacuum, or a void (all impossible “some-
things”). Instead, an apophatic art apparatus might enact 
a kind of hesitation, an indecision, a deer-in-the-head-
lights freeze. In so doing, the apophatic art apparatus 
makes nothing by arresting (however briefly) the ongoing 
process of becoming. Or, an apophatic art apparatus may 
make nothing by confounding the presence or absence 
binary inherent in classical human thinking, triggering 
a kind of back-and-forth arche-nothing that refuses to 
arrive at the resolved “something” of mere presence or 
absence. Whatever the tactics employed, apophatic art 
4 Brian Massumi, “Virtual Ecology and the Question of Value,” in 
General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm, ed. Erich Hörl (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017), 354.






apparatuses actively make phenomena that lure and en-
snare their participants (both human and material) into 
experiences of nothing that mere abstinence from some-
thing (don’t view the artwork; don’t make the artwork) 
could ever achieve.
Just as there are significant qualitative differences 
between making nothing and abstaining from making 
something, so too are there significant qualitative dif-
ferences between making nothing and simply undoing 
something. “Undoing” acts on that which is already done; 
but undoing itself is just another new instance of doing. 
Since the decisions of actual occasions are irreversible, 
nothing can really be undone. So, for instance, mere 
iconoclasm does not inherently equal visual apophasis. 
Iconoclasm doesn’t return the world to a historical state 
prior to the existence of icons; it just makes a new world 
of destroyed icons.
Furthermore, there is an important functional differ-
ence between something that is indifferent to enacting 
signification and something that succeeds at signifying a 
lack of signification. Critics Leo Bersani and Ulysse Duto-
it characterize Samuel Beckett’s unique understanding of 
failure: “To fail does not mean to represent successfully 
existential failures or existential meaningless; it means to 
fail to represent (either meaninglessness or meaning).”9 
Apophatic art apparatuses never attempt to signify a lack 
of signification, but sometimes they do flirt with enact-
ing a failure to signify. Generally, however, the goal of an 
apophatic art apparatus is not to elude capture by human 
systems of signification (an impossible and tired goal), 
but to make nothing(s). Since everything can always be 
captured and put to use as a signifier by a human (even 
silence, even “absence,” even “nothing”), apophatic art 
apparatuses are often indifferent toward their eventual 
9 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, 
Rothko, Resnais (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 14.
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and inevitable capture by semiotic systems. Sometimes 
apophatic art apparatuses purposefully attempt to de-
fer their own semiotic capture as long as possible, and 
then to confound this capture when it does inevitably 
happen. But apophatic art apparatuses are always doing 
something more in the world that merely confounding 
human semiotic systems. The something more that they 
are always doing is making nothing by braking becoming.
Finally, apophatic art apparatuses are not simply liter-
ary apparatuses culled from the historical tradition of ap-
ophatic writing. Instead, they are art apparatuses which 
produce an apophatic occurrence or phenomenon. In the 
same way that I am not merely taking the concept of ap-
paratus from quantum mechanics via analogy (since art 
apparatuses are legitimately functioning apparatuses), I 
am not merely taking apophatic tactics from literary apo-
phasis via analogy (since apophatic art apparatuses pro-
duce actual apophatic effects, whether or not they employ 
human language). It is important to note that uttered 
human language (whether read or heard) is an actual oc-
currence in the world; it does not stand removed from 
the world. So, an apophatic art apparatus that does hap-
pen to employ human language (like Arakawa and Gins’s 
Mechanism of Meaning) is not merely talking “about” the 
world so much as exerting an actual force in the world. 
It is also important to note that materials in the world 
already “mean” (if not always human-linguistically). So, 
an apophatic art apparatus that does not employ hu-
man language (like David Crawford’s Stop Motion Studies) 
is still actually uttering and meaning. Both apparatuses 
(Mechanism of Meaning and Stop Motion Studies) (do not) 
mean what they (fail to) become.
I won’t attempt apophatic writing in this book (al-
though the previous sentence comes close), but I will an-
alyze some classic examples of it. I am admittedly offer-
ing a kataphatic explanation of apophatic writing. I will 
use the term “God” and refer to God in the third person 
137
regarding apophasis
singular masculine as “him.” Apophatic writing would 
quickly unsay both of these terms. As per the ways in 
which Jacques Derrida practiced deconstruction, it was 
almost always counter-productive for him to give a clear 
definition of deconstruction. Derrida’s deconstructive 
practices differed from text to text, as determined by the 
contours of the texts he was deconstructing. I mention 
Derrida here because, since the emergence of deconstruc-
tive practices, deconstruction has often been associated 
with apophasis. I will argue that this association is not al-
together fair to either practice. At any rate, I am not Der-
rida, and I am not even writing an apophatic text (much 
less practicing deconstruction). I am not even writing a 
book about apophatic writing. I am writing a book about 
apophatic art apparatuses – art apparatuses that behave 
apophatically. Since using an art apparatus to pragmati-
cally make nothing is already tricky enough, I will not 
make it any more complicated by treating this book as if 
it were itself an art apparatus trying to make nothing. I 
will simply proceed as straightforwardly as possible.
I will first present a more expanded definition of ap-
ophasis and analyze some instructive examples of apo-
phatic writing. This will be followed by some relevant 
similarities and differences between apophasis and de-
construction, in order to salvage (for my own particular 
purposes) what may be salvaged from deconstruction, 
and to distinguish the ways in which apophasis differs 
from deconstruction. Next, I will consider the ways in 
which language is real (both actually and virtually); and 
what “real,” “actual,” and “virtual” mean in regards to lan-
guage. This will involve an explanation of literary critic 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the utterance, and a brief 
return to Whitehead and Deleuze. I will acknowledge the 
sense in which the perpetual becomings of matter are 
themselves “discursive” (Karen Barad’s term), but this 
recognition alone will not be enough to account for the 
particularly unique behaviors of human language. I will 
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then consider the ways in which human language is itself 
a force in the world, but this recognition alone will not 
be enough to account for all that matter comes to mean. 
It turns out matter and language both mean and mat-
ter, but differently. Ultimately, we will arrive at an under-
standing of language that strongly opposes both: 1. the 
reduction of the universe to a giant text that awaits hu-
man interpretation; and 2. the concept that there is any 
such thing as direct phenomenological access to immedi-
ate meaning which would overcome the shortcomings of 
mediated human language.
Having thought through language and its functions in 
the world, I will return to apophatic language proper and 
extract some of its tactics for use in our apophatic art 
apparatuses. In particular, we will consider the sister tac-
tics of perpetual deferral (no ending) and the arche-trace 
(no beginning), the powerful (hard-braking) tactic of in-
difference, and the immobilizing (confounding) tactic 
of aporia. Finally, I will consider why art might be more 
suitable for apophasis than writing, and think through 
some salient differences between apophatic art and what 
might be understood as deconstructive art.
A Kataphatic Explanation of Apophatic Writing
Apophatic writing is a way of talking about God that 
seeks to properly revere him by not overly delimiting 
him. “Apophasis” is negation and “kataphasis” is affirma-
tion. Since God is beyond all we can affirm about him, in 
order to more accurately describe him, we must balance 
our affirmations with reverent negations. Theologian 
Bruce Ellis Benson explains, “One affirms something but 
denies it, because to affirm it too strongly would be heret-
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ical and to deny it completely would also be heretical.”10 
In the Greek, Kataphasis means something like “toward 
assertive speaking” and apophasis means something like 
“away from assertive speaking.” 
By definition, it might seem that any art which refrains 
from using human language is apophatic. But apophatic 
writing doesn’t simply move away from “language” (on 
the contrary, it traffics in the medium of language); in-
stead, it more specifically moves away from assertive, de-
clarative language – away from the copula of equation. 
Whereas kataphatic language would freely assert some-
thing like “God is love,” apophatic language would never 
couple or equate God with anything. So visual art that 
traffics in non-linguistic media (as much visual art does) 
has not yet overcome the copula (the “is”) of equation 
and representation. A realistic painting of a pear that is 
meant to represent a pear is still operating in the realm 
of kataphatic assertion, even if the painting lacks a hu-
man language title (“This is a Pear”). Magritte’s paintings 
and titles playfully and ingeniously trouble this space be-
tween pictographic and linguistic assertion, but they are 
still probably not yet apophatic art apparatuses.
Regarding the coupling function of the “is” and its 
(non-)relation to apophatic writing, Jewish philosopher 
Jacob Taubes explains: 
In the realm of the “is”-assertion, there is no place for 
God. With an “is”-assertion, an object is referred to 
and described. The sum of “is”-assertions constitutes 
science. What is not an object is not knowable, cannot 
enter the realm of knowledge, and must be declared by 
science as null. But “God is not” is also the assertion 
of theology. For theology has always denied that God 
10 Bruce Ellis Benson, Graven Ideologies: Nietzsche, Derrida & Marion on 
Modern Idolatry (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 153.
140
some ways of making nothing
is an object and agrees in this with atheism, and with 
science grounded on atheism.11 
From this perspective, apophatic writing doesn’t “unsay” 
language per se, but rather it “unsays” the linguistic cop-
ula, the linking verb “is” of equation, in order to avoid 
overly reducing God to mere ontological presence.
Indeed, “disontology” is the name given by literary 
historian Michael Sells to the kind of apophatic writing 
that refuses to reduce God to an ontological thing. Dis-
ontology is not simply an alternative way of practicing 
ontology. Instead, it opposes the ontological project al-
together, (ab)using language in order to undermine and 
confound its ontological presumptions.
In the Greek, “ontology” means something like “the 
study of being.” Ontology assumes that there even is such 
a thing as “being,” and that being is made up of noun-
ish things. Ontology tries to understand the “nature” (the 
essences and qualities) of these noun-ish things – what 
are they like individually and how do they relate to each 
other? Indo-European languages (including English) 
presume an ontological understanding of being. To ask, 
“What is being?” is already to presume that being is some 
kind of “thing” that has a “nature.” Once “being” (or “the 
world,” or “immanence,” or “the real”) is instead under-
stood as a series of becomings and events in perpetual 
flux (à la Whitehead), this alternate understanding of 
being and becoming is not simply a new kind of ontol-
ogy, but an entirely different “thing” altogether. This new 
way of thinking requires a new way of speaking which 
avoids the presuppositions of ontology – a kind of dis-
ontological speaking. Apophasis is one such way of dis-
ontologically speaking. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche 
writes, “I’m afraid we’re not rid of God because we still 
11 Jacob Taubes, “Notes on an Ontological Interpretation of Theology,” 
The Review of Metaphysics 2, no. 8 (1949): 102–3.
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believe in grammar.”12 Apophasis attempts to approach 
a non-ontotheological, disontological God who exceeds 
the strictures of grammar.
The God of apophasis is a uniquely thorny entity when 
it comes to ontology, particularly if he is to be under-
stood as the giver of being who himself precedes being. 
This giver and source of being may then subsequently 
choose to participate in being, but he is hardly reducible 
to being. It is worth noting that Whitehead’s cosmology 
contains a God, but Whitehead’s God is more like the cre-
ative force immanent to the universe itself. Whitehead’s 
God is intrinsically bound up with Whitehead’s eternal 
entities, and since I have chosen not to follow Whitehead 
into the nuances of his eternal entities, I am not bound 
to wrestle with the subtle nuances of his God. I’m not so 
much substituting the God of apophasis for Whitehead’s 
God, because my cosmological amalgam of Whitehead 
and Deleuze doesn’t really require (or forbid) a God, per 
se. But the God of apophasis must (initially) become cen-
tral to my focus on apophatic writing, since the original 
and primary function of apophatic writing is to properly 
revere the apophatic God. 
In a nutshell, Whitehead’s God is too small to be the 
God of mystical apophatic writing. Whitehead’s central 
concern is not, “Why is there always something new?” 
but rather “How is there always something new?” So, 
Whitehead’s God is not the originary creator of the uni-
verse; but instead, he is a wholly immanent entity within 
the functional mechanisms of the universe, as contin-
gent upon the actual real as the actual real is upon him.13 
Whereas the God of apophasis exceeds being altogether. 
Humans may speak kataphatically about God only inso-
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophize with 
the Hammer, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), 21.
13 See particularly Whitehead, Process and Reality, 225, 348–49.
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far as God has revealed himself to humans. In the words 
of (Pseudo-)Dionysius (the Areopagite), arguably the 
greatest Christian apophatic writer, “It alone could give 
an authoritative account of what it really is.”14 But hu-
mans can never speak ontologically about God as if he 
were some sort of categorizable thing (“He is nothing. He 
is no thing.”15)
It is crucial to note that, in apophatic writing, nega-
tion never takes primacy (for then it would turn into 
another kind of affirmation), nor does it “cancel out” 
the affirmative. Instead, negation and affirmation work 
hand-in-hand, cycling back and forth, as we try to rev-
erently speak about God. Catholic philosopher Jean-Luc 
Marion explains, “Negation and affirmation bear upon 
the same attributes, only envisaged from two points of 
view. Instead of neutralizing one another, they reinforce 
one another with a properly unthinkable tension.”16 This 
back-and-forth process of affirmation and negation has 
been called “negative theology” (after a phrase from Dio-
nysius’s classic apophatic text The Divine Names), but Mar-
ion rightly points out that, “Dionysius uses nothing that 
might be translated as ‘negative theology.’ If he speaks of 
‘negative theologies,’ in the plural, he does not separate 
them from the ‘affirmative theologies’ with which they 
maintain [their] relation.”17 So, although I will continue 
to refer to this way of writing as “apophatic,” it is more 
properly understood as “kataphatic/apophatic.”
Pseudo-Dionysius himself further reminds us that God 
is necessarily beyond even this kataphatic/apophatic way 
of thinking: “We should posit and ascribe to it all the af-
firmations we make in regards to beings, and more appro-
14 Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Divine Names,” in The Complete Works, 
trans. Jean Leclercq (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), 50.
15 Ibid., 103.
16 Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies, trans. Thomas A. 




priately, we should negate all those affirmations, since it 
surpasses all being. Now we should not conclude that the 
negations are simply the opposites of the affirmations, 
but rather that the cause of all [God] is considerably prior 
to this, beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond 
every assertion.”18 In other words, even the new resultant 
kataphatic knowledge gained by the kataphatic/apophat-
ic way of saying/unsaying must itself be apophatically 
unsaid ad infinitum. Unlike some sort of Hegelian dialec-
tic which seeks (through thesis, antithesis, and synthe-
sis) to perpetually evolve concepts throughout history, 
the kataphatic/apophatic dance means to elude any syn-
thesis (however historically temporary) and any evolu-
tion (however ongoing). Neither kataphasis nor apopha-
sis ever get the last word. There is no last word, because 
any God worthy of the role necessarily eludes any sort of 
reduction. Apophasis means to perpetually confound, 
undermine, and mung up any linguistic attempt to re-
duce and capture the living God. It is this emphasis on 
the perpetual deferral of reduction (the extra-linguistic 
version of “reduction” might be understood as “becom-
ing”) that we mean to port from apophatic writing into 
our apophatic art apparatuses. A successful apophatic art 
apparatus is a work of art that resists (however fleetingly) 
the inevitable move toward becoming.
Apophatic writing shares certain affinities with many 
forms of experimental writing: Dadaist absurdity, Zen 
mysticism, Oulipian pataphysics, Korzybskian general 
semantics, and Derridean deconstruction, to name a few. 
(The specific relationship between apophatic writing and 
deconstruction will be explored later in this chapter.) But 
apophatic writing is its own unique form of literature. 
Importantly, apophatic writing is not simply illogical, ir-
rational, random, arbitrary, or generic. On the contrary, 
18 Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Mystical Theology,” in The Complete Works, 
136. [Bracketed comments are mine.]
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apophatic writing is rigorous, non-arbitrary, and quite 
specific. Michael Sells explains, “The apophatic para-
doxes are constructed upon a foundation of conventional 
logical distinctions; the more highly tuned the rational-
ity of the kataphatic context, the more successful will be 
the apophatic paradox.”19 This practice of rigorous unsay-
ing that is in meticulous dialogue with the specific con-
tours of the kataphatic assertions which it unsays makes 
apophasis a particularly suitable tactic for any art appara-
tus that means to “make nothing” (brake the becoming) 
of the well-decided materials with which it is in dialogue.
Before we proceed to some specific examples of apo-
phatic writing, it is important to understand that any 
apophatic experience ultimately exceeds the generic 
confines of “literature” and “writing.” As philosopher and 
literary theorist William Franke clarifies: 
The experience of apophasis, as an experience of not 
being able to say, is quintessentially linguistic: the ex-
perience itself is intrinsically an experience of the fail-
ure of language […]. And yet the experience in question 
is not fundamentally experience of language or of any 
other determinable object, for this could be adequate-
ly expressed. The experiencing subject is affected by 
“something” beyond all it can objectively comprehend, 
something engendering affects that it cannot account 
for nor even be sure are its own.20 
Successful apophatic writing must always ultimately 
exceed any tidy reduction to writing, speaking, human 
language, and even non-human discursivity; because the 
19 Michael A. Sells, The Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1994), 212.
20 William Franke, “Apophasis as a Mode of Discourse,” preface to On 
What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Lit-
erature, and the Arts, ed. William Franke, vol. 2 (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 3.
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goal of apophasis is to confound reduction. So, although 
we have chosen to begin with the historical genre that 
is apophatic writing, apophasis itself is an affective ex-
perience, not merely a style of linguistic formulation. As 
such, apophatic experiences can be (and are) triggered by 
a variety of non-linguistic materials.
Some Examples of Apophatic Writing
Without much accompanying analysis or commentary, 
here are some historical examples of apophatic writing. 
I’ve tried to select passages of extreme apophasis in or-
der to foreground the very limits of the genre. I’ve cho-
sen passages written by Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500 ce) and 
Meister Eckhart (1260–1328 ce), both Christians famous 
for their apophatic writing. Apophatic writing occurs 
across most religions (there is a particularly strong strain 
within the Sufi tradition of Islam), and even (arguably) 
in various genres of philosophy, but it seems to me that 
apophasis is forced to be at its most extreme when faced 
with kataphatic assertions that are most straightforward 
and clearly formulated. Christianity, with its specific 
claims of a particular, incarnate, historical messiah pre-
sents apophatic writers within the Christian tradition 
with a particularly acute challenge, and Dionysius and 
Eckhart ingeniously rise to that challenge in the follow-
ing passages.
Regarding God
God is not some kind of being. No. […] He was not. He 
will not be. He did not come to be. He is not in the 
midst of becoming. He will not come to be. No. He is 
not. […] He is not contained in being. […] He has every 
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shape and structure, and yet is formless and beautyl-
ess. […] He is nothing. He is no thing.21
God is therefore known in all things and as distinct 
from all things. He is known through knowledge and 
through unknowing. Of him there is conception, rea-
son, understanding, touch, perception, opinion, imag-
ination, name, and many other things. On the other 
hand, he cannot be understood, words cannot contain 
him, and no name can lay hold of him. He is not one of 
the things that are and he cannot be known in any of 
them. He is all things in all things and he is no thing 
among things. He is known to all from all things and 
he is known to no one from anything. This is the sort 
of language we must use about God.22
It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, 
conviction, speech, or understanding. Nor is it speech 
per se, understanding per se. It cannot be spoken of 
and it cannot be grasped by understanding. It is not 
number or order, greatness or smallness, equality or 
inequality, similarity or dissimilarity. It is not immov-
able, moving, or at rest. It has no power, it is not power, 
nor is it light. It does not live nor is it life. It is not a sub-
stance, nor is it eternity or time. It cannot be grasped 
by the understanding since it is neither knowledge nor 
truth. It is not kingship. It is not wisdom. It is neither 
one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness. Nor is it a spir-
it, in the sense in which we understand that term. It 
is not sonship or fatherhood and it is nothing known 
to us or to any other being. It falls neither within the 
predicate of nonbeing nor of being. Existing beings do 
not know it as it actually is and it does not know them 
as they are. There is no speaking of it, nor name nor 




knowledge of it. Darkness and light, error and truth – 
it is none of these. It is beyond assertion and denial.23
Whoever perceives something in God and attaches 
thereby some name to him, that is not God. God is 
above names and above nature.24 
God is nameless because none can say or understand 
anything about Him.25 
As he is simply one, without any manner and proper-
ties, he is not Father or Son or Holy Spirit, and yet he is 
a something that is neither this nor that.26 
You should know Him without image, without means, 
and without semblance.27
Regarding Mystical Practices
It is not God’s intention in his works that man should 
have in himself a place for God to work in. Poverty 
of spirit is for a man to keep so free of God and of all 
his works that if God wishes to work in the soul, he 
himself is the place in which he wants to work… Man 
should be so poor that he should not be or have any 
place in which God could work. When man clings to 
place, he clings to distinction.28
23 Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Mystical Theology,” 141.
24 Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentar-
ies, Treatises, and Defense, trans. Bernard McGinn (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1981), 204.
25 Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. 
Bernard McGinn (New York: Crossroad, 2009). 463.
26 Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, 181.
27 Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 464.
28 Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, 202.
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What is the final end? It is the hidden darkness of the 
eternal Godhead, which is unknown and never has 
been known and never shall be known. God abides 
there unknown in Himself, and the light of the eternal 
Father has ever shone in there, and the darkness does 
not comprehend the light.29
Lead us up beyond unknowing and light, / …in the 
brilliant darkness of a hidden silence.30 
We pray to enter within the super-bright gloom, and 
through not seeing and not knowing, to see and to 
know that the not to see nor to know is itself the above 
sight and knowledge.31 
Leave behind you everything perceived and under-
stood, everything perceptible and understandable, all 
that is not and all that is… By an undivided and abso-
lute abandonment of yourself and everything, shed-
ding all and freed from all, you will be uplifted to the 
ray of the divine shadow which is above everything 
that is.32 
As we plunge into that darkness which is beyond intel-
lect, we shall find ourselves not simply running short 
of words but actually speechless and unknowing.33
* * *
29 Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 283.
30 Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Mystical Theology,” 135.
31 Pseudo-Dionysius, “Mystic Theology,” in The Works of Dionysius the 
Areopagite, trans. John Parker (London: James Parker and Co., 1897), 
133.




My goal in citing the above examples is not to lay out 
any sort of particular theological propositions. Any such 
propositions would be beyond the scope of this book. 
Among other things, the God of mystical apophatic writ-
ing is a kind of limit-case study of an entity who refuses 
to ever finally and reductively resolve into any stable or 
static thing. The God of Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister 
Eckhart is useful to us not because he is a typical exam-
ple of the kinds of enduring objects we will encounter 
in our art apparatuses (apophatic or otherwise). Far from 
it. Rather, the ways in which these mystical writers are 
forced to approach such an anomalous entity causes 
them to invent rigorous braking strategies, linguistic 
ways of making nothing, which will become useful to our 
own apophatic art apparatuses as we attempt to brake 
(however temporarily) the eventually inevitable self-be-
coming of ordinary actual occasions. 
It is important to note that Dionysius and Eckhart 
aren’t purposefully obfuscating the issues or deceptively 
muddying the waters with tangentially vague, abstract 
language. Apophatic writing is not mere sophistry. In-
stead, it rigorously traces the contours of its subject to 
the point at which the representational, denominating, 
explicative, kataphatic function of language itself is ex-
hausted. This exhaustion doesn’t affirm or deny the “be-
ing” or “existence” or “immanence” or “transcendence” of 
God. It merely enacts the inability of language to reduce 
God to any one of these states. Such extreme apophatic 
writing initially invites and then requires and enforces 
a kind of intellectually athletic (and often contortive) 
performative reading. The texts above do indeed deno-
tatively mean what they say (they are not mere babble), 
but their main goal is not simply to clearly assert truths 
(that would move them toward the realm of kataphasis). 
Instead, these texts mean to lead their readers away from 
the realm of assertive truth statements. The apophatic 
experience that the reader has while being led away from 
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assertion is itself the “meaning” of the texts. The texts 
“mean” the performative intellectual contortions that 
they instigate. Of course, the same could be said of all 
texts. All texts “mean” the performative readings that 
they instigate; it’s just that kataphatic texts instigate less 
contortive readings than apophatic texts. According to 
this understanding, then, all texts (whether kataphatic 
or apophatic, denotative or poetic, sensible or absurd) 
function as apparatuses. All texts invite an utterance 
phenomenon (whether heard or read) to occur. More rel-
evant to our interests, the particular apophatic passages 
above function as apophatic apparatuses. But they are not 
yet apophatic art apparatuses. To make apophatic art ap-
paratuses, we either need materials other than text, or ad-
ditional materials in conjunction with text, or we need to 
treat text as a different kind of supra-semiotic material.
Relevant Similarities and Differences between 
Apophatic Writing and Deconstruction
Much has already been written on both apophasis and 
deconstruction. A fair amount has even been written 
on the relationship between the two. Derrida himself 
has written about their relationship. Is deconstruction 
merely a contemporary form of apophatic writing, or is 
apophatic writing an ancient form of deconstruction? Or 
are the two mutually exclusive? Or do the two exist in 
some other more oblique and complicated relationship? 
Since apophatic writing and deconstruction are both 
means of troubling stable ontologies, it has proved (and 
will continue to prove) inherently difficult to construct 
stable, reductive ontologies about what these two prac-
tices are and are not. I will argue that apophatic writing 
and deconstruction are mostly different, with certain 
overlapping similarities and goals. In order to make my 
case, I must first briefly describe my understanding of 
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deconstruction – an infamously slippery task since, like 
apophasis, deconstruction inherently resists reduction to 
resolved, assertive definitions.
Before I tackle a gloss of deconstruction, here is a quite 
apophatic passage by Derrida himself which could have 
resided comfortably above amongst the Eckhart and 
Pseudo-Dionysius passages: 
Of him there is nothing said that might hold […] –Save 
his name […] – Save the name that names nothing that 
might hold, not even a divinity, nothing whose with-
drawal does not carry away every phrase that tries to 
measure itself against him. “God” “is” the name of this 
bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification of 
language.34 
Derrida is quite familiar with the mystical traditions of 
negative theology and the historical practices of apo-
phatic writing practiced within them. Arguably, decon-
struction has its precedence in the historical traditions 
of apophatic writing; but deconstruction is (usually) not, 
technically or even functionally, apophatic writing.
Derrida purposefully resists regularly and clearly de-
fining deconstruction. He even resists regularly using the 
noun “deconstruction” as the moniker of his philosophi-
cal project. Derrida makes most sense to me as a kind of 
post-phenomenological philosopher, and less sense to 
me as a literary theorist. His goal is to read philosophi-
cal texts deconstructively, one by one; not to establish a 
new form of literary criticism known as “deconstruction.” 
However (in the context of a “dialogue” with analytic phi-
34 Jacques Derrida, “Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices,” trans. 
John P. Leavey, Jr., in Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold Cow-
ard and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1992), 300.
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losopher John Searle), Derrida does come fairly close to 
defining deconstruction in the following passage: 
The structure of the area in which we are operating 
here calls for a strategy that is complex and tortuous, 
involuted and full of artifice: for example, exploiting 
the target against itself by discovering it at times to be 
the “basis” of an operation directed against it; or even 
discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something ut-
terly different.35
Deconstruction first reads a text according to the con-
tours of the text’s own fault lines, and in so doing discov-
ers these fault lines (implications of the text not overtly 
stated in the text, weaknesses of the text which the au-
thor has attempted to marginalize, prior assumptions 
that the text has made which work against the very as-
sertions the text is trying to make). According to Derrida, 
“The movements of deconstruction do not destroy struc-
tures from the outside. They are not possible and effec-
tive, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting 
those structures.”36 Deconstruction then writes its own 
text in dialogue with the source text. The deconstructive 
text proceeds according to the logic of the source text, 
and like a mathematical proof, eventually comes to the 
aspects of the source text that are inconsistent, reveal-
ing them. Unlike a mathematical proof, nothing is reduc-
tively proved or disproved by the deconstructive text. In-
stead, the deconstructive text is itself immediately open 
to subsequent deconstructive readings. Indeed, if the de-
constructive text is truly deconstructive, it openly invites 
such future readings.
35 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Alan Bass and Samuel Webber 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 55.
36 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 144.
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“Deconstruction” is not a philosophy that asserts its 
own truth, but more like a way of proceeding. As literary 
theorist Jonathan Culler explains, “Deconstruction has 
no better theory of truth. It is a practice of reading and 
writing attuned to the aporias that arise in attempts to 
tell us the truth.”37 In this sense, deconstruction is similar 
to apophatic writing. Both “feed off” the kataphatic truth 
assertions of their source texts.
Each deconstructive reading will be different – tac-
tically, formally, rhetorically, tonally. The way in which 
the deconstructive text proceeds will depend largely 
on the way in which the source text proceeds. And, ac-
cording to Culler, “Paradoxically, the more powerful and 
authoritative an interpretation [i.e., a source text], the 
more [deconstructive] writing it generates.”38 Again, this 
is similar to apophatic writing. The more specific the 
kataphatic assertion, the more necessarily contorted the 
apophatic writing must be. And, as with deconstruction, 
there is no single, rote formula or method for the ways 
in which apophatic writing may be done. Each apophatic 
approach varies depending on the particular contours of 
the source kataphatic assertion, and thus both approach-
es (deconstruction and apophasis) are contingent upon 
the existence of some prior kataphatic assertion. In this 
sense, deconstructive readings and apophatic writings 
are like quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus: each 
relies on a prepared initial state. Art apparatuses also 
rely on a prepared initial state: their source materials (in 
whatever media).
The main differences between apophatic writing and 
deconstruction lie in their ethical goals, however oblique-
ly these must be inferred. The goal of apophatic writing 
is to undermine ontological language (language based on 
37 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structur-
alism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 80.
38 Ibid., 47.
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presences, essences, identities, and assertions of truth) as 
it attempts to describe God (note: the uniquely anomalous 
nature of God as subject matter is essential) in order to 
perhaps mystically be encountered by the God who is 
beyond “there/not there,” beyond “is/is not.” The goal of 
deconstruction (as I understand it) is to undermine onto-
logical language as it attempts to describe any and everything 
at all in order to give difference its due – to reveal dif-
ference (rather than presence, essence, or identity) as the 
actual means by which all meaning in the world emerges. 
The fact that apophasis unsays texts about God where-
as deconstruction deconstructs texts about any topic 
whatsoever may seem minor, but it actually puts apo-
phasis and deconstruction in two different philosophical 
camps. Apophasis would not deny the positivist elements 
of the universe itself. Attributes, behaviors, and charac-
teristics of actual entities do not arise merely as the re-
sult of pure difference. Positivist characteristics are real 
and in the immanent world. Apophasis does not deny any 
of this. It would only add a, “Yes, and… the God about 
which we write also exceeds all immanence.” Apophasis 
doesn’t claim that everything (or indeed, any other thing) 
exceeds immanence. The apophatic God alone flashes in 
and out of immanence at whim and will. Whitehead is 
intent upon keeping all outside, transcendental forces 
from being smuggled into his wholly immanent cosmol-
ogy. Contrarily, apophasis asserts that there is one (and 
only one) especially unique entity who is not constrained 
by immanence, being, entity-ness, thingness, or anything 
else. There is one (and only one) exception to the con-
straints of immanence: God.
Deconstruction’s project is altogether different in re-
spect to positivist forces, entities, and God. The goal of 
deconstruction is not to unsay meaning itself, but to de-
throne the idea that meaning is the result of originary 
essences and identities (nouns with inherent qualities 
and properties), and to replace this idea with a demon-
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stration of how meaning is actually the result of ongoing 
(non-originary) differences. So, for example, green means 
green not because there is some fundamental, originary, 
foundational essence of greenness in the world, but be-
cause there are all sorts of differences in the world be-
tween colors (always already), and the “meaning” of green 
arises from these differences. The difference between red 
and green is not derived from an essential property of 
redness and an essential property of greenness. Instead, 
red and green are themselves derived from the difference 
between themselves (and all other colors). Deconstruc-
tion means to foreground and enact difference (as op-
posed to essence, presence, or identity) as constitutive of 
meaning, so deconstruction always downplays and un-
dermines essence, presence, or identity as originary. This 
approach of undermining essence as foundational and 
originary is not applied to God alone, but to everything 
in the universe. 
Apophasis, on the other hand, means to give God 
(alone) his due by enacting the failure of language to 
reduce him to an ontological meaning. Deconstruction 
is primarily concerned with difference in and of itself 
(wherever that concern may lead, as long as it doesn’t per-
manently and statically lead back to difference as a new 
originary presence). Apophasis is primarily concerned 
with God himself (wherever that may lead, as long as it 
doesn’t permanently and statically lead back to assertive 
or reductive declarations about God). Deconstruction un-
dermines presence to get at difference. Apophasis under-
mines meaning altogether to get at God. Deconstruction 
and apophasis each make a kind of nothing, but decon-
struction attempts to make an ongoing nothing of eve-
rything, which (according to Whitehead’s cosmology of 
perpetual process) is simply not sustainable for very long. 
Deconstruction makes nothing of the primacy of pres-
ence and arrives at a vibrant (but ultimately unmoored) 
world of differences differing. Apophasis makes nothing 
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of all meaning (whether identity-derived or difference-
derived) and arrives at God-only-knows-where. The im-
plicit faith wager involved in apophasis is that God may 
manifest himself, but there can never be any guarantee 
of this. Apophasis rigorously descends or ascends into 
nothing and waits to be found by God (or not).
Just as deconstruction requires ontological language 
in order to have something to deconstruct, so apopha-
sis requires kataphatic language in order to have some-
thing to unsay. But these two relationships are not per-
fectly analogous. The former relationship is much more 
antagonistic; the latter much more resigned. Apophatic 
writing doesn’t need to deconstruct kataphatic writing in 
order to achieve its goals. Indeed, without kataphatic as-
sertions perpetually remaining to balance the apophatic 
project, apophatic writing risks heresy (as Meister Eck-
hart tragically discovered).
The differences between apophasis and deconstruc-
tion become particularly acute when one attempts to 
read apophatic texts deconstructively. It becomes like 
applying one kind of sulfuric acid to another. Apophatic 
texts are not your normal presence-presuming texts, de-
fenselessly and naively awaiting deconstruction. Conse-
quently, when Derrida himself attempts a deconstructive 
reading of Pseudo-Dionysius (in “How to Avoid Speak-
ing: Denials”39), it is with such rigor and care that Der-
rida becomes maddeningly indirect and circuitous, with 
occasional flashes (due to exhaustion?) of uncharacter-
istic directness and an (almost) biographical or confes-
sional tone. It is as if Pseudo-Dionysius’s “The Mystical 
Names” is itself exhausting Derrida’s own deconstructive 
reading of it. Derrida can’t avoid assertively imposing his 
39 Jacques Derrida, “How To Avoid Speaking: Denials,” trans. John P. 
Leavey, Jr., in Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold Coward and 




overarching concern with difference onto a text that has 
itself already moved beyond the identity–difference di-
chotomy in relation to God.
For our purposes, apophasis is more suitable than 
deconstruction for the creation of art apparatuses that 
make nothing, because apophasis is able to work within 
Whitehead’s cosmology of becoming. Apophasis doesn’t 
need to undermine all presence for all time under all cir-
cumstances everywhere forever. It simply needs to make 
local and temporary naught of presence in the exception-
al and singular case of God. What we are porting from 
apophasis, then, is not a nihilistic approach that would 
break the entire universe, or even an ethics of (arche-)
primary difference that would undermine every and all 
essences everywhere forever. Indeed, apophasis is flexibly 
indifferent to the battle between identity and difference 
regarding all other entities save one (God). Indeed, even 
in the case of God, apophasis doesn’t ever permanently 
side with difference or absence against identity or es-
sence. It merely performatively and cyclically enacts the 
role of difference in conjunction with its identity-centric 
counterpart, kataphasis. Thus, apophasis is a better, less 
universal, more locally applicable tool than deconstruc-
tion for our art apparatuses. We don’t need to break the 
universe, we only need to brake a part of the universe, and 
follow wherever such braking may lead.
Language as Actual/Virtual via 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s “Utterance”
It turns out that tactics from apophatic writing are di-
rectly applicable to art apparatuses in actual ways and 
not by mere analogy. This is not because the world itself 
is a text (that would require shoehorning all material in 
the world to fit into human linguistic structures); nor be-
cause human language is merely an ordinary and usual 
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form of material discursivity (that would require dilut-
ing, flattening, and dishonoring the unique and complex 
historical accretions that have resulted in human lan-
guage being in the world). There is a third way to think 
about human language and its actual functions in the 
world which will help us more clearly understand the rel-
evance and applicability of apophatic writing tactics to 
art apparatuses intent on making nothing. This third un-
derstanding comes via Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the 
utterance, and its relevance to Deleuze’s virtual/actual 
model of the real as applied to Whitehead’s cosmology of 
concrescence.
Prior to unpacking Bakhtin’s concept of the utterance, 
here are some explanations from Bakhtin himself: 
Language enters life through concrete utterances 
(which manifest language) and life enters language 
through concrete utterances as well. The utterance 
is an exceptionally important node of problems. […] 
Only the contact between the language meaning and 
the concrete reality that takes place in the utterance 
can create the spark of expression. It exists neither in 
the system of language nor in the objective reality sur-
rounding us. Thus, emotion, evaluation, and expres-
sion are foreign to the word of language and are born 
only in the process of its live usage in a concrete ut-
terance.40
An “utterance” event could be spoken words uttered at a 
particular historical time, but it could also be an instance 
of reading a book at a particular historical time. What it 
can’t be is simply a book sitting on a shelf unread. The 
book on the shelf unread contains the syntactic, system-
40 Mikhail Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” in Speech Genres 
and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1986), 63, 87.
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atic, grammatical side of human “language,” but that is 
only one side. I propose that the book on the shelf unread 
is akin to (but not exactly like) Deleuze’s virtual real. It 
may be instantiated and read (aloud or quietly) in history 
at any time, in which case it then becomes actualized, it 
becomes actually real as it ingresses into all of the actual 
occasions that take place during that particular utterance 
occurrence. If humans suddenly stop talking and reading 
and go extinct on the earth in actual history, the human 
“language” in the book on the shelf freezes and loses 
its ongoing, becoming relationship with the rest of the 
universe. The physical book itself (as a material object) 
is still prehended as an enduring object by any relevant 
actual occasions, and even the language within the book 
is arguably negatively prehended, but the language itself 
has a negligible effect on the actual real.
However, as long as humans are alive on the planet, 
talking and reading, even if we ourselves never open that 
particular book, the words used in that book continue to 
change over the years through ongoing usage in actual 
utterance events (changes that feed into and condition 
the potentia of the virtual real), so that when we finally 
do open the book and read it (prehending it into a series 
of actual occasions), our human understanding of certain 
words in that book will be different now than it was ten 
years ago. Artist and theorist Joseph Grigely even adds 
the supplemental idea that when an author pens a text, 
that historical event of writing (or typing or dictating or 
whatever) is itself an utterance. It is by no means the de-
fining or final utterance of that particular series of words, 
but it still qualifies as an actual utterance.41
The speaker of written language speaks once by writ-
ing. Her speech is then archived and time-shifted. It is 
translated into a potential future event that is only com-
41 See particularly Joseph Grigely, Textualterity: Art, Theory and Textual 
Criticism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 113–17.
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pleted (performed) upon its subsequent reading. Further-
more, with each new reading (even by the same “listen-
er”) a new utterance event occurs. Because the writer has 
already completed her single utterance performance (the 
initial writing) by the time her book is read (re-uttered), 
the event-contingent aspect of this two-part process 
(writing and reading) is often overlooked and superseded 
by an inordinate emphasis on the static words them-
selves, what they signify, and how they fit into a syntac-
tic or semiotic system. This calcification of the written 
word, this inordinate emphasis on its denominational, 
denotative aspects, is what Bakhtin’s theory of the utter-
ance seeks to counteract. Bakhtin’s theory of the utter-
ance properly accounts for the importance of the lived, 
bodily, actual affect of the utterance event (what might 
simply be described as “context”) on the “meaning” of 
human language.
Bakhtin’s concept of the utterance may be further sup-
plemented with Roland Barthes’s concept of intertextu-
ality, the idea that any single text is actually itself a tissue 
of citations of prior texts (whether explicitly footnoted 
or not). And yet, according to Bakhtin, without lived, his-
torical, actually real utterance events (whether they occur 
via speaking or listening or writing or reading), human 
“language” remains hermetically sealed. Without real-
time historical utterance events (which occur millions of 
times a day all over the world, and have occurred, day af-
ter day, for thousands of years), virtual human language 
(unread written language in a book on a shelf) is impo-
tent to exert its influence on the actual real. Furthermore, 
without ongoing historical utterance events, this same 
virtual language is unable to receive new meanings and 
connotations that evolve from the particular inflections, 
affects, timbres, typefaces, lighting, or contexts of each 
specific, actually real, historical utterance. This two-way 
transfer of meaning is why Bakhtin calls the utterance 
event “an exceptionally important node of problems.”
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This second aspect (the flow of lived actual language 
into virtual language) is particularly important. The ut-
terance is the way in which “the world” gets into “lan-
guage.” For example, imagine you are reading this para-
graph in a coffee house. The way your coffee tastes and 
the music to which you are listening and the sunlight 
through the window and the condition (and media) of 
your edition of the book and the typeface in which the 
book is set are all affectively modulating the language you 
are reading (in subtle but actually real ways). Subsequent 
to this utterance event (your reading of this paragraph), 
the next time you think and use and read and speak any 
of the words in this paragraph, those words have changed 
for you (however subtly) based on this particular reading 
(utterance) of the paragraph. Furthermore, if you read 
this same paragraph again two days later in a different 
setting (or even in the same setting), that second read-
ing constitutes a completely new utterance event. All 
of human language may thus be usefully understood as 
an ongoing and evolving dialogue amongst all humans 
throughout all history, but a dialogue totally contingent 
upon and entangled with the real historical instances 
(and the non-human materials involved in those instanc-
es) in which each word has been uttered. Language itself 
cannot evolve without the actual utterance event.
To give another example, suppose that I bodily meet 
a friend with whom I have previously corresponded on-
line but have never met “in real life.” We talk and spend 
time together. Those utterance events which occurred 
throughout our bodily meeting have now altered our 
subsequent online communication. That fact is obvi-
ous enough. But each of those utterances has now also 
altered all of our future communication with other hu-
mans (whether online or off), and has also altered (to 
however subtle a degree) the history of the English lan-
guage (assuming we are speaking English). Furthermore, 
there is nothing magical about us having met bodily 
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(although obviously there are important qualitative dif-
ferences between online and offline utterances). The 
online correspondences that my friend and I had prior 
to our bodily meeting also qualify as actual utterances. 
Bakhtin’s utterance doesn’t prioritize the spoken voice, or 
bodily presence, or any particular form of text. The utter-
ance simply has to happen in lived, historical time. It has 
to be an actual event.
To Bakhtin, the event of any single conversation be-
tween two people is an extension of a larger, ongoing 
historical conversation. Each utterance is a speech act in 
response to another utterance, going backwards through 
time. It is not merely that we all inherited the syntax of a 
common language system. Instead, we are all inheritors 
of every preceding conversation that has actually hap-
pened historically. Our current, nuanced understanding 
of language is subtly colored by every utterance anyone 
has ever made. In Bakhtin’s own words: 
Any speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or 
lesser degree. He is not, after all, the first speaker, the 
one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe. 
And he presupposes not only the existence of the lan-
guage system he is using, but also the existence of pre-
ceding utterances – his own and others – with which 
his given utterance enters into one kind of relation-
ship to another […]. Any utterance is a link in a very 
complexly organized chain of other utterances.42 
All utterances are thus vehicles of transmutation which 
are simultaneously dependent on their immediate, sub-
jective contexts and on a history of previous contexts. 
From the perspective of Whitehead’s cosmology, this 
makes perfect sense. Each utterance is comprised of a 
series of actual occasions. Each one of these actual occa-
42 Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” 69.
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sions prehends all prior actual occasions (whether nega-
tively or positively) and ingresses the positive prehen-
sions into itself.
Granted, Bakhtin’s utterance does prioritize a kind of 
human subject, but Bakhtin is writing his theory prior to 
object oriented ontology and its anthropocentric warn-
ings. Might we imagine cross-species utterances (“Las-
sie, come here girl!”)? Might we imagine animal, plant, or 
even rock utterances? Of course.
According to Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance, uttered 
human language is always already doing much more than 
merely describing the real world (although it is doing that 
too). Uttered language is actually altering the history of 
the world. Language is itself a part of (not apart from) the 
actual world; it is an actual force in the actual world. Lan-
guage is not merely descriptive or syntactical; it is also an 
enacted and context-contingent event. Human language 
operates as a force in the actual world via any entity able 
to access its virtual reservoir. Most humans are such enti-
ties, and humans are not the only ones with such access.
Photographer Hollis Frampton famously observed, 
“Photography is not a substitute for anything.” Art his-
torian Liz Kotz later proposed the radical corollary, “Lan-
guage is not a substitute for anything.”43 The implica-
tion is that language, like photography, is freed from the 
burden of re-presentation, to develop as its own artistic 
medium. Language does not simply declare, define, or 
describe. As such, language is less usefully understood 
solely from the Saussurean perspective of signifier and 
signified and better understood as a holistic relationship 
between a virtual language system and an actual uttered 
historical event, one feeding into the other in an ongo-
ing, unfolding progression. Meaning is never solely dis-
43 Liz Kotz, Words To Be Looked At: Language in 1960s Art (Cambridge: 
mit Press, 2007), 188.
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embodied and propositional, but always context-depend-
ent and enacted. To revisit Bakhtin’s own explanation: 
The natural meaning of the word applied to a particu-
lar actual reality under particular real conditions of 
speech communication creates a spark of expression 
[…]. Only the contact between the language meaning 
and the concrete reality that takes place in the utter-
ance can create the spark of expression.44 
To reiterate, apart from a lived, historical utterance event, 
any “meaning” that exists in an abstract linguistic sys-
tem remains quarantined, bereft, and contextless.
Notably, something akin to Bakhtin’s concept of the 
utterance is suggested in the writings of Derrida. Derrida 
is frequently mischaracterized as one who seeks to re-
duce the entire material world into a kind of text, but as 
literary theorist Claire Colebrook argues, “Derrida is not, 
we are coming to understand, a textualist; he does not 
endorse a narrowly linguistic idealism.”45 In Limited, Inc., 
Derrida begins with the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin, 
which famously observes that certain kinds of “perform-
ative” utterances enact what they say. (For example, the 
utterance, “I promise,” actually makes a promise.) Aus-
tin distinguishes these kinds of performative utterances 
from ordinary “constative” (declarative) utterances. For 
example, according to Austin, an utterance like, “The sky 
is blue,” is constative and not performative. Yet even Aus-
tin is haunted by the implication that “mere” constative 
utterances are themselves performative. In his seminal 
text How To Do Things with Words, Austin confesses: 
44 Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” 86–87.




Clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act [the 
changing of a listener’s mind] is liable to be brought 
off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the is-
suing, with or without calculation, of any utterance 
whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward 
constative utterance (if there is such an animal).46 
But Austin fails to develop this insight toward its more 
radical conclusion. Derrida expands Austin by claim-
ing that all utterances (whether declarative or explicitly 
performative) are themselves performative. This is true 
because all utterances cause something to happen in the 
world. In Derrida’s own words, “The promise is not just 
one speech act among others; every speech act is funda-
mentally a promise.”47
Austin is concerned with the intention of the speaker, 
as if what the speaker means to convey is somehow es-
sential in determining the particular genre of the speech 
act. But Derrida is unconcerned with the intention of 
the speaker, since the force and effect of an utterance are 
never solely determined by the speaker’s intentions. And 
Bakhtin is more concerned with the context of the utter-
ance, since saying “I promise” as an actor in a theater per-
formance would not be the same as saying it as a groom 
during a wedding ceremony.
Elsewhere, Derrida introduces the idea of “the uncon-
scious text” which seems very similar to what I am call-
ing the “virtual real” aspect of Bakhtin’s utterance theory. 
In Writing and Difference, Derrida explains, “The uncon-
scious text is already a weave of pure traces, differences 
in which meaning and force are united—a text nowhere 
present, consisting of archives which are always already 
46 J.L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), 110. [Bracketed clarifications are mine.]
47 Jacques Derrida, “The Villanova Roundtable,” In Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. Caputo (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 22–23.
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transcriptions. Originary prints. Everything begins with 
reproduction. Always already: repositories of a meaning 
which was never present.”48 The utterance event would 
thus be the occurrence which takes these “non-present 
texts” (proto-meanings, differences differing, possibili-
ties of new meanings yet to emerge) and prehends them 
into actual history.
It will be useful now to pause and connect our current 
understanding of the utterance back to art apparatuses. 
It would seem that if the utterance itself is a kind of ac-
tual phenomenon, then it must necessarily involve hu-
mans; and indeed, it usually does. But the utterance does 
not solely involve humans as reflective, disembodied, 
thinking cogitos who use language as a once-removed 
means of abstractly understanding the world, or even 
as a kind of Machiavellian means of socially controlling 
other human behavior within a sociologically seques-
tered, human-centric “culture” that never quite manages 
to touch the “physical” world of “nature.” The problem is 
not with Bakhtin’s utterance model of human language 
and its relationship with the actual world, but with our 
understanding of what humans are doing in the actual 
world when we utter human language.
It is true that humans do not directly and immediately 
control objects with incantatory spells, causing rocks to 
levitate by verbally commanding them to do so. The ef-
fects of human language on rocks are less direct but no 
less actual. Land deeds, quarry rights, construction blue-
prints, town hall dialogues, blog essays about housing 
shortages, and thousands of other human language ut-
terances have contributed to the eventual and actual levi-
tation of many rocks into many buildings. Because hu-
mans are part of the “natural” world and are themselves 
enduring objects within the world, human language is an 
actual force in the actual “physical” world. We need not 
48 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 265–66.
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even take recourse in the argument that certain behav-
ioral patterns of animals constitute a legitimate kind of 
language (although this is true), or that all materials in 
the world make “discursive” decisions (à la Barad) that 
come to mean what these materials have decided to be-
come (although this is also true). It is enough to note that 
human language causes many actual, physical events to 
occur in the world. This is because language is always do-
ing more than merely re-presenting the world.
Some of the apophatic art apparatuses we examine 
will use human language, and some will not. Most of our 
apophatic art apparatuses will involve humans, but this 
fact is not shameful or inordinately anthropocentric, as 
long as materials from the world are also included and 
given their own say. We will even take time to specula-
tively consider certain kinds of art apparatuses which do 
not involve humans, but these will be exceptional. 
Because we mean to examine art apparatuses that 
actually make nothing (instead of merely illustrating 
“nothing”), it becomes useful to make a case for the ac-
tual efficacious force of human language in the world. If 
ordinary, descriptive human language can be shown to 
always already have an actual force in the world, how 
much more of a force will the purposefully disontologi-
cal, intentionally affective language of apophasis have on 
the world? It is from this affectively forceful language of 
apophasis that our art apparatuses import their tactics. 
Bakhtin’s model of the utterance makes a case for the ac-
tual, efficacious force and function of any and all human 
language in the world. Having preliminarily associated 
the functioning of language with the functioning of the 
art apparatus, let us return to examining the utterance in 
a bit more detail.
Bakhtin is useful for our purposes because he recog-
nizes that all forms of utterance are tinged with contex-
tual affect, not just spoken utterances. He writes: 
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Each text (both oral and written) includes a significant 
number of various kinds of natural aspects devoid of 
signification […] but which are still taken into account 
(deterioration of manuscript, poor diction, and so 
forth). There are not nor can there be any pure texts. In 
each text, moreover, there are a number of aspects that 
can be called technical (the technical side of graphics, 
pronunciation, and so forth).49 
Proust echoes these sentiments when he writes:
Books, […] through the way their cover opens, through 
the quality of the paper, can preserve within them-
selves as vivid a memory of how I then imagined Ven-
ice or of the wish I had to go there, as the sentences 
themselves.50 
Not just human-centric vocal tone and bodily gesture 
may inflect utterances and infect meaning, but also ma-
terial-centric typefaces, paper thicknesses, screen resolu-
tions, and font sizes.
Media theorist N. Katherine Hayles has acutely rec-
ognized many of the ways in which the material affects 
of computer-based media inflect and inform their tex-
tual “content.” In her seminal essay, “Print Is Flat, Code 
Is Deep,” she writes, “We can no longer afford to pre-
tend that texts are immaterial or that text on screen is 
the same as text in print. The immateriality of the text 
49 Mikhail Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, 
and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analy-
sis,” in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 105.
50 Marcel Proust, Time Regained, trans. Stephen Hudson (1931; Paris: 




has ceased to be a useful or even a viable fiction.”51 Not 
only does the materiality of the medium color the text’s 
meaning, but Hayles radically argues that the materiality 
of the medium is in turn colored by the meaning of the 
text. “Materiality is reconceptualized as the interplay be-
tween a text’s physical characteristics and its signifying 
strategies, a move that entwines instantiation and signi-
fication at the outset.”52
The idea that the “meaning” of a text cannot be easily 
separated from its material instantiation suits Bakhtin’s 
utterance theory well. The semiotic meaning of language 
(from the virtual realm) combines in the utterance event 
with the affective “meaning” of the material instantia-
tion of that particular utterance (whether live human 
voice, recorded human voice, algorithmically generated 
synthetic [faux-]human voice, printed type on paper, 
computer-generated font on screen, etc.). The utterance 
is always a nexus of two-way exchange. Not only does the 
affective timbre of the voice inform the meaning of the 
text, but (and this seems the more radical notion) the 
meaning of the text informs the affective timbre of the 
voice. Signifying words, far from being cerebral and re-
moved from bodily affect, actually create their own kind 
of bodily affect. In the utterance event, semiotic meaning 
ingresses into the physical world (via reading eye, listen-
ing ear, speaking voice, writing pen); at the same time, af-
fective force (timbre, typeface, shadow, paper thickness) 
enters into and colors the virtual (yet real) meaning of 
words. The actual real informs the virtual real which in-
forms the actual real and so on. Likewise, affect informs 
meaning which informs affect and so on. This actual/
virtual way of understanding the holistic real becomes a 
useful tool for overcoming the false dichotomy between 
51 N. Katherine Hayles, “Print Is Flat, Code Is Deep: The Importance of 
Media-Specific Analysis,” Poetics Today 25, no. 1 (2004): 87.
52 Ibid., 67.
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affect and meaning, experience and idea, physical world 
and human language.
Regarding the utterance, Whitehead himself observes, 
“There is not a sentence, or a word, with a meaning which 
is independent of the circumstances under which it is 
uttered.”53 And, “There is always a tacit reference to the 
environment of the occasion of utterance.”54 In White-
head’s text Symbolism, language is understood as a human 
cognitive means of abstracting (and thus filtering) bod-
ily affect (so that humans don’t get overwhelmed by pure 
affect). But language itself is then returned to the world 
(as a new entity now itself in the world), and it begins to 
have its own affective influence. Rather than seeing hu-
man language as a problem to be solved or philosophical-
ly overcome, Whitehead admires it. In Modes of Thought 
he writes, “Language is the triumph of human ingenuity, 
surpassing even the intricacies of modern technology.”55
Deleuze also understands human language, not as 
a means of reducing and representing a universe “out 
there,” but rather as a kind of affective force within the 
universe. In discussion with Lyotard, Deleuze says, “A 
text, for me is nothing but a little cog in an extra-textual 
machine.”56 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
theorize “a new ‘pace’ produced by the imbrication of the 
semiotic and the material.”57 The world is not a text, and 
human language is not the master key to accessing it. In-
53 Alfred North Whitehead, “Immortality,” in Essays in Science and Phi-
losophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 96.
54 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 264.
55 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free 
Press, 1968), 31–32.
56 Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard, et al., “Discussion,” after 
the presentation of Lyotard’s “Notes sur le retour et le Kapital,” and 
Deleuze’s “Pensée nomade,” in Nietzsche AuJourd’hui, 1: Intensités (Par-
is: Union Générale D’Éditions, 1973), 186.
57 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 337. [Italics appear in the original text.]
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stead, human language is just one more plateau that has 
historically accreted in a world full of a thousand other 
accreted plateaus.
Another advantage of Bakhtin’s utterance model is that 
it foregrounds language’s contingent relationship with 
actual history. Human language has never been and can 
never be ahistorical. Media theorist Alexander Galloway 
even makes the compelling argument that math is now 
historically contingent. “After software has entered history, 
math cannot and should not be understood ahistorically […] af-
ter cybernetics, after the mathematization of the genome, 
after Google’s page rank algorithm, after the industriali-
zation of the social graph, after the growing chasm of the 
digital divide, any talk of math’s unmediated discourse 
with reality comes off as disingenuous or in poor taste.”58 
As Galloway insightfully observes, even math is an affec-
tive historical force in the actual world. Again, this is be-
cause humans are actual entities in the actual world, and 
their use of math actually changes the world.
Philosopher Eugene Thacker eloquently describes the 
relationship between language and affect when he writes, 
“Literature and life are connected not as form to matter 
but as mutually deforming and unforming activities.”59 
And Elizabeth Grosz radically contends:
Altogether new conceptions of corporeality […] need 
to be developed, notions which see […] animate mate-
riality and the materiality of language in interaction, 
which make possible a materialism beyond physical-
ism (i.e., the belief that reality can be explained in 
terms of the laws, principles, and terms of physics), a 
58 Alexander R. Galloway, “The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and 
Post-Fordism,” Critical Inquiry 39 (2013): 360, 362. [Italics appear in 
the original text.]
59 Eugene Thacker, “apophatic animality: Lautréamont, Bachelard, 
and the Bliss of Metamorphosis,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical 
Humanities 18, no. 1 (2013): 96.
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materialism that questions physicalism, that reorients 
physics itself.60 
Bakhtin’s model of the utterance event provides a useful 
way of understanding both the influence of language on 
physical material, and the influence of historical utter-
ances on the meaning of language; not as separate binary 
entities, but as Thacker’s “mutually deforming and un-
forming activities.”
Linguistically Generated Affect That 
Escapes Linguistic Recapture
It is important to understand the mechanisms of the ut-
terance event and the ways in which human language 
systems and actual lived affect feed back and forth into 
each other, but this closed-circuit model of meaning-
generation is not the end of the story. There is always a 
surplus of affect in the world that escapes (re-)capture by 
language systems, yet which nonetheless continues to 
“mean” something in the world. To whom does it mean 
something? To the rest of the non-human entities in the 
world, and even to those parts of a human that “know” 
without linguistically knowing. Recall that, according to 
Whitehead, consciousness (that which is able to traffic in 
linguistic representation and understanding) is merely 
the apex of being. “Humans” ongoingly experience and 
participate in all sorts of actual occasions apart from 
their conscious awareness of them.
Human language, once uttered, always has affective 
results. I see a stop sign, read it as signifying my need 
to stop, and already my physical body is in motion as a 
result of this linguistic encounter. But the converse is not 
60 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 22.
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always true. Not all affect in the world has a de facto lin-
guistic meaning. My increased pulse at becoming aware 
of the stop sign does not necessarily “signify” anything 
linguistically. Nor does it refuse to signify anything. It is 
simply indifferent to its own potential recapture (or lack 
thereof) by linguistic systems of signification. All affect, 
all material, every occurrence in the world may be de-
scribed and understood using human language. But (and 
this is essential), not all events in the world are so de-
scribed and understood. Yes, all becomings in the world 
mean something, just not necessarily linguistically; they 
mean the very thing that they have become, to them-
selves and to the rest of the universe in all of its future 
becomings.
Apophatic language in particular seeks to supersatu-
rate the utterance event with an embarrassment of af-
fective surplus, returning as little assertive meaning as 
possible. Poetry seeks a kind of back and forth dance be-
tween meaning and aesthetic affect, ultimately arriving 
at a surplus of affect that purposefully exceeds (but never 
fully drowns out) the denotative “meaning” of the poem. 
Even a letter to the editor calling for empathetic action 
involving the construction of new buildings to counter a 
housing shortage is not merely a declarative utterance. 
Its goal is to incite a surplus of affective passion that will 
lead to humans levitating stones into buildings.
Affective surplus always escapes linguistic recapture 
because all language is inherently polysemic. No single 
word ever means one single thing. So even when a writer 
is trying to be as straightforward as possible (as in the 
case of clear construction instructions for a housing pro-
ject), there will always be some slippage between what the 
writer intends and what is understood. A surplus of mate-
rial affect escapes into the world whenever such slippages 
occur. The slippage between intention and understand-
ing is not merely an occasional accident caused by care-
lessly worded language, but an inherent property of all 
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language. To put this in information-theoretical terms, 
there is no such thing as a pure signal. No signal is ever 
possible without a modicum of noise as the background 
from which it may arise and be recognized as signal.
Rather than attempting to overcome such slippages 
between “intention” and “understanding,” the cosmic 
artisan celebrates and exploits them. Indeed, a primary 
goal of all contemporary artists (and indeed, all artists) 
is to turn systems of signification into affective surplus. 
Elizabeth Grosz is adamant in championing such artistic 
production of affect. In Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and 
The Framing of the Earth, she posits, “Art is the art of affect 
more than representation, a system of dynamized and 
impacting forces rather than a system of unique images 
that function under the regime of signs.”61 Later, she calls 
for “the generation (and never the reproduction or repre-
sentation) of sensations.”62 Finally, parenthetically citing 
Deleuze and Guattari, she proposes that “artworks… do 
not signify or represent (‘no art and no sensation have 
ever been representational’ [What Is Philosophy, 193]): they 
assemble, they make, they do, they produce.”63 An artwork 
need not even purposefully evade being interpreted as 
“meaning” something. (Indeed, every entity in the world 
is defenseless at every moment to being interpreted as 
“meaning” something.) The goal of the cosmic artisan is 
not to avoid being reduced to language any more than 
it is to create linguistic meaning via material affect. In-
stead, the cosmic artisan means to create a surplus of ma-
terial affect, via language and any other forces she finds 
lying around.
Creating a surplus of material affect via human lan-
guage is not difficult, because human language is always 
61 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the 





slipping, refracting, and diverging during every utter-
ance event. Whitehead was a keen theorist of the affect-
generating function of language. Conveniently for our 
purposes, he even takes the time to analyze the affect-
generating function of a particular language-centric art 
apparatus (in this case, a Hamlet soliloquy): “It is difficult 
to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet’s speech, 
‘To be, or not to be:…’ commence by judging whether the 
initial proposition be true or false, and keep up the task 
of judgment throughout the whole thirty-five lines. Sure-
ly, at some point in the reading, judgment is eclipsed by 
aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience, is 
purely theoretical, a mere lure for feeling.”64
Not only does Whitehead recognize and analyze the 
affective surplus created by human language, he rightly 
recognizes that the inherent ambiguity of language is its 
cause. He observes, “The vagueness of verbal statements 
is such that the same form of words is taken to represent 
a whole set of allied propositions of various grades of 
abstractness.”65 He calls attention to “the hopeless ambi-
guity of language,”66 but rather than lamenting this am-
biguity or trying to overcome it, Whitehead resignedly 
accepts ambiguity as inherent to language. At times, he 
even seems amused by language’s ambiguity: “Language, 
as usual, is always ambiguous as to the exact proposition 
which it indicates. Spoken language is merely a series of 
squeaks.”67 The ambiguity of language allows (indeed, 
forces) language to do more than merely denotatively 
“mean” any single representative thing. Instead, human 
language is able to function affectively and bodily, in ad-
dition to and in excess of any cognitive signifying that it 
may also incidentally be doing.
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Karen Barad, from her own unique “agential realist” 
perspective, reinforces Whitehead’s concept of signifiers 
as propositional lures to feeling: “Representations are 
not (more or less faithful) pictures of what is, but pro-
ductive evocations, provocations, and generative mate-
rial articulations or reconfigurings of what is and what 
is possible.”68 Indeed, representations act as apparatuses, 
even if they claim not to, regardless of their ‘accuracy.’ 
Thus, even the most realistic photographic representa-
tion of a forensic crime scene, regardless of any objective 
accuracy it claims to achieve, is actually functioning as a 
meaning-generating apparatus.
Note that it is not necessary for signification to cease 
functioning altogether before a surplus of affect may 
occur. Oftentimes it is quite the opposite. As with apo-
phatic writing, the more kataphatic the denotative as-
sertions, the stronger the apophatic affect. Likewise, 
the more a speaker is trying to clearly convey her exact 
meaning, oftentimes the more affective surplus is gener-
ated. Marcel Proust talks about “an increasing profundity 
of sound.”69 Anthropologist Kathleen Stewart describes 
Roland Barthes’s concept of the “third meaning” of lan-
guage (a meaning resulting from a surplus of affect) as 
“Immanent, obtuse, and erratic, in contrast to the ‘obvi-
ous meaning’ of semantic messages and symbolic signi-
fication… Their significance lies in the intensities they 
build.”70 And Gilles Deleuze evocatively describes what 
happens when signifying representation becomes aware 
of its affect-generating capacities: “When representation 
discovers the infinite within itself, it no longer appears 
68 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 389.
69 Marcel Proust, The Captive, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff (1929; Paris: 
Feedbooks, 2014), 220, http://www.feedbooks.com/book/1451/the-
captive.




as organic representation but as orgiastic representation: 
it discovers within itself the limits of the organised; 
tumult, restlessness and passion underneath apparent 
calm. It rediscovers monstrosity.”71
Deleuze’s own acute and idiosyncratic interest in art 
makes his writings (and the subsequent theories they 
have inspired) particularly relevant to our project of 
making nothing via apophatic art apparatuses. Deleuze’s 
original analysis of the radical artwork and theory of 
Antonin Artaud leads us deeper into some specifics of 
how language may become exceedingly affective.72 Ar-
taud prescribes, “One may invent one’s language, and 
make pure language speak with an extra-grammatical 
or a-grammatical meaning, but this meaning must have 
value in itself, that is, it must issue from torment.”73 Ar-
taud critiques Lewis Carroll’s experimental language (in 
poems like “Jabberwocky”) as failing to issue from bodily 
torment, and thus resulting in a dearth of affective sur-
plus. It is not enough, then, to merely avoid speaking de-
notatively. One must do it in a way that somehow incites, 
hooks into, and lures bodies.
Elsewhere, writing about the novels of Pierre Klos-
sowski, Deleuze recognizes “the shifting function of lan-
guage which now expresses only intensities.”74 Klossows-
ki himself describes “fluctuations of intensity […] which 
71 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 42. [Italics appear in the 
original text.]
72 I come to the following two examples by way of Brian Massumi 
own insightful analysis in “Introduction: Like a thought,” in A Shock 
To Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi 
(London: Routledge, 2005), xiii–xxxix.
73 Antonin Artaud, “Letter to Henri Parisot,” in Lettres de Rodez (Paris: 
G.L.M., 1946), quoted in Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark 
Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 84.
74 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 294.
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correspond to the thought of everyone and no one.”75 
Regarding these fluctuations, Deleuze adds, “At the same 
time that bodies lose their unity and the self its identity, 
language loses its denoting function (its distinct sort of 
integrity) in order to discover a value that is purely ex-
pressive, or, as Klossowski says, ‘emotional’.”76 Perhaps, 
then, art apparatuses may be used to break down human 
identities (and even human bodies) in order to help lan-
guage move beyond mere signification and begin traf-
ficking in exceedingly affective intensities. Arakawa and 
Gins’s apophatic art apparatus Mechanism of Meaning pro-
ceeds along such lines.
What other types of slippages and misreadings may be 
invited and exploited by art apparatuses in order to cause 
a surplus of affect? To choose just one example, the crea-
tion of a purposefully noisy channel between instruction 
and implementation in something as standard as a dance 
performance could lead to radically new forms of bodily 
motion. “Misinterpreted” or “misread” instructions to a 
dancer never entirely inhibit the dancer from proceeding 
to move. This is because all language is polysemic. Some-
thing can always be performed in the world as a result 
of instructive utterances, however “misinterpreted.” Bil-
lions of things can be performed. And each different per-
formed thing qualitatively differs from the other things 
that could have been performed.
In this particularly constructed apparatal context 
(dance instructions relayed along a noisy channel to a 
dancer), language begins to acts as a kind of affective, 
analog force on human bodies. Even with very simple in-
structional language systems, an almost infinite number 
of interpretations and resultant behaviors are possible. 
75 Pierre Klossowski, “Oubli et anamnèse dans l’expérience vécue de 
l’éternel retour du Même,” in Nietzsche, Cahiers de Royaumont (Paris: 
Minuit, 1967), 233, quoted in Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 299.
76 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 299.
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These variable possibilities increase due to the fact that 
the apparatal context we have created is itself embed-
ded in an overlappingly complex and telescoping series 
of contexts (contexts of human etiquette, art historical 
contexts of performance and dance, contexts of (de-)
skilled athletic performance, gendered body movement 
contexts, modestly contexts, etc.). Not every uttered in-
struction is completely arbitrary and open to any mean-
ing whatsoever; but the shades of subtle differences in in-
terpreted meaning can be almost infinitely fine-grained 
and nuanced (depending on telescoping contexts, inter-
pretations of tone, bodily affect, prior human relation-
ships between speaker and dancer, etc.). As Jonathan 
Culler profoundly observes, “Meaning is context bound, 
but context is boundless.”77
Before we leave our focus on human language and 
proceed to forms of a-linguistically generated mean-
ing, it is crucial to remember that human language is 
a strange, unique, wildly refracting force in the world. 
Human language is prehended by actual occasions (as 
is every other force in the world), but by means usually 
involving human-centric utterance events; and humans 
are peculiarly anomalous enduring objects in the world. 
To deny the anomalous nature of human consciousness 
(whatever “human consciousness” is) is to deny the well-
decided and well-accreted actual histories of humans and 
their languages. By no means does the world reduce to 
human language (that would be anthropocentric, solip-
sistic, and silly), but neither does human language flatten 
into just one more ordinary, material-discursive force in 
the world. Human language is far too complex and his-
torically well-accreted, entangled, and decided to ever 
be meaningfully accessed via such molecular-theoretical 
means. Yes, the world is by no means contingent upon 
77 Culler, On Deconstruction, 64.
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humans, but neither are humans just one more ordinary 
thing in the world.
The good news for the practicing contemporary artist 
(Deleuze’s cosmic artisan) is that she is not an ontolo-
gist of rhetoric, linguistics, semiotics, grammar, or affect. 
She need not commit to a Saussurean, Peircean, White-
headian, Derridean, Bakhtinian, or even Baradian model 
of language. Setting aside the vast complexities of hu-
man language for a moment, to even theorize about the 
bare ways in which plain old inorganic rocks create rocky 
material-meaning for other inorganic rocks requires all 
sorts of complicated speculative gymnastics. When the 
well-decided and well-accreted plateau of human lan-
guage systems are unleashed onto the world, wild and 
complex refractions begin to resound, far too complex 
and fine-grained for any single theoretical model to pin 
down. Bakhtin himself proposed a taxonomical project of 
identifying and labeling every type of speech genre that 
might ever occur in any utterance context, but was wise 
enough not to take up the project himself. It would have 
proved a fool’s errand. Fortunately, our cosmic artisan 
need only modulate, intensify, complicate, and bother 
these wildly refracting relationships between material-
meaning, human language, oblique incantatory force, 
consciousness, bodily affect, virtual linguistic potential, 
and actual pragmatic efficacy. She simply needs enough 
understanding of language and meaning to trouble the 
waters and see what arises. 
My main reason for getting into the quagmire of hu-
man language theory at all is simply to show that tactics 
from apophatic writing need not be merely metaphori-
cally or analogically adapted in the creation of an apo-
phatic art apparatus. Since language is itself a force in the 
world, apophatic writing itself is already a kind of actual, 
non-metaphorical apparatus. It is simply a literary-genre 
apparatus rather than an art-genre apparatus. But as an 




Although human language participates in the actual 
world of actual meaning, it is responsible for only a small 
fraction of all the meaning-making that goes on in the 
world. Why do most humans, when they choose to theo-
rize about the world, place such an inordinate priority on 
human language? Because, as a human, to philosophi-
cally theorize about the nature of the world is to inher-
ently traffic in human language. But there are other, less 
linguistic ways that human consciousnesses may involve 
themselves in the world. One such way is through the 
creation of art apparatuses.
The material universe is forever making meaning. In-
deed, the ongoing, becoming process of the universe is 
itself what the universe comes to mean, moment by mo-
ment, to all the various parts of the universe that are per-
petually attending to (or negatively prehending) all the 
other parts of the universe. This is the broad and fun-
damental definition of “meaning.” Meaning has occurred 
prior to human language, it currently occurs alongside 
it, and it will continue to occur after it. Indeed, human 
language, according to our Whiteheadian model of ac-
tual occasions/entities, is a form of material meaning – 
not via any simple analogy, but via very complex forms 
of ingression that are almost impossible to unpack in 
any meaningful way at a moment-by-moment analytical 
pace. 
In a sense, our prior treatment of quantum-behavior-
measuring apparatuses in Chapter 1 was itself already an 
analysis of one kind of a-linguistically generated mean-
ing. Art apparatuses themselves may generate a-linguistic 
meaning, although they are rarely thought of as doing so. 
The reason is because everything in the actual world may 
be described using human language. Art apparatuses are 
(almost always) created by humans for (almost always) 
other humans in (almost always) human-institutional 
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contexts, and so art apparatuses are prime candidates for 
reduction to human language. Indeed, every commercial 
artist who shows work in a Chelsea gallery is hoping for 
her art apparatuses to be linguistically reduced, prefer-
ably via a favorable review in Artforum Magazine or The 
New York Times. But art apparatuses themselves involve 
materials, and do not always involve human language; 
and thus they may well (theoretically, at least) create a-
linguistically generated meaning that never gets reduced 
to human language. For example, artwork created by a 
non-speaking outsider artist who never gets “discovered” 
may qualify as purely a-linguistic.
Whether or not a work of art or an affective material 
experience is or is not subsequently reduced to human 
language, such an artwork or experience nevertheless al-
ways also creates its own a-linguistic “meaning.” Humans 
who work with materials have affective relationships with 
those materials that are always in some ways a-linguistic. 
Mark Twain as a steamboat pilot on the Mississippi river 
was always looking for “signs” in the river and sky (rough 
water, a certain color sunset). These “signs” only become 
linguistic signs when he writes about them in Life on the 
Mississippi; but as he is actually piloting, these signs are 
experienced by him more as affective bodily instincts or 
urges, moving across a large range of qualia, never bina-
rily shifting from signifying “safe” to signifying “danger-
ous” in a single instant, but known, felt, and apperceived 
by a racing heart and a rush of adrenalin prior to (and 
often without ever needing to be put into) words. For a 
riverboat pilot, the current in a river may cause a qualita-
tive bodily experience that simply means what it eventu-
ally becomes. This kind of a-linguistic meaning may also 
be caused by an art apparatus. Actually, such material 
“meaning” can’t help but be caused by an art apparatus, 




As a matter of fact, such material meaning only rarely 
results in conscious linguistic meaning. The eruption of 
material meaning into conscious linguistic meaning is 
never inevitable. It is an anthropocentric mistake to as-
sume that all phenomena are proto-linguistic; that they 
all eventually lead to a second-order linguistic difference. 
Phenomena are indifferent to human language. They may 
or may not lead to human language. A craftsman may 
spend his whole life on a lathe in an affective “dialogue” 
with wood – a “dialogue” which is altogether a-linguistic, 
and one which he may never choose to put into words (or 
even think in words). This is unlikely, but theoretically 
possible. Meaning is always already “made” by all mate-
rial becomings in the world, indifferent to capture by hu-
man language. Indeed, “meaning” is not even “made,” so 
much as: that which is made comes to mean what it has 
become. 
Some Things That Apophatic Art 
Apparatuses Are Not
Keeping these understandings of language, affect, mate-
rial, and meaning in mind, let us return to our apophatic 
art apparatus which means to make nothing (i.e., brake 
becoming), and let us disqualify some apparatal ap-
proaches that only superficially seem to make nothing, 
but actually do not. It is not enough for our apophatic art 
apparatus to simply avoid human language in order to re-
veal the “bare phenomenological being” which remains. 
The world doesn’t need human language to make mean-
ing; and more to the point, the mere avoidance of linguis-
tic meaning doesn’t constitute the making of nothing. If 
mere a-linguistic affect qualified as overcoming mean-
ing, which in turn qualified as making nothing, then all 
art that avoided the use of human language would be 
apophatic. This way of thinking is too facile. Linguistic 
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meaning is hardly the only flavor of “something.” “Noth-
ing” is not merely the absence of linguistic meaning. Thus, 
constituting a regime of “phenomenological presence” 
which is indifferent to the regime of human language is 
not enough. For nothing to be made (for the brakes to be 
applied), even this regime of phenomenological presence 
must be somehow apophatically (performatively) con-
founded. Phenomenological presence itself must be de-
territorialized (to use Deleuze and Guattari’s term), and 
deterritorialization proceeds differently depending upon 
the strata we mean to deterritorialize. Deterritorializing 
the linguistic representation of presence and deterrito-
rializing phenomenological presence itself are two very 
different things. How might the deterritorialization of 
phenomenological presence proceed?
Post-figurative painting is not inherently apophat-
ic, nor is abstract expressionism. Just as avoiding a ty-
pographic signifier does not inherently make nothing, 
neither does avoiding a pictographic signifier. Jackson 
Pollock’s paintings generate all sorts of affective some-
things, whether or not they are semiotically legible as 
representing any particular, noun-ish, figurative some-
thing. Certain flavors of abstract expressionism (Rothko’s 
chapel, for example, according to Bersani and Dutoit) ar-
guably do create a kind of impasse and poverty of affect 
that might qualify as apophatic. But this interpretation 
of Rothko’s work is in almost direct opposition to what 
Rothko (and Clement Greenberg) thought his work was 
accomplishing. Was Rothko making luminous darkness-
es; or was he making lures toward something which then 
immediately barred our entrance into anything much at 
all? Only the latter might qualify as apophatic art: Rothko 
as trompe l’oeil painter of the void.
Another facile move would be to simply do away with 
material in our art altogether. If we move toward perfor-
mance art and away from the art object, then certainly 
our performance art will constitute an apophatic art ap-
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paratus, since we have done away with the “something” of 
material. If this were true, then all performance art (and 
all “digital” art) would be apophatic art. But, as White-
head reminds us, all material is actually an accreted se-
ries of occasions. From this perspective, all art – from 
the heaviest Michelangelo marble sculpture to the most 
ephemeral Allan Kaprow happening – is performance art. 
So, process philosophy won’t allow us to consider events 
as “nothing.” On the contrary, according to Whitehead, 
all material is actually just a series of ongoingly enacted 
and decided events.
Art that simply mixes language and materials does 
not yet constitute an apophatic art apparatus. Nor does 
art that treats language as a kind of material. Neither of 
these approaches are excluded from apophatic art appara-
tuses, but they do not in themselves constitute the mak-
ing of nothing.
“Conceptual” art is not inherently apophatic. To enact 
a tautology via art (however dematerialized) is not inher-
ently to make nothing. Depending on how the tautology 
is enacted, such conceptual art may simply be a denota-
tive object lesson, or a kataphatic model of aporia. There 
is a difference between actually inhibiting processes of 
becoming and merely representing such inhibitions. The 
former qualifies as apophatic; the latter does not.
Furthermore, there is no clear and easy (meta)physi-
cal separation between “concepts” and “materials.” In 
the words of the experimental art collective Spurse, “The 
narrative of conceptual art history is wrong. You cannot 
dematerialize things to get concepts. Ideas are embod-
ied practices.”78 William James implies something simi-
lar when he asserts, “[Consciousness] is fictitious, while 
thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the con-
78 Spurse, Time Drills: A Series of Exercise Scores (Omaha: Bemis Center 
for Contemporary Art, 2009), Glossary: “Enaction.”
186
some ways of making nothing
crete are made of the same stuff as things are.”79 If concepts 
themselves are already things, then foregrounding con-
cepts by de-emphasizing physical materials does not yet 
make nothing. It just shifts the emphasis toward a less 
solid kind of something.
Minimalism itself is not inherently apophatic. At its 
worse, minimalism may actually function as a quest for 
essentialism and pure phenomenological presence, the 
very things that apophatic art means to problematize.
Nor is apophatic art merely psychedelic art or op art 
that attempts to affectively and phenomenologically dis-
rupts human perception. Trippy confusion alone is not 
vacuous enough to qualify as nothing. (It may be a start 
toward nothing, if rigorously pursued.)
If dematerialization of solidity and avoidance of hu-
man language are not enough to make nothing, then 
how does the apophatic art apparatus make nothing? As 
expected, it depends on the specific nature of each apo-
phatic art apparatus. In the following chapters, we will 
examine several particular ways of making nothing, one 
artwork at a time. Prior to that, let us take some time to 
extract a few general tactics from apophatic writing ap-
paratuses and port them to apophatic art apparatuses.
Tactics from Apophatic Writing Apparatuses 
Ported to Apophatic Art Apparatuses
In extracting tactics from apophatic writing apparatuses 
and applying them to apophatic art apparatuses, I should 
be clear that it is not at all my intention to “critique” or 
“deconstruct” art apparatuses by using apophatic writing. 
This book is not an apophatic text, and it would be (and 
79 William James, “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” in Essays in Radical 
Empiricism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 37. [Italics 
appear in the original text.]
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historically has been) a kind of scatological exercise to 
write critically about artworks in a deconstructive man-
ner. Similar to Derrida’s failed attempts to deconstruct 
Pseudo-Dionysius, writing apophatically about any art 
apparatus (particularly about apophatic art apparatuses) 
would be like applying one kind of corrosive acid to an-
other kind of corrosive acid. Perhaps something curious 
would emerge, but that is not my goal. The apophatic 
art apparatuses discussed in this book are themselves al-
ready making much more interesting and alluring noth-
ings than could ever be produced by my making a kind of 
textual nothing of them. I actually intend to accomplish 
the opposite: to make a reverent textual something of 
their ingenious artistic nothings.
Similarly, my goal is not at all to reduce art to a kind 
of text in order for me to then write critically about it via 
some form of literary apophasis. Instead, I mean to exam-
ine art apparatuses that themselves make nothing of ma-
terials and presences and becomings, just as apophatic 
writing makes nothing of kataphatic linguistic assertion. 
The “writing” aspects of apophatic writing are less cru-
cial to my project than the “making nothing” aspects of 
apophatic writing.
Since the universe is always already at every moment 
making something new, apophatic art apparatuses do not 
naively seek to escape altogether from this perpetual pro-
cess of becoming. Such an escape would be impossible. 
Instead, apophatic art apparatuses seek to rigorously in-
terrupt, stall, defer, or at least doggedly perturb this per-
petual process of becoming. If quantum-behavior-meas-
uring apparatuses create phenomenal entanglements 
that mean what they become, then apophatic art appa-
ratuses create phenomenal entanglements that forestall, 
stymie, hinder, trouble, problematize, or defer (however 
temporarily) any resolved, assertive becomings (and thus 
any emergent meanings). Apophatic art apparatuses fail 
to mean what they have not (yet) become, in one way 
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or another, by one means or another. According to their 
various ways and means, apophatic art apparatuses make 
nothing (by temporarily braking the inevitable becoming 
of something).
An Apophatic Tactic:  
Perpetual Deferral – No End/No Source
One general way in which apophatic art apparatuses make 
nothing is via the act of perpetual deferral. Deferral and 
refusal of resolution are a standard tactics in the perpetual 
cycling back and forth between kataphatic assertion and 
apophatic denial. Deferral of resolution works forwards 
and backwards in lived historical time. Deferral is not 
only a refusal to resolve future becomings, but a refusal to 
resolve and establish the prior origins of present becom-
ings as foundational and fundamental. According to our 
understanding of apparatuses and actual occasions, each 
becoming must inherently begin with some prior state. 
But this prior state itself required a prior state before it, 
and so on. Rather than attempt to track down and resolve 
which comes first – the assertion or the denial –, katapha-
sis and apophasis adopt a kind of in medias res approach 
as they continue to cycle back and forth between each 
other. Since this cycling is interminable, and its origins 
are indefinite, there is no end and no source. Apophatic 
art apparatuses don’t seek to establish “nothing” as the 
ground of everything, once and for all. On the contrary, 
the making of nothing (the braking of something) must 
perpetually defer and unground any and all subsequent 
attempts to establish nothing as an originary ground. 
Making nothing thus becomes an ongoing performance 
rather than a once-and-for-all accomplishment.
H.P. Lovecraft’s apophatic-esque prose provocatively 
evokes (or rather, fails to evoke) a few such groundless 
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nothings. He writes of “no trace save destruction itself.”80 
He describes a God-pronounced decree whereby a human 
entity “must not only cease to be, but must cease ever to 
have been.”81 Of the destruction of every entity in a prior 
cosmos, Lovecraft says, “Nothing survived to tell that 
they had been and gone, been and gone, always and al-
ways, back to no first beginning.”82 There is always the po-
tential of terror lurking in any rigorously made nothing.
Of course, the apophatic tactic of perpetual defer-
ral not only defers the founding of an originary ground, 
but it also defers the resolution of a present becoming. 
Deleuze suggests a kind of topological means of deferral 
via the baroque process of folding. “The Baroque invents 
the infinite work or process. The problem is not how to 
finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through 
the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity.”83 Such topological 
foldings are not concerned with the deconstructive de-
ferral of linguistic meanings. Instead, Baroque material 
foldings actually intend to defer the resolution of ma-
terials themselves by continuing a process of perpetual 
deformation. Similarly, apophatic art apparatuses make 
present nothings by remaining in the flux of process, by 
perpetually deferring future resolved becomings.
80 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Lurking Fear,” in The Dreams in the Witch House 
and Other Weird Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (New York: Penguin Books, 
2004), 64.
81 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Case of Charles Dexter Ward,” in The Thing on 
the Doorstep and Other Weird Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2001), 126.
82 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadath,” in The 
Cthulhu Tome, ed. Anthony Uyl (Woodstock: Devoted Publishing, 
2016), 411.
83 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley 
(London: Athlone Press, 1993), 34.
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An Apophatic Tactic:  
Indifference (Utter? Toward What?)
Another general way in which apophatic art apparatus-
es make nothing is via an attitude of indifference. The 
apophatic art apparatus must remain indifferent to a 
number of different agendas (for example, the agenda to 
manifest presence, but also the agenda to actively decon-
struct presence) in order to avoid being sidetracked by 
any particular agenda. Apophatic art apparatuses don’t 
even actively oppose being hijacked by these tangential 
agendas, because to oppose them is also to be reactionar-
ily derailed and sidetracked by them. Apophatic art ap-
paratuses simply remain indifferent to these agendas. 
They give themselves over to these agendas while always 
simultaneously exceeding them.
Apophatic art apparatuses are indifferent toward re-
solving differences between subject and object, self and 
other. They are indifferent toward resisting or not resist-
ing their own subsequent reduction to linguistic signifi-
cation. They do not actively court or actively resist lin-
guistic interpretation. Some apophatic art apparatuses 
(like William Pope.L’s Black Factory) are purposefully not 
indifferent toward their own subsequent archiving, can-
onization, institutionalization, and communication. The 
Black Factory does purposefully work to sabotage its own 
subsequent insertion into art history. But all apophatic 
art apparatuses (even Pope.L’s Black Factory) are largely 
indifferent to their own subsequent capture by linguistic 
systems of assertive meaning. This indifference is pre-
cisely what allows apophatic art apparatuses to always 
affectively far exceed linguistic reduction.
Derrida’s différance (difference and deferral) and “indif-
ference” are neither antonyms nor synonyms of each oth-
er. They are just two different responses to the assertive 
project of kataphatic language. Différance attempts an 
ethical escape from kataphatic assertion by shifting the 
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emphasis of such language from likeness and presence to 
difference and absence. Différance attempts a strong es-
cape from kataphatic language via a kind of weak engage-
ment with it.
Indifference, on the other hand, is simply indiffer-
ent to either engagement or disengagement with hu-
man language. As such, indifference can be a very pow-
erful tactic. Difference (between what is actually in the 
world and the language that describes it, between one 
thing and another, between one word and another) seeks 
to subsume all (the primacy of primacy, the presence 
of presence, the becoming of being). But indifference 
eludes the all-encompassing embrace of difference. In-
difference is not anti-difference (simply another form of 
difference) or alter-difference (yet another form of differ-
ence). Indifference is simply indifferent to difference, to 
identity, and to the difference and play between differ-
ence and identity. Indifference enacts a rigorous letting 
be of such signifying (anti-signifying, alter-signifying, 
even a-signifying) concerns.
In Writing and Difference, Derrida imagines “an exist-
ence that refuses to signify, […] an art without works, a 
language without trace.”84 But apophatic art apparatuses 
are indifferent to Derrida’s deconstructive agenda. They 
don’t refuse to signify; they are simply indifferent to sig-
nification. They don’t bother camouflaging themselves; 
they are (usually) recognizable as “works of art.”
In the nastiest and most unfortunate version of 
“the linguistic turn,” “phenomenological experience” is 
thought of as an inherently pre-linguistic condition, as if 
all actual occasions in the world are destined to eventu-
ally arrive at some sort of linguistic reduction. But most 
actual occasions are never reduced to or translated into 
words or even conscious human thoughts. Not that ac-
tual occasions are inherently anti-linguistic, or even a-
84 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 219.
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linguistic; they are simply altogether indifferent to hu-
man linguistic capture and reduction. Apophatic art 
apparatuses are also indifferent to human linguistic cap-
ture and reduction. They neither court it nor resist it. At 
most, they sometimes purposefully and playfully bother 
troubling it (as in the case of Arakawa and Gins’s Mecha-
nism of Meaning).
Apophatic art apparatuses are indifferent to the “sen-
sible/intelligible” ontological dichotomy. They do not 
resist capture as intelligible. They do not seek to solely 
traffic in the sensible or sensory. Nor do they seek to de-
constructively undermine this dichotomy by prioritizing 
the sensible over the intelligible. Nor do they seek to sup-
plant the regime of the intelligible by declaring that all 
meaning is wholly sensible. Apophatic art apparatuses do 
not identify as sensible or intelligible, nor do they refuse 
to identify as sensible or intelligible.
In Chapters 4 and 5 of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari recognize human language not as some all-to-
talizing, all-binding force to be escaped and overcome at 
all cost, but as just one among many well-decided histori-
cal accretions of territorialized strata (some other strata 
being geology, biology, economics, politics, music, ethol-
ogy, etc.) Deleuze and Guattari don’t seek to deconstruct 
language, nor do they seek to write their own language 
in a way impervious to deconstruction. This is because 
there are always plenty of other relevant and exciting, 
extra-linguistic strata at play in the world, waiting to be 
modulated, deterritorialized, and reterritorialized onto 
other strata and into entirely new strata. And infusing 
all strata, there awaits the teeming plane of undifferenti-
ated immanence which obeys no single strata, least of all 
the strata of human language. Like Deleuze and Guattari, 
apophatic art apparatuses are usually indifferent toward 
human language and its deconstruction. Apophatic art 
apparatuses have bigger nothings to fry.
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An Apophatic Tactic:  
Cognitive Aporia
A third general way in which apophatic art apparatuses 
make nothing is by manufacturing cognitive aporia. Cog-
nitive aporia enacts an impasse. It halts, blocks, stymies, 
and confounds cognitive resolution. Cognitive aporia is 
a particular kind of perpetual deferral involving human 
thinking. Apophatic art apparatuses purposefully make 
a place for their human “audiences” within the apparatal 
phenomenon that they engender. Apophatic art appara-
tuses lure human thinking to crash, but in a very particu-
lar way. 
(Not that human “consciousness” is reducible to hu-
man brains, and not that human brains operate at all 
like computers, but) by analogy, there are several ways 
software can crash. One kind of crash returns an error 
message alerting its user that there has been a crash. A 
bit less courteous, but still gentle, is the software crash 
where the software stops functioning and shuts down. 
The thorniest kind of software crash is created by an 
endless internal loop within the software that hangs the 
software up. The software is still running, working, mak-
ing, becoming, and meaning; often even using an excess 
of processing energy to do so. But it is trapped within 
its present process. No result or outcome will ever be re-
turned. Apophatic art apparatuses crash human think-
ing in a similar way. They do not return the error mes-
sage “nothing.” They do not shut down and make a weak 
nothing by failing once and for all to make a conclusive 
something. Instead, apophatic art apparatuses perpetu-
ally hang up any conclusive, summative becomings. In so 
doing, they continuously and perpetually make nothing.
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Why Might Apophatic Art Be Better 
Than Apophatic Writing?
Why bother porting apophatic tactics from writing to art? 
What might art be able to accomplish apophatically that 
writing cannot? One difference between the aesthetics of 
writing and the aesthetics of art is that, ever since Kant 
proposed his version of the sublime, the idea of cogni-
tive aporia (achieved by one’s being overwhelmed by the 
sublime) has been part of the fundamental theoretical 
understanding of visual aesthetics. One way to achieve 
aesthetic impact is by ordered beauty; the other is by ap-
peal to an overwhelming sublime. Although apophatic 
writing predates Kant by many centuries, apophatic writ-
ing has always remained at the fringes of most historical 
forms of writing, as an extreme form of mystical practice. 
Kataphatic assertive writing has almost always taken 
center stage. From this perspective, artists have had more 
historical experience using apophatic tactics (if never 
explicitly labeled “apophatic”) than writers; and contem-
porary art audiences are (arguably) more open to engage 
with apophatic art that contemporary readers of litera-
ture are open to engage with apophatic writing (although 
within certain sub-genres of experimental literature, this 
claim is debatable). Contemporary artists may find a wid-
er audience (and thus a wider influence) for their apo-
phatic art than contemporary writers may find for their 
apophatic texts. As literary theorist Stanley Fish snidely 
observes, “Although the ‘textual’ or the ‘discursive’ is […] 
a crucial site of social contestation, the people who study 
that site are not crucial players in the contest.”85
If apophatic tactics are currently more intrinsic to 
contemporary art than to contemporary writing, why 
did these tactics first appear historically in writing? My 
85 Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political 
Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 123–24.
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guess is that human language was so inherently bound 
by kataphatic assertion that apophasis was most desper-
ately needed there first; and that once it appeared, it was 
most recognizable as a generic anomaly there.
In shifting from human-instigated apophatic writ-
ing to human-instigated apophatic art, I am not shifting 
straight out into the total, phenomenal universe. I am 
merely moving sideways from one form of human activ-
ity to another. It is not incumbent upon me to make a 
case for how the “non-human” world-in-itself enacts apo-
phatic tactics and creates apophatic apparatuses, because 
humans are (almost) always an intrinsic (although by no 
means sole) component in the creation of apophatic art 
apparatuses. The difference between apophatic writing 
and apophatic art is that materials from the world get 
introduced into apophatic art apparatuses in more direct, 
less oblique ways than they get introduced into apophat-
ic writing apparatuses. Yes, materials in the world do en-
ter written apophatic language via the utterance event, 
but this utterance ingression is a particularly unusual, 
nuanced, human-consciousness-contingent type of oc-
currence. Whereas materials may ingress into apophatic 
art apparatuses more directly (or at least differently).
Furthermore, materials always also connect out into 
the world in discursive but not necessarily human-lin-
guistic ways. This is not to say that humans and their 
languages don’t also actually connect out into the actual 
world. They do, but via a more oblique occurrence – the 
utterance. There are not and never have been any her-
metically sealed boundaries between human language, 
human art, humans, and materials in the world. The art 
apparatus functions as a uniquely intentional, experi-
mental, and speculative proposition-generator: a fecund, 
phenomenal nexus where human processes and thoughts 
encounter material entities. As such, art apparatuses ex-
ist in an emergent space between the decisions, whimsies, 
and proclivities of materials (accreted, enduring objects) 
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and the purposeful, investigative tactics and approaches 
of humans (also accreted, enduring objects). Apophatic 
art apparatuses are thus able to more fine-grainedly be-
come entangled with materials in a way that apophatic 
writing apparatuses are not.
One difference between apophatic writing and apo-
phatic art is insightfully foregrounded in an observation 
by Alexander Galloway regarding the difference between 
literary post-structuralism and architectural post-mod-
ernism. When Frank Gehry’s buildings begin to leak, 
their owners don’t celebrate these leaks as post-structur-
alist features. As Galloway observes, “Even if an architec-
tural design is allowed to crack and buckle at the semiotic 
or symbolic level, it is not allowed to fail at the level of 
material functionality.”86 According to my own criteria, if 
Gehry’s buildings are not allowed, expected, and invited 
to materially buckle and leak (and they are not), then they 
are not yet apophatic art apparatuses (and they are not).
How Might Apophatic Art Be Different 
Than Deconstructive Art?
Both apophatic writing and deconstructive reading must 
begin with an initial state, something on which to work. 
In the case of apophatic writing, the initial state is kata-
phatic truth assertions about God. With deconstructive 
reading, the initial state is any text (about anything) 
which proceeds according to truth assertions. As men-
tioned previously, the goal of apophatic writing is to 
undermine ontological language about God (language 
based on presences, essences, identities, and assertions 
of truth) in order to (perhaps) be encountered by the God 
who is beyond ontology. The goal of deconstruction is to 
86 Alexander Galloway, “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?” Culture & 
Society 28, No. 7–8 (2011): 97.
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undermine ontological language (about any and every-
thing) in order to give difference its due – to reveal dif-
ference (rather than presence, essence, or identity) as the 
actual means by which all meaning in the world emerges. 
Apophatic writing must necessarily leave kataphatic as-
sertion standing. To fail to do so would be heretical. De-
constructive reading doesn’t mind leaving whatever text 
it deconstructs lying in a deconstructed heap. It simply 
moves on to the next text.
Now let’s shift from writing to art. The initial state 
of our art apparatus is no longer an ontological truth 
assertion but a piece of physical material. Here we may 
understand “material” as an accreted series of historical 
decisions (if not exactly kataphatic or ontological “asser-
tions”). Returning to Whitehead, a piece of “material” is 
properly understood as an enduring society of actual oc-
casions, actual decision events. It seems to me that a truly 
deconstructive art apparatus would always be pursuing a 
kind of nuclear annihilation of material, a kind of under-
mining of actual presence in order to achieve a kind of 
nihilistic absence. This is not to say that deconstructive 
reading is itself inherently nihilistic (far from it), but sim-
ply to say that a deconstructive art practice would shift 
toward nihilism as it shifted toward physical material. 
Either that, or deconstructive art would always be un-
dermining the noun-ishness of entities in order to make 
manifest the flux of difference at the heart of their verb-
ish becomings. From this latter perspective, then, White-
head’s cosmology (that objects are actually events) simply 
describes as always already true much of what a decon-
structive art might hope to exemplify and foreground.
Whereas apophatic art does not desire to leave its ma-
terials in a heap, or even to reveal the differentiating flux 
at the heart of their apparent presence. Recall that apo-
phatic writing intends to let kataphatic assertion stand. 
Likewise, apophatic art intends to let materials have their 
way and their say – not in order to deconstruct them 
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and reveal their inherent instability, but to use them 
as kindling to make nothing, as firestarter for braking. 
Apophatic art apparatuses have nothing against mate-
rial (whether as object or as event). Instead, apophatic art 
apparatuses trouble, disturb, and brake the becomings of 
material in order to make nothings.
Why Make Apophatic Art Apparatuses at All?
“Since every aesthetic encounter is singular, any-
thing like a general aesthetics is impossible.”
– Steven Shaviro87
“[All] untranslatable words are in fact synonyms; and all share 
the desire for untranslatability, the longing for uniqueness.”
– Svetlana Boym88
Why make apophatic art apparatuses at all? What might 
be the ethical goal? Why not just continue making ordi-
nary art apparatuses, or cease making any art apparatus-
es? Why not just continue writing apophatically, or cease 
writing apophatically? As mentioned previously, one rea-
son for making apophatic art apparatuses is to brake on 
ice, and in so doing, somehow more efficaciously steer 
into the future. There are other ethical reasons which will 
be more easily unpacked in the final chapter of this book, 
once we have closely examined several, specific, exempla-
ry apophatic art apparatuses in the next four chapters. 
Each one of these works of art presents its own unique 
approach to enacting apophasis.
87 Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 156.




If every apparatus (scientific, artistic, material, lin-
guistic, “natural”) simply “means” what it has become, 
then what might the outcome of an art apparatus that 
makes nothing “mean?” Will it mean anything? Must it 
explicitly mean “nothing?” Does it defer returning any 
meaning at all in its deferral of becoming something? 
Might something relevant and new be learned about 
ordinary art apparatuses (works of art that make some-
thing) by closely examining the function of apophatic art 
apparatuses (works of art that make nothing)? Hopefully, 
we shall see. 
We now take our current understanding of appara-
tuses and apophasis and turn to a close examination of 
a few particular apophatic art apparatuses. At the begin-
ning of my research for this book, I initially “measured” 
these artworks, and tailored my theory to suit those ini-
tial measurements. In the following chapters, I try my 
theory back onto the artworks to see how well it fits. In 
order to best reveal the suitability (or lack thereof) of my 
theory to these artworks, I have chosen to proceed as if 
the theory fits each artwork just right. That way the read-
er can more easily judge the instances where the fit seems 
forced, awkward, or altogether unsuitable. According to 
Whitehead’s pragmatic criteria for philosophy (his own 
and others), “The verification of a rationalistic scheme is 
to be sought in its general success, and not in the peculiar 
certainty, or initial clarity of its first principles.”89 Let’s try 
my apophatic art apparatus theory on for size.
89 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 8.
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How To Do (No)things with Words: 
Robert Fludd’s Diagram of Hyle  
Vs. 
Arakawa and Gins’s Mechanism of 
Meaning
 
Sometimes the best way to understand what an apophat-
ic art apparatus is doing is by comparing it with a non-
apophatic art apparatus. This chapter makes such a com-
parison. In this case, the non-apophatic art apparatus is 
really more like a non-apophatic diagram apparatus that 
claims to be doing less (materially and affectively) than 
it is actually doing. And the apophatic art apparatus is 
really more like a sequence of photographic documents 
of a (faux?-)pedagogical installation, documents that 
(implicitly) claim to be a lot more benign than they actu-
ally are. Both apparatuses involve human language, and 
as we discovered in the last chapter, human language has 
a nasty habit of lying about what it is actually, affectively 
doing. Both apparatuses approach the conceptual topic 
of “nothing,” but in radically different, almost directly 
antithetical ways.
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The apophatic art apparatus under consideration is 
Mechanism of Meaning by (artist? filmmaker? architect?) 
Shusaku Arakawa and (artist? poet? philosopher?) Made-
line Gins, the duo known as Arakawa and Gins. Mechanism 
of Meaning is a series of art installations (each a revised 
version of the prior installation) which occurred over a 
period of about forty years. Each iteration of the installa-
tion consists of a sequence of cognitive (visual and bod-
ily) exercises, in the form of physical stations, meant to 
disrupt (foreground? reset? revise? altogether bungle?) a 
human’s ability to make meaning. I think of each station 
as a kind of object lesson workshop – something similar 
to a child’s primer, but physical, and for adults. But one 
could also think of each station as a kind of self-inflict-
ed brainwashing trap (which is to say almost the same 
thing: something similar to a child’s primer, but physical, 
and for adults). In earlier iterations of the installation, 
the individual stations were hung on walls, and in later 
iterations the stations were placed on the floor. The ini-
tial station panels measured 7.5 × 5.5 feet. The first itera-
tion of the installation occurred at the Venice Biennale 
in 1970, although work on the project actually began as 
early as 1963.
These same exercises are also published in four differ-
ent book editions (1971, 1979, 1988, 1997), each a revision 
of the last. All of the exercises are troubling and disrup-
tive in their own specific way. The exercises are grouped 
according to “improbable or preposterous (lacking defi-
nition) subdivisions,”1 and placed in an intentional se-
quence within those subdivisions, the subdivisions and 
1 Arakawa and Madeline Gins, Mechanismus der Bedeutung (Werk im 
Entstechen: 1963–1971) (Munich: Bruckmann, 1971), 27. This text ap-
pears in German in the book itself. This English source text is from 
a hand-typed letter on Ronald Feldman Fine Arts Inc. letterhead 
which came inserted in my copy of the book. At the bottom of the 
letter is typed “Arakawa, Mechanism of Meaning / Verlag F. Bruck-
mann KG / (Munich, 1971).”
205
how to do (no)things with words
sequences themselves continually undergoing revision 
over the years. After proceeding through all of the exer-
cises sequentially, rigorously, and repeatedly, one is (or at 
least I am always) well and properly flummoxed. Tempt-
ing as it is to analyze the specific function of each exer-
cise, and then the entire series of exercise stations as a 
whole, I will constrain my examination to one particular 
exercise station, and consider its revisions, fluctuations, 
elidings, and slippages across the series of four books 
(and into its fifth [final?] instantiation on the internet). 
The particular exercise under consideration always ap-
pears as the first exercise in the “Neutralization of Sub-
jectivity” subdivision, which is itself the first subdivision 
in editions 2–4, but is the third subdivision in the first 
edition. I will simply refer to this exercise as “The Dot.”
According to my analysis, “The Dot” exercise is really 
an apophatic (micro?-)apparatus which is itself a contrib-
uting element toward a much larger apophatic (macro?-)
apparatus, the macro-apparatus being the entire Mecha-
nism of Meaning project. Where that macro-apparatus 
begins and ends (makes its “cut” into the universe, fol-
lowing Barad’s terminology) is, by design, impossible to 
pin down. The entire apparatus itself keeps slipping (over 
time, across galleries, in and out of print), and the mi-
cro-apparatuses (the individual exercises) within it keep 
slipping (instantiation after instantiation, “individual/
subjective” human use after use). Rather than try to pin 
it all down, I will just slip along with it for a while and 
report back on the qualitative flavor(s) of the nothing(s) 
it refuses to finish making.
In order to better understand and appreciate the inge-
nuity of the apophatic art apparatus known as “The Dot,” 
we will place it alongside another quite rich apparatus: 
(alchemist? physician? mathematician? astronomer?) 
Robert Fludd’s 1617 diagram of the pre-creation void. 
Whereas Arakawa and Gins’s apparatus acts as a lure to 
trap and brake linguistic human thought, Fludd’s dia-
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gram actually enlists linguistic human thought in order 
to help constrain his diagram from doing and becoming 
something much greater than he intends it to become. 
We will ignore Fludd’s admonitions to ignore what the 
materiality of his diagram is actually doing, and will in-
stead attend to and follow the diagram’s actual material 
becomings (both on the front side of its page, on the re-
verse side of its page, over the centuries, across multiple 
editions, through the division-of-labor conventions of in-
ternational book production during the 1600s, in regards 
to hermetic cosmologies, and in dialogue with the tools, 
substrates, and materials of engraving media). We will 
discover that Fludd’s diagram is actually a diagrammatic 
apparatus meant to employ pictographic analogy in order 
to assist in the mimetic description of a braked state. And 
yet, far from actually braking anything, Fludd’s appara-
tus continues to become and mean what its materials are 
(still) doing.
Basically, Fludd’s apparatus fails to achieve any real ap-
ophatic effect because he is unable to properly brake the 
speedy and proliferating becomings of his own apparatal 
materials. Whereas Arakawa and Gins’s apparatus does 
enact apophatic effect because they succeed in braking 
their apparatal materials. More specifically, the present-
tense actual occasions that make up Arakawa and Gins’s 
apparatal materials (one material is human language, 
another material is human bodies) are forced to prehend 
each other in ways that enact their own self-braking apo-
ria. Fludd’s materials exceed his linguistic claim that they 
signify “nothing.” Whereas Arakawa and Gins make no 
linguistic claim of signifying “nothing” (or “anything”).
In a wonderfully concise passage, philosopher and 
theologian Denys Turner observes that “there is a very 
great difference between the strategy of negative propo-
sitions and the strategy of negating the propositional; be-
tween that of the negative image and that of the negation of 
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imagery.”2 Some clarification is in order. By “proposition-
al,” Turner does not mean Whitehead’s use of the term, in 
which “propositions” need not ever involve language or 
conscious human thought. He means “linguistic proposi-
tions” which assert denotative meanings requiring con-
scious human thought. Fludd’s diagram is merely what 
Turner calls a negative image. Whereas Arakawa and 
Gins’s “The Dot” not only avoids the strategy of negative 
linguistic propositions; it even moves beyond “negating” 
the linguistically propositional, and instead throws a sab-
otaging wrench in the entire mechanism of the linguis-
tically propositional (i.e., the mechanism of meaning). 
Similar to Turner, Deleuze observes, “It is of the essence 
of representation not only to represent something but 
to represent its own representativity.”3 Fludd’s diagram 
follows this maxim by representing its own ability to be 
represented. Whereas “The Dot” (pseudo-)banally enters 
the regime of representation, only to immediately begin 
eroding the entire regime from within.
Before moving too far along in introducing these two 
apparatuses, some images of what they look like are in 
order. The first figure in this chapter is a drawing of the 
left 3/4 of page 284 of my own copy of the first printed edi-
tion of Arakawa and Gins’s Mechanism of Meaning (more 
properly titled Mechanismus der Bedeutung [Werk im Entste-
hen: 1963–71]) (see Fig. 15). The photographic image that 
appears on page 28 of this first edition is (one presumes) 
2 Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35. [Italics appear 
in the original text.]
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 80.
4 The right 1/4 of the page has typeset German translations of the Eng-
lish text.
5 For larger versions of these images, and for additional images, visit 
http://textshopexperiments.org/textshop03/bereft-nothing-vs-
fecund-nothing which is adapted from a presentation I gave at the 
“[image here]” conference at Harvard in 2016.
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Fig. 1: The left 3/4 of page 28 of the first printed edition of Arakawa and 
Gins’s Mechanism of Meaning. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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Fig. 2: The diagram on page 26 of Robert Fludd’s The Macrocosm and the 
Microcosm. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
a photograph of the physical panel for “The Dot” exercise 
taken from an instantiation of the Mechanism of Mean-
ing installation some time between 1963 and 1971. The 
introductory title at the top of the panel (“3 neutrali-
Zation of suBJectiVity”) and the main instructions be-
low it (“use these eXercises as a series of ‘filters’ / 
through which to pass suBJectiVe moDes of / inter-
pretation anD neutraliZe to some Degree:”) apply to 
all of the subsequent exercises in section 3 of Mechanism 
of Meaning, not just “The Dot” exercise. The first exercise 
in section 3 appears immediately below these main in-
structions. It is the exercise I am calling “The Dot.” “The 
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Dot” exercise is comprised of three sub-exercises. Each 
one of these sub-exercises has its own instruction which 
appears beneath it. I will focus more on the first two sub-
exercises than on the third.
The second figure in this chapter is a drawing of a digi-
tal image of the diagram on page 26 of Robert Fludd’s 1617 
magnum opus, Utriusque Cosmi, Maioris scilicet et Minoris, 
Metaphysica, Physica, atque Technica Historia (The Meta-
physical, Physical, and Technical History of the Two Worlds, 
Namely the Greater and the Lesser), more commonly known 
as The History of the Two Worlds, or The Macrocosm and the 
Microcosm (see Fig. 2). Simply put, the image on page 26 of 
The Macrocosm and the Microcosm is Fludd’s diagram of the 
formless pre-universe (which is made up of “hyle”). “Et 
sic in infinitum” means “And so on to infinity.”
Fludd’s diagram enacts a kind of bereft flavor of noth-
ing. It paradoxically but merely re-presents the impos-
sibility of representing “nothing.” Via the accompany-
ing text from The Macrocosm and the Microcosm, and via 
the border text of the diagram itself, Fludd enlists his 
reader as the meaning-making component of his overall 
diagrammatic apparatus, in order to make the meaning, 
“nothing.” In this “bereft nothing” apparatus, although 
a limit of the semiotic system is indeed approached, the 
semiotic system itself necessarily remains intact and 
un-exceeded. The reader resides within and functions 
to maintain the semiotic system. The system continues 
to function well enough to represent its inability to rep-
resent. Such media looks “like” nothing, but “nothing” 
is not experienced. To quote Derrida (out of context), 
“Presentation […] is presented in its very inadequation, 
adequate to its inadequation. The inadequation of pres-
entation is presented.”6
6 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 131.
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Fortunately, Arakawa and Gins employ human lan-
guage for an entirely different purpose, one that well ex-
ceeds the hermetically sealed and self-referential realm 
of “the semiotic turn.” “The Dot” apparatus enacts what 
I will call a fecund (as opposed to bereft) flavor of noth-
ing. “The Dot” triggers an aporia in its viewer in order to 
engender a kind of supra-semiotic experience of nothing. 
This “fecund nothing” apparatus lures the viewer into 
initially behaving as a meaning-making component of 
its overall apophatic apparatus in order to sabotage that 
meaning-making function so that other affective, mate-
rial, a-linguistic forms of experience may rise to the sur-
face. The overall linguistic system of human language is 
not “dismantled” (indeed, this would be impossible), but 
rather it is used as a launching pad to bootstrap an ac-
companying affective experience which then exceeds it.
In “The Dot,” visual surfaces are not merely occlud-
ed, blackened, or erased (as in Fludd’s bereft nothing 
approach). Instead, the very cognitive mechanisms by 
which surface effects are produced and by which they 
are semiotically “read” are themselves foregrounded and 
destabilized, deferring and braking the signifying finality 
of the surface image. This form of semiotic braking is an 
apophatic tactic.
It is important to note that affect and signification 
are always already occurring in both Fludd’s diagram and 
“The Dot.” Indeed, how could they not be? Both affect 
and signification are refracting through and folding in 
and out of one another in both of these apparatuses. The 
difference is simply this: the “bereft nothing” tactic of 
Fludd calls on the viewer to ignore the (often considera-
ble) affective and material excesses produced by the para-
dox of its signification strategy. Such excesses are treated 
as incidental and are not purposefully exploited. Where-
as the “fecund nothing” tactic of Arakawa and Gins uses 
the ever-present regime of signification as a lure which 
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then becomes a trap, the aporia of which is purposefully 
meant to release an excess of experienceable affect.
Language Is As Language Does
If we mean to get at actual (non-metaphorical) becom-
ings and brakings in the actual (non-metaphorical) 
world, why begin the case study section of this book 
with two apparatuses that rely so heavily on human 
language? Almost as a kind of control against which to 
measure future, less-linguistic apparatuses. If actual ap-
paratal becomings can be enacted by apparatuses which 
incorporate human language (and they can), then hu-
man language must simply be one more force (albeit a 
strange, unique, and explicitly anthropocentric force) in 
the actual world (and it is). Human language (even the 
most declarative, constative, straightforward language) 
is always already doing something in the world beyond 
merely re-presenting the world from a once-removed, 
metaphorical, purely semiotic perspective. In the case of 
“The Dot,” human language acts within the art apparatus 
as a lure which triggers human bodily aporia. This bod-
ily aporia functions as the affective braking force of the 
overall apparatus.
We need not even employ a special, magical, dedi-
cated flavor of performative language in order to achieve 
our braking force. Although “The Dot” does happen to 
include linguistic commands, they turn out to be com-
mands that become increasingly difficult to sensibly in-
terpret, much less to pragmatically obey. Instead, any and 
all language, even “ordinary” denotative language, may 
instigate actual occasions of becoming; and thus (when 
properly, apophatically implemented), may also instigate 
brakings and hesitations within those actual occasions.
Regarding the relationship between human language, 
human thought, and the world, semiotician Charles 
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Sanders Peirce roundly observes: “The whole function 
of thought is to produce habits of action… To develop its 
meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what 
habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what 
habits it involves […]. I only desire to point out how im-
possible it is that we should have an idea in our minds 
which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects 
of things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible 
effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive 
ourselves.”7
According to Peirce’s perspective, human language 
and human thought are not once-removed from the 
world; they are inextricably entangled in the ordinary 
becomings of the actual world, because they are inextri-
cably bound up with the actions they produce. If (accord-
ing to Karen Barad) materials mean what they eventu-
ally become; and if (according to me) human language 
is a material force in the world; then human language is 
as human language causes to become. From this kind of 
Peircean perspective, someone like Derrida (re-)appears 
in a much more performative light. Rather than an infu-
riating logician who obfuscates more than he elucidates, 
Derrida becomes the producer of texts that purposefully 
act as delucidation apparatuses. As Derrida himself ex-
plains, “I never write on anything […]. Even if I feign writ-
ing about it, and no matter what I say, before all else I 
am seeking to produce effects.”8 My point is simply that 
linguistic effects (whatever their results, however they 
are produced) are actual, pragmatic, “real world” effects.
7 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How To Make Our Ideas Clear,” in Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume V: Pragmatism and Pragmati-
cism, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1934), 400–401.
8 Jacques Derrida, “Envois,” in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and 
Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 113.
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Artist and poet Brion Gysin, insightful beyond his era, 
grasped well (and idiosyncratically) the materiality of 
language as an artistic medium. In 1958, Gysin asserted, 
“Language is an abominable misunderstanding which 
makes up a part of matter. The painters and the physicists 
have treated matter pretty well. The poets have hardly 
touched it.”9 Later, in 1963, he wrote about language, “It’s 
just material, after all. There is nothing sacred about 
words.”10 In that same year, Arakawa and Gins installed 
the first iteration of Mechanism of Meaning, ingeniously 
capitalizing on the materiality of language from the com-
bined perspectives of poetry, architecture, and art. Bet-
ter than merely “touching” the materiality of language, 
Arakawa and Gins constructed an apparatus which lured 
in, exploited, and deeply troubled the materiality of both 
human language and human bodies.
The time has come to compare Fludd’s diagram of 
pre-creation with Arakawa and Gins’s “The Dot” in much 
more nuanced detail, beginning with Fludd. 
Bereft Nothing (Fludd’s Diagram)
Fludd’s “black” diagram appears toward the beginning of 
The Macrocosm and the Microcosm. In it, Fludd famously il-
lustrates the formless pre-universe, made of a material 
called hyle. Fludd’s own interpretation of hyle is basically 
a conflation of Aristotle’s original hyle (matter awaiting 
form) with Aristotle’s “prime matter” (a fundamental 
substance not made up of any other substance).
Fludd writes of hyle:
9 Brion Gysin, Poem of Poems (Alga Marghen LP N. plana G 8Voc-
Son021, 1997), originally recorded in 1958.
10 Brion Gysin, “Cut-Ups: A Project for Disastrous Success,” in William 
S. Burroughs and Brion Gysin, The Third Mind (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1978), 43.
215
how to do (no)things with words
This primal material is a primordial, infinite, shape-
less existence, as suitable for something as for noth-
ing; having no size or dimension, for it cannot be said 
to be either large or small; having no qualities, for it 
is neither thin, nor thick, nor perceptible; having no 
properties nor tendencies, neither moving nor still, 
without colour, or any elementary property.11
This explanation constitutes an admirably apophatic 
piece of writing, in which Fludd presses us into service 
as meaning-makers, only to confound our ability to make 
meaning. But when Fludd transitions from writing about 
hyle itself, to writing about his own visual representation 
of hyle, the disclaimers of mediation begin. On visually 
representing hyle, Fludd writes:
And here, honestly following the descriptions of Mer-
curius Trismegistus and Moses, we have painted an 
imaginary picture of this formless matter, as a black 
smoke, or vapour, or a dreadful gloom, or the darkness 
of an abyss, or, in a word, any kind of unfinished, raw, 
impalpable material.12
Fludd freely admits the failure of his image to properly 
illustrate the formlessness of pre-formed matter. He 
writes, “We have painted,” but the diagram is actually a 
Matthäus Merian engraving, and not a Fludd painting 
at all. Fludd’s term “imaginary picture” attempts a kind 
of double remove from actual, material hyle itself. Fur-
thermore, by describing hyle “as” a list of analogs, Fludd 
falls back on analogical, metaphorical adequation, which 
serves as an even further (thrice) remove. Fludd’s written 
language is doing all it can to bracket our expectations of 
11 Robert Fludd, The Origin and Structure of the Cosmos, trans. Patricia 
Tahil (Edinburgh: Magnum Opus Hermetic Sourceworks, 1982), 21.
12 Ibid.
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the picture. He is exhausting his own language to warn 
us that the picture is merely a formal illustration of form-
less matter, and not an actual enaction of formless mat-
ter. Like some kind of proto-Magritte, Fludd cautions us, 
“this is not a nothing.”
In effect, Fludd’s diagram and his writing about the 
diagram are meant to gather, collect, corral, and ultimate-
ly trap any and all affective forces emanating from the 
material diagram itself, and press those forces into the 
singular service of intensifying signification in order to 
stress and approach the limit of the meaning of “noth-
ing.” Fludd never intends any of the affective, material 
forces of the engraving to exceed the regime of significa-
tion. He even goes so far as to corral the borders of the 
diagram with his own linguistically explanatory hedge: 
“and so on to infinity.” Far from extending the borders 
of the engraving into actual, material infinity, this hedge 
text attempts to trap the engraving within the bounds of 
linguistic signification.
And yet, far from being an impoverished stand-in for 
Fludd’s concept of formless matter, the material diagram 
itself is actually doing much more than Fludd’s own 
explanatory disclaimer claims. Indeed, the diagram is 
veritably exuding excessive material affect (all of which 
Fludd means us to ignore as merely incidental). Instead, 
we are going to ignore Fludd, and unpack the material 
functioning of the physical diagram.
As asserted in the previous chapter, representations 
act as apparatuses, even if they claim not to. It is essential 
to note that even non-apophatic representations (such as 
Fludd’s diagram) are always affectively doing something. 
One thing that diagrams are affectively doing is masking 
the fact that they are affectively doing something! By in-
ordinately focusing us on what they are analogically rep-
resenting, diagrams divert our attention away from all the 
other things they are actually doing. Metaphors function 
a lot like representational diagrams. Metaphors seduce 
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humans into thinking about metaphors metaphorically, 
as if metaphors can only ever be thought according to 
their own self-declared function. Meanwhile, metaphors 
are actually smuggling in and forging all sorts of intui-
tive, back-door connections, well in excess of their basic 
tenor–vehicle relationships.
We may now revisit the Derrida quotation mentioned 
earlier, attending to its original context. Here is the ex-
panded quotation: “The sublime proper […] refuses all 
adequate presentation. But how can this unpresentable 
thing present itself? […] Presentation […] is presented in 
its very inadequation, adequate to its inadequation. The 
inadequation of presentation is presented.” Derrida goes 
on to explain, “[The sublime] inadequately presents the 
infinite in the finite and delimits it violently therein.”13 
Such inadequate presentation and violent delimitation 
of the infinite within the finite is precisely what Fludd’s 
diagram accomplishes. In this sense, Fludd’s diagram is 
an apparatus for subliming. It intends, via hypertrophied 
media and analogical representation, to point us toward 
some transcendental beyond. We are meant to use our 
own sign-interpreting imaginations to arrive at this in-
finite, transcendent nothing, this form of formlessness.
It bears noting that this kind of imaginative subliming 
of the transcendent has nothing at all to do with apopha-
sis. Apophatic apparatuses don’t point outward toward 
a transcendent nothing. Instead, they actively brake the 
becoming of something. In order for Fludd’s diagram to 
truly succeed at its subliming purpose, it has to violently 
delimit infinite formlessness within discrete, finite me-
dia. The more constrained, bereft, and hypertrophied the 
media materials, the more sublime the overall effect. Un-
fortunately for Fludd (but fortunately for us), his materi-
als are bursting out at the seams in myriad directions.
13 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 131.
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The Square (into Circles)
Fludd’s Macrocosm initially describes the progressive evo-
lution of the cosmos. Each evolutionary stage of the cos-
mos is illustrated with a diagram, all of which are in the 
form of circles save one. Only Fludd’s initial, pre-cosmos 
hyle diagram is in the form of a square. Why the differ-
ence? The difference is theological, but also technical and 
material. The circle form is derived from Fludd’s idiosyn-
cratic and hermetic theology, but the initial square owes 
its shape to both theological and technical forces.
The created cosmos is a circle because Mercurius Tris-
megistus says that once God’s creative light emanated 
forth from him (with a hearty fiat lux), it then circled back 
toward him, because God was the most desirable thing 
in the universe, and the light desired him. So, although 
Fludd’s initial diagram (on page 26 of the Macrocosm) is 
square, the diagram which depicts the creation event 
(page 49) and all other diagrams of the cosmos (pages 29, 
37, 41, 46, 55, 63, 66, 69, 131, 136, 138, and 141) are circles. 
In a much later diagram (on page 62 of Fludd’s second 
volume, the Microcosm), Fludd goes so far as to label the 
space outside of the circle of the cosmos extra omnia = 
outside of everything.
In addition to the theological underpinnings of Fludd’s 
circular cosmos, it is worth noting the almost direct for-
mal correlation between Fludd’s spherical experimental 
laboratory apparatuses (many of which are also depicted 
in The Macrocosm and the Microcosm) and Fludd’s model of 
the cosmos. Fludd would not resist this correlation, since, 
to him, the spherical forms of his laboratory equipment 
naturally arise from the circular forms of the cosmos it-
self. Whereas, to us, 500 years later, from the perspective 
of our much different cosmological model, it seems the 
exact opposite is more likely true: Fludd’s cosmos formal-
ly mirrors the shape of his laboratory apparatuses, and 
not vice-versa.
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The reason for the square shape of Fludd’s initial page 
26 diagram is also technical and material. Not “materi-
al” simply in the analogical sense, having to do with the 
“meaning” of “material” within Fludd’s cosmology (hyle 
= a kind of pulpy, formless matter); but “material” in the 
very immediate, pragmatic, apparatal sense of the shape 
of physical books, and the nature of copperplate engrav-
ings. In Fludd’s diagrammatic apparatus (i.e., the engrav-
ing on page 26), the re-presented, pre-formed hyle must 
analogically seek and attempt to exceed the very edges of 
media representation. In Fludd’s case, those edges hap-
pen to be a square copperplate. Why square? Because pa-
per pulp dries most readily on a wire mesh grid, so we 
have rectangular books full of rectangular pages instead 
of circular books full of circular pages. The copperplate 
engraving of the unformed hyle must fit on the rectan-
gular page of the book. This rectangular shape actually 
works out well for the engraver, because it is more cost-
effective to cut a flattened copperplate into squares than 
into circles (since less material is wasted). Because of 
these technical and material facts of the world in 1617, the 
baseline, default, unmodulated shape of the pre-engraved 
copperplate substrate is square. Since Fludd means to re-
present his hyle as reaching and exceeding any and all 
limits, the hyle must cover the full plate, and the default 
shape of the plate is square. Hence the diagram of the 
hyle is square.
Technically, all of the engraved figure prints pasted 
into Fludd’s book are square, even when they depict cir-
cular images. This is due to the technical nature of intag-
lio printing. You need not crop your copper plate itself 
into the form you are depicting (like a circle), because you 
can just wipe off the ink from the un-engraved area be-
yond your engraved circle, and the image still prints as a 
circle (albeit on a square piece of paper). And actually, be-
cause of Fludd’s border text (“And so on to infinity”), the 
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engraved “hyle” in the square diagram on page 26 doesn’t 
actually reach to the edge of its copperplate either.
All these material processes and histories are sud-
denly brought into view and accidentally foregrounded 
once the medium is hypertrophied, once the edge of the 
copperplate is purposefully approached and (faux-)ex-
ceeded. Representing formlessness can’t help but stress 
the regime of formal representation, because formless-
ness necessarily hypertrophies the limits of represent-
able form. Representing formlessness always forces a 
focus on the mechanisms, formal craft skills, materials, 
tools, processes, and substrates of whichever particular 
medium is doing the formal representing. In this sense, 
formlessness winds up “outing” the hidden material 
functionings of the (ostensibly pure) signifying medium 
seeking to formally represent it. Formlessness seeps out-
ward and beneath the realm of simple signification, out-
pacing the realm of mere re-presentational adequation. 
Formlessness lures otherwise straightforward, meaning-
making humans toward illicit encounters with absurdist 
a-formulations of nothing.
Yet almost in direct response to these out-of-bounds 
tendencies (lest we begin focusing more on the actual 
functions of the diagrammatic apparatus itself, rather 
than on the meaning of Fludd’s proposed cosmology), 
Fludd immediately seeks to cordon off all these material 
affects and excesses with his border text (Et sic in infini-
tum), returning us to the realm of linguistic signification. 
Otherwise, all these material forces might get out of hand 
and begin to mean what they are actually doing (which, 
of course, they do anyway).
The Crosshatching
Fludd says formless hyle is homogeneous, because it can’t 
contain varying intensities of heterogeneous difference. 
But he also says it has no qualities or pattern, and ho-
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mogeneity seems like a kind of pattern to me. As such, 
the diagram seeks to represent an un-form that is neither 
variable nor consistent.
Fludd himself sketched all of the diagrams in The Mac-
rocosm and the Microcosm, and Matthäus Merian translat-
ed his sketches into engravings. Fludd says he painted the 
hyle diagram, but there is no extant record. What would 
he have painted? Whatever Fludd’s original painting 
looked like (if there even was one), it was up to Merian 
to translate Fludd’s painting, or his written instructions, 
into a copperplate engraving.
It is worth noting that, had Fludd purposefully intend-
ed to incorporate the materials of engraving (ink, paper, 
copper, steel burin) and the processes of engraving (incis-
ing, inking, pressing) into the explicit structure and evo-
lution of his cosmology, he would have been approach-
ing something like the engraved poems of William Blake, 
where the technical nature of the engraving process in-
fluenced and was influenced by the content of Blake’s po-
ems. Instead, Fludd drew the diagrams, wrote the text, 
and conducted the lab experiments; but he subcontract-
ed the technicalities of the engraving and printing.
Merian used the common engraving technique of 
crosshatching to depict the unformed hyle, but the cross-
hatching in the hyle diagram is denser (thus darker) and 
less symmetrical than other crosshatched shadows in 
Merian’s more standard engravings (of cows, barns, and 
fields) for his less cosmically inclined clients. What drove 
Merian’s formal decision to crosshatch the hyle diagram 
so densely and asymmetrically? No one knows. Merian 
was a subcontracted craftsman, and this particular deci-
sion was not considered worth recording for posterity. It 
would have been considered a purely technical decision, 
not likely to interest those outside of Merian’s particular 
trade. And yet, Matthäus Merian’s chosen technical ap-
proach to the unique crosshatching challenges of this 
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particular engraving assignment form an integral com-
ponent of the overall diagrammatic apparatus.
From subsequent diagrams throughout The Macrocosm 
depicting the hyle in more formed states, it is obvious 
that Merian’s crosshatching decisions for the unformed 
hyle on page 26 were far from arbitrary. From the engrav-
ings on pages 37 and 49 for example, the areas of formed 
(and being-formed) hyle are depicted using symmetri-
cal, directional hatchings, while the areas of yet-to-be 
formed hyle are depicted with the same, almost aleatoric 
crosshatchings used on page 26.
Speculating about Merian’s specific decisions regard-
ing craft technique necessarily cause us to consider 
the agency of the subcontracted craftsman at the time, 
which further leads us to consider the broader interna-
tional chain of production for fine books in the early 
1600s: author Robert Fludd (England) hires publisher Jo-
hann Theodor de Bry (Germany) who hires engraver Mat-
thäus Merian the Elder (Switzerland). Once again, Fludd’s 
diagrammatic apparatus of formlessness surprises us by 
exceeding the bounds of mere signification, this time 
cutting into and thus prehending specific human labor 
relations of Europe at the time.
Whatever conceptual, technical, theological, econom-
ic, or representational goals drove Merian’s decisions to 
crosshatch the way he did, he arrived at an unusually 
dense and varied matrix of crosshatchings. The density 
and variety of this crosshatching matrix caused an in-
ordinate (and inordinately varied) amount of ink to re-
main within the copperplate incisions after the surface 
of the plate was wiped and prepared for printing. The 
differing amounts of ink retained from one inking to an-
other meant that each pressing of the copperplate varied 
greatly from one edition of the book to the next. As a re-
sult, four hundred years later, some editions are blotchy 
and quite ink-black, others contain brittle white ridges 
amidst a field of black, and still others have grey splotches 
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where fields of parallel raised white ridges have chipped 
away and worn down over the years, resulting in a kind of 
grey residue beneath (see Fig. 3). The sheer amount of ink 
retained in the copperplate incisions often oversaturated 
the paper onto which it was printed, resulting in bleeding 
along the x, y, and z axes.
THE BLEEDS (along the x, y, and z Axes)
Because of the dense crosshatchings, each individual 
printing of the formless hyle plate is more variable than 
Fig. 3: The bottom left quadrant of the diagram on page 26 of Robert 
Fludd’s The Macrocosm and the Microcosm, from the edition housed at 
Harvard’s Houghton Library. Note the purposeful irregularity of the 
crosshatchings. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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it would be in a printing run of an ordinary engraved 
plate. As mentioned, some inkings of the copperplate 
retained more ink than others. Some pressings pressed 
harder than others. Furthermore, over hundreds of years, 
due to the density of ink retained by the plate, in various 
pressings, parts of the ink have flaked off, unevenly ex-
posing areas of the substrate. These material variances do 
not normally manifest themselves in engravings of cows, 
but with this particular hypertrophied copperplate, they 
do. These discrepancies between editions are particularly 
evident along the edges of the hyle, where the ink has ex-
ceeded its proscribed boundary in various, unique ways 
per edition. It is almost as if the ink itself is attempting to 
obey the border’s admonition to continue “on to infinity.”
Also, because the formless hyle diagram plates are so 
ink-saturated, several even show through, to varying de-
grees per edition, from the front side of the page (page 26 
[verso]) to the reverse side of the page (page 25 [recto]), 
along the “z-axis,” as it were.
A Brief Word on “Blackness”
It might seem that making the physical diagram of the 
pre-formed proto-universe as black as it could possibly be 
would somehow create a kind of “actual” nothing, as if we 
were suddenly staring at a void contained within the very 
page itself. But, of course, “blackness” does not inherent-
ly (or immediately, or directly) “equal” nothing without 
the human-interpretive work of adequating blackness 
with nothing. No matter how black the black, we are still 
called upon as humans to become meaning-making ma-
chines in order to “make something” of the black. Black-
ness doesn’t even inherently equal absence; and even if it 
did, absence doesn’t inherently equal nothing (particu-
larly since the nothing we are pursuing in this book has 
more to do with putting the brakes on becoming, and 
less to do with any sort of void). One is (humorously) re-
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minded of Anish Kapoor’s attempt to patent the black-
est black paint possible, and of the black album cover for 
Spinal Tap’s Smell the Glove (“It’s like, ‘how much more 
black could this be?’ and the answer is none. None more 
black.”) At least one inherent property of blackness seems 
to be how inherently funny is the brute force, full frontal 
attempt to achieve the maximum quantitative degree of 
nothingness via sheer qualitative excess of blackness.
To equate blackness with nothing is to suffer from 
oculo-centrism (and a specifically human flavor of oculo-
centrism at that). Human art history suffers from such 
oculo-centrism. This is why many an art historian has 
conveniently interpreted Fludd’s hyle diagram as a pre-
cursor to a host of 20th-century abstract expressionist 
black paintings (from Kazimir Malevich to Frank Stella). 
But even Fludd (although he’s no Arakawa and Gins) 
avoids such an obvious, oculo-centric trap. Fludd’s dia-
gram does not rely on the color of ink or the accuracy of 
the illustration to be the hyle itself, or even to accurately 
re-present the hyle. For Fludd, the whole diagrammatic 
system used throughout The Macrocosm and the Microcosm 
only ever serves to supplement and augment the text it-
self. Fludd invokes us as readers to piece everything to-
gether in our imaginations. We are called upon to behave 
as meaning-making mechanisms within the diagram-
matic apparatuses he has constructed. We are enlisted 
to make meaning of the mysterious, inexplicable, form-
less, originary hyle no more or less than we are enlisted 
to make meaning of all the other more ordinary elements 
of earth, air, water, and fire. It’s just that the bizarre, apo-
phatic nature of this formless prime matter throws a par-
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All of these unique material properties that emerge due 
to hypertrophying the medium of copperplate engraving 
are bracketed by Fludd himself as merely incidental. They 
fall outside of Fludd’s circumscribed, hermetically sealed, 
signifying program. And yet, [t]here these material prop-
erties all still are, ignoring Fludd’s declared intentions as 
they function within the diagrammatic apparatus that 
he has co-created. Fludd intends his formless hyle dia-
gram to enlist its viewers as meaning-making machines 
in order to make the meaning of “formlessness.” And al-
though, as we’ve shown, Fludd’s diagrammatic apparatus 
is actually doing much more than Fludd himself intends, 
it is still not making nothing (i.e., braking the becoming 
of something). On the contrary, Fludd’s diagrammatic 
apparatus is actually becoming all sorts of particular new 
somethings, as every ordinary, non-apophatic apparatus 
can’t help but do (whether art apparatus, Newtonian-
behavior-measuring physics apparatus, quantum-behav-
ior-measuring physics apparatus, or any other apparatus 
created by carving out an explicit chunk of the universe 
from the rest of the universe). In other words, whatever 
the merits of Fludd’s diagrammatic apparatus (and they 
are several and thrilling), it is still not an apophatic ap-
paratus. As such, Fludd’s diagrammatic apparatus makes 
a kind of bereft nothing (it makes the human-semiotic 
meaning “nothing”) while simultaneously making a host 
of proliferating material somethings.
Fecund Nothing  
(Arakawa and Gins’s “The Dot”)
Whereas Fludd’s formless hyle diagram succeeds in mak-
ing a bereft nothing (enlisting the viewer as a meaning-
making machine in order to make the semiotic meaning 
of “nothing”), Arakawa and Gins’s installation and book 
project Mechanism of Meaning makes a series of fecund 
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nothings: the viewer’s ability to make meaning is pur-
posely sabotaged and confounded. Rather than being 
able to successfully make the semiotic meaning of “noth-
ing” (or anything, for that matter), the viewer is stranded 
in a state of aporia, unable to make any definitive mean-
ing at all. Although we will focus on just one exercise (the 
one I have been calling “The Dot”), each exercise from 
Mechanism of Meaning makes its own unique flavor of fe-
cund nothing (each at its own unique pace, each for its 
own unique duration, each to its own increasingly con-
founding end). Each exercise puts the brakes on human 
meaning-making. One might rightly ask, “why create 
such a rigorous series of apophatic apparatuses?”
In the first edition of the book (published in 1971), not 
in a forward or a preface, but in the very first section of 
Mechanism of Meaning itself [said first section being called 
“1. presentation of Bases for selection (irony, amBi-
guity, paraDoX, concrete aBstraction, humor, hyp-
notic illustrations, etc.)”], Arakawa and Gins describe 
their own goals for the project:
This project is […] an animated […] cartoon for [non-
sense or] meaning. The animation or the mechanism 
of meaning occurs through […] the interaction of lan-
guages [visual-verbal-tactile etc.] by the viewer work-
ing out the exercises on his own terms (sense or non-
sense) […] to increase the effort required (and thus 
make it more apparent?) and to prolong the time nec-
essary (to allow enough time for the setting of a trap?) 
for the viewer’s mechanism of meaning to operate14
14 Arakawa and Gins, Mechanismus der Bedeutung, 27. This text appears 
in German in the book itself. This English source text is from a 
hand-typed letter by Arakawa which came inserted in my copy of 
the book. 
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Later (at least by the publication of the second edition of 
the book in 1979), the artists had deemed this first sec-
tion to be over-determining and had removed it from the 
book and from the installation instantiation of the pro-
ject. This removal makes sense: if the goal of the project is 
to destabilize the viewer, then providing the viewer with 
this (however vague, at least somewhat clear) contextu-
alization of the goal of the project winds up undermining 
the goal of the project. I include Arakawa and Gins’s con-
cise explanation here because, unlike Mechanism of Mean-
ing, the goal of this book is not to destabilize its reader, 
but simply to explain how such a destabilizing apparatus 
may be constructed. As such, insight into what the artists 
themselves actually thought their own project was doing 
(at least in 1971) is useful, if for no other reason than to 
be able to contrast their explanation with Fludd’s textual 
explanation of his diagram. Whereas Fludd was openly 
apologetic for how inadequately representative his dia-
gram was, Arakawa and Gins indicate that they purpose-
fully intend to use such slippages between signifier and 
signified in order to set a trap for the viewer’s meaning-
making abilities. Since “the mechanism of meaning” is 
the viewer, the project is best understood not as a mecha-
nism of meaning in and of itself, but more as an apophat-
ic art apparatus designed to disrupt “the mechanism of 
meaning” (i.e., humans). The project thus begins with the 
implicit awareness that its human “viewers” are already 
part of the art apparatus.
Although Arakawa and Gins don’t directly allude to 
quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses, or to apo-
phatic writing, note how aware they are of the apophatic 
apparatal functionings of their art. They know full well 
that each exercise functions as a lure that sets a trap. The 
primary goal of each exercise is to lure human thinking 
into a whorling, perpetually refracting, aporetic quag-
mire. Indeed, the artists talk much more about what the 
work is doing and how it functions than about what it 
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looks like, its physical dimensions, or even its source ma-
terials. Of course, they can’t talk about what the work 
“means,” since it means (purposes, intends) to confound 
human cognitive ability to make meaning.
Finally, we have arrived at our first proper apophatic 
art apparatus! Let us first examine the specific, pragmat-
ic ways in which “The Dot” functions, and then unpack 
some of the implications of its behavior.
The Curious Case of the Dot (Edition 1)
“The Dot” exercise appears (relatively) straightforward in 
edition 1 of the book (see Fig. 1). The first dot of which we 
are instructed to think is admittedly tiny, but still visible 
just to the left of the “x” that appears roughly in the mid-
dle of the top diagram. Or is that “x” really a “+”? Or is 
that dot not a dot, but only the left-most part of the left-
hand arm of the “+”? Perhaps it only appears as an extant, 
self-contained dot because of a misprint of that particu-
lar “+”? (When a dot only appears to be a dot, doesn’t that 
still make it a dot?) For the sake of argument, let’s call 
it a dot. We may assume (or may we?) that in the source 
installation panel for this particular exercise (the physi-
cal panel that was photographed for this first edition of 
the book), the “x”s have first been stenciled, and the dot 
itself has been added later with acrylic paint by the art-
ist’s hand.
Ah, but then the instructions below the diagram read: 
“please think only of the Dot not of the X’s.” Perhaps 
the dot of which we are supposed to think is actually the 
period at the end of these very instructions? Perhaps it is 
the apostrophe between the “X” and the “S” in these in-
structions. (Is an apostrophe a dot?) But let’s assume the 
dot of which we are supposed to think (and only think) is 
the dot next to the center “x” (an “x” that might also be 
a “+”). Whether or not it’s an “x” or a “+” turns out to be 
irrelevant, since we are only supposed to think of the dot. 
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But then why add “not of the x’s”? Why not simply say, 
“please think only of the dot” and leave it at that? So now 
we have to keep a place in our mind for the x’s, a place 
that is a bit more specialized and reserved than the place 
we are not supposed to keep for all other non-dot things, 
but a place not yet as central as the place we are supposed 
to keep for “the dot.” But, of course, how can one think 
to reserve a semi-special place for something that is not 
supposed to be thought?
It is hard enough to think “only” of the dot. You wind 
up thinking about thinking about the dot, in which case 
you are not thinking only of the dot. Or maybe you start 
thinking about what “only” actually means (set theory, 
unions, exclusions, and the logics they imply); or you start 
thinking about what “of” means (what is the difference 
between thinking about something and thinking of some-
thing? why of?); or you start thinking about what think-
ing is; or you begin occasionally self-monitoring to as-
sess whether you are still thinking only of the dot (which 
of course, now you aren’t, because now you are thinking 
about whether you are or not); or you start thinking about 
how long you are meant to think of the dot (is an instant 
enough, or need it be a series of instances, and need these 
instances be continuous, or can they be sporadic?). All of 
the aforementioned difficulties (and many more) arise 
simply from trying to think only of the dot, much less from 
trying to think only of the dot not of the x’s.
The initial straightforwardness of the exercise proves 
to be a Trojan horse, a lure, a trap. It extends the (false) 
promise of understandability. But (and this is crucial) the 
apparatus really does mean us to actually attempt (in real 
time) the mental gymnastics required to try and execute 
the instructions. (They did ask nicely, after all. They said 
please.) And here we are only 1/3 of the way down the page, 
with 2 more sub-exercises to go, and only 1/5 of the way 
into all of the printed editions of this particular exercise.
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In the second diagram on the page, the circle diagram, 
the dot appears toward the right-hand side of the panel, 
about mid-way up, above the last in a string of consecu-
tive circles, and to the bottom right of another single cir-
cle (or is the single circle really just the skewed final cir-
cle in the aforementioned string of consecutive circles?). 
All of the same conundra apply here as applied to the x 
diagram, with a few additional difficulties. Maybe all of 
these circles are actually just large hollow dots. Is “the 
dot” now this new dot that we see in the circle diagram, 
or are the instructions still referring to the first dot up in 
the x diagram? And now, in addition to reserving a spe-
cial mental place for the x’s so that we may not think of 
them, we must also reserve the same kind of special men-
tal place for the circles so that we may not think of them. 
Or perhaps we can simply empty our reserved mental x 
space and replace it with circles. But then of course we 
would have to think about enacting that swap, and we 
can’t think about that. Why are they circles and not o’s? 
o’s might make more sense, or at least be more consist-
ent with x’s. Whatever the case, we can’t think about the 
question of why the circles are not o’s. And we can’t think 
about the circles (or the o’s) themselves. And we can’t 
think about the difference between about and of. We must 
(please) think only of the dot.
The final (third) diagram shows a sequence of gray-
scale swatches shading toward (what appears to be) the 
color of the canvas substrate upon which they are paint-
ed. The instructions read “using the same system sepa-
rate the neXt two shaDes.” Evidently the above two 
dot diagrams were supposed to have caused a “system” 
to emerge, a system which may then also be applied to 
approximating sequential shades of grayscale. One of 
the problems with this third set of instructions is that 
only the first of the “next two shades” may be approxi-
mated, after which we have already arrived at white. 
We can’t approximate along the grayscale any whiter 
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than white (“none more white”). But wait, the instruc-
tions aren’t merely asking us to approximate the next two 
shades, they are asking us to separate them. How can you 
separate two things, when you can’t even imaginatively 
approximate one of those two things? Wait a minute, 
if I’m only imaginatively approximating the next two 
shades, why am I unable to approximate a shade that 
is more white than white? In my imagination, I can ap-
proximate anything? Or can I? Is imagining the same as 
thinking? Is it only possible to imagine actual colors, or 
may I imagine non-actual colors? And what system (“the 
same system”) would I use to imagine non-actual colors? 
I don’t recall having purposefully developed any consist-
ent system during my (failed) attempts to complete the 
dot exercises. Have I accidentally developed some sort 
of intuitive system without consciously knowing it? If 
so, how can I purposefully “use” that intuitive system to 
complete this third set of instructions? Is it possible to 
create a problem-solving system without consciously un-
derstanding how it works? Even more challenging, is it 
possible to intuitively apply an intuitive problem-solving 
system without ever consciously understanding either 
the system or the way in which you are applying it? How 
would you intuitively invent and apply such a system? 
Bodily? Haptically? What does that even mean? And once 
you had invented and applied the system, how could you 
consciously verify that you had applied it? Indeed, why 
would you ever need to consciously verify that you had 
applied it? Could you bodily verify it? Can a body know? 
What is the difference between conscious knowing and 
bodily knowing?
The tip of the Mechanism of Meaning iceberg has been 
struck, and with only 91 more exercises to go! Fortunately 
(or unfortunately), we will stick with this first exercise 
(“The Dot”) and track it across subsequent book editions 
and subsequent art installations.
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Fig. 4: The top two diagrams on the left-hand side of the page contain-
ing "The Dot" exercise in edition 2 of Mechanism of Meaning. Drawing 
by Jordan Cloninger.
The Curious Case of the Dot (Edition 2)
Now let us consider the same exercise in edition 2 (1979) 
of the book (see Fig. 4). Some of the revisions in this edi-
tion are overt and intentional (additional color, addition-
al figures), but others differences seem slight and inci-
dental, and some differences seem outright accidental.15
In the second edition, the dot page has been printed 
in color (although if you are currently reading the print-
ed version of Some Ways of Making Nothing, Figure 4 will 
be in black and white), and it turns out the circles are 
actually multicolored. Some circles are yellow, some are 
black, some are blue, some are tan, and some are red. And 
although we won’t focus on the third diagram (the one 
15 It is worth noting that the edition 3 (1988) instance of “the dot” 
exercise is identical [more or less] to the edition 2 instance.
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with the swatches) from here forward, it turns out that 
the swatches which had initially appeared in grayscale in 
the first edition are actually shades of purple (from dark 
to pale). We are thus able to infer from edition 2 that the 
physical installation panel of “The Dot” exercise is actu-
ally in color rather than grayscale. This poses all sorts of 
new challenges when it comes to imagining “the next two 
shades,” but mercifully, from here on out we will limit our 
focus to the first two dot diagrams.
Apart from the addition of color, something very 
unusual is happening in the circle diagram. The dot has 
largely disappeared. In its place is a kind of light smudge. 
Similar (but not identical) smudges appear in several 
other places throughout the circle diagram. What is go-
ing on? The dot in the x diagram is plainly visible. Indeed, 
it is more prominent than it was in the first edition. So 
why has the dot in the circle diagram become so scant as 
to have practically disappeared? Had we not already seen 
the circle diagram in the first edition, we would think 
that this exercise was a prank, and that there was no dot 
amongst the circles. But since we know where to look, we 
are able to discern what might perhaps be called a trace 
of the circle dot.
Is the (almost) absent dot simply a technical misprint? 
Is it intentional? These questions are further complicated 
by the addition of extra images in the right-hand third of 
the page. In the first edition, the right-hand third of the 
page had been reserved for typed German translations of 
the text from the left-hand panel exercises, because the 
first edition was originally printed in German by a Ger-
man press. But now in this right-hand margin, two new 
images appear (see Figs. 5 and 6).
The top image in the right-hand margin (see Fig. 5) is 
hilarious and provides an entirely new set of cascading 
x’s and circles for us to not think of, including an entire 
waterfall that we also must not think of. But the bottom 
image in the right-hand margin (see Fig. 6) is the one on 
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Fig. 5: The top image in the right-hand margin of the page containing 
"The Dot" exercise in edition 2 of Mechanism of Meaning. Drawing by 
Jordan Cloninger.
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Fig. 6: The bottom image in the right-hand margin of the page con-
taining "The Dot" exercise in edition 2 of Mechanism of Meaning. Draw-
ing by Jordan Cloninger.
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which I want to focus. It is evidently a color photograph 
of the physical exercise panel itself as it appears in an 
instantiation of the art installation, accompanied by an 
appropriately perplexed viewer. Note that, in this right-
hand photograph, the dot amongst the circles is present 
in all of its full, solid (albeit twice-mediated) glory. So 
now, there is an additional dot for us to think of. 
So which circle dot are we to think of? Is the “primary” 
circle dot the one in the right-hand installation picture 
that we can most clearly see, or is the “primary” dot the 
one in the left-hand book diagram that seems to be a 
mere trace? Does “primary” mean “original”? Arguably, 
the original circle dot is the one painted on the panel for 
the installation. Both the left-hand-diagram circle dot 
and the right-hand-margin installation-documentation 
circle dot are mediated (via photography and printing). 
Which dot is most mediated, and which one is most im-
mediate? Does immediacy equal primacy? Assuming the 
left-hand diagram dot is the most immediate, it is also 
the least visible. Is the trace of a less mediated dot more 
primary than the clear punctum of a more mediated dot?
What if the left-hand dot’s ghostliness is merely a 
technical misprint? Are we to forgive the misprint and 
imagine the left-hand dot as more present and less ab-
sent? Or is the dot we see the dot we get – technical mis-
print, intentional dot, or otherwise?
Arakawa and Gins authorize us, indeed, they force 
us, to pursue such scatological minutiae. Fludd more or 
less pleads with us to ignore the technical discrepan-
cies of his diagram, and to focus on what the diagram 
“means.” But Arakawa and Gins have done just the oppo-
site. By purposefully creating an apparatus meant to call 
into question the mechanism by which humans make 
meaning (that mechanism being humans themselves), 
Arakawa and Gins invite in every technical considera-
tion, every possible misprint, every speck of dust that 
falls on the page. Their apparatus extends outward into 
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all of the technical mechanisms that humans use to cre-
ate meaning (the book; the printed page; the distinction 
between a misprint, an incidental mark, and an inten-
tional mark). Their apparatus sucks all of these technical 
mechanisms into its own apparatal quagmire. Once our 
agreed-upon conventions of meaning-making begin to 
be undermined, where does that undermining stop? We 
are no longer able to confidently say, “Well that’s just a 
misprint. Well, that mark is just a stray mark. That’s not 
the intended dot. This is the intended dot.” Any dot (even 
the trace of a dot from the 1971 edition that has made its 
ghostly way forward into the 1979 edition) is a legitimate 
contender for “the” dot.
Additional questions arise. If the ghost dot in the left-
hand circle diagram is a misprint, then why is it misprint-
ed in exactly the same way (and it is) in 1988’s edition 3? 
The artists and publishers had nine years to correct their 
mistake. Why didn’t they? Or was it a happy accident and 
they just re-printed the misprint because they enjoyed 
the extra sense of ambiguity that it introduced? Assum-
ing that was indeed the case (and I’m just assuming), is 
edition 3’s intentional re-print of edition 2’s accidental 
misprint now suddenly not a misprint? Does the addition 
of intention now suddenly make edition 3’s ghost dot 
somehow more “primary” than its edition 2 predecessor?
To carry things a step further, perhaps the illustrator 
of this book (Some Ways of Making Nothing) mis-drew the 
edition 2 circle diagram. Perhaps, in translating the dia-
gram from printed book to drawing, the dot got altered. 
Perhaps once the drawing was published in this book, the 
dot got altered again. Perhaps a speck of dust has fallen 
on your own book’s page, (or kindle screen, or whatever). 
Which of these dots is “the” dot?
Arakawa and Gins intentionally invite all of these ques-
tions into their apparatus. Their apparatus intentionally 
opens out onto any further reproductions of the repro-
ductions of their original exercise panel. Their apparatus 
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cuts into the very domain of human meaning-making, 
across decades, book editions, installation instantiations, 
reprints of reprints of reprints, and forward into future 
reprints not yet printed. The most recent physical panel 
of “The Dot” installation exercise station is currently in 
art storage in Manhattan as we speak. Is dust falling on 
it? Is that dust any more primary than the dust on your 
kindle? Which dot is “the” dot? And now that we have 
begun thinking of all these other dots, how can we pos-
sibly not think of them? Have all dots now collapsed into 
“the” dot?
The Curious Case of the Dot (Edition 4)
The same dot exercise appears again in edition 4 of the 
book (which appears as part of the larger catalog for 
Arakawa and Gins’s 1997 Guggenheim Soho show). The 
Fig. 7: the top two diagrams on the (now) right-hand side of the page 
containing "The Dot" exercise in edition 4 of Mechanism of Meaning. 
Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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Fig. 8: The lone image at the bottom of the (now) left-hand margin of 
the page containing "The Dot" exercise in edition 4 of Mechanism of 
Meaning. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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main diagram has been moved to the right-hand 2/3 of 
the page (see Fig. 7).
Note that the dot has now solidly returned to the circle 
section (more so than in any of the prior book editions). 
This edition 4 circle dot actually looks more like the circle 
dot from the actual (?) panel as depicted in the marginal 
installation documentation photograph from editions 2 
and 3. So, the problem of the missing (traced? ghosted?) 
circle dot has been temporarily resolved, just in time for 
an altogether weirder problem to arise in the new photo-
graph of the installation included in edition 4 (see Fig. 8).
Now, in the left-hand 1/3 margin, the waterfall image 
has been removed, and there is a completely new installa-
tion documentation image, this time of a different view-
er staring at the physical exercise panel. The panel is no 
longer hanging on the wall (as it was [presumably] in edi-
tions 2 and 3), but is now resting on supports which are 
themselves resting on the floor. Additionally, the edge of 
the entire documentation image now includes the border 
contact (test) print text from the printed roll of film and 
some of the film holes from the negative film roll. Fur-
thermore, masking tape appears to be taping some blue 
paper to the contact print itself. Were the masking tape 
and the blue paper actually present on the wall in the gal-
lery? No, the scale is not right. So then why were these 
physical artifacts left on the contact print prior to trans-
ferring the image into the book? In other words, why take 
a picture of the installation, print that picture out as a 
contact print, put tape on it, and then take a second pic-
ture of that printed out picture to use for the book? Why 
not just exclude the contact print from the production 
process (as is usually the case), and simply print to the 
book from the final print? The inclusion of these addi-
tional “technical” elements seems to indicate a kind of 
artistic intention. Or does it?
Regardless of (in addition to? in concert with?) these 
border details, what on earth is going on in this new im-
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age? The circle dot is visible, but it now competes with at 
least two other circle dots that have manifested them-
selves and become equally as prominent as the actual(?) 
circle dot. Even more problematic, the dot in the x dia-
gram and its nearest proximate x are both garbled into 
something that looks more like Morse code than a “+” 
with a dot to its left. The same kind of visual garbling 
occurs with several other x’s, turning their arms into new 
legitimate dot candidates. (Alas, recently dissipated x 
dot! Oh, ye who had proved so fairly stable throughout 
editions 1–3; yea, and even continue to appear stable in 
the larger, right-hand image on this very page in edition 4!) 
Is this installation documentation photograph a(nother) 
misprint? If so, why is it (seemingly) the sole misprint 
in an otherwise excruciatingly detailed and rigorous solo 
exhibition catalog published by the ordinarily detail-ori-
ented Guggenheim Museum Publications? Are these dot 
slippages the accidental residue of an intentional move 
the artists meant to make by publishing the contact print 
rather than the final print? Or are these new dot slippag-
es themselves all part of the artists’ intentions? More rel-
evantly, what (really) do the artists’ intentions have any-
thing to do with the extant instructions that still gently 
yet persistently compel us to please think only of the 
Dot not of the X’s?
Additional Dot Research
Time does not permit the thrilling tale of the adventures 
of “The Dot” on the web! ok, briefly: the original Flash-
based site of Mechanism of Meaning used the main image 
from editions 2 and 3 (ghost circle dot image), whereas 
the current non-Flash based version of the panel uses the 
main image from edition 4 (strong dot image). Through-
out my preceding exegesis of “The Dot” across these four 
book editions, I have made it a point to openly think 
thorough, question, and doubt my observations and con-
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clusions; not simply to be cheeky, but to transparently 
enact the role I am lured into playing as a part of this 
apophatic art apparatus. Now I will attempt to stop get-
ting sucked into the apparatus itself (I will fail), and I will 
include some extant research on the actual development 
process involved in these editions. Lamentably, Arakawa 
and Madeline Gins had both passed on (they have fa-
mously decided not to die) by the time I began writing 
this chapter. In some ways, I am glad not to know their 
exact intentions regarding these formal, technical deci-
sions. Ultimately, the dot apparatus they wound up con-
structing continues to do what it does without my access 
to their personal intentions. I was able to put some of 
my questions to Stephen Hepworth (Director of Collec-
tions at Arakawa and Gins’s Reversible Destiny Founda-
tion) and Peter Katz (Executive Director of the Reversible 
Destiny Foundation). I discovered the following details: 
Based on a 10×8-inch black and white vintage pho-
tograph of the dot panel from the Dwan Gallery in the 
1970s, both the x and circle dots in the actual panel are 
as they appear in the First edition photograph. But now 
(predictably), it gets stranger. Hepworth, upon closely ex-
amining the dot in the main circle diagram from edition 
2, says it “has been over-painted, leaving just the edge of 
the original [dot] visible, shifting it closer to the identity 
of a circle.”16 This would imply that Arakawa intentionally 
altered the physical panel in order to make the dot in the 
circle diagram less prominent.
So, it wasn’t just a misprint! Ah, but there is still a prob-
lem: if this change (the purposeful painting-over of part 
of the circle dot) was intentional, and actually enacted on 
the physical panel itself, then why, in the inset documen-
tation of the installation (right there on the same page in 
edition 2) is the dot in the circle diagram so prominent 
and solid? There is an obvious discrepancy between the 
16 Stephen Hepworth, e-mail message to the author, August 3, 2017.
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two images. If the ghosted dot in the larger image on the 
page reflects the intention of the artists, then we may as-
sume (may we?) that the discrepancy between the larger 
image and the inset image is also intentional.
Regarding the increased prominence of both dots in 
the larger image from edition 4, Hepworth clarifies that 
this larger image is based on a 5×4-inch color transparen-
cy taken of the physical panel shown at the 1997 Guggen-
heim Soho show. Both images coincide with Hepworth’s 
own personal condition-reporting photographs that he 
took of the panel at that time. Hepworth goes on to ob-
serve, “It is clear that both the dots have been repainted 
and made larger and blacker than they appear in the first 
edition. Why this change occurred I do not know. It is 
clear from looking at vintage documentation, sometimes 
as it appears in catalogs, that Arakawa would continue to 
work, or rework paintings, and in many cases create new 
versions of works.”17
So… some time after 1970, Arakawa intentionally 
ghosted the circle dot in the physical installation pan-
el; and then a few years later he intentionally darkened 
both the circle dot and the x dot. Ah, but there is still 
a problem! As with the discrepancy in editions 2 and 3 
between the large image of the panel and the inset in-
stallation documentation image of the viewer looking at 
the panel, there is a similar discrepancy in edition 4 be-
tween the large image of the panel and the inset installa-
tion documentation image of the (other) viewer looking 
at the panel. Again, one may presume (may one?) that the 
discrepancy between the larger image and the inset im-
age is intentional.
We may as well follow this rabbit hole on down. Hep-
worth concludes, “Looking at the difference in stretch-
ers (both in construction and dimensions), it suggests 
that the Mechanism of Meaning was made at four differ-
17 Ibid.
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ent times starting (according to Dwan Gallery labeling) 
in 1969 where it is described as “unfinished, 300 or more 
6’ × 8’ panels” until it was shown in its entirety at the 
Guggenheim. The second version was made and shown 
in Japan dated 1988 where it is in the collection of Se-
zon Museum of Modern Art. Further research needs to 
be done to determine when the first version reached the 
stage it was at when it was shown at the Guggenheim.”18
“The Dot” as an Apophatic Art Apparatus
Now that we have as clear a logistical understanding as 
we are likely to get regarding “The Dot” and its behav-
ior across six decades, four book editions, and at least 
four installations, we are ready to begin exploring, in 
more nuanced detail, the ways in which “The Dot” be-
haves as an apophatic art apparatus. Although “The Dot” 
and all of the other exercises in Mechanism of Meaning 
incorporate human language, and although the primary 
“audience” for “The Dot” is those who can read human 
language (i.e., humans), “The Dot” and the overall Mecha-
nism of Meaning project are by no means limited to human 
language or humans. Instead, “The Dot” is an apparatus 
that purposefully cuts into, carves out of, cordons off, and 
thus intra-acts with a much broader swath of the extra-
anthropocentric universe.
Why begin with humans and human language? Be-
cause, if humans are to head toward post-humanism and 
begin to more purposefully, rigorously, and ethically en-
ter into and flow amongst the entanglements they (al-
ways already) have with the rest of the universe, the inor-
dinate stronghold of human language on humans must 
be foregrounded, confounded, problematized, ridiculed, 
made a public showing of, and displayed in all of its limi-
18 Ibid.
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tations. It is not enough to merely list in human language 
the limitations of human language; such a move only 
winds up enacting and thus reconstituting the efficacy 
and primacy of human language. It is not even enough 
to create aporias within language using only language it-
self (whether via apophatic writing or deconstruction). 
Instead, the limitations of human language must be en-
acted in a bodily, affective capacity. They must be made 
to be felt in human bodies. Furthermore, these aporetic 
enactions must prehend actual material from the physi-
cal, human-indifferent, linguistic-indifferent world. In 
the case of “the dot,” the non-human components in-
corporated into its apparatus include dust motes, stray 
marks, canvas, black paint, white paint, paintbrushes, 
stencils, photographic negatives, photographic plates, 
photographic contact prints, printed paper, bound books, 
physical gallery spaces, physical publishing and distribu-
tions systems, and several decades worth of historical 
lived time (“cultural,” “natural,” “universal,” “planetary,” 
and yes, even “art historical”).
Furthermore, in order for the stronghold of human 
language on humans to be properly and performa-
tively throttled, the presumed barriers between human 
language and the “outside world” which it “describes” 
(whether those barriers are considered impassable or 
merely correlative) must be involuted, dissolved, recon-
stituted, permeated, confounded, and bastardized. The 
“frame” of the work must ultimately be prehended recur-
sively and perpetually into the work itself.
Additionally, the “aesthetic” importance of the visual 
appearance of the work must be inverted, marginalized, 
and made increasingly subordinate to the apparatal func-
tion of the work itself. The work won’t simply disappear 
(although the dot may temporarily [seem to] disappear), 
but the way in which the work appears will only come to 
matter insofar as its appearance functions as a lure for 
aporetic, human-cognitive impasses.
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Finally, the ultimate “moral” or “meaning” of the work 
must perpetually and continually be refused any summa-
tive form of resolved signifying escape; the “meaning” 
of Mechanism of Meaning must always be (re-)captured, 
turned back into itself, torused, infinitized, deferred, and 
thus forever braked. In the historical trajectory of their 
own art practice, Arakawa and Gins proceed from this 
initial (decades long) place of linguistic confounding to 
make less apophatic, more positive speculative gestures 
involving architecture and ways of living. Still, it may be 
legitimately argued that all of Arakawa and Gins’s subse-
quent architectural explorations are really just continua-
tions and outworkings of the implications of Mechanism 
of Meaning. The “moral” “take-away” of the “narrative” of 
Mechanism of Meaning was never fully reconstituted by 
the artists in clear assertive language. Instead, Arakawa 
and Gins chose to proceed along the lines of more affec-
tive, bodily, materially entangled ways of “knowing.” And 
well they would. After riding in on the dying horse of hu-
man language and throttling said horse to death repeat-
edly, why resurrect your beaten linguistic horse and ride 
it into the sunset? Instead, Arakawa and Gins let sleeping 
horses lie.
Becoming Something New (But What?)
It is important to note that Mechanism of Meaning eventu-
ally does lead somewhere. It does become something new. 
It doesn’t forever brake the ongoing, emergent, becom-
ing of the entire universe. It doesn’t force a bleak, eternal, 
nihilistic nothing-void. (How could it?) Instead, what it 
does do is put the brakes on our habitual human reliance 
on words as more or less trustworthy. It puts the brakes 
on our habitual human faith in our ability to make mean-
ing of (seemingly) simple situations. And by braking-on-
ice (however temporarily) these habitual and usual kinds 
of linguistically inflected becomings, by making nothing 
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of them, Mechanism of Meaning steers us toward new kinds 
of becomings that would not have emerged if straightfor-
ward signification was its primary apparatal function.
In what new direction are we then steered? Arakawa 
and Gins were steered in one kind of direction in terms 
of their own art practice post-1997. Another artist who 
subjects herself to the Mechanism of Meaning apparatus 
(by actually working through the exercises repeatedly in 
good faith) might emerge from her braking-on-ice expe-
rience pointing in a different direction than Arakawa and 
Gins. The specific new kinds of becomings and resultant 
new directions cannot be determined beforehand. The 
proof is in the pudding, in the actual apparatal intra-ac-
tions, one human at a time. As with baking, so with the 
actual concrescences of the universe. Leaving out bak-
ing soda doesn’t just mean the result will merely lack x 
amount of baking soda. Baking soda is an active agent. It 
is prehended by the rest of the ingredients in ways that 
modulate the overall becoming of the bake. Leaving out 
x amount of baking soda prior to the bake is much more 
fundamentally radical than leaving out the same amount 
of powdered sugar after the bake is done. For humans (as 
enduring objects with [occasional] consciousness), semi-
otic language can be quite the active agent in our own 
ongoing becomings.
In Writing and Difference, Derrida incisively recognizes 
just how much we fundamentally presume by using any 
kind of language at all:
If discourse and philosophical communication (that 
is, language itself) are to have an intelligible meaning, 
that is to say, if they are to conform to their essence 
and vocation as discourse, they must simultaneously 
in fact and in principle escape madness. They must 
carry normality within themselves. And this is not a 
specifically Cartesian weakness (although Descartes 
never confronts the question of his own language), is 
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not a defect or mystification linked to a determined 
historical structure, but rather is an essential and uni-
versal necessity from which no discourse can escape, 
for it belongs to the meaning of meaning.19
Mechanism of Meaning foregrounds and problematizes 
this presumed “meaning of meaning” which accompanies 
(indeed, inheres within) all ordinary use of language. By 
braking the normality-constituting effects of language, 
Arakawa and Gins allow for something other-than-nor-
mality to emerge. Will “madness” emerge, or “absurdity,” 
or “senselessness,” or something else? Whatever else does 
emerge, whatever that difference or excess or other, that 
is the wager of their particular apophatic apparatus.
For me, what actually winds up emerging from repeat-
ed exposure to “The Dot” is a kind of dizzyingly (thrill-
ingly? spookily?) enlarged field awareness which doesn’t 
slot easily into either “sensibility” or “senselessness” 
(both terms having their origin in sensibility). What I ex-
perience seems too safe, self-aware, and just this side of 
self-possessed to be “madness.” “Absurdity” is too blunt 
and un-nuanced a term for my experience with “The 
Dot.” Perhaps it could be described as some more specific 
flavor of absurdity, possibly “ridiculousness,” although 
that term seems too superficial. What I feel might best 
be described via an analogy from my own bodily experi-
ence: I’m not an amazingly technical drummer, or even a 
very good drummer, but I enjoy drumming a lot. While 
drumming along with a song, sometimes I forget what 
I’m doing and just intuitively fall into a groove, during 
which time I sound much better than I do at other times. 
At such times, when I’m in said groove, I’ll get to feeling 
as if I’m a better drummer than I actually am. This tem-
porary sense of elation and confidence will often cause 
me to dive headlong into a heartfelt and daring riff or fill, 
19 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 65.
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the successful outcome of which I have no way of ensur-
ing, but which I nevertheless naively feel will just sort of 
work itself out because, hey, I’m in the groove. Nine times 
out of ten I dramatically flub the riff, enacting a kind of 
awkward, screeching misfire, after which (and often even 
during which) I laugh openly at the cathartic immediacy 
of the discrepancy I feel in my body between my moment 
of misguided, elated confidence and the sudden, instant-
after come-down of my clumsy crash-and-burn. That im-
mediate, humorous feeling of hubristic comeuppance, of 
feeling the discrepancy between what I was sure I could 
do and what I was immediately proved unable to do – 
that feeling is somewhat similar to the way I feel after 
spending some time trying to rigorously think only of 
the Dot. 
Returning to Bergson, “It is one thing to understand 
a difficult movement, another to be able to carry it out. 
To understand it, we need only to realize in it what is es-
sential, just enough to distinguish it from all other pos-
sible movements. But to be able to carry it out, we must 
besides have brought our body to understand it. Now, the 
logic of the body admits of no tacit implications.”20 When 
I try to think only of the Dot, all of the tacit implica-
tions upon which I was presuming when I thought I un-
derstood what thinking only of the dot would entail are 
immediately dashed and confounded. I feel my failures to 
think only of the dot; I feel them one by one. I enact these 
failures in my body. Thinking is curiously and uncannily 
felt by me as a bodily action. Thinking is no longer some 
magic, transcendental, disembodied exercise that occurs 
outside of space and time. My own act of thinking has 
been foregrounded by the apparatus of “The Dot.”
The fact that there are stumbling, impartial, and inef-
fable ways of making meaning only comes as a surprise 
20 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and 
W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 112.
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if I have bought into a binary model of meaning where 
things are either “sensible” or “senseless.” But, as White-
head observes, “Our conscious experience involves a baf-
fling mixture of certainty, ignorance, and probability.”21 
“The Dot” and its sibling exercises are pitch-perfect, 
finely tuned apparatuses for luring out into the open and 
foregrounding this “baffling mixture.” The purposes and 
intentions of “The Dot” are not vague; on the contrary, 
“The Dot” purposes and intends a precisely calibrated fla-
vor of vagueness.
Regarding the generative potency of purposeful 
vagueness, Whitehead explains, “A power of incorporat-
ing vague and disorderly elements of experience is es-
sential for the advance into novelty.”22 Brian Massumi 
concurs, and recommends accompanying intentional 
vagueness with speculative conviction: “Vague concepts, 
and concepts of vagueness, have a crucial, and often en-
joyable, role to play. Generating a paradox and then using 
it as if it were a well-formed logical operator is a good 
way to put vagueness into play. Strangely, if this proce-
dure is followed with a good dose of conviction and just 
enough technique, presto!, the paradox actually becomes 
a well-formed logical operator.”23 The very bald-faced and 
dry tone of Mechanism of Meaning, its “generically” sten-
ciled capital letters, its almost naive and straightforward 
explanation of its own goals, the child’s-primer-esque 
nature of its format – all of these elements lure us into 
taking the speculative wager of the project seriously. 
After four decades, four editions, and multiple installa-
tions, the artists are nothing if not invested. If they are 
21 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free 
Press, 1978), 205.
22 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free 
Press, 1968), 79.
23 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 13. [Italics appear in the 
original text.]
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joking, they are seriously joking. This level of commit-
ment and conviction lures in, teases out, and generously 
invites (please think only of…) rigorous engagements 
with the apparatus that have led to new, speculative, bod-
ily felt ways of making meaning (in Arakawa and Gins’s 
subsequent “architectural” practice, and in the various 
contemporary art and research practices Mechanism of 
Meaning has inspired).
Some Words on Causal Efficacy, Presentational Immediacy, and 
Symbolic Reference
Whitehead’s universe is a universe of micro-instances, 
of actual occasions. These are its fundaments. Neverthe-
less, humans do consciously perceive a world full of en-
during objects in spatial relation to one another. We are 
more likely to consciously perceive a chair as an enduring 
object rather than as a historically related route of actual 
occasions. This conscious human perception of enduring 
objects is notably unusual since we humans ourselves are 
also historically related routes of actual occasions. But 
then perception, consciousness, and humans are all par-
ticularly unusual anomalies in the broader scope of the 
universe. So how does conscious perception, or conscious 
thought “persist” across actual occasions? I’m not just 
asking about long-term memory. I’m asking about the 
consistent formulation of any single thought over a ten 
second period of time. If “I” am merely a series of actual 
occasions, how am I ever able to read a single continu-
ous sentence and make conscious sense of its meaning? 
According to Whitehead’s cosmology of concrescence, 
each actual occasion is prehended by a series of relevant 
subsequent actual occasions, and what was known in one 
instant impinges on the next instant. This occurs accord-
ing to Whitehead’s principle of conformation, 
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whereby what is already made becomes a determi-
nant of what is in the making […]. In practice we never 
doubt the fact of the conformation of the present to 
the immediate past. It belongs to the ultimate texture 
of experience […]. The present fact is luminously the 
outcome from its predecessors, one quarter of a sec-
ond ago.24 
The pragmatic mechanisms of this conformal transfer-
ence from actual occasion to actual occasion are compli-
cated and nuanced, exceeding the scope of this text.
“Causal efficacy” is what Whitehead calls the non-con-
scious mode of perception which deals with actual occa-
sions/entities, and their ingressions, prehensions, virtual 
actualizations, and concrescences. But there is another, 
conscious mode of perception called “presentational 
immediacy.” Presentational immediacy is the mode in 
which we consciously perceive a persistent, object-like 
chair. Historically, human philosophy has given primacy 
to this mode of presentational immediacy. But “we” hu-
mans are more than our conscious minds, and “we” also 
traffic in the mode of causal efficacy. 
To Whitehead, although consciousness may occasion-
ally be part of experience, it is by no means a requisite 
of experience. He explains, “An actual entity may, or may 
not, be conscious of some part of its experience. Its expe-
rience is its complete formal constitution, including its 
consciousness, if any.”25 
The [false] assumption is that the basic elements of 
experience are to be described in terms of one, or all, of 
the three ingredients, consciousness, thought, sense-
perception. The last term is used in the sense of “con-
24 Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 46.
25 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 53.
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scious perception in the mode of presentational imme-
diacy.” Also in practice sense-perception is [wrongly] 
narrowed down to visual perception. According to the 
philosophy of organism these three components are 
unessential elements in experience.26
According to Whitehead, the gap between causal efficacy 
and presentational immediacy is bridged by “symbolic 
reference.” Whitehead explains, “The unraveling of the 
complex interplay between the two modes of percep-
tion – causal efficacy and presentation immediacy – is 
one main problem of the theory of perception […]. The 
interplay between the two modes will be termed ‘sym-
bolic reference’.”27 Symbolic reference is the means by 
which human consciousness translates the experience of 
causal efficacy (the historically related route of chair-like 
actual occasions) into the enduring object perceived as 
a presentationally immediate chair. Causal efficacy may 
do without presentational immediacy (tree-like actual 
occasions falling in a human-less forest), but there is no 
presentational immediacy without prior causal efficacy.
I bring all of this up now, because Mechanism of Mean-
ing confounds human language, which Whitehead says 
“almost exclusively refers to presentational immediacy 
as interpreted by symbolic reference.”28 When we traffic 
in human language, we are usually dealing with human 
consciousness and its mode of perceiving the world as 
presentationally immediate. By confounding human lan-
guage, “The Dot” in turn mungs up presentational im-
mediacy and conscious human thought. We are made to 
consciously focus on the tiny, micro-moment, actual oc-
casions of our own thinking – not simply to think about 
the concept of thinking, but to actively think our own 




how to do (no)things with words
thinking. We are brought to consciously feel the force of 
causal efficacy. This is an uncanny, braking, stuttering, 
aporetic, apophatic feeling. “The Dot” uses language as a 
snare to capture and make consciously felt the otherwise 
camouflaged presumptions of presentational immediacy.
Meaning Is As Body Does  
(The Installation Apparatus)
Human–computer interface designer Joy Mountford 
once observed, “When the computer stares back at you, it 
sees you as one eye and one finger.”29 In other words, we 
have designed our computer interfaces as if we ourselves 
are disembodied minds. A corollary might be, “When the 
book stares back at you, it sees you as one eye.” Yet books 
may also be designed to stare otherwise, see otherwise, 
engage, lure, or proposition otherwise. And, of course, in-
stallation art has the intrinsic capacity to engage much 
more than our disembodied minds, if installation artists 
purpose to make work that speaks an embodied language 
(and usually, even if they don’t). Arakawa and Gins’s pur-
poseful and ingenious baking of language into the physi-
cal installation exercises of Mechanism of Meaning causes 
(or at least insistently invites) human bodies to feel the 
force of language. The affective impact of these physical 
installation spaces is then translated into (and modu-
lated by) the accompanying book editions, which in turn 
inform and further complicate the installations. 
These installation stations enlist the “viewer” to expe-
rience language in a more holistic way, as a compelling 
force rather than just a once-removed signifier. Whereas 
the primary goal of apophatic writing is ultimately to 
29 Joy Mountford, quoted in Camille Utterback, “Unusual Positions 
– Embodied Interaction with Symbolic Spaces,” in First Person: New 
Media as Story, Performance, and Game, eds. Noah Wardrip-Fruin and 
Pat Harrigan (Cambridge: mit Press, 2004), 218.
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confound “the mind” of the reader, the primary goal of 
the Mechanism of Meaning installations is ultimately to 
confound the body of the viewer. The overall apparatus 
of the Mechanism of Meaning installation sets a starter 
trap for the viewer’s “mind” in order to gradually ensnare 
her body. The stations all begin with a kind of cognitive, 
purely linguistic aporia, and while the viewer is engaged 
with the stations at that initial, seemingly safe, purely 
intellectual level, the sculptural elements and the sheer 
scale and proximity of the station panels themselves 
gradually allow the aporia to seep into, entangle, and be 
prehended by the (actual occasions of the) body of the 
viewer. Mechanism of Meaning quickly overloads and ex-
ceeds the boundary between mere linguistic signification 
and bodily affect. Language becomes a kind of material, 
experienced by a human body in installation space. In-
stallation art is the ideal (mixed) medium for this kind 
of swinging back-and-forth between language and mate-
rial. At each installation station, the door separating the 
two domains (language and matter) is swung a bit more 
rapidly and a bit more forcefully, until eventually the 
door is swung off of its hinges. Language begins to exert 
a kind of material force, and material begins to speak a 
kind of affective language.
Although we have focused solely on “The Dot” exer-
cise station, each exercise station in Mechanism of Mean-
ing examines a different cognitive aspect of “meaning-
making.” As with “The Dot,” the other exercises always 
include text, but the text is always situated in a kind of 
mock-Cartesian painterly space, and its letterforms fre-
quently do more than simply denote. Each set of English 
instructions is always accompanied by some piece of ex-
tra-textual media – lines, diagrams, images, and some-
times dimensional objects. All instructions invite some 
form of action on the part of the viewer. Often the exer-
cise stations extend dimensionally into the gallery space 
and include various objects meant to be manipulated by 
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the viewer (who now must necessarily be called some-
thing with more bodily agency than merely “the viewer”).
The textual “content” of each exercise is tightly and 
non-arbitrarily coupled with the embodied event it 
means to instigate. As a result, the overall embodied ex-
perience of each exercise (in terms of scale-awareness, 
balance, line-of-sight, blush-response, proprioceptive 
disorientation, haptic feedback) is created in no small 
part by the instructional provocations and invitations 
of the exercise’s text. If we were to extract the texts of 
Mechanism of Meaning from their spatial con-texts and 
set them in Helvetica typeface as poetry in a book, they 
would read as alternately facile and meaningless. Like-
wise, if we were to inject other texts into the Mechanism 
of Meaning installation, the rigorous and particular forms 
of intriguing disorientation and aporia would be lost, re-
placed by a much less involving, much less luring, merely 
binary disconnect.
The embodied elements of the installation are instan-
tiated into the book editions via the marginal installa-
tion documentation photographs which accompany 
many of the exercises in the books. Continuing to fo-
cus on “The Dot” exercise, no installation documenta-
tion photographs appear in edition 1. But in the second 
and third editions, we get an installation shot of a gray-
haired viewer scratching his chin, folding his arms, and 
(presumably) attempting to think only of the circle dot. 
By the fourth edition, even when the inset waterfall im-
age has been removed, we still have an inset installation 
photograph. This time it is a new photograph of another 
viewer, in blue shirt and olive pants, (presumably) at-
tempting to think only of the x dot. These same types of 
marginal installation shots appear throughout editions 
2–4, particularly accompanying the exercise stations 
which require more direct physical viewer engagement 
(handling physical elements, holding bodies in certain 
positions, performing physical motions). The installa-
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tion documentation photographs give the reader of the 
book editions a kind of mirror-neuron, bodily way into 
the installation stations. The documentation photo-
graphs suggest bodily scale and proximity in relation to 
the exercise stations. They also suggest ways of engage-
ment with the book exercises themselves: Perhaps we 
should be standing rather than sitting. Ah, so we really 
are meant to move our actual bodies in that way, and not 
merely passively contemplate what it would be like to 
move our actual bodies in that way. The documentation 
photographs make the books more bodily engaging.
The decision to move the installation panels from 
the wall (in the earlier installations) to the floor (in the 
Guggenheim Soho installation) is not by any means mi-
nor or arbitrary. A comparison of the two different instal-
lation documentation photographs of “The Dot” (and its 
two viewers) reveals some of what is at stake and what 
has been accomplished by moving the stations onto the 
floor. In the earlier documentation photograph (edi-
tions 2 and 3), the circle diagram instructions are at the 
viewer’s eye level, with 2/3 of the panel (containing the 
two dot diagrams) above his eye level. The photograph 
crops his body at the waist, with the majority of the panel 
looming on the wall above him. The viewer appears in an 
intellectually engaged but somewhat physically removed 
stance. His arms are folded, and he is holding his chin. It 
is the classic pose of someone in a museum catalog shot. 
He might just as easily be contemplating a Rembrandt 
painting. The moral is, when you hang something on 
the wall in a gallery, even if it is more like a page from 
a child’s primer and less like a Rembrandt painting, hu-
mans are going to view it as if it is a painting, with all of 
the art-historical baggage such viewing entails. 
Now consider the installation shot from edition 4. 
The x diagram instructions are at the viewer’s eye level, 
with 2/3 of the panel below his eye level. The photograph 
crops his body at the ankles, revealing the fact that the 
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exercise panel is stationed on the floor rather than hang-
ing on the wall. This viewer seems much more bodily en-
gaged than the viewer in editions 2 and 3. Here in edition 
4, the viewer’s left hand appears to be on his belt and his 
right arm hangs slightly bent at his side, with his right 
hand semi-cupped in an almost absent-minded gesture, 
as if he is devoting the majority of his bodily attention to 
thinking only of the dot, and his right hand must some-
how take this particular shape in order to allow him to do 
so. His face is much nearer the panel itself, and he seems 
to be peering intently at the x dot. In moving the panel 
to the floor, Arakawa and Gins have reconfigured their 
apparatus. This newly reconfigured apparatus invites 
greater bodily participation and thus more holistic en-
gagement of the “viewer” with the overall apparatus. It is 
worth noting that “The Dot” is arguably one of the least 
physically engaging of all the installation stations. Per-
haps this is why Arakawa and Gins chose to begin with it. 
They are easing the viewer into greater and greater bodily 
intra-action. And yet, even with an exercise station that 
invites relatively minimal bodily movement, taking the 
dot panel from the wall and placing it on the floor creates 
a perceptible increase in bodily engagement. 
For other, more painterly artists, these formal chang-
es in placement would certainly matter, but they would 
hardly be critical. Such formal decisions might even be 
delegated as curatorial decisions. For Arakawa and Gins, 
these kinds of formal placement decisions and the par-
ticular ways in which they lure and activate bodies be-
come increasingly central to their subsequent “archi-
tectural” practice. Such formal placement decisions are 
already (arguably) central to Mechanism of Meaning, at 
least in its later stages of development.
There is an intrinsic relationship between what a body 
is doing and the way in which a body makes meaning. 
Which brings us to a series of wonderful quotations about 
the importance of bodily movement in relation to think-
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ing, reading, and language. Nietzsche: “Only thoughts 
that come by walking have any value.”30 Proust: “Move-
ment alone restores our thought.”31 Gysin: “Who runs may 
read my drawing. Run faster to read better.”32 Recognizing 
the inherent (although often merely implicit) connection 
between bodily movement and meaning-making, the in-
stallation instantiations of Mechanism of Meaning are pur-
posefully designed to engage and modulate human bod-
ily movement and bodily proprioception as a means of 
disrupting a human’s ability to make cognitive meaning.
Manhattan gallerist Ronald Feldman was deeply in-
volved with Arakawa’s art installations for many impor-
tant early shows in New York. Feldman shared the story 
of a personal experience he had after spending time at 
one particular Arakawa and Gins installation. He left the 
gallery and began walking down the street in Manhattan, 
and suddenly he was a giant. All the buildings were tiny 
and he was huge. This experience lasted several blocks, 
and when it went away and he shrunk back down to nor-
mal size, it was extremely depressing.33 Nothing about 
the work itself overtly (or even implicitly) suggested that 
its viewers imagine themselves as giants. Indeed, as Feld-
man describes the experience, he didn’t imagine that he 
was a giant. He felt himself to be a giant. The fact that he 
would have this kind of visceral bodily experience after 
an Arakawa and Gins installation suggests one of several 
ways in which their installation apparatuses modulate 
human bodies: not metaphorically or symbolically, but 
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophize with 
the Hammer, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), 10. [Italics appear in the original text.]
31 Marcel Proust, The Captive, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff (1929; Paris: 
Feedbooks, 2014), 104, http://www.feedbooks.com/book/1451/the-
captive.
32 Gysin, “Cut-Ups,” 46.
33 Ronald Feldman, personal conversation with the author at Arakawa 
and Gins’s studio on Houston Street, Manhattan, June, 2014.
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actually, by shifting their overall proprioceptive self-
awarenesses. When the stabilizing regimes of human lan-
guage and normal modes of meaning-making are braked 
and made nothing of, what new scalar reconfigurations, 
what new giants might emerge?
Reconfiguring Frames (The Fly and The Machine)
In David Cronenberg’s The Fly, the main character acci-
dentally enters his teleportation machine accompanied 
by a fly and winds up melding with the fly. In an attempt 
to reverse this process, the human–fly amalgam re-enters 
the teleportation machine and winds up melding with 
the machine itself, resulting in a human–fly–machine 
amalgam. The machine that was meant to frame the 
entire transformation process has been folded into the 
transformation process itself. The machine frame was 
not dissolved, permeated, exceeded, or erased. Instead, 
the frame was incorporated into that which it was meant 
to frame.
The same kind of thing is happening with Mechanism 
of Meaning, across the several installation instantiations 
and the several book editions throughout the decades. 
If each exercise station is its own apparatus, and if the 
entire Mechanism of Meaning installation is a larger, me-
ta-apparatus, then the four editions of the Mechanism 
of Meaning books extend the entire project into an even 
larger meta-meta-apparatus; and the relationship estab-
lished back-and-forth between the installations and the 
books becomes a yet larger meta-meta-meta-apparatus. 
This telescoping across media, scales, and time is in per-
fect keeping with the goals of overall project – namely, to 
continually make nothing of the contextualizing frames 
and borders which allow us to presume a kind of easy un-
derstanding of language, and of meaning in general.
According to Karen Barad, in order for an apparatus to 
begin functioning at all, an apparatal cut into the universe 
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must first be made. The apparatus cannot stand outside 
of the universe, so it must demarcate the part of the uni-
verse in which it stands, and in so doing demarcate the 
part of the universe outside of itself. Per apparatal event, 
each apparatal cut is actual. It matters to the involved ap-
paratal “material” (Whitehead would say “enduring ob-
jects”), and it matters to all resultant “measurements.” 
But new and different cuts may always be made. Barad 
explains, “Boundary transgressions should be equated 
not with the dissolution of traversed boundaries… but 
with the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries.”34
As an apophatic art apparatus, Mechanism of Meaning 
is forever reconfiguring its own boundaries. For example, 
in editions 2–4 of the books, the supplemental, marginal 
installation documentation (the inset photographs of 
viewers interacting with the installation stations) tog-
gles back and forth between being secondary, derivative 
material and primary, source material. Are we to think 
only of the dot in the larger book diagram, or only of 
the dot in the installation documentation diagram? Do 
the books frame the installations, or do the installations 
frame the books? Do the books supplement the installa-
tions, or do the installations supplement the books? Der-
rida’s analysis of the parergon is completely relevant to 
the fluctuating enframings and enfoldings that Arakawa 
and Gins have devised. The artists are not surprised at 
the slippery, unstable negotiations between “content” 
and “frame.” On the contrary, they expect such instability 
and purposefully construct their apparatus to further ex-
ploit it. Mechanism of Meaning is an apparatus built to tes-
selate, enfold, and inflect the conventional frames that 
humans have constructed in order to encompass and cor-
ral sensible “meaning.” Rather than simply being a self-
sabotaging art apparatus (à la Jean Tinguely’s Homage to 
34 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 245.
263
how to do (no)things with words
New York), Mechanism of Meaning is a self-reconfiguring art 
apparatus. It persists in its instability. It is permanently 
unstable. How can Mechanism of Meaning continue to per-
form its own instability now that no new books are being 
published and no new installations are being exhibited? 
Because humans are the mechanism of meaning. As long 
as humans keep coming to these exercise stations, this 
apparatus will continue to lure us into perpetually recon-
figuring its boundaries.
In Order to Make Nothing,  
It Must Look Like Something
In order to properly enact nothing (to brake becoming), 
the apophatic art apparatus must paradoxically look like 
something. This is simply because the enaction of noth-
ing is not achieved via mimesis. Enacting nothing won’t 
ever “look like” nothing. Instead, a visual something is 
always presented which acts as a lure for thinking (i.e., 
making meaning). This meaning-making process is then 
disrupted. As Derrida observes, “To overthrow the power 
of the literal work is not to erase the letter, but only to 
subordinate it to the incidence of illegibility.”35 The dot 
doesn’t merely disappear. Instead, it ghosts itself, but a 
trace always remains. And of course, multiple interpreta-
tions of which dot is the dot remain.
The goal of the apophatic art apparatus is not to re-
place visual spectacle with darkness, but to rigorously 
problematize the regime of the visual. Similarly, the goal 
is not to replace language with silence (à la Wittgen-
stein’s famous dictum), but to rigorously problematize 
language, to orchestrate and foreground its own self-
confounding aporia. The goal is not to replace the object 
with the event (à la Fluxus), or even to replace the event 
with inaction and contemplation (which are also events); 
35 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 237.
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but to rigorously problematize the regime of the event 
itself, to bring it to an impasse, a perpetual tessellation, 
a braking.
An analogy from the world of contemporary technolo-
gy seems appropriate. Stealth planes don’t become invis-
ible by disappearing; but via cloaking algorithms, which 
divide a plane’s presence up into a collective pack of tiny 
presences, so that the plane reads like a flock of birds on 
an enemy’s radar. The contemporary stealth plane doesn’t 
simply become “black”; instead, it causes itself to be read 
as something else – not pure absence, but not itself. In-
visibility via obfuscation. Mechanism of Meaning takes the 
same approach toward its human “radar” systems. We are 
obviously able to see and read the stenciled capital letters. 
There is nothing magic or mysterious about this stencil 
typeface. In the genre of 1970s conceptual language art, 
this stenciled typeface was meant to signify generic neu-
trality. Now, forty years later, we identify this typeface 
with the art-historical genre of 1970s language art. But 
no matter. Why? Because the braking, confounding func-
tion of Mechanism of Meaning has little to do with whether 
its typeface is generic or genre-d. The typeface only mat-
ters as a lure which invites the viewer to feel confident 
enough to proceed as if she is able to read what is hap-
pening. In the 1970s, the viewer would have felt confident 
that the work of art was contemporary and conceptual. 
In 2020, the viewer feels confident that this work must 
have originated in the 1970s. But once the viewer actually 
begins engaging with the exercises, the visuality of the 
stenciled typeface becomes only one of many prehended 
materials, all of which collide and collude to brake our 
easy read of any apparent presences.
In Mechanism of Meaning, ocular media perform an al-
together different function than the mere conveyance of 
information, or even the mere occlusion of information. 
Ocular media act like a lure promising the (faux-)convey-
ance of meaning. This lure, once swallowed by the viewer 
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(through her eyes), acts like a trojan horse, irrupting and 
dismantling the viewer’s meaning-making mechanisms 
altogether. Image as decoy, trap, snare. The image must 
be visible in order for the viewer to admit it entrance; 
but once inside, the trojan-horse image renders all subse-
quent images pragmatically obfuscated.
Furthermore, the poorer and more low-resolution the 
media is, the easier it is to hypertrophy and confound its 
visuality and apparent “meaning.” The more dimensional 
and rich the media, the more artistic gymnastics it takes 
to hypertrophy it. Written words are a low-resolution me-
dium. As such, they require a great deal of work (assem-
bly, constitution) on the part of the viewer. Because the 
medium of the written word is doing so little “represen-
tational” work, the viewer must do more re-constituting 
work. She must imagine a dog from the word “dog.” She 
must more actively prehend the medium in order to do 
the heavy semiotic lifting required by written language. 
This is why (as discussed in Chapter 2) it is easier to con-
found a meaning-making human with written language 
than with visual imagery.
Ramping up the resolution of the medium decreases 
the semiotic work that the user must do in order to “make-
meaning,” to “piece things together.” High resolution me-
dia require much more rigorous work on the part of the 
visual artist if she intends to wreck humans as meaning-
making machines, simply because there is less human 
meaning-making work going on to sabotage. Duchamp’s 
Nude Descending a Staircase hypertrophies 2D painting 
toward film, but his was a pretty ingenious and difficult 
move. It becomes even more difficult to begin with film 
and hypertrophy it toward whatever exists beyond film 
(toward “video,” perhaps?). Hito Steyerl’s How to Become In-
visible is a valiant, hilarious, ridiculous, and always already 
doomed attempt to hypertrophy video toward something 
like algorithmic–machinic–networked vision. In Steyerl’s 
video, no one ever becomes fully invisible (although many 
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are ghosted). Instead, we human viewers, as meaning-
making machines, are increasingly destabilized to the 
point where even though figures on the “screen” are com-
pletely and technically “visible,” we begin to doubt our 
ability to make meaning of their visibility.
One of the reasons the Mechanism of Meaning project is 
so successful at braking and confounding human mean-
ing-makers is because it so prominently uses the low-res-
olution (and thus readily hypertrophied) medium of writ-
ten language in conjunction with higher-resolution media 
like imagery, sculpture, and installation. Because lan-
guage is always very present in each exercise station, we 
are immediately lured, activated, involved, and charged 
as highly engaged meaning-makers. Once involved, our 
highly energized meaning-making activity and receptiv-
ity is assaulted by even higher resolution media. It is like 
whispering into a microphone to get a sound check, and 
then yelling abruptly into the microphone once the vol-
ume has been ramped up. The stenciled instructions en-
tice us; the mysterious dot assaults us. 
It might seem like the removal of language (written or 
spoken) from visual art would make the art more readily 
able to approach nothing. But the absence of language 
actually makes the visual art have to work harder to ap-
proach nothing. Why? Because, to approach nothing in 
a visual regime of representation requires not blacker 
paint, but a radical disruption of the viewing human as 
a meaning-making mechanism. Her meaning-making ra-
dar systems must be scrambled, and low-resolution lan-
guage is an ideal means of scrambling human meaning-
making systems, because it so fully and quickly engages 
humans as active meaning-makers. Language is a lure, a 
trap, a cue for humans to turn up their meaning-making 
volumes. And since meaning-making is also embodied, 
when humans do turn up their meaning-making volumes, 
they also effectively turn up their prehending, apperceiv-
ing volumes. The artist can then begin to blast any num-
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ber of higher-resolution media (painting, sculpture, vid-
eo, architecture, immersive Vr worlds, or whatever). But 
merely, brutishly increasing the technology and resolu-
tion from the get go, prior to setting the appropriate trap, 
doesn’t make approaching nothing any easier. It actually 
makes approaching nothing increasingly difficult.
Braking Tactics  
(Aporia, Impasse, Deferral of Resolution) 
Mechanism of Meaning does not attempt to directly or im-
mediately change its viewer’s cosmology. It doesn’t overt-
ly determine exactly what experience a person is going to 
have, nor does it specify the direction in which a person 
may proceed once she has completed the exercises. In-
stead, it puts the brakes on a person’s ability to make a 
resolute meaning from the project. 
How exactly is the meaning-making ability of humans 
braked? The tactics vary from exercise to exercise, but 
with “The Dot,” a kind of perpetual feedback loop is es-
tablished which fails to ever resolve. Instructions under-
mine and re-interpret other instructions in an inverted 
Moebius strip that has no exit. If the symbol for a basic 
loop is the ouroboros [zero], then the symbol for “The 
Dot” exercise is the infinity symbol: self-cannibalism 
with a twist. The goal is not to constitute a resolved, bro-
ken human, but to defer the reconstitution of any singu-
lar, constrained, definitive human at all.
In one sense, Mechanism of Meaning prepares the way 
for Arakawa and Gins’s subsequent forays into architec-
ture; but in another more accurate sense, their forays into 
architecture are simply continuations of Mechanism of 
Meaning. The goal of their architectural projects is not to 
reconstitute a new, stable human from the rubble of the 
Mechanism of Meaning exercises. Instead, their architec-
tural projects explore even more rigorous, dimensional, 
spectral, embodied ways to keep the deconstitution of 
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human bodies going and open. Charles Eames famously 
called the house a machine for living. For Arakawa and 
Gins, the house becomes a machine for not dying. By 
hook or by crook, dying must be deferred. “To not to die.” 
And if the constitution of normal “living” must also be 
deferred in order to keep dying from subsequently con-
stituting itself, so be it.
To me, Mechanism of Meaning is not yet all that inter-
ested in achieving a reversible destiny. Its primary con-
cern is simply to avoid constituting and thus finalizing 
a dead-end destiny. It is not interested in reconfiguring 
the universe. It is not even interested in reconfiguring art 
institutions. It is not interested in conveying new infor-
mation to an old subject. It is not even interested in re-
constituting an old subject into a new subject. It is only 
interested in deconstituting an old subject. This old sub-
ject is bound to be reconstituted into some yet to be de-
termined “whatever,” or perhaps this reconstitution will 
be perpetually deferred, or forever reconfigured. Regard-
less of what particular fate awaits the human who par-
ticipates in the Mechanism of Meaning exercises, a portion 
of her old meaning-making self will remain trapped in 
a torus of perpetually deferred signification. Indeed, the 
very last exercises in Mechanism of Meaning circle around 
to resemble the first exercises. This bent toward recur-
sion suggests a kind of perpetual refusal to permanently 
re-assemble the viewer as a new and stable meaning-
making mechanism.
Summary
Since Mechanism of Meaning (and specifically “The Dot” 
exercise) means to undermine the viewer as a meaning-
making mechanism, it welcomes into its apparatus all 
kind of material, technical, and incidental marks: stray 
marks, misprints, vague marks, dust, smudges, photo-
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graphs of photographs, periods, commas, circles, o’s, x’s, 
and dots. Every mark and mote resists being bracketed 
as non-meaningful, because the apparatus itself refuses 
to take a pre-determined side regarding what is and isn’t 
meaningful. All of these marks, ghosts, traces, and rem-
nants keep asserting themselves back into the frame. 
What are we to make of them? What do they mean? And 
how do we determine what they mean? The exercises in 
Mechanism of Meaning don’t attempt to re-present noth-
ing. Nor do they occlude a visual something. These exer-
cises approach nothing because they confound our abil-
ity to make something of them. They approach nothing 
because we can make nothing (definite) of them.
Whereas Fludd means us to regard the differences be-
tween the various hyle printings as “merely” technical 
and incidental, in Mechanism of Meaning, such differences 
in printings become centrally relevant. Or, more precise-
ly, our inability to conclusively determine whether or not 
they are relevant becomes centrally relevant (perhaps).
In principle then, when it comes to apophatic art ap-
paratuses, any rigorous attempt to undermine the viewer 
as a language-deciphering maker-of-meaning will even-
tually necessitate a re-valuation of the formal, techni-
cal, material aspects of signifying media. Furthermore, 
such re-valuations and re-configurations of linguistic 
media destabilize old language-centric, anthropo-centric 
regimes (such as the perceptual mode of presentational 
immediacy) and lead outward + inward toward surfaces 
and substrates and materialities and affects; distribut-
ing and dispersing the linguistic realm into flows, econ-
omies, processes, bodily ways of knowing, and affective 
resonances. Humans are undone as primarily meaning-
making machines and distributed more fine-grainedly 
into broader ecological flows. The harder the linguistic 





Generative Algorithms and 
Perpetual Deferment: 
David Crawford’s Stop Motion 
Studies and the Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser
 
In this chapter, we will look at one apophatic art appa-
ratus (David Crawford’s Stop Motion Studies project) and 
one scientific apparatus (the uber-thorny Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser experiment).1 Both may be usefully un-
derstood as apparatuses of deferment. Stop Motion Stud-
ies enacts a kind of perpetual deferment which makes its 
own kind of apophatic nothing. The delayed choice eras-
er experiment enacts a kind of self-contained, provision-
ary apparatal deferment which eventually does come to 
a final end. Why get back into quantum mechanics again 
1 My original thoughts about Stop Motion Studies were initially com-
missioned for the Sequences exhibition (a group show on contempo-
rary forms of chronophotography), and later published in the book 
Sequences: Contemporary Chronophotography and Experimental Digital 
Art, ed. Paul St George (London: Wallflower Press, 2009), 114–19; and 
also in my collection of essays One Per Year (Brescia: Link Editions, 
2014), 65–86.
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when we had so satisfactorily extricated ourselves from 
it and the end of Chapter 1? Because the delayed choice 
eraser is an apparatus worth tackling, particularly when 
attempting to think about time and its relevance to art 
apparatuses and to apophasis in general. Both Stop Mo-
tion Studies and the delayed choice eraser are apparatuses 
which tease out, lure, and proposition the concept of 
time, but from which time itself never seems to emerge. 
Stop Motion Studies problematizes our prior human under-
standing of time as represented in photography and film, 
and the delayed choice eraser problematizes our prior hu-
man understanding of time in general.
Before diving into Stop Motion Studies, we must return 
again to the world of quantum mechanics and attend 
carefully to the delayed choice quantum eraser apparatus. 
I will keep my descriptions and interpretations as concise 
as possible, but there really is no “in brief” interpretation 
of the phenomenon which occurs in this experiment.
A Brief Description of the Delayed 
Choice Quantum Eraser
The Delayed Choice (Quantum) Eraser apparatus is re-
ally just an extremely rigorous version of the Delayed 
Choice Which-Path Double-Slit apparatus, which meas-
ures which-path occurs after/behind the double-slit wall 
rather than before/in front of it, and discovers the same 
“weird” results. The Delayed Choice Which-Path Dou-
ble-Slit apparatus is just a more rigorous version of the 
Which-Path Double-Slit apparatus, which itself is just 
a more rigorous version of Young’s original Double-Slit 
apparatus (both discussed in Chapter 1). And so, we find 
ourselves back at Richard Feynman’s statement that the 
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double-slit experiment “contains the only mystery” of 
quantum mechanics.2
I will initially describe the delayed choice eraser ap-
paratus reported by Kim et al. in 1999,3 and will also re-
fer to the 2008 Canary Islands apparatus reported by Ma 
et al.4 A prepared and isolated photon is sent through a 
double-slit wall. On the far side of the double-slit wall, 
if the photon passes through slit A, it is split into an en-
tangled pair of photons such that their polarizations are 
opposite. Likewise, if the photon passes through slit B, 
it is also split into an entangled pair of oppositely polar-
ized photons. Here, “entangled” just means that when 
you “measure” the value of one photon’s polarization 
(polarization being one kind of particle observable), then 
the other entangled photon’s polarization will be the op-
posite value. It turns out that this process of quantum 
entanglement introduces more “weirdness” into the ap-
paratus than it removes (we’ll get to that later), but ini-
tially this kind of photon splitting and entanglement was 
intended as a way to measure the which-path informa-
tion of one entangled photon without decohering (and 
thus altering) the wave-like diffraction range in which its 
partner photon could be expected to land. One proton of 
the entangled pair (let’s call it the “signal” photon) is sent 
forward and detected in some specific position along a 
far “wall” (not really a “wall,” but just a position detector 
placed at a consistent distance from the double slit). At 
2 Richard P. Feynman, “Lecture 37: Atomic Mechanics,” in The Feyn-
man Lectures on Physics, Volume I (Mainly Mechanics, Radiation and 
Heat) (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 2013), 1–1: 
“Atomic mechanics,” http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/
III_01.html.
3 Yoon-Ho Kim, R. Yu, S.P. Kulik, and Y.H. Shih, Marlan O. Scully, “A 
Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser,” Physical Review Letters 84, no. 1 
(2000): 1–4.
4 Xiao-Song Ma, Johannes Kofler, et al., “Quantum Erasure with Caus-
ally Disconnected Choice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences of the United States of America 110, no. 4 (2013): 1221–26.
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the same time, its partner proton (let’s call it the “idler” 
photon) is diverted and sent along a different path which 
detects which of the two slits it passed through. Because 
we haven’t physically interfered with the signal photon, 
our original measurement conundrum should be solved. 
The signal photon should remain cohered and land some-
where within the predicted, wave-like diffraction pattern 
(rather than in the decohered, tennis-ball-like clump pat-
tern), and the idler photon should tell us which-path the 
pre-split photon went through.
But the results confound this expectation. We send a 
bunch of photons through the apparatus one at a time, 
splitting and entangling each one of them after the 
double-slit wall and detecting each one of the entangled 
pairs as described above, and instead of a diffraction pat-
tern on the signal photon “wall,” we get a tennis-ball-like 
clump pattern. Perhaps this clump result is not surpris-
ing, since both signal and idler photons are detected si-
multaneously. Perhaps the simultaneous detection of the 
idler photon’s which-path data is causing its entangled 
signal path photon to decohere and get clump-like. So, 
we delay the detection of the idler photon (by 8 nanosec-
onds in the Kim apparatus, and by a lengthy 479 micro-
seconds in the 2008 Ma apparatus). Surely now we will 
observe a diffraction pattern on the signal “wall,” since 
the signal photon must “land” (be detected) “prior” to its 
idler photon. Surely all of the signal photons will (gradu-
ally) display the expected diffraction pattern from the 
original (non-which-path) double slit experiment, since 
each signal photon will have already landed and can’t 
possibly “know” whether or not the which-path informa-
tion of its idler photon will or will not ever be detected. 
And yet, even by delaying the time between the signal 
photon’s position detection and its entangled idler pho-
ton’s which-path detection, the clump pattern of the sig-
nal photon continues to emerge.
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What if we modify this apparatus (and thus construct 
a new apparatus) that records which slit each idler pho-
ton went through 50% of the time, and loses (obfuscates) 
which slit each idler photon went through the other 50% 
of the time? To make things even more interesting, what 
if we construct this new apparatus so that the choice (to 
record the path of the idler photon or to lose the path of 
the idler photon) is totally random? This new apparatus 
Fig. 1: Schematic of the experimental setup of the 1999 Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser apparatus devised and implemented by Yoon-Ho Kim, 
et al. Starting at the pump, a photon first passes through either slit A 
or slit B (or does it?), and then is split into an entangled signal/idler 
pair. The location of the signal photon is recorded by detector D0. Its 
idler photon passes through a series of splitters and reflectors, with 
a 50% chance of arriving at detector D3 with its which-path informa-
tion intact, and a 50% chance of arriving at detectors D1 or D2 with its 
which-path information obfuscated (erased, lost). The idler photon 
is detected 8 nanoseconds after the signal photon. The coincidence 
circuit records which signal photon goes with which idler photon. 
Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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that I’ve just described is the Delayed Choice Quantum 
Eraser (see Fig. 1).
We fire a bunch of photons through this new appa-
ratus one at a time. What we find on the signal photon 
“wall” is just a big clump of photons. But wait, we are able 
to correlate each one of these individual signal photon 
locations with its exact corresponding idler photon. We 
know which signal photons had their idler photon paths 
recorded, and which signal photons had their idler pho-
ton paths lost. So, we separate out all the signal photons 
which had their corresponding idler photon paths record-
ed, and we get a tennis-ball clump pattern. We separate 
out all the signal photons which had their corresponding 
idler photon paths lost, and we get the diffraction pat-
tern.5 Once again, the (human-)”weird” aspect is that the 
signal photon locations were each recorded “prior to” any 
corresponding idler path information was recorded or 
lost (obfuscated, erased). Arguably, this delayed choice 
eraser result is no more or less “weird” than the delayed 
choice non-eraser result. It’s just that the added rigor 
of the eraser element intensifies the “weirdness” of the 
same basic results.
The 2008 Ma experiment was conducted in the Ca-
nary Islands between two separate islands. The part of 
the apparatus (a quantum random number generator) 
that randomized the “choice” (whether to save or lose the 
which-path information of the idler photon) was “space-
like separated” from the recording of the location of the 
signal photon, which was “space-like separated” from the 
recording (or obfuscation) of the path of the idler photon. 
In other words, because the recorded idler photon results 
5 Actually, in the Kim apparatus, we get two diffraction patterns, in-
versely phased with one another: one phase for all the idler photons 
that went through slit A, and the inverse phase for all the idler pho-
tons that went through slit B. This phase inversion has to do with 
the way the apparatus was constructed, the nature of half-silvered 
mirrors, and the laws of optics.
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could not have traveled faster than the speed of light, they 
could not have “physically” (in a Newtonian, cause-effect 
sense) influenced the location of their signal photon. 
Perhaps then we are thinking about it all wrong, and it 
was actually the “original” signal photon that influenced 
the “subsequent” which-path detection (or erasure) of its 
idler photon. But this won’t do, because the decision to 
record or lose the idler photon path information was ran-
domly made by aleatoric software, space-like separated 
from the recording of the signal photon’s location. Dra-
matically (although perhaps only incidentally), the signal 
photon location was recorded on one island and the idler 
photon path was recorded (or intentionally obscured) 144 
kilometers away on an entirely different island. 
Perhaps we may seek comfort in the fact that these 
“weird” results are only applicable to massless phenom-
ena like photons and light and energy; but are in no way 
applicable to electrons and atoms and matter. Perhaps 
massless particles don’t experience time, because time is 
related to mass. But that won’t do either, because simi-
lar results in different apparatuses have been observed 
with particles as “large” as helium atoms.6 Perhaps these 
“weird” eraser results are simply the effect of quantum 
entangled photon pairs themselves, and if we were some-
how able to build the same kind of delayed choice eras-
er apparatus for a single photon, we could bypass these 
weird results. But again, that won’t do. Delayed choice 
eraser apparatuses have been created for single photons, 
and they yield similarly “weird” results.7 Perhaps each 
idler photon, upon its which-path detection (or obfusca-
tion), travels back in time and alters the prior recorded 
6 A. G. Manning, R. I. Khakimov, R. G. Dall & A. G. Truscott, “Wheel-
er’s Delayed-Choice Gedanken Experiment with a Single Atom,” Na-
ture Physics 11 (2015): 539–42.
7 Xiao-Song Ma, Johannes Kofler, and Anton Zeilinger, “Delayed-
Choice Gedanken Experiments and Their Realizations,” Reviews of 
Modern Physics 88, no. 1 (2016): 15–16.
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location of its signal photon. But this won’t do, because 
the signal photon location results have been recorded. 
They have been measured. They happened. Irrevocable 
“marks” have been made. If this were not the case, if ir-
revocable marks had not yet been made, then nothing 
about these apparatal measurement results would seem 
“weird” at all. When the idler photon which-path infor-
mation is recorded, the diffraction pattern on the signal 
detection “wall” doesn’t “disappear.” It isn’t “erased.” Ap-
parently, for those signal photons whose idler photons 
had their which-path information recorded, the aggre-
gate diffraction pattern was never there.
Human physicists are ingenious to the point of obses-
sion at attempting to nail down the challenges to our 
inherited Newtonian cosmology posed by quantum be-
havior. And yet, it seems, the more rigorously we attempt 
to impose our inherited cosmology onto photons via the 
construction of increasingly bizarre and convoluted ap-
paratuses, the “weirder” quantum behavior behaves.
A Semi-Brief Interpretation of the 
Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser
It seems we are going to have to abandon one of our cher-
ished Newtonian presuppositions. We can abandon the 
idea of causality altogether, but this is the least appeal-
ing option. We can abandon the notion of chronological 
time, which is at least more appealing than abandoning 
causality. Or we can abandon the notion that a holistic 
apparatus may somehow readily and easily be broken up 
into discrete sub-parts and rightly understood separately 
without radically misunderstanding the overall holistic 
function of the apparatus. Barad’s interpretation of Bohr 
does indeed challenge the idea that a holistic apparatus 
can be divided into parts without disruptive consequenc-
es.
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The problem with my above description of the time 
delayed quantum eraser apparatus is that the sequen-
tial chronology of written human language forces me to 
describe the functioning of the apparatus in sequential 
parts, one after the other, as if one function of the ap-
paratus was completed as I completed describing it, and 
another function of the apparatus was then subsequent-
ly begun as I subsequently began describing it. Even the 
name “delayed choice eraser” forces me to describe a 
choice that is sequentially delayed until after the signal 
photon position has been recorded, a choice of whether to 
record which-path idler photon information that became 
available after the slit was passed through, or to erase that 
information now. Indeed, my entire linguistic description 
of the apparatus presumes its divisibility and imposes a 
chronological series of events onto it.
Even the above diagram of the Kim apparatus is pre-
sumptive and misleading. During the holistic apparatal 
event, when the particles are in a superpositional quan-
tum state, it is incorrect to imagine that the particles 
have decided upon a particular path at the beginning of 
the apparatus which they then simply follow pro forma 
through the apparatus to its end. And yet the diagram 
above implies that an idler photon, upon arriving at one 
of the two which-path obfuscation detectors at the end, 
will have either followed path A or path B to arrive there. 
Thus, the diagram itself presumes that the idler photon 
first commits to one of two paths (collapses its waveform 
of potential position probabilities), then goes down that 
one specific path, then has its path choice obfuscated 
rather than detected, then reverse-expands its waveform 
of potential position probabilities (thus also reverse-ex-
panding the corresponding waveform of potential posi-
tion probabilities belonging to its signal photon). But 
perhaps this described sequence of events is not what is 
happening at all. In other words, this diagram, far from 
neutrally and objectively displaying the set-up of the ap-
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paratus, is actually interpreting (sequentializing, sub-
partitioning) the inner workings of the holistic appara-
tus. The diagram can’t help but do this. The diagram was 
drawn by human scientists to convey information to hu-
man scientists, and we humans are all still deeply condi-
tioned to think according to classical Newtonian physics. 
The “problem” is not just with our language, but with our 
entire sequential, cause-and-effect, object/subject way of 
thinking.
But (apparently) the delayed choice eraser apparatus 
functions holistically, not discretely. The entire appara-
tus happens as it happens and until the whole thing is 
finished happening none of it is finished happening. This 
interpretation is troubling because 479 microseconds 
elapse between the recording of the signal photon’s posi-
tion and the recording (or obfuscation) of the idler pho-
ton’s path. All I can say is that this external measurement 
of the 479 microseconds is somehow not part of, not pre-
hended by, and thus irrelevant to the overall functioning 
of the holistic apparatus. Such a time-indifferent inter-
pretation is admittedly troubling to a human, but not as 
troubling as backwards time travel or the abandonment 
of causation. And, of course, my “holistic apparatus” in-
terpretation is not troubling at all to the pair of entan-
gled photons.
Causality and Time
A re-examination of causality seems in order. Regarding 
the entangled photons, Newtonian concepts of direct 
physical causality leave us with two clear-cut, binary op-
tions: either the signal photon’s position measurement 
directly caused the “subsequent” recording or obfusca-
tion of its idler photon’s path, or the recording or obfus-
cation of the idler photon’s path directly retro-caused 
whether or not its signal photon landed in a clump pat-
tern range or a diffraction pattern range. But entangled 
281
generative algorithms and perpetual deferment
photons behave “weirdly,” not just from a Newtonian 
perspective, but even from an Einsteinian perspective 
(Einstein’s word for their behavior was not “weird,” but 
“spooky” – “spooky action at a distance”). Perhaps, in this 
prepared, cohered, and entangled state (pre-decoherence, 
pre-well-decidedness), photons retain all of their observ-
able value options until they are invited by the holistic 
apparatal arrangement (however courteously or insist-
ently) to commit to specific observables and values. Until 
such commitments are made within the cut-off, carved-
out, holistic context of the overall apparatal phenome-
non, external time and space are irrelevant to (negatively 
prehended by) the holistic apparatus. If we are to believe 
that time and space are truly the result of relations within 
and amongst phenomena, rather than time and space be-
ing the always-already-given, all-pervading, pre-existent, 
Cartesian containers for relata (nouns), then within the 
phenomenon of the apparatal context, until all relations 
have been irreversibly decided, time has not yet emerged.
Once entangled and well-decided, quantum particles 
do not inherently pine for the fjords of the Schrödinger 
equation. And yet, until quantum particles do decide to 
decohere and commit to an observable and its particu-
lar value, they tend to remain as uncommitted as they 
can for as long as possible. The delayed choice quantum 
eraser apparatus is a very delicate, very courteous appara-
tus that quite gently invites particles to commit in their 
own good “time,” and particles take every advantage of 
this courtesy.
Within the quantum-behavior-measuring apparatal 
entanglement, then, what we are dealing with is not so 
much Newtonian “causality” (well-decided societies of 
complexly entangled entities physically bumping into 
each other). Instead, we are dealing with entities that are 
barely decided at all. Indeed, a prepared, unentangled, co-
herent photon is arguably a mere bundle of undecided 
potentialities. Perhaps the entire “journey” of the two 
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entangled photons through the delayed choice quantum 
eraser apparatus is in fact only one single, indivisible, ac-
tual occasion. One thing that is happening with(in) the 
time delayed eraser apparatus (and with(in) all quantum-
behavior-measuring apparatuses) is that the virtual real 
is becoming actualized into the actual real. Until this vir-
tual real is actualized, it is no use expecting it to behave 
as if it had already been actualized.
The “speed of light” is simply the fastest that one 
thing can affect and communicate with another thing 
in Einsteinian spacetime. But what do “affect” and “com-
municate” mean? And what is “one thing” and “another 
thing?” Are a pair of entangled photons one thing, or two 
things? If neither of the entangled photons have mani-
fested their position observable at all (much less its ac-
tual value), are either of them even noun-y “things” at 
all? Can a thing without an actual position rightly be 
considered an actual thing? Perhaps a prepared, unmeas-
ured photon is an actual thing, but its position observ-
able is a virtual thing, something that may or may not 
ever emerge. Can an actual thing have a virtual position? 
Is a virtual position even a position? Is a photon with-
out an actual position constrained by the speed of light? 
Evidently not. Is the relationship between two entangled 
photons more “fundamental,” more “primary,” than time 
and space? Evidently so. When offered the chance within 
a particularly courteous apparatal arrangement, will pre-
pared, cohered, entangled photons remain largely indif-
ferent to time and space? Evidently so.
Concrescent becomings (actual occasions/entities) 
don’t happen “in” space and time; they create space and 
time. This is because such concrescences involve com-
mitments (decisions) that are irreversible. According to 
Whitehead, these actual occasions are the holistic units 
that make the world. An actual occasion is not subdivis-
ible into units of time. Actual occasions are the funda-
mental units, and time and space are their byproducts. 
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Time results from decisions of commitment that cumu-
late and become irreversible. In Whitehead’s own words, 
“This passage of the cause into the effect is the cumula-
tive character of time. The irreversibility of time depends 
on this character.”8 He explains that 
actual entities atomize [the extensive continuum], and 
thereby make real what was antecedently merely po-
tential. The atomization of the extensive continuum 
is also its temporalization; that is to say, it is the pro-
cess of the becoming of actuality into what in itself is 
merely potential.9 
Due to the sequential nature of linguistic explanation, 
Whitehead is forced to describe the internal workings of 
an actual occasion/entity in terms of a series of progres-
sions, but these progressions are internal to the holistic 
occasion itself. Actual occasions don’t actually break up 
into discrete, externally measurable sub-occasions, or 
those sub-occasions themselves would be actual occa-
sions, and you have to stop somewhere. In describing the 
internal “phases” of the actual occasion/entity, White-
head makes this curious aside, “Time has stood still – if 
only it could.”10 In the delayed choice quantum eraser ap-
paratus, perhaps we are given a glimpse into the standing 
still of time that occurs within singular actual occasions.
Prior to running the delayed choice quantum eraser 
apparatus, within the prepared apparatal state itself, ir-
reversible decisions have yet to be made. The “quantum” 
state of the apparatus does not come about because pho-
tons are very small, but because a purposefully “shielded” 
environment has been prepared. This shielded environ-
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ment lacks the pressing obligations to honor a prior his-
tory of cumulative decisions made by prior actual occa-
sions. Those decisions are negatively prehended by the 
apparatal phenomenon. In this sense, the apparatus has 
been carved out from the rest of the universe. If the rest 
of the universe also lacked a history of prior cumulative 
decisions, it would also be in this same cohered state. 
Physicist Roland Omnès speculates that, “If the universe 
contained only two or three particles [such that deco-
herence were not likely], […] one would be allowed to 
choose arbitrarily the direction of time in logic.”11 Taking 
up Omnès, Michael Epperson further clarifies, “Logical, 
asymmetrical temporality is a byproduct of the actual-
ization of potentia – the evolution of probability to fact 
[…]. Without the existence of facts, there is nothing to 
measure temporally.”12 In other words (stated in White-
headian–Deleuzian terms), since “time” (asymmetrical 
temporality) is a byproduct of actual occasions that actu-
alize the virtual real, time is hardly the most suitable tool 
for measuring actual occasions.
Regarding the relationship of cartesian space to a sin-
gular actual occasion, splitting up the “parts” of the de-
layed choice quantum eraser apparatus and placing them 
on separate islands is irrelevant to the holistic actual oc-
casions that occur intra-actively within the “prepared” 
and “shielded” functional context of the apparatus. 
This is because actual occasions make their own space. 
Whitehead explains, “The concrescence presupposes its 
basic region, and not the region its concrescence. Thus 
the subjective unity of the concrescence is irrelevant to 
the divisibility of the region. In dividing the region we 
are ignoring the subjective unity which is inconsistent 
11 Roland Omnès, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 318.
12 Michael Epperson, Quantum Mechanics and the Philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 96.
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with such division. But the region is, after all, divisible, 
although in the genetic growth it is undivided.”13 This 
passage reads as if Whitehead is interpretively explaining 
the “weird” behavior of the delayed choice quantum eras-
er experiment (as I am currently doing), but he is sim-
ply theorizing in 1928 about the “ordinary” behavior of 
the general universe, decades before the delayed choice 
quantum eraser experiment had even been conceived, 
much less successfully implemented.
Until final decisions are made, they have not finally 
been made. The delayed choice quantum eraser, with its 
rigorously courteous invitation to decide, its barely in-
sistent insistence to eventually commit, is the quantum-
behavior-measuring apparatus par excellence at enacting 
deferment. As a human who is himself a well-decided, 
well-entangled society of entities, who is used to thinking 
and moving amongst well-decided, well-entangled socie-
ties of entities (enduring objects like rocks, dogs, laptop 
computers, and other humans), the idea that actual occa-
sions create space and time is difficult to think. This dif-
ficulty extends beyond anthropocentrism. It is more like 
well-decided-centrism. Oh well. My difficulties to think 
something don’t alter the results of the apparatus. Such 
is the power, efficacy, and world-view-altering potential 
of an apparatus. Unlike mere human rhetoric, an appa-
ratus is far more difficult to dismiss. Simply pejoratizing 
all of the behavior in the time delayed eraser apparatus 
as “weird” won’t do, because such behavior (whether vir-
tual, actual, or both) is still real; and the real is relevant. 
The primacy of entangled apparatal relationships (intra-
actions) over even time and space is particularly relevant 
for all levels of decidedness (from well-decided to semi-
decided to undecided), and thus relevant to our art ap-
paratuses.
13 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 283–84.
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The Holistic Apparatus
Just as the quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus is 
indivisible into sequential time-fragments, it is also in-
divisible into spatial part-fragments. To cut out a sub-
part of the delayed choice eraser apparatus and examine 
it separately is to create an entirely new apparatus. One 
may choose within the apparatus to bracket whichever 
portion of it she so desires (just as the holistic apparatus 
itself chooses to bracket the portion of the universe that 
it so desires), but such internal bracketing may not occur 
without cutting into (and out of) the overall holistic ap-
paratus. Thinking separately about the discrete function 
of each individual component of the delayed choice eras-
er apparatus (the source photon, the double-slit wall, the 
signal photon, the signal photon position detection de-
vice, the idler photon, the random number generator, the 
idler photon which-path detection device, the idler pho-
ton eraser/obfuscator device, etc.), and then combining 
those thoughts together will not result in proper think-
ing about the overall holistic apparatus. Even thinking 
about the ways in which these discrete parts “interact” 
with each other will not result in proper thinking about 
the overall holistic apparatus. As Barad lucidly observes, 
“interaction” assumes that all the parts of the apparatus 
are already discretely formed prior to the apparatal phe-
nomenon. “Interaction” is a Newtonian way of thinking 
– pre-existent noun objects with pre-existent adjectival 
properties verb-ishly acting upon each other in adverbial 
ways. But within a quantum-behavior-measuring appa-
ratus, the key elements of the apparatus (the photons) 
are not yet discrete, noun-y things. What the photons 
will eventually become has everything to do with the 
“intra-active” (Barad’s term) phenomenon of the holistic 
apparatus. As humans, we don’t just need new words to 
describe the function of quantum-behavior-measuring 
apparatuses; we need new, holistic, apparatal, intra-ac-
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tive ways of thinking altogether. Whitehead was already 
there, as early as 1927.
The 2008 version of the Ma et al. delayed choice eraser 
experiment which takes place across two islands illus-
trates some other important facts regarding the holistic 
nature of apparatuses: apparatuses need not be black box-
es; they need not exist in contained laboratories (or con-
tained galleries); they need not appear to be hermetically 
sealed. In one of John Wheeler’s original delayed choice 
eraser thought experiments, the original photon is emit-
ted from a star many light years away from the “eraser” 
component of the apparatus. In Einstein’s original epr 
thought experiment, devised to question the “spooky ac-
tion at a distance” of entangled photons, the entangled 
photon pair is separated over great cosmic distances so 
that the measurement of one photon could only instanta-
neously “affect” the state of its partner photon at a speed 
greater than light. These examples drive home the fact 
that an apparatus is really just a configuration of intra-
acting relationships cut out of the rest of the universe in 
such a way that its “measured” “results” mean what they 
have become. Just as parts of the universe are perpetually 
“measuring” (I would say “reckoning”) other parts of the 
universe; in this same sense, apparatal phenomenon (i.e., 
intra-active becomings, apparatuses) are cropping up all 
the time. Throughout this book, I am primarily using the 
term “apparatus” to discuss human-devised apparatuses 
(whether artistic, scientific, or otherwise); but techni-
cally, what makes an apparatus an apparatus is the intra-
active relations amongst its phenomena, the cutting out 
of itself from the rest of the (negatively prehended) uni-
verse, and the irreversible “marks” left on the universe 
as a result of its “measurement” outcome. Apparatuses 
function as a propositions, as holistic lures for becoming, 
regardless of what they look like.
I will leave the final word on the issue of apparatal ho-
lism to the physicists themselves –
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Niels Bohr: 
Only the totality of phenomena exhausts the possible 
information about the objects. […] I advocated the ap-
plication of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer 
to the observations obtained under specified circum-
stances, including an account of the whole experimen-
tal arrangement.14
John Wheeler, proposer of the original delayed choice 
eraser thought experiment: 
In actuality it is wrong to talk of the “route” of the 
photon. For a proper way of speaking we recall once 
more that it makes no sense to talk of the phenom-
enon until it has been brought to a close by an irrevers-
ible act of amplification.15
Xiao-Song Ma, principal investigator of the 2008 Cayman 
Islands apparatus:
It is a general feature of delayed-choice experiments 
that […] the relative temporal order of measurement 
events is not relevant, and no physical interactions or 
signals, let alone into the past, are necessary to explain 
the experimental results. To interpret quantum exper-
iments, any attempt in explaining what happens in an 
individual observation of one system has to include 
the whole experimental configuration and also the 
14 Niels Bohr, “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems 
in Atomic Physics,” in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilpp (New York: mJf Books, 1970), 210, 237–38.
15 J.A. Wheeler, “Law without Law,” in Quantum Theory and Measure-
ment, eds. J.A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1983), 192.
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complete quantum state, potentially describing joint 
properties with other systems.16 
The fact that it is possible to decide whether a wave or 
particle feature manifests itself long after – and even 
space-like separated from – the measurement teaches 
us that we should not have any naive realistic picture 
for interpreting quantum phenomena. Any explana-
tion of what goes on in a specific individual observa-
tion of one photon has to take into account the whole 
experimental apparatus of the complete quantum 
state consisting of both photons, and it can only make 
sense after all information concerning complemen-
tary variables has been recorded.17
Indifference to Human Observation
Although the delayed choice quantum eraser apparatus 
never would have been devised were it not for the relent-
less and idiosyncratic inquisitiveness of humans; nev-
ertheless, the actual results of the apparatus are wholly 
indifferent to and independent of human observation. 
The measured results of our quantum-behavior-measur-
ing apparatuses may be mind-blowing to humans; but 
to photons, it’s just another day on the job. To photons, 
there is absolutely nothing “weird” or “spooky” about the 
results of the delayed choice eraser. The apparatus’s be-
havior is totally expected and utterly banal. Indeed, the 
human capacity to think that something is weird is way 
more weird than any of the things that humans think 
are weird.
16 Ma, Kofler, and Zeilinger, “Delayed-Choice Gedanken Experiments 
and their Realizations,” 24.
17 Ma, Kofler, et al., “Quantum Erasure with Causally Disconnected 
Choice,” 1226.
290
some ways of making nothing
The measured results of any scientific apparatus 
(whether quantum-behavior-measuring or classical-
behavior-measuring) are based on irreversible decisions 
that the apparatus itself enacts. Physicist Maximilian 
Schlosshauer observes, “The very definition of measure-
ment hinges on the property of irreversibility.”18 And 
again, “It is difficult to regard a reversible interaction 
as a proper measurement.”19 What makes the apparatal 
measurements count as measurements at all is not that 
humans observe these measurements, but that the meas-
urements themselves are irreversible. Indeed, until a 
measurement is irreversible (i.e., until the apparatus has 
decided to mean what it has holistically become, until 
the actual occasions relevant to it have occurred), there 
is no measurement.
In multiple quantum eraser apparatuses of various 
configurations (Dürr, 1998; Kim, 2000; Scarcelli, 2007), the 
diffraction (interference, fringe) pattern is “destroyed” 
and becomes a clumped pattern once which-path infor-
mation is detected and stored within the apparatus, re-
gardless of whether or not a human ever reads, observes, 
or notes that which-path information.20 The which-path 
information has not yet been obfuscated. It remains in 
the universe. The retention of this information matters 
within the carved out, holistic context of the apparatus, 
whether or not it ever comes to matter to a human exter-
nal to the apparatus.
Perhaps even more (human-)”weird,” Barad summariz-
es the findings of one which-path apparatus in which the 
mere ability to distinguish which-path information with-
in the apparatus is enough to “destroy” the interference 
pattern, even when “which-path” measurements are not 
18 Maximilian Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical 
Transition (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 69.
19 Ibid., 101.
20 Ma, Kofler, and Zeilinger, “Delayed-Choice Gedanken Experiments 
and their Realizations,” 17–18.
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performed.21 “It has been confirmed experimentally that 
the interference pattern disappears without any which-
path measurement having actually been performed – but 
just by the mere possibility of distinguishing paths.”22 
These findings only strengthen the interpretation of the 
scientific apparatus as a holistic unit in and of itself, in-
dependent of external human observation.
In contrast, all of the art apparatuses I happen to dis-
cuss in this book do concern themselves with humans. 
This is not because art is “subjective” and science is “ob-
jective.” The difference is, science apparatuses (at least of 
the physics variety) are purposefully structured to avoid 
intra-acting with the enduring objects known as hu-
mans, whereas (most) art apparatuses are purposefully 
structured to intra-act with humans. Art apparatuses are 
not solely dependent upon human intra-action. Materi-
als within the art apparatus are themselves intra-acting 
with each other. Humans are involved in most art appa-
ratuses simply because most artists purposefully config-
ure their art apparatuses to intra-act with humans. Most 
human artists assume and make a place for human “au-
diences” in their art apparatuses. All of this is perfectly 
understandable and utterly reasonable. It doesn’t mean 
art apparatuses are any less apparatuses. It just means 
that, by definition, art apparatuses are less scientific than 
scientific apparatuses (as one would expect). Whereas to 
science, according to the goals of science, it is essential to 
(attempt to) inhibit the scientific human observer from 
influencing the measurement outcome.
Of course, the various measurement outcomes of the 
various quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses have 
a great effect on the human community of physicists. 
21 X.Y. Zou, L.J. Wang, and L. Mandel, “Induced Coherence and Indis-
tinguishability in Optical Interference,” Physical Review Letters 67, no. 
3 (1991): 318–321.
22 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 306.
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But in order for those measurement outcomes to matter 
to human physicists, humans themselves may not be al-
lowed to intra-act with these apparatuses in any way that 
would affect the measured results. Almost the opposite 
is true with the human community of artists, gallerists, 
art historians, and art patrons. Unless humans are invit-
ed to intra-act with art apparatuses, the human art com-
munity is generally not that interested. Art apparatuses 
have been devised which seem to purposefully exclude the 
intra-action of humans. Joseph Beuys’s How to Explain Pic-
tures to a Dead Hare comes to mind. But even during that 
performance, humans are welcomed to peer through the 
gallery windows, the “pictures” in the gallery have been 
created by humans, and after a certain amount of time, 
humans are invited back into the gallery. And of course, 
Beuys himself is a human.
By observing that art apparatuses purposefully in-
clude humans, I am not at all saying that art appara-
tuses are merely equivalent to gedanken apparatuses, to 
thought experiments. Artists and scientists may imag-
ine the possible results of various apparatuses, but until 
those apparatuses are built and run in the world, until 
irreversible marks are made, both gedanken science ex-
periments and yet-to-be-implemented art project ideas 
are less integrated into (and thus less integral to) the uni-
verse. Yes, to imagine is itself a form of actualizing the 
virtual, since thoughts are actually real and not merely 
virtual potentia. But thoughts themselves don’t involve 
much material, so they (literally) don’t matter as much. It 
is one thing for Niels Bohr to assert against Einstein that 
“spooky action at a distance” (space-like separated quan-
tum entanglement) is a real thing. It is another thing for 
scientists to construct an apparatus and run an experi-
ment that enacts this form of remote entanglement. The 
apparatus doesn’t merely “show and prove” the “truth” 
of the thought experiment. The apparatal experiment 
entangles that thought experiment with materials and 
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actual history, and in so doing, translates the thought 
experiment into an irreversible event. There is no sub-
stitute for the construction and enaction of an actual 
apparatus (whether scientific or artistic). Even an artist 
as conceptual and language-centric as Lawrence Weiner 
must still spray-paint words onto a floor, or hang some 
words on a wall, or publish some words in a conceptual 
manifesto explaining how art doesn’t have to be made 
of anything other than words. Theoretical thinking alone 
won’t do. Thinking alone won’t cut it. An actual apparatus 
is required.
And so, we turn our attention to David Crawford’s Stop 
Motion Studies art apparatus. Crawford doesn’t merely 
think theoretically about the liminal space between pho-
tograph and film. Instead, he constructs an art appara-
tus that functions in that liminal space. What emerges 
continues to problematize and advance both photogra-
phy theory and film theory, as well as human notions of 
durational time.
Stop Motion Studies 
Stop Motion Studies is our second proper example of an 
apophatic art apparatus. Our first apophatic art appa-
ratus (“The Dot” from Arakawa and Gins’s Mechanism of 
Meaning) put the brakes on making meaning. Stop Motion 
Studies puts the brakes on sequential becoming; but then 
so does still photography, and so does the filmic loop. Yet 
Stop Motion Studies goes further, braking both the static 
resolution of still photography (by setting its own frames 
in perpetual motion) and the cyclic repetition of the film-
ic loop (by aleatorically animating its own frames so that 
they never actually “loop”). Stop Motion Studies is a very 
thorough apophatic art apparatus. Something does grad-
ually and eventually become of/from this time-braking 
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Fig. 2: 2/3 of the frames from David Crawford’s Stop Motion Studies: 
Series #8, Sequence #2. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
apparatus: a portrait of humans as a sequence of occa-
sions rather than as enduring objects.
Stop Motion Studies is a series of aleatoric animations 
by the artist David Crawford. The animations are not 
static photographic stills, nor are they perpetually loop-
ing micro-films. Crawford’s microcosmic photographic 
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studies of people riding on subways initially seem like 
looping micro-films. But the animations never actu-
ally loop. Instead, their sequence and duration are con-
trolled by randomizing software instructions. Imagine a 
slide projector tray filled with anywhere between three 
to eight slides. All the slides in the tray are of the same 
subject, all photographed within a limited time frame 
of just a few seconds. The projector displays these same 
slides infinitely, but always in random order. The projec-
tor also randomizes the duration each slide is displayed, 
anywhere from about .03 seconds to about .3 seconds. 
This set-up roughly approximates the mechanics of what 
Crawford has termed “algorithmic montage.”23 The result 
is a kind of stochastic motion study more akin to chrono-
photography than film; but with a distinct, non-linear 
twist. Crawford uses this aleatoric art apparatus to prize 
open the liminal timescape between still photography 
and film (see Fig. 2).
Although Stop Motion Studies is similar to both still 
photography and looping film, it is its own taxonomical-
ly unique genre of media. It shares features with and was 
inspired by the Victorian-era chronophotography of Éti-
enne-Jules Marey. Crawford himself poetically observes, 
“Marey’s chronophotographs flourished in the tiny space 
between the still and the moving image.”24 The shared 
goal of Stop Motion Studies (hereafter, SMS) and Marey’s 
chronophotography experiments is not to simulate mo-
tion (à la film), but to dissect and unpack a discrete mo-
ment. Yet Marey’s approach is more akin to still photog-
raphy. Every frame of the discrete moment is spread out 
before the viewer in a single image, like individual notes 
on a piano keyboard, immediately assimilable and thus 
immediately foreclosed, reduced, and finalized. Although 
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different than ordinary photography, Marey’s approach 
still freezes the moment too much. Like Zeno’s arrow 
paradox, Marey’s chronophotography removes the viewer 
from the moment under analysis and places her outside 
of the moment, peering back into it. She does not fly 
along with the arrow. Marey’s chronophotographic ap-
paratus only invites the viewer into the apparatus after 
the occasion in question has been archived and frozen. 
The viewer does indeed have an immediate experience 
(how could she not?), but it is an immediate experience 
of viewing static documentation of an archived series of 
moments. Contrarily, by aleatorically re-animating static 
documentation of a discrete moment (via random frame 
order and random frame duration), SMS places the view-
er in a re-enactment of the moment, and leaves her stuck 
therein. In this sense, SMS distinguishes itself from Mar-
ey’s chronophotography (and standard still photogra-
phy), functioning as a particularly apophatic apparatus.
In his classic work of photographic theory, Towards a 
Philosophy of Photography, Vilém Flusser notes: 
The camera is not fully automatic. These are the cat-
egories of photographic time and space. They are nei-
ther Newtonian nor Einsteinian, but they divide time 
and space into rather clearly separated areas. These ar-
eas of time and space are distances from the prey that 
is to be snapped.25 
Although an ingenious critique of still photography and 
its slavish relationship to the stalk, capture, pin-down 
function of the apparatus known as camera, Flusser’s ob-
servations don’t fully apply to Stop Motion Studies. This is 
because, via aleatoric programming code, SMS functions 
as a meta-camera-apparatus. Crawford re-animates the 
25 Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, trans. Anthony 
Matthews (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 34.
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frozen spacetime of his source camera images, freeing 
them from their own amber trap. In so doing, he activates 
an entirely different kind of meta-camera apophatic ap-
paratus which functions as a porous and sticky La Brea 
tar pit trap for its viewers. The still photograph sucks out 
spacetime in order to trap a moment; Stop Motion Studies 
creates an aleatoric, apophatic spacetime in order to trap 
us within a moment.
If SMS differs from still photography, it also differs 
from film, video, and even looping micro-animation. 
Paul Virilio observes, “Cinema is the end in which the 
dominant philosophies and arts have come to confuse 
and lose themselves, a sort of primordial mixing of the 
human soul and the languages of the motor-soul.”26 Ar-
guably, as early as Vertov’s Man with A Movie Camera, the 
motion of the projector reel/wheel was predisposed to 
celebrate the motion of the motor wheel. But Crawford’s 
aleatoric animations aren’t constrained to follow the cy-
clic function of either, because they never (quite, exactly) 
loop. Although the stage and setting of SMS are on mov-
ing subway trains, the functional SMS software appara-
tus “jumps the track.” It refuses to proceed sequentially 
on down the line, but it also refuses to loop perpetually 
round and round. Instead, SMS stutters and staggers for-
wards and back. There is actually a function in certain 
programming languages called “drunk” which randomiz-
es a series of numbers between, for example, 0 and 9, in 
such a way that the numbers selected move forward and 
backwards in steps, constrained within a range of some-
thing like 3. So, unlike a “random” function, a “drunk” 
function would never return 0 followed immediately by 
9. It would instead return something like the following 
series: 0, 3, 5, 2, 6, 4, 3, 7, 4, 8, 9. Although Crawford’s Ac-
tionScript code is not technically a drunk function, by 
26 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance (New York: Semiotext(e) 
Books, 1991), 105.
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randomizing the duration of each frame in addition to 
randomizing the order of the frames, it feels drunk. It is 
obviously not a loop. It lurches forward, hesitates, stag-
gers, returns, and lurches again.
SMS contrasts this drunken stagger of its own appa-
ratal kinematic procession with the steady, motor-wheel 
hurtling-forward of the subway train itself. Crawford’s 
media apparatus ingeniously stages and foregrounds the 
stuttering micro-movements of its human subjects in 
front of the speedy, motor-logic blur of the scenery pass-
ing by outside of the train windows. The humans move 
fractionally, while the blurred backgrounds lurch wildly 
from one frame to the next. By staging his moments on a 
moving train, Crawford captures and juxtaposes human 
bodily affective time with motor/projector-wheel speed-
ing time, confusing and confounding them both within 
the drunken, lurching, molasses time created by his apo-
phatic apparatus.
It is not as if SMS is such a new medium that all prior 
photographic theory is totally inapplicable to it. No, SMS 
traffics in images, so any theory of images still comes into 
play, albeit modulated by the aleatoric animation. Simi-
larly, although SMS is not merely looped video, it is still 
creating many of the effects and much of the affect that 
looped video also creates. Stop Motion Studies is not to-
tally other than either still photography or looped video, 
just as looped video itself is not totally other than still 
photography. It would be overly simple to say that SMS is 
doing everything that still photography and looped video 
is doing, and then some. It is not simply an n+1+1+1 math-
ematics of linear accretion. This is because each work of 
art is its own holistic apparatus. In an apparatus, accre-
tion is not merely additive. Instead, new additions to the 
apparatus often modulate the entire holistic function of 
the apparatus: they alter the ways in which it is becom-
ing, and the things it is coming to mean. New differences 
emerge from accreted similarities.
299
generative algorithms and perpetual deferment
Regarding looped video itself, every looped video cre-
ates its own unique event depending on the nature of the 
video and the way in which it loops. For single or multi-
channel video installations looping in the context of an 
art gallery exhibition, the goal of most contemporary 
video installation artists is rarely to mimetically (or even 
abstractly) re-present some kind of source experience 
in and of itself. Instead, a looped video acts as its own 
discrete, catalytic “object” which causes its human “audi-
ence” to perform an undulating, back-and-forth dialogue 
between present perception and past memory, result-
ing in an emergent future. This generic affective func-
tion is characteristic of looped film, looped video, looped 
animated gifs, looped analog flipbook animations, or any 
looped sequence of images. 
My point is that aleatoric animation is not explicitly 
required to create a visceral (sense of) time. Not only vid-
eo art, but all art is properly understood as “time-based.” 
Film and photography (and painting, and sculpture) have 
always already been time-based and time-generating ap-
paratuses. Per Roland Barthes’ concept of intertextuality, 
every discrete “linear” text gets re-mixed and re-run in 
real time every time it is read anew, even by the same hu-
man reader. To experience a variation in the text, no cut-
up techniques or aleatoric constraints are required. Sim-
ply re-read the same text a second time. Likewise, as I sit 
in front of a Rothko painting, I am having a time-based 
experience. I am intra-acting with that Rothko painting 
apparatus, and time is emerging as a result. The relevant 
question is not “is this piece time-based?” (since all art 
is time-based). From a media theory perspective, the rel-
evant question has to do with how much and what kind of 
variability occurs in the art apparatus over time? And 
a related question: how much of the variability occurs 
within the technics of the piece itself, and how much of 
the variability occurs in the affective experience of the 
user, audience, participant, or viewer? In the case of a 
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Rothko painting, there are technical changes in the hue, 
saturation, value, surface, and depth of the painting as I 
move my body around the room in relation to the paint-
ing; these changes also occur as I attend to one part of 
the painting and then another part. But the majority of 
the variability in a Rothko painting occurs in my affective 
experience as a viewer over time. Whereas, in a looped 
digital video, in addition to the variability that my view-
ing body is experiencing, drastic technical changes are 
occurring to the media itself (rgBa value changes, pixel 
by pixel, micro-second by micro-second) as the video 
proceeds from frame to frame. And in Stop Motion Stud-
ies, due to its aleatoric animation, there is a near infinite 
amount of variability in the technical procession of the 
medium itself.
Ironically (but understandably), this infinite amount 
of variability in the medium of aleatoric animation fails 
to create an experience of infinitely variable time in the 
viewer. This is because we as humans are unable to cog-
nitively process the exact, discrete differences in frame 
order and frame duration. These subtle differences elude 
intellectual reduction. But we are able to affectively and 
bodily experience these differences. We don’t read Stop 
Motion Studies as a loop, and we don’t read it as a still 
photograph. Our inability to reduce it to either of these 
historically familiar media only further contributes to 
the lure and trap that SMS sets for us. We get stuck in 
the unique time of its infinitely variable media, trapped 
within an unending moment. Via aleatoric animation, 
Stop Motion Studies “wrest[s] a non-pulsed time from th[e] 
system of chronological pulsation”27 (to apply Deleuze). 
SMS breaks our habit of viewing photography as static 
27 Gilles Deleuze and Richard Pinhas, “Vincennes Seminar Session, 
May 3, 1997: On Music,” trans. Timothy S. Murphy, Discourse: Journal 
for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture 20, no. 3 (Fall 1998): art. 23, 
8.
301
generative algorithms and perpetual deferment
documentation and our habit of viewing film as narrative 
representation. It creates a different time, a trap time, an 
apophatic time of the perpetual moment.
Aleatory vs. Iteration
Software can be thought of as a set of instructions. 
Whether these instructions are ultimately executed by a 
digital computer, a wooden loom, or an ensemble theater 
cast is not what determines them as software. All pro-
gramming is governed by three basic control structures: 
sequence (execution in a linear order), selection (choos-
ing between two things), and iteration (looping). The 
combination of these three structures is what deter-
mines the operation of any piece of software. Introduc-
ing a random variable into the iteration structure results 
in a variation or wobble in the loop. Each time the loop it-
erates, a new random value is generated which alters the 
run of that particular loop. Combining a random number 
generator with an iteration control structure results in 
an aleatorically induced wobble time that is not quite an 
ordinary loop. The effects of a random number generator 
are so unique, it almost acts like its own fourth program-
ming control structure. Technically, a random number 
generator is really just a kind of arrayed selection control 
structure (randomly select one number from a given set 
of numbers), but because a random number generator is 
a uniquely value-indifferent form of selection, a wildcard 
form of selection, it can seem like its own category of 
programming control structure. 
A brief and nerdy sidebar regarding randomness: 
within programming circles, there is great philosophical 
debate over whether or not a truly random selection is 
actually possible. Most random number generators are 
actually pseudo-random, deriving the source (“seed”) of 
their randomness by sampling a computer’s internal clock 
state, and then doing math on that source number. Be-
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cause a computer’s internal clock is not actually random, 
the number that results is more properly understood as 
pseudo-random. More truly random number generators 
take their source seeds from extra-computational, real-
time climate readings or other “naturally” occurring val-
ues. The philosophical debate comes down to whether or 
not you think the universe itself is random. Pragmatical-
ly, in our case, the distinction between randomness and 
pseudo-randomness is splitting hairs, because whether 
truly random or pseudo-random (SMS happens to be 
pseudo-random), the affective result of SMS on the hu-
man viewer would be more or less the same.
By embedding a random number generator within 
an infinite loop, a new, unique, non-looping, non-stat-
ic time is created and made to be felt. This new time is 
not merely a simulated, once-removed, mimetic trick of 
the media. The time created, enacted, and felt is not a 
symbolic, re-presentational, re-mediated version of alea-
toric time. It is actual aleatoric time (or more properly, 
it is actualized aleatoric becoming, human-apperceived 
as aleatoric time). Via the random (or pseudo-random) 
seed sampling, the agency and variability of the real uni-
verse is purposefully invited to ingress into the ongoing 
occasions involved in the software-driven art apparatus. 
Each singular, unique, real-time, random number deci-
sion event is repeatedly and indefinitely made, over and 
over: an infinite number of one-of-a-kind historical deci-
sions. By combining a random number generator with an 
iteration control structure, the resolution of the system 
is indefinitely deferred.
Of course, according to Whitehead, a rock sitting in a 
field is doing more or less the same thing as the SMS ap-
paratus. The static rock is actually a society of moment-
by-moment actual occasions, each occasion prehending 
(or mostly negatively prehending) the “randomness” 
of the rest of the universe, and concrescing with it into 
its own self-becoming. The difference between the rock 
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and SMS is that, moment by moment, the rock occasions 
mostly decide to continue to become an enduring object 
known as rock. Until the rock shatters apart, or melts, or 
lands on our foot, we are mostly human-indifferent to 
its subtle (quasi-static) perpetual becomings. Whereas 
Crawford has embedded into the heart of his SMS ap-
paratus a lively random number generator which fore-
grounds to humans the ongoing becomings of his art ap-
paratus. The random number generator injects marked, 
actual differences into the system’s perpetual becomings 
in order to make these moment-by-moment becomings 
felt. Its becomings become human-apparent to our ha-
bituated, media-consuming bodies. We are made to feel 
these differences in the micro-second becomings of the 
SMS apparatus. We find (the successive occasions of) 
ourselves prehending its aleatoric time. Furthermore, 
these functional, processual, software differences are not 
“content”-indifferent, because the mediated “content” of 
Stop Motion Studies is itself a prior, actual moment of be-
coming: a moment of humans riding trains. Crawford’s 
random number generator injects a lively present-tense 
variable into a mediated prior moment (which was, it-
self, at that prior time, actually lively and present-tense), 
thus perpetually re-animating and re-vivifying that prior 
micro-moment. SMS brackets and freshly enacts its prior 
moments in a kind of living amber, and our human view-
ing bodies get stuck-in with them.
Returning to quantum mechanics, the wave function 
predicts a probability range of observable values, but nev-
er a single exact value for any given measurement event. 
The exact observable value is only decided, enacted, and 
marked once the apparatal measurement is historically 
made. Similarly (although not identically), the random 
number generator injects a kind of quasi-quantum-be-
having, superpositional randomness into SMS’s photo-
graphic media. I don’t mean to claim that SMS is a proper 
quantum-behavior-measuring apparatus; but rather that 
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it is a human–cinematic apparatus which is transformed, 
via random number generation, into something func-
tionally and behaviorally non-deterministic, similar to a 
quantum-behaving superpositional state.
Of course, the individual photographic frames of SMS 
do not remain in a literal quantum superpositional state. 
Every sequential frame and its duration are finally and 
discretely decided once and for all, each time the loop 
function is re-run. SMS is thus not so much a series of 
perpetually deferred decisions as an infinitely ongoing 
series of final decisions randomly made each time. Still, 
since humans are invited to intra-act with the SMS appa-
ratus (as opposed to being quarantined from the Delayed 
Choice Quantum Eraser apparatus), we bodily experience 
these perpetually made random decisions as a kind of su-
perpositional, perpetually deferred time state. SMS is ap-
ophatic in that it refuses to settle on any single, resolved 
time (whether static or looped). SMS is not as cosmically 
radical as the Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser appara-
tus (although to the universe itself, the Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser apparatus is quite normal). Instead, SMS 
is aesthetically, bodily, and affectively radical to our cine-
matically conditioned, photographically conditioned hu-
man bodies. Whereas the results of the Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser apparatus blow our Newtonian-condi-
tioned human minds, Stop Motion Studies makes us bodily 
feel the rich superpositional fecundity of the universe’s 
moment-by-moment micro-becomings.
Deferment
Stop Motion Studies is apophatic because it arrests time 
while not exactly freezing it. It defers any single, final be-
coming; much more so than a discrete photograph, which 
always winds up getting thrust into “having become” a 
static image. SMS makes us feel what Whitehead calls 
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“the penumbral welter of alternatives.”28 We are opened 
out onto and remain stuck in this penumbral welter of 
alternatives. Whitehead elaborates:
This graded envisagement is how the actual includes 
what (in one sense) is “not-being” as a positive fac-
tor in its own achievement. It is the source of error, 
of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is 
confronted with alternatives.29 
As conscious humans, we normally rush past this “graded 
envisagement,” this actualizing of the virtual, these ac-
tual occasions of micro-becoming that perpetually make 
the world new. SMS sidesteps our recognizing minds and 
sticks our experiencing bodies into these occasions of 
moment-by-moment becoming by perpetually deferring 
any finalized sequence of its loop. In so doing, Crawford’s 
apparatus invites us to (more consciously) feel these mi-
cro-instant becomings.
SMS doesn’t halt becoming (that would be impossi-
ble), but it does remain in a perpetual state of becoming. 
All apparatuses lure their involved actual occasions into 
making time; SMS lures the actual occasions of its human 
viewers into its own time-making process, into its per-
petual time of time-making. Deferral of closure is a major 
tactic of the apophatic writers, and deferment necessar-
ily involves time. In the words of historian Michael Sells, 
the achievement of unsaying is “unstable and fleeting.”30 
Apophatic language is always performative and ongoing 
in order to avoid reaching a definitive conclusion that 
might calcify into a reducible ontological statement. SMS 
simply automates this deferral process via software and 
28 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 187.
29 Ibid., 189.
30 Michael A. Sells, The Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1994), 217.
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applies it to photographic media rather than to natural 
human language. SMS is thus an apophatic apparatus 
that, by perpetually making an infinite number of dif-
ferent ephemeral marks, refuses (and thus defers) the in-
scription of any final, concretized, single mark.
From the perspective of post-structuralism (and al-
ways with a bit of Whitehead sprinkled throughout), 
SMS is an apparatus which generates a perpetually un-
stable trace. It inscribes and re-inscribes event-trace after 
event-trace, without ever leaving any final, underlying, or 
source event-mark. It assembles an ensemble of perpetu-
ally becoming and re-shuffling, ghost-image occasions 
that refuse to ever settle down and become a single, sta-
ble, well-decided society of entities. In this sense, SMS is 
a purposefully unstable media apparatus. It is indifferent 
toward the finality of its own mark. It is an auto-rewrit-
ing etch-a-sketch. To decide not to is (subtly, but) radi-
cally different than to not decide. SMS enacts Bartleby’s 
“I would prefer not to,” creating a kind of self-cancelling 
combination of affirmations and denials that results in a 
disturbingly aporetic deferral, much more apophatic than 
the mere direct refusal of, “No I will not.” SMS perpetually 
re-inscribes an unstable un-mark. It purposefully fails to 
resolutely leave a final mark. All trace; no mark. Such is 
the (admittedly apophatic) language post-structuralist 
literary theorists might use to unpack Stop Motion Studies.
Humans Intra-act with SMS
The mediated human bodies (on trains) in Carson’s 
source photographs act as a lure for the human viewers of 
SMS. Whether via mirror neurons, performance empathy, 
bodily affect, emotional connection, or simple formal 
recognition, humans more strongly connect with medi-
ated images of other humans than they do with mediated 
images of rocks. Or at least they connect and entangle 
differently. Once this human-to-human entanglement is 
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formed, the variable time that SMS creates is that much 
more likely to tweak and trap our human viewing bodies. 
We, as human viewers, are more likely to bodily intra-act 
with the apophatic apparatus of SMS via our own bodily 
identification with the train-riding human bodies than 
we would if the source images were of rocks in a field. We 
affectively feel the jittery movements of Carson’s medi-
ated bodies as both recognizable and uncanny. Our bod-
ies are sucked into the strange, stuttering time of these 
aleatorically animated, human-populated micro-scenes. 
In this sense, SMS is similar to almost all other art ap-
paratuses: art apparatuses are (almost always) designed 
to intra-actively involve humans in their apparatal con-
figurations. Art apparatuses cut out a part of the universe 
which purposefully includes humans. As mentioned pre-
viously, this is in stark contrast to quantum-behavior-
measuring scientific apparatuses, which cut out a part of 
the universe that purposefully excludes humans.
Crawford himself is fully aware of the importance of 
experientially sucking his human viewers into his appa-
ratus, rather than positioning them as once-removed, in-
tellectually reflecting agents outside of his apparatus. In 
an essay entitled, “The Implication of Movement: From 
Bergson to Bohm,” Crawford cites Henri Bergson on the 
difference between distanced reflection and immersive 
identification. The Bergson selections that Crawford 
cites are worth repeating in full:
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming 
of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to 
recompose their becoming artificially. We take snap-
shots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these 
are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string 
them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, 
situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in 
order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in 
this becoming itself […].
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In order to advance with the moving reality, you 
must replace yourself within it. Install yourself within 
change, and you will grasp at once both change itself 
and the successive states in which it might be immo-
bilized.31
It is difficult enough to theorize this kind of immersive 
identification, and even more difficult to construct an ap-
paratus which causes it to be felt. SMS is such an appara-
tus. Again, as stated previously, (the actual occasions that 
make up) humans participate in all sorts of “naturally oc-
curring” apparatal configurations all day long, moment 
by moment. It’s just that we, as conscious humans, rarely 
recognize what is happening in these micro-second ac-
tual occasions. Instead, it most often seems to us that we 
are discrete entities passing other discrete entities within 
a kind of Cartesian container space along a kind of lin-
ear timeline. SMS disrupts our habitual understanding of 
time by sucking us into an apparatus which allows us to 
(in Bergson’s words) “advance with the moving reality” 
by “replac[ing] [ourselves] within it.” Not only does SMS 
place us within the reality of movement, it leaves us stuck 
there indefinitely, until we click on another aleatorically 
animated scene, which traps us yet again. SMS places us 
within the becomings of micro-second actual occasions.
One of the ingenious ways SMS lures us into itself is 
by showing us images of other humans. As human view-
ers, we allow ourselves to intra-act with the apparatus, 
in part, because we see and feel the pathos, the signifi-
cance, and the import of the micro-moments being (re-)
enacted: humans hurtling forward on trains, living their 
urban working lives, spending and wasting passing mo-
31 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London: 
Electric Book Co., 2001), 295–297, quoted in David Crawford, “The 
Implication of Movement: From Bergson to Bohm,” in New Realities: 
Being Syncretic, eds. Roy Ascott, Gerald Bast, et al. (Vienna: Springer, 
2009), 78.
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ments, moments lost in transit, going nowhere fast. Stop 
Motion Studies enacts the often brutal melancholy and ba-
nality of individual human lives, moment by moment by 
moment. These in-transit (transitory, transitional) lives 
are not epically memorialized in a captured photographic 
moment. Photography gives each captured moment a 
kind of grace, dignity, and elevation. Or rather, photogra-
phy elevates us as viewers from the moment, allowing us 
to intellectually ponder the moment at a distance, in our 
own good time, at our leisure. Contrarily, SMS traps us 
within the banal frozen micro-moment, forcing us to on-
goingly live and re-live it in our own present-tense, per-
petually emerging time. We become inordinately aware 
of the gravitas of these micro-moments, in stark contrast 
to the humans on the train, who are largely oblivious to 
the very micro-moments in which they themselves are 
participating. If only they could see themselves through 
the lens of this new medium, surely their next commute 
would be more purposefully relished? Surely after SMS, 
we ourselves will now be more fully present to our own 
micro-moments. But probably not, because giving one-
self over to the process of concrescence is not really an 
intellectual exercise. Actual occasions happen too fast 
for that. And yet, bodies may themselves know and be 
trained. Perhaps SMS is training our bodies to better ne-
gotiate their own moment-by-moment becomings.
At any (and every) rate, it is a mistake to think that 
process philosophy and affect theory reside on the cold 
and analytic side of human-beingness; and that ethics, 
compassion, and empathy reside on the culturally rele-
vant and politically pragmatic side of human-beingness. 
Our empathy arises from and folds back into the technics 
of our affective concrescences. There is not one world of 
process and physics and another world of emotions and 
ethics. There is only one immanent world, and everything 
affects everything else (however epically or fractionally).
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Time Created (Not Filled)
Both the Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser apparatus and 
the Stop Motion Studies art apparatus demonstrate that 
time is created rather than filled. In both cases, only by 
deferring resolution within the apparatus does this fact 
become apparent. In its attempt to lock down the weird-
ness of the Double Slit apparatus, the Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser introduces the further weirdness of en-
tangled particles and “spooky action at a distance.” In the 
process, time (and space) are revealed as created rather 
than filled. The time created within the Delayed Choice 
Quantum Eraser apparatus is not subject to clocks exter-
nal to the apparatus. Similarly, in its attempt to problem-
atize and disrupt the media regimes of photography and 
film, SMS invents an ongoingly liminal, molasses time 
that traps its audience via aleatoric animation and hu-
man empathy. Again, time is revealed as created rather 
than filled. In a sense, SMS invites its human viewers to 
remain in the (non-)time of the actual occasion, the (pro-
to-)time of the virtual becoming actual. Technically, the 
time SMS makes is more like an actualized faux-virtual 
time. It is an emulation of the virtual instantiated within 
the actual. In computer science terms, SMS is a software-
enacted emulation of the virtual, running on the Operat-
ing System of the actual.
It is noteworthy that the idea of the virtual came to 
both Proust and Bergson via the topic of human memory: 
the one thing that explicitly falls outside of the arrow of 
linear time and the grid of Cartesian space. According to 
Bergson, human memory is not stored anywhere in the 
human brain. It is created anew each time in real-time. 
Memory is not media material. It is not matter; it is event 
(not noun, but verb).
Proust elaborates on the extra-temporal (and affec-
tive) nature of memory:
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The noise of the spoon upon the plate, the unevenness 
of the paving-stones, the taste of the madeleine, im-
posed the past upon the present and made me hesitate 
as to which time I was existing in. Of a truth, the be-
ing within me which sensed this impression […] found 
itself in the only setting in which it could exist and 
enjoy the essence of things, that is, outside Time […]. 
The being that I then had been was an extra-temporal 
being […]. Only that being had the power of enabling 
me to recapture former days, Time Lost, in the face of 
which all the efforts of my memory and of my intel-
ligence came to nought.32
Short of such an involuntary, immersive memory experi-
ence, what other ways might the procession of time be 
braked? SMS offers at least on means of (temporarily) 
braking time: software-induced aleatoric animation. In-
deed, a bit later in Time Regained, Proust himself observes, 
“A work of art is the only means of regaining lost time.”33 
Why? Because art apparatuses are able to manufacture 
time anew in ways that invite humans to affectively, bod-
ily experience these new temporal becomings. Time is of 
course always created anew, actual occasion by actual oc-
casion. But art apparatuses (whether epic French novels 
or aleatoric new media animations), if constructed ingen-
iously enough, invite their human audiences to affective-
ly experience the creation of new time. SMS achieves this 
effect by miring us in the perpetual creation of new time.
Apparatal intra-actions create space and time, so it is 
backwards to think of art apparatuses as objects (space 
occupiers) or even as “performances” or “time-based 
media” (time occupiers). Instead, art apparatuses make 
32 Marcel Proust, Time Regained, trans. Stephen Hudson (1931; Paris: 
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space and time. The difference between Stop Motion Stud-
ies and your average art apparatus is that, rather than 
merely making time, SMS brakes time, luring us into its 
own amber trap, embedding us within its own micro-sec-
ond mise-en-scènes which it perpetually re-enacts anew, 
moment by moment by moment.
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Br(e)aking Archives and 
Sabotaging Institutions: 
Joshua Citarella’s Compression 
Artifacts and William Pope.L’s 
Black Factory
 
Just as apophatic writing sabotages the system of kata-
phatic language, forcing it to perform its own limitations 
until it collapses; certain apophatic art apparatuses sabo-
tage systems of art object commodification, systems of 
art historical canonization, and even entrenched histori-
cal systems of constructing self-identity and difference. 
This chapter analyzes two such apophatic art appara-
tuses. The first apparatus is Joshua Citarella’s Compression 
Artifacts, an ephemeral gallery show that simultaneously 
occurred in a temporary gallery in the woods and at dif-
ferent locations online, featuring impossible art objects 
that simultaneously exist somewhere between physical 
gallery space and digital archive space. The second appa-
ratus is William Pope.L’s Black Factory, a mobile “factory” 
(performance/installation) for pulverizing inherited no-
tions of racial blackness, racial whiteness, and other bi-
nary constructs.
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Both Compression Artifacts and the Black Factory cut out 
large swaths of the world (across time, space, human-art-
histories, human-recognizable-media) and intra-act with 
them, while simultaneously refusing to allow themselves 
to be cleanly subsumed into larger apparatuses of “art 
world” assimilation. Both of these projects refuse to be 
out-meta-ed. They will not allow art markets to commod-
ify them. By rigorously, ingeniously, and playfully refus-
ing to let themselves be easily canonized by art-historical 
forces, both apparatuses reveal the mechanisms, presup-
positions, and unspoken agendas of art institutions, art 
archives, and art markets. In all the places where sparks 
fly and things don’t quite slot in, the conforming con-
tours of our cultural institutions are revealed.
As mentioned previously, one crucial difference be-
tween art apparatuses and quantum-behavior-measuring 
apparatuses is that the boundaries of art apparatuses can 
always be made to extend well beyond their immediate 
physical edges; whereas scientific apparatuses meant to 
intra-act with quantum-behaving materials can’t tel-
escope outward without experiencing decoherence, the 
very bane of quantum-behavior measurement and quan-
tum computing. In the case of both Compression Artifacts 
and the Black Factory, the edge of each physical appara-
tuses (in one case, three temporary walls and a floor; in 
the other case, a large truck) is really just a ruse, a decoy, a 
provocation meant to initiate a larger chain of outwardly 
telescoping boundaries. This outward telescoping is large 
part of the apparatal phenomenon that these apparatus-
es purpose to engender. 
With both apparatuses, it is as if something really ba-
nal or silly has to happen within the immediate, local, 
lure component of the apparatus in order to trigger the 
outward-telescoping, macrocosmic, large-swath-cutting 
component of the apparatus. In the case of Compression 
Artifacts, a minimal sculpture and a few digital prints are 
placed in a well-lit gallery. What could be so media-mod-
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ulating about this move? In the case of the Black Factory, 
a kind of medicine show truck rolls into town with three 
vaudeville-like performers acting absurd. What could be 
so identity-shattering about this move? The apparatal 
bait is set with banality and humor; and the larger net 
unfolds outward from there.
Neither Compression Artifacts nor the Black Factory are 
overtly anti-gallery or anti-museum. These aren’t real-
ly works of “institutional critique” in the art historical 
sense. But both projects are what one might call gallery-
aware and museum-aware. Both apparatuses presume the 
existence and function of art institutions in the world, 
and both purposefully cut off the part of the world that 
includes these art institutions in order to involve gal-
leries, museums, and art markets in their own apparatal 
intra-actions. In this sense, we are dealing less with mere 
institutional “critique” and more with holistic institu-
tional modulation.
Two precedences from art history come to mind, one 
per project. Marcel Broodthaers’s Musée d’Art Moderne, Dé-
partement des Aigles (Museum of Modern Art, Department of 
Eagles) is particularly relevant to Pope.L’s Black Factory. 
Both are mobile museums (or at least part of the Black 
Factory is a museum). Both are patently and absurdly the-
matized: Broodthaers’s museum is comprised of eagle-re-
lated images and objects (however obliquely interpreted), 
while Pope.L’s museum is comprised of black-related im-
ages and objects (however obliquely interpreted). Both 
are paradoxically acerbic and playful in tone. Both pedan-
tically add value to their objects by transforming them 
into art commodities: Broodthaers by stamping bars of 
gold with eagle images and selling them at twice their 
value; Pope.L by signing canned goods, selling them at 
increased prices, and donating the profits to local soup 
kitchens so they can buy canned goods. Finally, both pro-
jects have proved difficult for art institutions to archive, 
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the projects themselves being their own archiving insti-
tutions.
Yves Klein’s Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle 
(Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sensibility) is particularly rel-
evant to Citarella’s Compression Artifacts. Klein’s project 
consisted of selling a certificate for an invisible work of 
art. The buyer paid Klein a specified amount of gold leaf 
in exchange for the certificate. If the buyer wanted to 
keep the certificate, she would own the work of art but 
never be able to access it. In order to access the work of 
art, the buyer had to meet with Klein on the banks of the 
river Seine and burn their certificate of ownership while 
Fig. 1: Some of the ashes of the burned gallery from Joshua Citarella’s 
Compression Artifacts. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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Klein threw half of the gold leaf payment into the river. 
That event (the burning of the certificate and the throw-
ing away of the gold) was the actual work of art, which 
the purchaser had been able to experience, but was no 
longer able to own. Somewhat similarly, at the end of Ci-
tarella’s Compression Artifacts exhibition, the gallery in the 
woods was burned. Years later (via the internet) Citarella 
sold chances (at $5 per chance) to be mailed some of the 
ashes of the burnt gallery. Winners were then mailed the 
ashes (see Fig. 1). They were asked to scatter the ashes, 
document this scattering, and post digital images of the 
scattering event to Instagram. Both Compression Artifacts 
and Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sensibility translate (seem-
ingly) solid objects into air, and reify (seemingly) abstract 
market value into gold (or at least into a $5 PayPal credit).
I mention both of these art historical precedences to 
emphasize the fact that apophatic art apparatuses are 
not inherently “new media,” or even new. Yes, Compression 
Artifacts and the Black Factory both do use the internet to 
achieve part of their apophatic effect, but the apophatic 
power of these apparatuses is not some de facto byprod-
uct of merely using electronic networks. Instead, like 
Broodthaers and Klein before them, Pope.L and Citarella 
have rigorously constructed apophatic apparatuses, clev-
erly situated within their own contemporary worlds. All 
four artists simply use whatever relevant materials and 
media are at hand.
Both Compression Artifacts and the Black Factory ul-
timately wind up exhausting their material apparatal 
structures. Citarella burns his gallery and Pope.L submits 
his truck to a series of punishing performances (and one 
installation) before finally donating it to a local homeless 
shelter. Yet this exhaustion of the physical object alone is 
not what makes these projects apophatic, any more than 
merely abandoning the art object for ephemeral Fluxus 
performance was ever able to side-step the commodify-
ing (re-)capture of the art market. Apophatic apparatuses 
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don’t annihilate matter as much as undermine faith in 
fundamental presence and ontological stability. Just as 
deconstruction first adopts the trajectory of an argu-
ment in order to then undermine that argument from 
within according to the argument’s own presuppositions 
and rules of engagement, so Compression Artifacts and the 
Black Factory begin with the presumed aura/presence of 
“the things themselves” (sculptural objects, donated ob-
jects) in order to “absence” these objects from within. Ci-
tarella uses Photoshop; Pope.L uses a blowtorch.
Both of these apparatuses are fairly complicated, so a 
good part of this chapter will simply be me explaining 
the logistical workings of the apparatuses themselves. 
Once we come to specifically understand the ways in 
which these apparatuses function, theoretical analysis 
of their accomplishments and implications should be a 
straightforward step away.
Compression Artifacts
Compression Artifacts was a group show curated by Joshua 
Citarella featuring work by Wyatt Niehaus, Kate Steciw, 
Brad Troemel, Artie Vierkant, and Citarella himself. All 
of these artists (particularly Vierkant and Citarella) make 
work that purposefully blurs the line between physical 
objects in a gallery and digital documentation of those 
objects online. The gallery was built in the woods in an 
undisclosed location. The physical construction of the 
gallery was streamed live on the internet. Once the gal-
lery was constructed, the artworks were installed, and 
then documented photographically. The works were then 
de-installed, the gallery was disassembled, and every-
thing (gallery and work) was burnt.
Documentation of the show was then posted to Cita-
rella’s web site in the form of digital photographs, a short 
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low-resolution video, and an animated gif.1 Initially, the 
photographic documentation appears straightforward 
enough, but upon closer inspection, things begin to seem 
amiss. The gallery keeps changing dimensions, and the 
artworks themselves keep changing appearance and loca-
tion. Artie Vierkant is known for printing large images of 
Photoshop “brush strokes,” hanging these printed images 
in a gallery, taking digital photographs of these physi-
cal prints, adding more Photoshop brushstrokes to these 
digital photographs (of hanging physical prints of photo-
shop brush strokes), and posting these digital > physical 
> digital images online. It seems that the same type of 
approach is happening to the documentation of Compres-
sion Artifacts, but on a much more holistic, messy, entan-
gled, nuanced, and difficult-to-parse scale. There is a pile 
of sand that seems obviously photoshopped. The marble 
of the floor must also be photoshopped. The sculpture in 
1 Joshua Citarella, Compression Artifacts, http://joshuacitarella.com/
artifacts.html.
Fig. 2: An instantiation of Joshua Citarella’s Compression Artifacts. Draw-
ing by Jordan Cloninger.
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the middle (Citarella’s own piece) keeps changing shape 
and material, and at one point it is on fire, so those effects 
must be photoshopped. The gallery itself keeps chang-
ing dimensions, gaining a split level, gaining differently 
angled walls, increasing in length; so all of that must be 
photoshopped (see Fig. 2).
But what to make of the woods? The shots of the gal-
lery interior show what we initially took to be a legitimate 
gallery somewhere in Manhattan, Paris, Berlin, London, 
or wherever. But the shots of the gallery in situ reveal 
it as a kind of stage set in the middle of some suburban 
looking woods. Has the gallery itself been photoshopped 
into the woods? It doesn’t appear that way. So, if we are 
now convinced that the gallery really was constructed in 
the woods when we had initially taken it to obviously be 
some gallery on West 26th Street in Chelsea, then what 
else are we to believe and doubt?
Citarella has created an apparatus for confounding 
several presumed dichotomies: offline vs. online; analog 
vs. digital; material vs. immaterial; outside-the-machine 
vs. inside-the-machine; documentation as after-the-fact 
supplementary media vs. documentation as integral 
and ongoing conceptual component of the artwork it-
self; group exhibition as art-market-sanctioned event vs. 
group exhibition as (post-)internet-art performance pro-
ject. Compression Artifacts (hereafter CA) would not have 
been able to achieve such confoundings by simply tak-
ing a digital image of the woods and photoshopping a 
Bigfoot into it. We are not amazed anymore by believable 
images of fantastic scenes. We see them all day long in 
Hollywood science fiction movies. We have grown suspi-
cious of (and even indifferent to) their claims of veracity. 
CA does something much more clever than merely trick 
us into believing that something “fake” is “real” – it pur-
posefully straddles the line between the believable and 
the dubious. We waver back and forth in our reading of 
the narrative of this project. And while we vacillate and 
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hesitate, an intrinsic yet occult relationship begins to 
emerge between the value of contemporary gallery art, 
the value of Manhattan real estate, and the value of high-
resolution photographic documentation.
On May 10, 2018 (five years after the project), Citarella 
announced on his Instagram account: 
Let’s try something fun. Help me give Compression Ar-
tifacts the burial it deserves. I’m going to lottery off 
10 containers of ash and we will scatter the remains 
around the world. I built the gallery in 2013 at an un-
disclosed location. After the show I demolished and 
cremated the remains and have been saving them 
ever since. The documentation images were so trans-
formed in Photoshop that no one ever really knew 
what was there… people still ask if it was real to begin 
with. Signing up for $5 puts you in the lottery. Send 
me a video of you scattering the ash I’ll throw in an 
extra ticket for next month’s piece.2
This final act of networked distribution increases the 
dematerialization of the physical objects while simulta-
neously monetarily reifying the purely abstract and con-
ceptual value that the project initially possessed. The an-
nouncement of the contest is distributed via Instagram. 
Lottery tickets are purchased via the micro-funding in-
ternet platform Drip. The ashes are distributed via the 
(semi-)analog network of the postal service. Presumably, 
some ashes will continue their distribution via river net-
works and wind currents. Finally, the digital traces of these 
physical distribution events will find their way back to 
the artist via email attachments and Instagram hashtags. 
All that is solid melts into air, flames, ash, and photoshop 
filters; only to return in the form of PayPal credit and (yet 
2 @joshuacitarella, Instagram post, May 10, 2018, https://www.insta-
gram.com/p/Bim-4a_njJV/?taken-by=joshuacitarella.
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more) digital image documentation. This final act of (re-)
distribution all the more deeply confounds and entangles 
all of the dichotomies mentioned above.
Confounding the Original/Mediated Dichotomy
Compression Artifacts calls into question both the primacy 
of the original object and the derivative nature of its me-
diated documentation by confusing the line between the 
two. For example, did the morphing sculpture begin its 
life as a steel object, a wooden object, or a 3D software 
image that was only later turned into a physical object? If 
it began as a physical object, which was the original ob-
ject, the steel instantiation or the wooden instantiation? 
Or was the sculpture ever even a physical object? Was it 
ever physically present in the gallery, or has it only ever 
existed as a digital object? Was the photographic docu-
mentation not really documentation at all, but instead 
the “original” art object? For that matter, was the gallery 
itself ever physically present? Perhaps CA is not an art ex-
hibition at all, but simply a digital photography project.
Deconstruction has already taught us that just be-
cause a mark came first, that doesn’t mean it is inherently 
more relevant than its subsequent traces. So, let us set 
aside the concern about which instantiation of CA came 
first and assume for the sake of argument that the physi-
cal gallery is the “original” version. Perhaps the ultimate 
and final instantiation of the project is the most impor-
tant, the final word, so to speak. But that won’t do either, 
because the final instantiation of the project is vials of 
indiscriminate ashes that might or might not be from 
the physical exhibition, distributed to winning entrants 
throughout the world who only properly participate in 
the project (à la Klein’s Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sen-
sibility) by scattering the ashes.
Perhaps we are asking the wrong questions by concern-
ing ourselves with primary and ultimate instantiations. 
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Perhaps we should instead be trying to discern which 
of the instantiations (physical exhibition, online “docu-
mentation,” networked distribution of ashes) is most 
fundamental, primary, and important to the project. 
But that won’t do either, because they are all important 
to the overall functioning of the art apparatus. Like any 
proper apparatus (art, science, or otherwise), separating 
out the individual components and analyzing them sepa-
rately interferes with the holistic functioning (and the 
“measurement results”) of the entire apparatus. If I were 
to make a case for which of the instantiations is most im-
portant, my money would be on the internet-contingent 
instantiation (the online documentation). But that’s not 
exactly right either, because without the physical instal-
lation, there would have been no livestream broadcast, 
no source images to tweak, and no ashes to distribute. 
Which brings us to the inescapable conclusion that the 
entire apparatus, including the physical gallery in the 
woods, is intrinsically internet-contingent. Likewise (and 
equally inescapable), the entire apparatus, including the 
online documentation and the distribution of ashes, is 
intrinsically contingent on the physical site-specificity of 
the gallery in the woods. Thus, nothing is made of our 
attempt to dissect and parse out the primary locus of the 
“art” within the apparatus. The art is what the entire ap-
paratus winds up becoming; and in this particularly apo-
phatic case, the CA apparatus winds up becoming a de-
vice to confound the dichotomies between originary vs. 
mediated, source vs. copy, presence vs. absence, logos vs. 
trace.
CA pits two equally wrong but well-entrenched my-
thologies against each other, and winds annihilating 
(or at least deeply problematizing) both. The first wrong 
mythology posits the modernist white cube gallery as 
a transcendental space of pure spiritual encounter be-
tween audience minds and image aesthetics. The sec-
ond wrong mythology posits the “inside” of a computer 
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(and its accompanying networks) as a non-physical, dis-
embodied, transcendental space of pure data. Of course, 
neither of these mythologies is the least bit true. The art 
gallery is entangled and shot-through with economics, 
real estate markets, class and race presuppositions, grav-
ity, air condition, track lighting, unpaid interns, art han-
dlers, collector contracts, and bottles of wine. Likewise, 
the inside of a computer and its accompanying networks 
are entangled and shot-through with silicon, electricity, 
proprietary code, microchip architecture patent lawyers, 
underwater fiber optic cables, contested transfer proto-
cols, New Zealand mineral mines, Indonesian manufac-
turing plants, and non-European dump sites. CA doesn’t 
simply and naively presume to undermine passé physi-
cal gallery spaces with the new and virtual power of the 
internet. Instead, CA undermines, foregrounds, reconfig-
ures, dallies-with, conflates, and further entangles both 
gallery and computer mythologies. Physical materials, 
concepts, aesthetics, networks, audiences, and markets 
are stretched, shrunk, intermingled, and modulated; not 
unlike Citarella’s warped gallery documentation images.
What, ultimately, are the “Compression Artifacts” of 
Compression Artifacts? Technically, they are the signature 
blurs and bandings that incidentally result from digital 
image file compression formats (gif, Jpg, png, etc.). Ar-
cheologically, they are the source artifacts of the actual 
gallery (the displayed digital prints and the sculpture, the 
wood used to build the gallery, and the burned ash rem-
nants from the fire). Cognitively, they are the bits, pieces, 
and traces that remain in affective limbo after our failed, 
uncanny attempts to parse aspects of this project into 
clean categories of either “original” or “mediated.”
Realism Matters
The confounding, apophatic, braking effect that CA 
achieves is predicated on the realism of its media. This 
325
br(e)aking archives and sabotaging institutions
is because humans are also part of the CA apparatus, and 
in order for our human dichotomies to be confounded, 
we need to believe certain things about the media with 
which we are presented. By “realism,” I don’t mean the 
hyper-realism of Hollywood special effects, or even solely 
the high-resolution of Citarella’s digital images. By “real-
ism,” I simply mean that a given media element has the 
texture that our apperceiving bodies expect to receive, 
according to our normal, regular consumption of that 
medium. In the case of CA, these expected media textures 
persuade us that the objects/events mediated by the me-
dia were physical, and that they were actually installed 
somewhere in a physical location at an actual historical 
time. An image can’t be unheimlich or unhomelike with-
out there first being something homelike and familiar 
about it. The realism (expected texture) of the media is 
the lure, the bait on the hook. The not-quite-right, un-
canny tweak of the media is the hook itself that brakes 
any business-as-usual, interpretive becomings.
Again, this kind of media realism is not inherently 
triggered by high-resolution mimeticism. Instead, it is 
achieved by an expected grain of the media that synchs-
up-with and checks-out-with the networks (technical 
and economic) through which we are meant to believe 
the media has traveled. So, for instance, the low resolu-
tion of the short video feed at the CA web page is read by 
us as realistic, because we are meant to believe that it is 
a video screen capture of a live internet video stream. If 
the video were high resolution, we would read it as unre-
alistic. (The “truth” is, the entire livestream was not ar-
chived. Although the construction took several days, the 
live stream was only streaming during part of one day.3) 
Similarly, the high-resolution digital images of the gal-
lery space also initially check out as realistic, because any 
3 Joshua Citarella, interview with the author at Citarella’s New York 
apartment/studio, April 21, 2017.
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gallerist with a gallery that white and that cubed would 
have paid the requisite money to hire a professional art 
photographer to light and shoot her group show. One 
reason the texture and resolution of Citarella’s digital 
images are so pitch-perfect is because he has a day job 
as a professional photographer documenting gallery art 
exhibitions.
In the case of CA, the actual choice of the sculpture 
and the prints included in the show is made in order to 
set up and prime the subsequent slippages in the texture 
and resolution of their digital documentation. The work 
in the gallery is created with the express purpose of sabo-
taging the seamlessness of its subsequent digital (re)dis-
tribution. This is exactly the opposite of an “old media” 
sculpture or photography show, where the sculptures and 
photographs are (ostensibly) chosen based on their aes-
thetic or conceptual merit in-and-of-themselves, with 
little regard for how they will appear in subsequent docu-
mentation. Then it simply becomes the job of the profes-
sional photographer documenting the show to make that 
Henry Moore sculpture look the best she can via light-
ing, shutter speed, tripod placement, depth of focus, etc. 
And yet, in the commercial gallery world, even this is not 
exactly true, because artists are regularly coached by gal-
lerists to create works of certain dimensions (and even 
certain colors) so that the work will look more appealing 
in an online buyer catalog or will fit better over a collec-
tor’s sofa.
The minimal geometric forms Citarella chooses for his 
sculptures are a way to focus viewers on the line between 
what is “fake” and what is “real,” instead of focusing 
them on how aesthetically pretty the object itself is.4 The 
sculptural forms are chosen not for any inherent aesthet-
ic value, but because complex sculptural forms would be 
less confounding. Basic forms seem more readily present 
4 Ibid.
327
br(e)aking archives and sabotaging institutions
and more easily readable in photographic documenta-
tion. When these seemingly easy-to-read forms suddenly 
begin slipping and changing, we are all the more funda-
mentally confounded. In this sense, Compression Artifacts 
is a holistic apparatus telescoping outward through art 
markets and digital networks. In the context of the over-
all CA project, the sculpture and the prints in the show 
don’t really function as discrete, individual apparatuses 
(as they normally would in an urban gallery exhibition). 
There are no art patrons there in the woods to experience 
these pieces in the live, physical gallery context. Instead, 
the sculpture and the prints are actually the starter bait 
components of a much larger, holistic, apophatic art ap-
paratus. They are the set-up for a punch line that comes 
much later.
There are some forms of contemporary sculpture (by 
Jon Rafman, for instance) meant to look in the gallery 
space as if they are physical instantiations of images from 
mediated space. If you were to take a realistic image of 
such sculptures, they would look as if they had been pho-
toshopped, or as if your image’s gif or Jpg compression 
algorithm had glitched. There are other forms of contem-
porary sculpture (by Olafur Eliasson, for instance) that 
are simply impossible to photograph altogether. Your 
body in the physical space apperceives a certain image (a 
circular rainbow, a refraction of light), but when you go 
to take a digital picture of it, what your body is seeing is 
uncapturable by the camera apparatus. And again, there 
are certain forms of “digital sculpture” (work curated by 
the online gallery Panther Modern, for instance) that are 
purposefully meant to be fantastic and physically impos-
sible, designed to populate virtual galleries of non-phys-
ical space.
Citarella’s sculptural object in CA is not really any of 
these three types of sculpture. It doesn’t look like it came 
from the internet. It is not impossible to photograph. It is 
not meant to exist exclusively on the internet. It is really 
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a fourth kind of sculpture meant to elude firm placement 
in either offline physical or online mediated space. By 
failing to settle down and neatly land in one space or the 
other, it acts as a kind of sabotaging wrench, munging 
up the works and sending off sparks along the physical–
mediated divide. This kind of sabotage only works if the 
digital image of the sculpture reads believably as a repre-
sentation of a physical object. This kind of realism is only 
possible if aspects of the sculpture are actually physical. 
According to Citarella, computer-generated 3D models of 
physical objects somehow lack the alchemy of physical 
stuff in the actual world. Physical materials that exists in 
space over time (marble, for example) reveal aspects of 
historical space and time.5
In CA, the dividing line between the physical and the 
mediated is so problematized, that four years after the 
project, Citarella himself could not remember which im-
ages were photoshopped and which were not. Some of 
the components that seem to me the most photoshopped 
(like the fire) were actually physical. Other components 
that seem to me the most “natural” (like several of the 
welded angles of the metal sculpture) were actually pho-
toshopped.
Even the vertical order of the documentation on the 
web page is carefully choreographed to promote maxi-
mum confusion. The web page begins with images that 
seem believable, then gradually progresses to increasing-
ly unbelievable images, ending with the low-resolution 
animated gif which blatantly and unrealistically distorts 
the dimensions of the gallery.6 The result is the braking 
of “resolution” (in both the technical and cognitive sens-
es). The documentation exists across a range of technical 
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on the accuracy and truth of the event; and the actual 
historical space of the gallery is cognitively irresolvable.
Citarella says the “art” of his work happens in both the 
physical space of the gallery and the subsequent docu-
mentation of that space. To him, it’s not that a new third 
space is created. Instead, an uncanny effect is created by 
combining difficult and rigorous pre-Photoshop staging 
of physical objects with professional post-production 
Photoshop techniques.7 A new space is not created (that 
would be making something), but rather the combina-
tion of two existing spaces is apparatally choreographed 
in such a way that an apophatic braking event is caused. 
The cognitive aporia induced by CA is in some senses 
even more disturbing than the cognitive aporia induced 
by the affective linguistics of Arakawa and Gins’s Mech-
anism of Meaning. As humans, it is easier to dismiss lin-
guistically induced aporia as “merely” a trick of language 
(even though language is itself a material force in the 
actual world). We are somehow less willing to dismiss 
photographically induced aporia. Evidently (even if the 
evidence is only in media textures), realism still matters.
Markets Matter/The Material of Markets
As mentioned above, although documentation of art 
exhibitions chronologically occurs after the creation of 
the artworks in the exhibitions, that doesn’t mean that 
the documentation has no effect on the creation of the 
artworks, particularly if the art exhibitions occur in for-
profit galleries. Furthermore, the size of the gallery itself 
affects the monetary value of the artworks on display. As 
a professional photographer of art exhibitions, one of Ci-
tarella’s main jobs is to make the gallery look as large as 
possible. The logic goes like this: Manhattan real estate 
is expensive. The larger the gallery, the higher the rent. 
7 Ibid.
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The higher the rent, the more the gallerist must be mak-
ing. She must be making all that money selling valuable 
art.8 A bizarre, tail-wagging-the-dog effect is thus created 
whereby it becomes as important to make the gallery look 
large in your catalog images of the exhibition (because 
not all buyers will be able to attend the actual exhibition) 
as it does to make the art look good.
Compression Artifacts was inspired by all of these bizarre 
(real estate and art) market forces. If Citarella’s photo-
graphic documentation of his own exhibition can make 
it look as if he and his friends had a group show in a large 
white cube Chelsea gallery, then it doesn’t matter where 
the gallery is, even if it is a gallery he constructed himself 
miles outside of Manhattan in the woods. At least this is 
one of the tongue-in-cheek conceits of CA. Artists who 
wish to make money from their art are forced to consider 
not just the technical production of a single work of art, 
but also its subsequent reception, critical journalistic 
evaluation, catalog distribution, conceptual marketing, 
art fair booth hawking, sale, resale, institutional collec-
tion, eventual re-exhibition, and ultimate art-historical 
canonization. Given an awareness of this outwardly tel-
escoping chain of forces, the fact that real estate markets 
and perspectival photographic techniques for enlarging 
architectural interiors would be relevant to a conceptual 
art project seems at least a bit less bizarre.
The fun and critical ingenuity of CA is that it takes 
these economic forces and throws a wrench in them, play-
fully grinding them to an aporetic halt (however briefly), 
all the while obscuring its overt “exposure” of them. The 
project doesn’t read as straightforward “institutional cri-
tique.” The CA apparatus doesn’t merely cut out a large 
swath of the world called “the art market,” point a didac-
tic finger at it, and make something called “critical aware-
ness.” Instead, CA cuts out and follows the contours of 
8 Ibid.
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all of these market forces and digital networks in a way 
that causes these forces to publicly perform their own 
aporetic absurdity. Five-dollar transaction bits enter the 
apparatus, and ashes exit the apparatus. What is “made” 
in the interim is a kind of perpetually involuting Mobius 
strip, back and forth between offline and online, original 
and mediated, profit and profligation, object and image, 
art and dust.
The Black Factory
If Compression Artifacts cuts out a large swath of the world, 
the Black Factory (hereafter the BF) cuts out even more. 
Like CA, it too subsumes art institutions and art mar-
kets; but the BF moves well beyond them to chew on ad-
ditional institutions like race, class, nationality, identity 
construction, difference, and gas mileage. Tempting as 
it is to launch right into the apparatal functionings of 
the BF, a pragmatic explanation of its myriad logistical 
functions is first in order before any theoretical analysis 
is even possible.
Pope.L initially imagined the BF as “a mobile art in-
stallation performance work that would travel not only 
geographically but also conceptually.” It would be housed 
in “a truck renovated to function like a cross between a 
lending library, an old timey medicine show, and a field 
research laboratory.”9
Although the BF is (mostly) housed in a truck, the 
project itself is not the truck, but is instead an installa-
tion and a performance (and an archive, and two web-
sites, and a contest, and numerous conversations). Even 
the truck itself isn’t just a single thing. The truck houses 
9 William Pope.L, artist talk given at Center for Maine Contemporary 
Art, Rockland, Maine, August 4, 2004, available at http://theblack-
factory/ceo_pages/ceo_2.htm.
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several stations that expand on performance day. There is 
“the workshop” (also known as “the pulverizing station”), 
the store, the inflatable igloo archive, the “black object of 
the day,” the online archive (accessible via a laptop in the 
back of the truck), the main website associated with the 
project (theblackfactory.com), and the auxiliary “Distrib-
uting Martin” website (distributingmartin.com) which is 
frequently linked to from the main website.
The BF project launched on May 8, 2004, at MASS 
MoCA as part of a group exhibition curated by Nato 
Thompson called The Interventionists. The truck went on 
three us tours, one per year, between 2004 and 2006. The 
tour stops were announced prior to the tour and people 
were invited to bring objects to the truck which they as-
sociated with blackness. On the day of the installation/
performance, the truck would show up at a town (usually 
sponsored by a local arts institution), set up the differ-
ent stations, and each person of the three-member crew 
would begin to perform a “node.” The nodes were struc-
tured interactive performances ultimately designed to 
engage visitors from the community in dialogue. There 
were around twenty different nodes, and these nodes 
would be repeatedly performed in cycles over a six-hour 
period. The black objects which community members 
brought were either photographed and archived in the 
online archive, and/or collected and added to the physi-
cal archive, or pulverized at the pulverizing station, the 
residue of which might be packaged and sold in the store.
Typically, each stop lasted a day and a half, although 
certain guerrilla stops (unplanned, unsponsored, spon-
taneous stops) might last as short as fifteen minutes. In 
2004 there were six scheduled stops in four states over 
ten days. In 2005 there were twelve scheduled stops in 
fifteen states over six weeks. In 2006 there were twenty-
four scheduled stops in twelve states over two months. 
That is the BF in a nutshell. Now for a more detailed ex-
planation of each individual component.
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A More Detailed Explanation of the Individual Black Factory 
Components
The Truck Itself
The truck was a 22-foot long, 1989 gmc, Grumman Olson 
paneled step van (ice cream) truck weighing six tons. Its 
previous owner had used the truck for occasional fishing 
trips in Maine.10 Once set up, with the attached inflatable 
igloo coming off the back of the truck, the entire installa-
tion was 54-feet long (see Fig. 3).
The cab of the truck, once parked and installed, ex-
panded into the gift shop. In transit, the rear of the truck 
stored the igloo archive, the pulverization table, objects, 
props, and a sound system. Once parked and installed, 
the rear of the truck housed the computer station for 
accessing the online archive. Furthermore, according to 
10 William Pope.L et al., “ceo page 5,” Black Factory, http://www.the-
blackfactory.com/ceo_pages/ceo_5.htm and William Pope.L et al., 
“the truck,” Black Factory, http://www.theblackfactory.com/truck.
html.
Fig. 3: The Black Factory installation set up, sans crew and audience. 
Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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Pope.L, “The rear of the BF is also a work area [and …] a 
hiding place for goof-off employees.”11
After the third and final BF tour in 2006, the truck it-
self was used in several subsequent Pope.L projects. In 
2009 at Art Basel in Miami it was partially buried under 
gunpowder. In 2011 it was used as a mobile projection unit 
which was pulled through the streets of New Orleans by 
local volunteers. Finally, in 2013, in a move reminiscent of 
Pope.L’s own durational body crawls, the truck was pulled 
throughout Cleveland for twenty-five miles by a rotating 
group of volunteers. After the 2013 event, the truck was 
donated to 2100 Lakeside Men’s Shelter in Cleveland.12
The Pulverization Station
The pulverization station is 
a set of 3 heavy duty plywood and steel tables whose 
tops, when properly assembled, resemble a contorted 
usa and Cuba. The tables are off-loaded at the vehicle’s 
rear and set-up on the side of the truck along with a 
hefty array of tools and workshop gadgetry.13 
In Pope.L’s own playfully acerbic verse: 
We stand on this table. / Shout. Talk. Sing. Leap. Beg. 
Cajole. Shake in our boots. Act tough. Let our minds 
wander. Get the lack out. / Grind shit up on the table. 
Blind shit up on the table. Dance on the table. Spirit on 
the table. spit on the table… / Do experiments. Chew 
experience. Product the black that’s out-of-wack. Serve 
enchiladas, watermelon, sauerkraut. feather, iron, sa-
liva…blood…tums…14
11 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004
12 William Pope.L et al., “the truck.”
13 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004.
14 William Pope.L et al., “overview,” Black Factory, http://www.the-
blackfactory.com/overview.html.
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The pulverization station is one of the locations where 
nodes are performed. Here, “black” objects are pulverized 
via electric grinder, blowtorch, pestle and mortar, and 
other means.
The Gift Shop
In the gift shop, the staple items for sale include a rubber 
duckie stamped with the BF logo ($5), “limited edition 
good used soap” ($1,400), and a plastic Yoda head shrink-
wrapped together with racist Ben Klassen’s “white hate 
literature” The White Man’s Bible. Also, for sale is powder 
from the pulverized donated black objects, packaged as if 
it were spice for your spice rack, labeled with a gold black 
factory sticker signed by Pope.L. Additionally, canned 
goods are sold and auctioned for several times their 
original value, and then that money is donated to local 
food pantries so that they can buy more canned goods. 
Pope.L calls this scheme “Twice Sold. […] a perverse re-
verse of capitalism.”15 As described by Pope.L, the list of 
canned goods includes, “peas, corn, pork n’ beans, pick-
led eggs (discontinued but hopefully coming back!), col-
lard greens, peanut butter, tomato soup, evaporated milk 
(discontinued), airport candle, used soap, tee-shirts, used 
American flags, Tesco chicken curry (uk) and Sainsbury 
baked beans (uk).”16 According to Pope.L, “The BF has a 
graduated pricing scheme and we love to give discounts, 
for almost any reason at all.”17
The Igloo Archive
The Igloo Archive is an inflatable igloo with hanging 
shelving throughout, displaying a rotating selection of 
physical items that have been donated to the BF archive. 
15 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004.
16 William Pope.L et al., “products,” Black Factory, http://www.the-
blackfactory.com/products.html.
17 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004.
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The igloo has window-like openings for people to look in 
and view the items. It is attached to the back of the truck. 
According to Pope.L:
Anyone may donate a black object. A black object is 
anything a person deems black or feels references 
blackness for them. The specific days for submitting 
black objects are called check days. During the tour, 
every day was check day.18
The Black Object of the Day
The black object of the day is one of the donated black 
objects from the physical archive, placed inside a box 
built into the side of the truck. According to Pope.L, 
“You can only access this box by putting your hands into 
holes cut into the side of the truck and feeling around for 
knowledge.”19
The Nodes
The nodes are the interactive aspect of the BF. The num-
ber of nodes is variable. In 2005, during each six-hour in-
stallation, there were 20–25 different nodes. The nodes 
are performed in rotation. Once the rotation of nodes is 
completed, it is begun again, continually, until the six 
hours ends. Most nodes are short, around three minutes 
each.
According to Pope.L: 
A node is a chunk of time defined by an activity or an 
event. An installation can also be a node. All nodes are 
designed. Some are scripted. Some not. Improvisation 
is key in playing a node. […] The function of a node is 
to engage the audience-participant in an inward-out-
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for example, stereotypical views of migrant workers 
in the U.S. Some are built around a gesture, such as 
giving away free watermelon. Most have a turning 
point where the meaning of what was first proposed is 
shifted to create a conflict or contradiction or enigma 
or silliness. All nodes have three parts: 1. the come-on, 
which is the invitation to engage, 2. the shift, which is 
the raising of the stakes of the invitation. It can also 
be the introduction of a problem that has to be solved. 
An audience-participant can also raise the stakes. […] 
3. the leave, what the performer and audience-partici-
pant glean from the interaction.20
One particularly successful node was developed and 
performed by Pasqualina Azzarello, crew member and 
Miss Black Factory 2005. The node involved a tarot read-
ing with a custom set of tarot cards. The outcome of the 
reading always involved the exclamation, “Shazam!,” and 
a prophesied shift in race, nationality, and gender for the 
participant.
I promised to defer my theoretical analysis until after 
the logistical explanations, but the shift within the node 
is the crux of the entire apparatus, so a bit of preliminary 
theoretical analysis is in order here. Pope.L’s motto for 
the entire BF project is, “The Black Factory does not make 
blackness. we make something better: opportunity.”21 The 
nodes are the heart of the opportunity that is made, be-
cause they are the interpersonal contact points at which 
each individual community member most overtly intra-
acts with the overall BF apparatus. The “shift” phase in 
the node is precisely the “nothing” that the BF makes. It 
is the BF’s most apophatic moment. The shift is the point 
at which the brakes are thrown on the participant’s prior, 
operative understanding of her own culturally inherited 
20 William Pope.L et al., “ceo page 5.”
21 William Pope.L et al., “overview.”
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self-identity. The “leave” phase of the node is never pre-
determined. Yes, something is always left. Something al-
ways becomes. But what that something is cannot be pre-
determined. It must remain undetermined in order to 
allow the shift to truly occur and accomplish its braking 
work. Otherwise, we simply have one more series of pre-
determined becomings, with the artist’s pre-determined 
ideology engaging in the same tired/rote, partisan-driv-
en agreements/disagreements with the participant’s pre-
determined ideology. Granted, “nothing” can never be 
permanently (or even briefly) maintained in a world of 
perpetual becomings. The wager of the BF is that after 
the hard brake of the shift (Shazam!), at least the oppor-
tunity to live otherwise in the world will be made. This 
opportunity is what is left, what emerges, what remains; 
and the specific nature of this opportunity is inherently 
different and personal, per person, per node.
Miss Black Factory
Miss Black Factory was a contest held in 2005 and again in 
2006. Primarily the contest was a way to select one of the 
three members of the crew. Her duties were exactly the 
same as the other two members, except she held the title 
Miss Black Factory. The first contest announcement ran as 
a feature piece is the Spring 2005 edition of Art Journal, 
and also served as a promotion for the upcoming tour.
In order to be eligible, 
Anyone may enter who is 18 years old or older, has a 
valid U.S. driver’s license, and a major credit card. Also 
necessary are: a strong back, an enthusiasm for mak-
ing social change, good people skills, the ability to use 
power tools, attendance at all BF rehearsals and tour 
activities, and collaboration with CEO Pope.L. A few 
not so necessary, but still excellent skill areas with 
which Miss BF might be familiar: community orga-
nizing, playing music, street theater, chemistry, eth-
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nic culture, international law, political theory, baking, 
working in a factory, etc.22 
Miss Black Factory 2005 was Pasqualina Azzarello and 
Miss Black Factory 2006 was Josh Atlas.
The Online Archive
The “DonateD Black oBJect archiVe” is an online ar-
chive accessible at http://www.theblackfactory.com/
archiveintro.html. It contains numbered pictures of 
black items that people brought to the BF, descriptions 
of those items, comments about the items by the peo-
ple who brought them, numbered pictures of the people 
who brought them, and a series of questions answered by 
the people who brought them. Sometimes the items are 
donated for pulverization or collection in the physical ar-
chive. Other times, they are simply photographed for the 
online archive and then returned to their owners. 
As of summer 2018, there were 934 donated objects in 
the online archive. Sometimes the pictures of the items 
and/or the donors are absent, in which case black place-
holder images are put in their place, as “place holders 
for lost encounters.”23 Each item is assigned a color, but 
the colors are only ever accidentally associated with the 
items. The colors simply cycle in order. Seventeen items 
in a row will be listed as “blue,” then the next seven will 
be listed as “clear,” then the next thirteen will be listed as 
“white,” and so on.
Here are the questions asked of each donor:
Black Object: _
Why donor chose object: _
22 William Pope.L et al., “miss bf contest,” Black Factory, http://www.
theblackfactory.com/contest.html.
23 William Pope.L et al., “archive,” Black Factory, http://www.theblack-
factory.com/archiveintro.html.
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States/Counties/Countries you have lived in: _
Reaction to the experience of donating a black object: 
_
On the 2006 tour, the following questions were added:
Do you feel that Affirmative Action only benefits 
blacks? Why? Why not?
If you had a daughter and/or son is there any race from 
which you would not want them to marry? Why? Why 
not?
Should undocumented workers a.k.a. illegal immi-
grants be allowed to remain in the us? Why? Why not?
Should the us withdraw from Iraq? Why? Why not?
Should Israel give land back to the Palestinians? Why? 
Why not?
The objects donated range from thoughtful items that 
people have obviously prepared to bring after viewing 
the BF invitation in advance, to things that passers-by 
simply had in their pockets. Jazz cDs are inordinately rep-
resented. There are many items associated with Africa. 
Sometimes people take picture of their hair. Some items 
(particularly books) seem to have been donated by Pope.L 
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himself (since he references the same books in texts 
about the BF). There is also a photograph of a vagina, and 
a photograph of a penis (both from anonymous donors).
Upon entering the website for the entire BF project 
(theblackfactory.com), the visitor is led through a series 
of randomly sequenced introductory pages of various 
phrases and colors. Oftentimes, a randomly selected pho-
tograph of a black object from the online archive will ap-
pear on one of these introductory pages.
distributingmartin.com
distributingmartin.com is a website in the form of an 
interactive, multimedia, blog-like journal. As of sum-
mer 2018, distributingmaratin.com itself never links to 
theblackfactory.com, but various pages throughout the-
blackfactory.com link to various pages throughout dis-
tributingmartin.com. In this sense, distributingmartin.
com serves as an auxiliary site, or a back-story site, or a 
supplementary site, or at least a companion site to the BF 
project website.
distributingmartin.com contains journal entries be-
ginning at the date of Pope.L’s conception (“15, or 18, 0r 23 
October 1953”) and continuing into an imagined future 
where Martin Luther King Jr.’s Dna has been distributed 
throughout the world and has altered all humans. The 
journal entries talk about Pope.L’s old band (sardonically 
named John Wayne), his family, his old girlfriend, a nov-
el he wants to write, his moving to Maine, his teaching, 
and the offline distributingmartin project. For the offline 
distributingmartin project, in 2001 Pope.L pasted posters 
throughout New York City that read, “this is a paint-
ing of martin luther king’s penis from insiDe my fa-
ther’s Vagina” in white letters on a black background.
The blog entries are written in a non-linear, hypertext 
fashion, with words from each entry linking across the 
site to (mostly) personal photographs, other blog entries, 
fragments of the novel-in-progress, notes for the project, 
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various cryptic instructions and plans, and newspaper 
clippings about Dna experiments and biomatter theft.
The site lists “13 reasons to make a blog about spread-
ing mlk’s body parts all over the Universe.” Reason #1: 
“fingers, toes, eyes, & ears are better in the stars, moun-
tains, and clouds but easier to reach on macs and pcs.”
The site lists 12 steps to the completion of the long-
term distributingmartin project. Step #8 is “Peace.” The 
first three paragraphs of this step are worth quoting in 
full:
Step 8: Peace
The Peace Gene Project is a bio-engineering enact-
ment in which genetic material from Martin Luther 
was obtained and re-tooled with the help of artists and 
scientists from mQXrrswQrXlrllQDXiXQBDggsJrra-
BsXslt, who participated in a special interdisciplinary 
program encouraging projects between specialists in 
different fields.
King’s genetic material was obtained via a lucky 
fluke. The possibility of a degraded or polluted sample 
is not out of the question. Regardless, the material was 
re-built, retrained, and retrofitted with new mechan-
ics and subsequently re-introduced to the human body 
via the eating of fruit on sale in supermarkets, where-
upon, after being ingested the mlk gene (or milk gene) 
‘turns on’ and replicates at an incredible rate: its motor 
was modeled on the amazing replication ability of the 
hiV virus. The milk gene then seeks out receptor sites 
on a rogue protein curiously called the ‘Peace Gene’ 
and interacts with it to create fresh biological, social, 
and political environments, matrixes and potentiali-
ties within the human host.
Of course, the exact nature of these new environ-
ments can never be completely known. Interestingly 
enough, the outcome focus is very similar to Afri-
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can vodoun rituals where a simple shift of wind may 
drastically alter the effectiveness of a spell or action. 
The so-called Peace gene (like the so-called Gay gene) 
is surrounded by much debate. Other names for the 
Peace gene are: the Flying Dutchman gene, the Ghost 
gene, or simply pg. Many thinkers do not so much 
doubt the existence of the pg as simply doubt the abil-
ity of humans (who are naturally bent to self-destruc-
tion) to take advantage of such a provocative biologi-
cal resource.24
In a sense, the offline distributingmartin project is a pre-
cursor and companion to the BF, just as distributingmar-
tin.com is a precursor and companion to theblackfactory.
com. distributingmartin is the imaginary distribution of 
Dna (to the stars, mountains, and clouds), and the actual 
internet distribution of a viral opportunity to imagine 
a future that might be otherwise; BF is the actual geo-
graphical distribution (stop by stop, town by town, state 
by state) of that same opportunity.
The Documentation
theblackfactory.com contains media documentation 
from the three tours in the form of the online black object 
archive, still photographs of the performances, short vid-
eo promotional materials for the project, much writing 
by Pope.L poetically explaining the project in the persona 
of the BF ceo, and two separate written accounts of com-
munity members who attended performances. In 2005, 
Craig Saddlemire made a documentary film called Get 
Off The Truck: Black Factory Rehearsal 2005, which chroni-
cled the training of the 2005 crew members by Pope.L, 
but there is little footage in Saddlemire’s documentary of 
any actual nodes being performed. In 2015, The Museum 
24 William Pope.L, “Step 8: Peace,” Distributing Martin, http://www.dis-
tributingmartin.com/Page08A.html.
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of Modern Art acquired some physical items from the BF 
archive for their permanent collection (more on this ac-
quisition later). As mentioned, the truck was donated to 
a homeless shelter in 2013.
An Analysis of the Holistic Functioning of the Black Factory 
Apparatus
Now that the logistical components of the BF have been 
explained, we are ready to consider the ways in which it 
holistically functions as an apophatic art apparatus. Prior 
to my own analysis, I want to let the ceo of the BF have 
his own say regarding the project, its goals, its purpose, 
and its function.
The CEO of the Black Factory on the Function of the  
Black Factory
The Black Factory was built to explore the space be-
tween what we think we know and what we can imag-
ine.25
[The Factory] encourages us to take hold of the stereo-
types of race and class which bind us to our indecision 
and apathy and to turn them inside out. It challenges 
us to grapple with the habitual ways in which we con-
sume products, identities, and ideologies.26
The BF travels throughout America (or as much of it 
as we can afford on three miles a gallon), bringing pos-
sibility and the glaring light of amusement, boredom, 
pushy conversation and a flaky utopianism wherever 
it’s needed most.27
25 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004.
26 William Pope.L et al., “ceo page 3,” Black Factory, http://www.the-
blackfactory.com/ceo_3.htm.
27 William Pope.L et al., “the truck,”
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[The Black Factory] travels throughout America seeding 
difference where it is needed.28
The Black Factory makes […] the opportunity to make a 
new blackness. And what is this new XXXXXXX? Dif-
ference! A boutique lackness. A lackness on the beach. 
And – where is this this this – reach? Well, where is 
your frolitics? Lying on its multi-ethnic towel boiling 
under a hot, hot, hot pun.29
Our big thing is to be clumsy, very earnest and manip-
ulative and imperfect in the face of beliefs like:
1) everything matters
2) nothing matters unless you got money then noth-
ing matters because you got money
3) nothing matters unless you are you and nothing but 
you because you are the center of the XXXXX so help 
you god and there is no god except you how lonely30
Finally, here is Pope.L (more or less) as Pope.L, applying 
for a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2002, two years prior to 
the first BF tour:
[The Black Factory is] at once a mobile marketplace that 
trades in provocation and a nomadic laboratory for 
crafting consciousness.
I want to make “crucibles” for blackness. These cru-
cibles are art works that have two functions: 1) to 
protect, validate and enshrine blackness; 2) to isolate, 
imprison and obfuscate blackness. The drama of these 
28 William Pope.L and Patricia C. Phillips, “Artist Project,” Art Journal 
64, No. 1 (Spring 2005): 51.
29 William Pope.L et al., “overview.”
30 Ibid.
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two opposing forces, at odds with each other, circum-
scribes a contradictory blackness.
To me, blackness is a many-sided hole. Or more para-
doxically, a hole within a hole within a hole and so on. 
When I say this I simply mean an open-ended nature 
that is not about blackness but the world itself. The 
Black Factory is the concrete expression of this sort of 
thinking. It is the experiment with which I will test 
this very hypothesis.
By collecting, recycling and peddling the ingredients 
for re-thinking blackness, The Black Factory transforms 
the tensions and contradictions of race into a dynamic 
field of possibility.31
The BF ceo is well aware of the apophatic function of his 
factory, and poetically describes this function in admira-
bly apophatic language, pitch-perfectly aligned with the 
tone of the project itself. Perfectly apophatic is the corre-
lation between black and lack, and the idea that a hole-y 
lack might contain within it the bastard seeds of a holy 
fecundity. The BF ceo presents the factory as one very 
rigorous, complex, and exhaustive way of seeing what 
new possibilities might arise from pitching oneself, a 
few crew members, and dozens of communities headlong 
into the aporetic, telescoping hole of (b)lackness.
The Black Factory Slams on the Brakes of Rote Becoming, 
Leaving the Door Open for X
The BF makes nothing of (i.e., brakes the rote and cycli-
cal becoming of) inherited, status quo, historical modes 
of capturing, oversimplifying, and binarily delineating 
(black/white) actually nuanced differences. As men-
31 William Pope.L, “ceo page 1,” Black Factory, http://theblackfactory.
com/ceo_pages/ceo_1.htm.
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tioned above, these apophatic brakes are most forcefully 
applied during the “shift” phase (the second phase) of the 
various performance and installation nodes. This hard 
braking is designed to produce an instantaneous open-
ing-up toward reconfigurable difference(s), creating a 
brief worm hole into possibly othered becoming(s). This 
temporary wormhole is the productive opportunity that 
the factory makes. It makes a kind of open placeholder 
for future encounters. The labor of the BF is to do eve-
rything in its power to keep this wormhole open for as 
long as possible, to stall, ward off, and keep at bay its in-
evitable collapse and closure. This hole-stabilizing labor 
is accomplished on as many fronts as possible: by defer-
ring the inevitable museological canonization of the BF 
so that it may properly run its institution-eroding course; 
by not overdetermining the performance nodes and by 
allowing the crew members to participate in the organic 
development and improvisational enaction of the nodes; 
and by letting the crew drive the truck away on the tour 
while the artist–ceo stays at home. 
The BF makes nothing of all institutions (financial, 
national, socioeconomic, artistic) that would attempt to 
suck the project into their own contextualizing appara-
tuses. Instead, the BF lures and sucks those institutions 
into its own gaping apparatus, leaving the door open for 
whatever else may enter and exit. The BF is a brave pro-
ject because of its scope, its openness, and its vulnerabil-
ity toward being captured by other contextualizing insti-
tutions. This vulnerability (the artwork “looks like” a silly 
vaudeville ice cream truck cum inflatable igloo) actually 
functions as a lure that allows the BF to entice, trap, and 
capture topics like race, religion, gender, income, and 
housing; tweak them; and release them into the worm 
hole. The BF makes nothing of itself being made some-
thing of (some thing of), in order for it to make nothing 
of other institutional somethings.
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The BF ceo states, “Someone once told me: ‘The BF 
stages a kind of moral constipation.’ I said to myself: 
‘That’s cool. what does it mean?’ It’s a question that has 
to be asked and re-casted over and over again.”32 The 
BF stops-up previously configured and calcified ethical 
flows, in order to hold open the bung hole of becoming 
long enough for X to emerge.
Humor is part and parcel of the BF apparatus, as is 
self-deprecation, as is absurdity; because bald-faced ear-
nestness can become a kind of codifying trap that propels 
one forward into already-proscribed, rote, partisan, cycli-
cal becomings. Humor puts the brakes on these binarily 
determined, pre-scripted re-dialogues and re-debates. It 
sets the stage for something else to happen other than 
the same old presumptions leading to the same old binary 
positions leading to the same old circuitous arguments.
Pope.L says of humor: 
Humor is a water-soluble, personal lubricant made 
social. I like the idea that when people laugh their 
mouths open and all sorts of things can fall in – bits, 
ideas, cracks, sites, very tiny police-persons, subver-
sives, dust, hope – an erotics of humor must be ca-
thected to the flesh as well as the waste of the flesh 
– the castoff flavors that ooze out of our tittering and 
guffaws and nervous nelly-a-tions – humor can be 
used as a structure that dis-a-wows while building an 
architecture of what-the-fuck.33 
In the same interview, Pope.L says of binary contradic-
tion: 
32 William Pope.L et al., “overview.”
33 William Pope.L, “William Pope.L on ‘Acting a Fool’ and Alternative 
Futures,” interview with William Pope.L. by Samuel Jablon, Hyperal-
lergic, July 10, 2015, https://hyperallergic.com/221452/william-pope-
l-on-acting-a-fool-and-alternative-futures/.
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Contradiction. Don’t exist in the real world. What 
I mean is, in a way, contradiction is too logical, too 
closed off and neat and packageable-like – similar to 
opposites, contradiction is frequently understood as 
figured on binaries. Bargain basement epistemology. 
But contraries, which I prefer, are more fflaky (note: 
keep the extra “f” for fucking or flucking or…), so 
they are more the knot one encounters on the ground 
where most of us crawl. Acting a fool. To be contrary. 
To act the fool. To act your act off. To disappear the 
ass in presencing the act. To put your foot in in in in 
someone else’ ass –34
The BF ceo doesn’t know exactly where the BF will lead, 
but humor and undermining inherited dichotomies are 
two apparatal mechanisms that lead to that wherever. 
The only guaranteed outcome provided by the BF’s hard 
braking apparatus is the guarantee that eventually, here 
and there, catch as catch can, new opportunities for re-
configuration will be created. What these opportunities 
are and where specifically they lead is a massive specula-
tive wager. As Pope.L concedes, “Part of doing this work 
is to let it go, is to not be so afraid to have a work that you 
can’t control. But you pay for that.”35
Lest I put too much emphasis on the punk rock, “slam 
the brakes on in order to make nothing of rote becom-
ing” aspect of the BF, I also want to focus on the final 
“leave the door open for X” aspect of the BF. If the first 
two node stages (the come-on and the shift) are the bait-
and-switch, apophatic trap of the BF apparatus; then the 
final node stage (the leave) is the necessarily courteous 
but no less essential “easing-off of the emergency brake 
in order to accelerate into whatever new directions have 
34 Ibid.
35 William Pope.L, in Craig Saddlemire, “Black Factory (Teaser),” Vimeo, 
March 25, 2014, http://vimeo.com/90020782.
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emerged” part of the BF apparatus. This third phase is the 
self-revelatory phase for the community member, who is 
invited during the leave to articulate her own self-revela-
tions to the participating BF crew member, further his-
torically actualizing the virtual potentia which began to 
ingress during the shift phase. Pasqualina Azzarello (Miss 
Black Factory 2005) noted that it was not enough for the 
participant to merely have a revelation, but that the node 
encounters were purposefully constructed so that the 
participant was then able to articulate this revelation to 
a total stranger, when just thirty seconds prior, the par-
ticipant had not even had the revelation.36
In order for participants to feel comfortable enough 
to share their own immediate self-revelations with total 
strangers, a very intentional kind of courtesy and care had 
to be produced by the BF. The creation of this safe space 
(the space of “the leave”) was just as much a part of the 
BF’s tactical ingenuity and success as its creation of the 
uncomfortable “shift” space. According to Azzarello, the 
two spaces operated in tandem: “There was something in 
the discomfort that made people speak. There was a pres-
sure for people to respond […]. But at the same time, there 
was a sense of safety where people could share.”37 To Azza-
rello, the actual “product” produced by the BF was the re-
sponses that the community members gave. Beyond just 
producing responses, the gift that the BF returned to its 
participants was allowing them “to inhabit their own 
experience.”38 Pope.L had obviously placed a great deal of 
trust in the Black Factory crew members. What was less 
immediately obvious to me, but what Azzarello was quick 
to point out, was the amount of trust Pope.L had also 
placed in the participating community members.39
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In order for the BF apparatus to allow each participant 
to inhabit and articulate her own experience of race, the 
BF had to maintain a fine-tuned balance between under-
determining and overdetermining her experience. Had 
Pope.L underdetermined the come-on and shift phases 
(by leaving them out altogether), the participants would 
have had a very rote, impersonal, superficial, party-polit-
ical, pre-scripted conversation about race in the us. On 
the other hand, had he overdetermined the “leave” phase 
by preaching his own political agenda to the participants, 
they would have been left with someone else’s relation-
ship to race in the us without being allowed to consider 
anew the ways in which their own constructed identities 
and personal histories were colored by blackness.
In a reflective piece Azzarello wrote just after return-
ing from the 2005 BF tour, she observes, “it seems there 
is a gap. not just between the self-image this country 
projects and its internal daily reality, but between our 
own ideas of this reality and how people actually inter-
relate when room is made for the possibility to see things 
differently. the smoke that the black factory generates, 
this symbol of proof that transformation is taking place, 
seeps into this gap and it makes its boundaries and limi-
tations known, makes them visible, and serves to create 
a more holistic understanding of what a resource this 
can be, when made use of.”40 This observation resonates 
with Pope.L’s own understanding of the potential agency 
of holes. Where there are gaps (between institutionally 
whitewashed histories and actually lived histories, be-
tween de facto inherited self-identities and more pur-
posefully constructed “selves”), then there are always op-
portunities for productive slippage.
40 Pasqualina Azzarello, “insides-out: an intimate look at the black 
factory by pasqualina azzarello, miss black factory, 2005,” privately 
published, 2005.
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The Black Factory Negotiates Its Own Contingency Upon Art 
Institutions
The BF was funded by grants from arts institutions, and 
its regularly scheduled stops were sponsored by local art 
institutions. It even began its life in an art show at MASS 
MoCA, a major art institution. Hilariously (to me, at 
least) but inevitably (I suppose), in 2015, the Museum of 
Modern Art acquired objects from the BF archive for its 
permanent collection. Tellingly, the March 2015 Artforum 
news article reporting the acquisition reads: 
MoMA […] added William Pope.L’s The Black Factory, 
2004–2006, to its collection recently – a collection of 
objects, films, commercial products, props, and docu-
ments associated with the artist’s performance tour 
project across the United States.41 
As if the entire BF project could be reduced to and re-
side within a few physical objects and media related to 
it. At the MoMA web site, their online catalog entry is a 
bit less reductive and a bit more accurate: “The Black Fac-
tory Archive / 2004–ongoing / Medium: Archive with 210 
items, including objects, multiples, ephemera, digital im-
age files, and a film / Dimensions: Various dimensions”42
So, a mobile performance/installation laboratory with 
its own online object archive has now been “collected” by 
a major art institution and entered into its online archive. 
Appropriately (at least as of summer 2018), there is only a 
placeholder image at the MoMA online catalog web page 
for the BF archive that says “Image not available.” If any-
thing, like Broodthaers’s Museum of Modern Art, Depart-
ment of Eagles, the collecting, museological nature of the 
41 “Museum of Modern Art Acquires Jasper Johns Sculpture,” Artforum, 
March 17, 2015, http://artforum.com/news/museum-of-modern-
art-acquires-jasper-johns-sculpture-50855.
42 “Pope.L, The Black Factory Archive, 2003–ongoing,” Museum of Mod-
ern Art, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/182201.
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BF project itself insured that, once another museum tried 
to collect it, the ordinarily invisible mechanisms of the 
institutional act of collecting and canonizing could not 
help but be revealed. The BF was booby-trapped from the 
beginning to foreground the culturally commodifying, 
value-adding function of the art museum apparatus. Like 
a sabotaging wooden shoe, the BF allows itself to enter 
into the art-institutional mechanism, in order to throw 
a wrench in that same mechanism. A black factory for 
munging up a white-(cube), white-(run) factory.
The acquisition of ephemera from the BF by the MoMA 
might seem like a conceptual failure or an ethical sell-out, 
but the stated goal of the BF apparatus was never blatant 
institutional critique. The BF was never really anti-art-
institution. It always had bigger institutional fish to fry. 
If collecting art museums wanted a piece of the BF action 
(and Pope.L anticipated they eventually would), the ap-
paratal doors of the BF were always already open for this 
intra-action. The primary focus of the BF was never on 
museums anyway, but always on the individual personal 
encounters that community members had with the BF 
apparatus. The ephemera that the MoMA collected will 
never be able to reduce, encapsulate, finalize, and dead-
en those individual encounters. Because of the way the 
ceo has structured the evolution of the BF project over 
time, the only thing these pieces of collected ephemera 
can ever really do is instigate further individual, personal 
encounters with the (ghost of the) BF – a kind of Shazam 
2.0. MoMA may have the physical BF archive, but the in-
ternet will always have the (much more expansive) online 
object archive, and Cleveland still has the truck.
Although the goal of the BF is not solely or even primar-
ily to resist institutional commodification and archiving, 
such resistance is still at least one of its goals. As Pope.L 
himself clarifies (regarding his overall art practice): 
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Is resistance to the art market essential for perfor-
mance art? Did its celebrated slippery resistance ever 
truly exist? Is resistance an obsolete concept for to-
day’s consumers? / For my money, resistance to estab-
lished power is always necessary, even if, especially if, 
the established power is radical, avant-garde, or sub-
versive. / Or a gleaming castle on a hill that sells art-
works, snacks, and central heating.43
At any rate, the BF was already collecting art institutions 
long before art institutions were collecting it. Black Fac-
tory Donated Object Number 168 is a black-colored key-
chain and cards from Maine College of Art’s gallery, the 
Institute of Contemporary Art, donated on June 20, 2004, 
by Sarah Schuster. “Why donor chose object: Hi William, 
the ica needed to be recycled back to the Black Factory I 
think!”44 And Black Factory Donated Object Number 248 
is a catalog from the Cleveland Institute of Art donated 
by Tina Cassara on June 8, 2015, at the BF stop sponsored 
by the Cleveland Institute of Art. Cassara describes the 
donated object as “The Cleveland Institute of Art” itself. 
“Why donor chose object: A black hole, the invisible with-
in the larger blackness.”45 Holes within holes within holes.
Regarding institutional support along the tour, the BF 
ceo is aware of it, and negotiates it as a kind of necessary 
evil. But his heart really is in the bare streets. He explains, 
“In a way, as a way, the BF is always performing. Rain or 
shine, we deliver the gusto so the cracks show.
With high gas prices, the truck getting 9 miles to the 
gallon […] we’ll continue to waste gas and do guerrilla 
stops whenever we feel like it (though they can be the 
43 William Pope.L, “Canary in the Coal Mine,” Art Journal 70, No. 3 
(2011): 56–57.
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toughest cause there is no institutional net to catch 
you when you fall), in fact, we have to do guerrilla 
stops! They are our politic-colonic. The crew might 
disagree, especially after a particularly grueling stop 
but no matter it’s what makes us go.
What be a guerrilla stop? That’s when we go to a 
place, park the truck and trek out to meet the natives 
sans beads and blankets, sans muskets and powder, 
sans truck, sans spectacle, sans theatrical frame, sans 
the confidence provided by our familiar. Whatever you 
want to call it, we leave as much of it behind as pos-
sible and go native.
We have problems getting venues to fund this guer-
rilla-thing, it has an elegant framelessness so it’s dif-
ficult to “product” so they don’t trust it. Even I have a 
hard time with guerrilla stops but that’s what happens 
when you let more life in –46
One particularly noteworthy guerrilla stop was the last 
stop on the 2005 tour. Scheduled by Pope.L at the last 
minute, it was meant to be a video documentation op-
portunity in a remote, unpopulated location. The crew 
members were to perform for an absent audience while 
being filmed. Instead (as described by Azzarello), “we 
pulled in and did our job. we sang our song and carried on 
audaciously for the butterflies, rocks and trees. we were 
there for all of ten minutes when two atv riders pulled 
in. then some hikers. then a mom and her children. then 
one of the atv riders called his father, who showed up mo-
ments later. among them were a student, a soldier, two 
factory workers, a mother, a child and a cop. and there we 
were, in the middle of the goddamn woods, with an audi-
ence, and conversation that was among the very richest 
of the entire tour.”47 One of the atV riders was shipping 
46 William Pope.L, et al., “overview.”
47 Azzarello, “insides-out.”
356
some ways of making nothing
out to serve in Iraq the next day. The other atV rider, his 
best friend, was opposed to the war.48 In this particular 
instance, even when the expressed intent was to acquire 
documentary footage for some future, art-institution-
aware, archival purpose, the BF apparatus could not help 
but intra-act with local humans.
Regarding art-institutional funding of the tours them-
selves, it only ever covered part of the costs. The ceo ex-
plains: 
Why do it in this particular way? Why an art object 
that loses money? Why a truck that gets 4 miles to a 
gallon of gas? Why a ceo, yours truly, who during every 
two week rehearsal period develops medical problems? 
Why do it? Why do it this way? […] To fear a little less. 
To be encouraged a little more. To take a risk that I 
could share with others.49
The Black Factory Operates across Multiple Scales of Time
The BF is an ambitiously perspicacious apparatus oper-
ating across multiple scales of time. The BF is not just 
a series of three summer tours that occurred between 
2004–2006. As mentioned above, it also anticipates (ne-
gotiates, and partially evades) its own eventual museo-
logical capture/collection, which doesn’t happen until 
nine years after the tour is completed. Pope.L continues 
to maintain the online black object archive, and both web 
sites at theblackfactory.com and distributingmartin.com. 
distributingmartin.com reaches into the past (beyond 
Dr. King’s assassination and right up to Pope.L’s concep-
tion) and into the future (when the milk peace gene is 
distributed to all humans). The questions on the black 
object donation questionnaire about Israel–Palestine re-
48 A photograph of this encounter is viewable at http://www.the-
blackfactory.com/images_hiatus/10-cairo/csp-20.jpg.
49 William Pope.L et al., “ceo page 5.” 
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lations and us immigration paranoia continue to haunt 
the world. If anything, these issues have only intensified 
and become more relevant since they were added to the 
donation questionnaire in 2005.
As an archive of objects, the BF operates as a kind of 
memory modulation machine. It separates the subjective 
personal associations from individual objects and redis-
tributes them amongst an entire archive of other memo-
ry-laden objects. Personal memories are mixed with cul-
tural memories. “Black” memories are mixed with “white” 
memories. Entire objects, memories, and histories are 
pulverized, fine-grainedly shuffled, and fundamentally 
reconstituted. In this sense, the BF is mnemonically po-
rous: a hole-y, memory-filtering sieve. Rather than merely 
being a cultural memory repository (which all archives 
are), the BF purposes to be a memory modulation factory 
(which most archives also are, but don’t realize that they 
are). The BF breaks apart, rearranges, and reconstitutes 
new cultural memories. Memories from the past made 
new for the future.
The Black Factory Is Designed to Modulate Its Own Crew 
Members
The performative nodes were not just meant to brake, 
switch, and open up participating community members. 
In order for the BF to truly brake the old and make new 
opportunities for X, the BF crew members also had to be 
improvisationally and intuitively open to where the con-
versations and events might lead. If the BF was to create 
new opportunities in the world, then the crew members 
couldn’t merely show up with their own bag of pre-pack-
aged opportunities. That would only be a mobile oppor-
tunity distribution unit. Whereas the BF was supposed 
to be a mobile opportunity creation factory. As described 
by the ceo: 
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BF nodes sometimes had a clear goal, sometimes the 
only goal was to get at a feeling, not a position. To do 
this, a performer needed to reject final answers yet ac-
cept the performance situation. So – no matter what I 
say in these notes, no matter how confident they might 
sound, the on-going challenge was always to arrive at 
and accept a radical in-betweenness that disturbs.50
This radical performative openness was a lot to ask of a 
small set of three crew members, all under thirty years 
old, somewhere in the middle of Ohio, with Pope.L back 
in Maine. The ceo explained: 
At the end of each day we’d talk on the phone. The crew 
would describe their successes and challenges and I’d 
offer perspectives and direction. There were two main 
challenges: 1) could or should they, as a primarily white 
crew, really engage people in a discussion about black-
ness? And 2) was blackness the end goal?
I answered their queries in this way: 1) you have to 
own the challenge. Whatever it is. Maybe you are black 
and you don’t know it? Or are not willing to admit it? 
Perhaps being black is a matter of commitment like 
being honest or being true or being free. I answered 
#2 like so: blackness is a conduit to speak about dif-
ferences.51
Pope.L did more than challenge and offer support. He 
ongoingly fine-tuned the functional logistics of the BF 
apparatus based on crew member feedback. According 
to Pasqualina Azzarello, “he listened after every perfor-
mance to the lengthy lists of discoveries and challenges. 
he then privately ingested what he heard, and before each 
50 William Pope.L, “ceo notes,” Black Factory, http://www.theblackfac-
tory.com/ceo_notes.html.
51 William Pope.L, artist talk, August 4, 2004.
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and every show new additions were integrated into the 
mix: new characters, new approaches, new baubles in the 
pockets.”52
From my own research of the project, it seems to me 
that the people whom the BF changed the most were 
the crew members and Pope.L himself. From the begin-
ning, the BF was set up to be self-replicating. It was never 
meant to be permanently run by a group of experts in 
the know for a group of community members awaiting 
enlightenment. The ceo even includes these instructions 
for how to make your own Black Factory:
Reach out to someone.
Do this over and over and over anD oVer again.
If you take Back your hanD. It’s ok. it’s ok.
Count to 5. then—
Put it out there again.
Keep doing this. oVer anD oVer anD oVer again—
You will notice after a while that
The clarity you initially possessed eVaporates anD
Any sense of system you once haD is now in bits and 
doubts and tatters—
This is how to make your own BF—
now53
Summary: Two Macro-Cosmic 
Apophatic Apparatuses
Pope.L’s Black Factory and Joshua Citarella’s Compression 
Artifacts are both apophatic art apparatuses that cut out 
52 Azzarello, “insides-out.”
53 William Pope.L et al., “make your own bf,” Black Factory, http://
www.theblackfactory.com/make_your_bf.html.
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large swaths from the institutional world. The danger of 
such macroscopic engagements is always that your own 
apparatus will be folded into and recontextualized by the 
larger institutions with which you are trying to intra-act. 
This is (probably) ultimately inevitable. The game is to 
see how long you can defer your own commodification, 
and how many ways can you anticipate and thus steer 
your eventual commodification. How many wrenches 
can you throw into the institutional works? How can you 
throw the brakes of inevitable institutional becoming in 
such a way that new and heretofore unimagined ways of 
becoming might emerge? Not anti-institutional becom-
ings or even alter-institutional becomings, but new ways 
of becoming that tweak the institutions themselves. How 
do you bait the institutions to swallow the trap of your 
apparatus? And how does your apparatus then deploy it-
self once inside those institutions, to mung up their de 
facto works? Much is at stake for art apparatuses that cut 
out such large and well-established chunks of the world.
Glossing Deleuze and Guattari’s cosmology of stratifi-
cation and territorialization, Brian Massumi explains:
The force of collective, expressive emergence will be 
streamed into stratified functions of power. Unless 
the collectivity in the making resists pick-up by an es-
tablished stratum, insisting on defining its own traits, 
in a self-capture of its own anomaly. In this case, they 
will retain a shade of the unclassifiable and a margin 
of unpredictability in the yes (or net) of existing sys-
tems of reference, no matter how hard those systems 
try fully to contain them […] (especially if the collec-
tive learns to creatively shed its traits as confidently 
as it cultivates them) [… The atypical expression] must 
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extract itself from captures ready and waiting, falling 
for an instant through the propositional mesh.54
Not only do BF and CA resist commodification and fall 
through the nets of institutional capture, on their way 
down they manage to mung up and slice into those insti-
tutional nets. Then they take the scraps of institutional 
netting that they have torn loose, and use those scraps to 
fashion hole-riddled wings for plummeting down newly 
emergent black holes.
54 Brian Massumi, “Introduction: Like a Thought,” in A Shock To 
Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi 





Haim Steinbach’s Object 
Ensembles
 
Since the 1970s, Haim Steinbach’s art practice has (most-
ly) involved arranging and displaying various objects on 
shelves. The shelves are specifically constructed to display 
the particular objects they are displaying. The objects are 
not affixed to the shelves; they merely rest on them. The 
shelves are usually colored in some way that correlates to 
the color of the objects, and often the shelves have two 
tiers. These custom shelving units displaying their ac-
companying objects are meant to be installed on walls, 
usually at about chest height, either in a collector’s home, 
a gallery, or a museum.
These ensemble shelf/object pieces function as lures 
and traps for human-generated critical and theoretical 
perspectives about objects and their relationship to hu-
mans and other objects. It is in this sense that Steinbach’s 
object ensembles function as apophatic art apparatuses. 
Surprisingly, numerous competing theories about objects 
are readily accommodated by Steinbach’s work. 
It might be objected that all art accommodates multiple 
interpretations, each of which may be convincingly sup-
ported by a number of equally valid critical perspectives. 
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I disagree. A Rembrandt self-portrait inherently rewards 
certain art-critical perspectives and thwarts certain oth-
ers. To critique a Rembrandt as if it were a Warhol would 
perhaps be a wacky post-modern exercise in perspectival 
subjectivity, but it would yield a poorer analysis of the 
Rembrandt than any number of critiques based on more 
formal or material aesthetic perspectives. A Rembrandt 
etching doesn’t purposefully give itself over to multiple 
critical perspectives. It is not that kind of art apparatus. 
It invites and accommodates certain perspectives while 
eluding and impoverishing other perspectives. Whereas, 
not only do Steinbach’s object ensembles draw out and 
yield themselves to multiple art critical perspectives, 
they also draw out and yield themselves to multiple and 
differing ideological and cosmological perspectives.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the Rem-
brandt etching, an accidental cobweb in the corner of a 
gallery is so unpurposeful, so unstaged, it welcomes any 
old kind of critical perspective at all. The cobweb invites 
all of the same, rote, unrigorous, boring, unproductive, 
philistine perspectives wielding all the same old, blunt, 
brutally well-trodden questions: Why is Duchamp’s uri-
nal even art? Why is Felix Gonzalez-Torres pile of can-
dy art? Why is Tracey Emin’s unmade bed art? Isn’t my 
child’s drawing just as good as Picasso’s? The cobweb in 
the corner may indeed function as an apparatus (because 
any part of the universe cut off from the rest of the uni-
verse may function as an apparatus), but it is not yet an 
explicitly human-directed (i.e., “art”) apparatus, because 
there is no human-devised, human-aware rigor or stag-
ing which would purposefully include humans in any par-
ticular way. The cobweb is not intended for humans. And 
so, we are left asking the same banal semantic questions 
about what constitutes art at all, rather than asking more 
rigorous questions about what this particular art appara-
tus is actually doing.
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Whereas I contend that Steinbach’s object ensembles 
have purposefully and willingly yielded themselves up 
to an onslaught of critical perspectives over the decades 
(and the parade of perspectives shows no sign of stop-
ping). By so utterly and unreservedly yielding to compet-
ing theoretical perspectives about objects, Steinbach’s 
work continues to elude, confound, and play the coquette 
to an army of theory suitors who continue to try (in vain) 
to woo it into becoming the object-lesson mascot of their 
object-centric theories. Through its apparent straightfor-
wardness and seeming openness to analysis, Steinbach’s 
work lures each of these theoretical perspectives into 
revealing itself. After all, these are just some objects ar-
ranged on a shelf, similar to what you might find on a 
knick-knack display shelf in your grandmother’s house 
(if your grandmother were a surrealistic metaphysical co-
median). (Most of) the objects aren’t moving. They are 
just sitting there. The objects don’t resist examination or 
theoretical capture. They don’t even resist physical cap-
ture, since they are not glued down to the shelves. Once 
a pair of basketball shoes was stolen from an object en-
semble at a gallery opening by a boy who wandered in 
and wanted a new pair of basketball shoes.1 According to 
Steinbach, the motivating question driving his entire art 
practice is deceptively simple: “What happens when you 
put things next to things?”2 His object ensembles evoke 
myriad interpretations not because they are occluded, 
misty, and vague; but precisely because they are so plain-
ly denuded (like a kind of object porn). The fact that they 
remain intriguing even after they have been so plainly 
1 Haim Steinbach, interview with the author at Steinbach’s New York 
studio, April 21, 2017.
2 Haim Steinbach, “Haim Steinbach in Conversation with Tom Ec-
cles, Beatrix Ruff, and Hans Ulrich Obrist,” in Haim Steinbach, Bea-
trix Ruf, et al.  Haim Steinbach: Object and Display (New York: Gregory 
R. Miller & Co, 2015), 362.
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and obviously “displayed” makes them all the more in-
triguing. Their plain apparentness is their lure.
Ultimately, however, the work resists being summa-
tively and reductively analyzed by any single explanatory 
theory. It accomplishes this feat by yielding to multiple 
explanatory theories simultaneously. Steinbach’s object 
ensembles are wily and acrobatic in their temporary dal-
liance with, but ultimate indifference toward, any single 
human-generated cosmology. The object ensembles are 
porously resistant. They are like ingenious, paradoxical, 
theory-confounding trawling nets: they capture other 
people’s interpretations in their own apparatal nets, but 
manage to slip through the nets of the interpretations 
which they capture.
Steinbach’s shelf/object artworks are human-designed 
apparatuses which orchestrate objects in such a provoca-
tive, open, curious, and faux-apparent way that they in-
voke and draw out of humans a variety of theories about 
objects. Steinbach’s apparatuses not only invoke various 
human interpretations, they willingly make themselves 
available as proof positive of these interpretations. They 
lure human-invented object-theories to the fore, tease 
them into articulation, and all without being summative-
ly captured by any of them. Although Steinbach’s appa-
ratuses appear to be object-centric and human agnostic, 
they are anything but. They are explicitly engineered by 
a human in order to provoke humans into thinking about 
objects, even when (particularly when) the human-con-
structed theories which they provoke claim that Stein-
bach’s art lets objects “speak for themselves.”
Before I proceed any further, I should introduce the 
particular Steinbach piece on which I will focus. It is ti-
tled 00:02 (2,4S). It was made in 1988 and acquired by the 
Stedelijk Museum in 1989. It is part of the Stedelijk’s per-
manent collection and is on display (as of summer 2018) 
in the sculpture room of “part two” (1980–now) of their 
displayed permanent collection (“steDeliJk Base”). The 
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piece is comprised of two trash cans and four lava lamps. 
The two trash cans sit toward the left on a large black 
shelf. The four lava lamps rest on a smaller silver shelf, 
inset into the right side of the black shelf, raised slightly 
above the black shelf, and protruding slightly to the right 
of the black shelf (see Fig. 1).
If the descriptive wall text in the Stedelijk is to be be-
lieved, “00:02” in the title refers to an amount of elapsed 
time; “2” and “4” in “(2,4S)” refer to the number of trash 
cans and lava lamps respectively; and “S” stands for 
“small” (because the same work has been realized in both 
large and small versions). The title of the work is a bit 
anomalous for Steinbach. Many of his shelf/object en-
sembles are either simply titled “Untitled” with a list of 
the objects in parentheses, or their titles are minimally 
sly and wry (to list just four examples: the village people; 
oxygen; oz; and orient point). His titles are sometimes fol-
lowed by numbers describing the identity of that particu-
lar shelf/object ensemble within a related series [to list 
four examples: Untitled (breast mugs, Marilyn guitar) I-2; 
Fig. 1: A Photograph I took of Haim Steinbach’s 00:02 (2,4S) at the Ste-
delijk Museum in 2018. Drawing by Jordan Cloninger.
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One minute managers I-1; One minute managers II-2; and One 
minute managers, IV-1]. The materials listed for 00:02 (2,4S) 
[hereafter referred to as 00:02] are “plywood, black veneer, 
silver-colored metal leaf, lava lamps, trash receptacles.”
I selected this piece as an example not because it is per-
fectly representative of Steinbach’s entire shelf oeuvre. 
Arguably, by design, no single shelf/object ensemble is 
representative of the others. Indeed, one interpretation 
of the object ensembles is that they purposefully trouble 
the line between “this” specific object (its haecceity) and 
this object as representative of a generic kind (its inter-
changeability). One reason I selected 00:02 is because it 
includes objects with well-decohered (not merely sub-
atomic) moving elements (the lava lamps are plugged in 
and their lava is “active”). Just as a point of comparison, 
two other objects with moving elements in Steinbach’s 
other ensembles are digital clocks and those wave ma-
chines that sit on office desks and see saw back and forth. 
I also selected 00:02 because it is a mixture of objects that 
are meant to be functionally utilized (the trash cans) and 
objects that are meant to be visually contemplated (the 
lava lamps). Finally, 00:02’s contextual situation in the 
Stedelijk Modern Sculpture room (across from Damian 
Hirst’s transparent bin of medical waste, and in the same 
room with Donald Judd’s phenomenology-centric chairs 
and Ashley Bickerton’s own version of an object ensem-
ble) affords a critical opportunity to comparatively think 
through what Steinbach’s work might uniquely be doing 
in the immediate physical vicinity of other work arguably 
functioning in similar ways.
Throughout the decades, people have theorized that 
Steinbach’s object ensembles were about: the objects 
themselves, the shelves themselves, about what an ob-
ject even is, about commodities and capital, about semi-
otics and language, about fundamental numerical rela-
tionships, about minimalism, about formalism, about 
found objects and readymades, about pop art, about the 
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psychological and mnemonic connection that humans 
have with objects, about domesticity, about the artist as 
curator, about minimalist phenomenological sculpture, 
about institutional critique, about symbolic narrative, 
and about Steinbach himself. Evocatively, and some-
what in line with my own approach to the work, Stein-
bach asserts, “It’s about the display showing itself being 
displayed.”3 This formulation is the inverse of Derrida’s 
formulation regarding the way in which the sublime (in-
adequately) presents itself: “Presentation […] is presented 
in its very inadequation, adequate to its inadequation. 
The inadequation of presentation is presented.”4 In the 
case of Steinbach’s object ensembles, his claim is that 
there is no man behind the curtain: no inaccessible sub-
lime “beyond” which obliquely reveals itself by prohibit-
ing our access to it. Quite the opposite, in fact. The object 
ensembles don’t simply display and disclose their con-
tent while occluding the act of display itself. Instead (at 
least according to Steinbach), the shelf/object ensembles 
are all openly, purposefully, and primarily displaying the 
fact that they are putting objects on display, regardless of 
the specific objects actually being displayed.
Whether we take Steinbach at his word or not depends 
on our own interpretation of what the work itself is do-
ing, but I find his claim intriguing at least. It suggests 
that the things on display (whether as types or singulari-
ties; whether as semiotic signifiers or surplus commodi-
ties; whether as “enduring objects” or “societies of actual 
entities;” whether “in-themselves,” “for-us,” or “in-them-
selves-for-us”) are simply there to jump-start the more 
primary meta-function of their holistic art apparatus: 
namely, to display the act of displaying. You can’t display 
nothing, so you must start with something. But the work 
3 Ibid., 365.
4 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 131.
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is not really about the somethings (per se); it is about the 
act of displaying (in toto). What it is it to display? Is dis-
playing the same as disclosing? Uncovering? And if so, 
uncovering what? Essences? Qualities? Intra-object rela-
tionships? The act of uncovering itself? Also, uncovering 
to whom? To humans? To other objects? To being itself? 
All very Heideggerian and Derridean questions.
When I initially encountered Steinbach’s object en-
sembles, I had the distinct impression that their creator 
had somehow mastered access into the essences and sub-
jectivities of ordinary objects. The work bodily affected 
me. It still does. Initially, it seemed like Steinbach was 
some kind of object-whisperer. I don’t quite believe that 
anymore. I still believe Steinbach is a master, but he is 
a master at discerning the affinities that objects seem to 
have with one another (based on their production histo-
ries, material qualities, formal qualities, past functional 
uses, historical cultural connotations, art historical reso-
nances) all from his own capacious human perspective; and he 
is a master at staging those objects in order to evoke rich 
and resonant responses from other humans. I concur with 
Germano Celant’s observation that “[Steinbach] wants to 
verify [the thing’s] degree of seduction and persuasion, of 
delight and repulsion.”5 Yes, but verify to whom? To him-
self and to other humans. It turns out Steinbach’s work 
wasn’t deftly revealing the subjective hidden language 
of objects right before my eyes; instead, Steinbach was 
orchestrating objects in such a way that I intuited them 
talking to each other. He was creating inviting and con-
notative blanks for me to fill in. What I initially mistook 
as the occult voice of the objects I now recognize as the 
siren voice of the holistic apparatus, luring me into its in-
genious trap: a trap set in holistic collaboration with the 
objects, the shelves, and art history; a trap for humans, 
5 Germano Celant, “An Existential Building Site,” in Steinbach, Ruf, et 
al., Haim Steinbach, 389.
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invented by a human. At least that is the theory which 
the object ensembles are currently provoking from me.
According to this position, 00:02 functions as a kind 
of double-slit apparatus for human-generated cosmolo-
gies. Whereas Young’s apparatus is “measuring” photons, 
Steinbach’s apparatus is “measuring” humans. In Young’s 
double slit apparatus, humans are purposefully exclud-
ed from the experimental measurement results, and the 
photons themselves are left to make their own decisions 
and marks. In Steinbach’s 00:02, humans are purposefully 
invited into the apparatus. We are lured into believing 
that we are measuring the results of the intra-actions 
between trash cans and lava lamps. We declare them ei-
ther withdrawn objects (per object oriented philosophy), 
ongoing events (per process philosophy), linguistic signi-
fiers (per Saussurean semiotics), etc. We imagine we are 
reckoning the marks these objects have made; when in 
truth, we are the ones making the marks and getting reck-
oned. All the while, the trash cans and lava lamps “them-
selves” remain, utterly indifferent to our presumptuous 
cosmological pronouncements on their behalf. 00:02 isn’t 
an object-centric apparatus for measuring trash cans and 
lava lamps; it is a display-centric apparatus employing 
trash cans and lava lamps to measure humans.
The rest of this chapter will examine some of the hu-
man-generated cosmologies and ideologies that Stein-
bach’s shelf/object ensembles have enticed thus far, 
beginning with past dalliances and proceeding toward 
the work’s most recent paramour, object-oriented ontol-
ogy (and in particular, its progenitor, Graham Harman’s 
dashing yet troubled object-oriented philosophy). We 
will conclude our examination of the theory suitors with 
one of the work’s most ardent and persistent hopefuls, 
semiotics. This will lead to my own personal favorite (yet 
still woefully unrequited) theoretical interpretation, the 
artist as master craftsman of the medium known as ob-
ject arranging.
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Suitor #1: Symbolic Narrative
There was an idea in 1970s art criticism that every object 
contained its own narrative. Critics subscribing to this 
approach failed to understand or appreciate Steinbach’s 
work, because they were not able to interpret his ensem-
bles in terms of any sort of cohesive symbolic story. His 
work was criticized as nonsense. There seemed to be no 
“meaningful” relationship between his objects. In fact, 
the objects in Steinbach’s ensembles have always been 
very purposefully selected and arranged. His selections 
and arrangements are not in the least random or non-
sensical. It’s just that the work doesn’t parade any overtly 
symbolic narrative “meaning.” Instead, Steinbach’s ob-
ject-selections and object-groupings are driven by his 
own oblique attunement to objects rather than by any 
agreed upon cultural symbolism (or even by any idiosyn-
cratic, personal mythology, à la Matthew Barney).
In an attempt to interpret the object ensembles as 
“narratives,” we might choose to see Steinbach as the 
director, the shelves as the stage, and the objects as the 
actors. But the object ensembles are not really “plays.” 
There is no “narrative plot,” no “rising action.” The clos-
est we are going to get to symbolic narrative is the para-
digm of a staged tableau, in which case Steinbach is more 
like a stage director, or perhaps a prop master, or is he 
the wedding photographer, or perhaps the tableau place-
ment orchestrator, or maybe the window dresser of a de-
partment store product display? If we must interpret the 
object ensembles as “narratives” at all, they enact a new 
kind of symbolic language developed by Steinbach in col-
laboration with the histories, forms, and materialities of 
the objects that “star” in his micro-tableaus. But if that 
is indeed the case, why awkwardly strain to retroactively 
shoehorn these object ensembles into the anthropocen-
tric constraints of “symbolism” and “narrative” at all?
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Despite the overall weaknesses of this symbolic narra-
tive approach toward the shelf/object ensembles, the en-
sembles themselves are nevertheless able to seduce and 
draw out (human-supplied) symbolic interpretations. For 
example, to me, when I first saw 00:02, it seemed like all 
of the objects were in some sort of object rock band. The 
two black trash cans were like twin, male, death metal 
lead guitarists; and the four lava lamps on their raised 
silver background platform seemed like female, doo-wop 
backup singers. The title 00:02 seemed to allude to John 
Cage’s 4’33’’. To me, the entire ensemble seemed like a 
conceptual speedmetal doo-wop John Cage cover band, 
except the band was so minimalist and monumental, 
they only made it two seconds into the performance be-
fore they froze. The only thing left moving was the slow 
undulation of the lava in the lamps, which was like the 
fluttering poodle skirts of the doo-wop backup singers. 
According to this symbolic narrative interpretation, I just 
happened to walk into the room at the four second mark 
of the performance, right after the band had frozen.
To add further fuel to the symbolic suitor fire, Stein-
bach says that the squawking stuffed pumpkin object 
that appears in several of his ensembles actually sym-
bolizes the Belgian critic Thierry de Duve, who criticized 
Steinbach for betraying Duchamp.6 This proves that the 
symbolic narrative interpretation is correct!
Seriously, the symbolic narrative suitor is ill-matched 
to the object ensembles because it is too wed to the other 
media for which it was more purposefully developed (fic-
tional literature, theater, and film). Applying it to Stein-
bach’s work proves an awkward fit.
6 Haim Steinbach, interview with the author at Steinbach’s New York 
studio, April 21, 2017.
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Suitor #2: Found Objects and Readymades
Steinbach’s work doesn’t betray Duchamp. If anything, it 
continues and complexifies what Duchamp was doing, 
and in so doing, exceeds it. Duchamp was interested in 
displaying everyday, manufactured objects in a museum 
setting to undermine the value placed on rare, esoteric, 
hand-crafted objects within the modern art world and 
the modern art market of the early Twentieth Century. 
The gallery was a key context for Duchamp’s historical 
move. In contrast, Steinbach’s investigation of the mech-
anisms of display doesn’t require the gallery; it also works 
in the home of a collector beyond the gallery building (if 
not beyond the art market). Steinbach’s practice is less 
institution-centric. Furthermore, Steinbach’s objects 
are much more diverse than Duchamp’s. Steinbach’s ob-
jects include Yoda heads, ancient pottery, rocks, rubber 
dog chew toys, Hulk hands, medicine balls, and eastern 
European salt shakers. Although most of Steinbach’s ob-
jects are man-made, not all of them are. Also, many of his 
objects dive headlong into proper-name pop culture in 
a way Duchamp’s objects refuse to. Duchamp dealt with 
coffee grinders and snow shovels, not C-3PO and Tony 
the Tiger.
There is of course a comparison to be made between 
Joseph Cornell’s object-filled boxes and Steinbach’s ob-
ject-laden shelves, but the comparison proves superficial. 
Cornell is exploring a kind of personal object surreal-
ism, combining wondercabinetry with Magritte’s object 
synecdoche. Steinbach’s object combinations might ini-
tially seem interpretable through this lens, but the viewer 
winds up encountering object assemblages that refuse to 
assemble, even according to the alter-logic of surrealism. 
Perhaps Steinbach is akin to artists like Mark Dion and 
Fred Wilson who also use and arrange objects. But Wil-
son’s arrangements are made with an explicit interest in 
the social history of his objects, often in order to subvert 
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the implicit colonial perspective of museological curat-
ing. And Mark Dion’s arrangements are meant to evoke a 
cultural memory of Victorian exploration and early sci-
entific experimentation. Steinbach is also interested in 
the cultural history of his objects, but this is not his pri-
mary interest.
All of the artists mentioned (and we could add Daniel 
Spoerri, Arman, the Fluxus box artists, and Ashley Bick-
erton) have engaged in the collection, arrangement, and 
display of objects they did not themselves “make.” But, so 
what? Each of these artists is pursuing very different top-
ical and conceptual trajectories. A similarity in process 
and media alone is not enough to group Steinbach with 
the found object artists. No one would curate a group 
show of Vermeer, Klee, Rothko, and Bob Ross simply be-
cause they all used brushes to distribute paint on canvas. 
Once again, the object ensembles entice, yield, and pass 
through the trawling net of another theory suitor.
Suitor #3: Minimalist Phenomenological Sculpture
The shelf/object ensembles may be considered as mini-
malist phenomenological sculptures. From this theoreti-
cal perspective, Steinbach removes everything but the 
essentials in order to cause us to experience what the 
essentials are essentially doing. The work of minimalist 
sculptor Robert Irwin seems a particularly relevant point 
of comparison, since Irwin is intent on foregrounding 
spaces between objects rather than objects themselves. 
Or rather, Irwin uses ephemeral materials to create gaps 
that our bodies are meant to phenomenologically experi-
ence. Irwin’s sculptures are like dimensional versions of 
John Cage’s 4’33’’. The sculptures are more about removal 
than addition. Regarding earlier experimental exercises 
that led Irwin to his process of removal, he recalls, “Maybe 
it didn’t need any of the details I added. What was really 
376
some ways of making nothing
essential was going on there anyway.”7 Irwin biographer 
Lawrence Weschler adds, “The point of these exercises, it 
sometimes seemed, was to achieve the maximum trans-
formation with the minimum alteration.”8
Steinbach’s process seems similar. Select an initial 
group of objects that seem to have an affinity with each 
other; add and remove objects, fine-tuning the relation-
ships between the objects; rearrange the objects, moving 
them further apart and closer together; sit with the ob-
jects; walk away from them; think about the objects while 
absent from them; revisit the ensemble; continue rear-
ranging, until… what? Until, according to Weschler’s dic-
tum, the maximum transformation is achieved with the 
minimum alteration. But the maximum transformation 
of… what? In Irwin’s case, the maximum transformation 
of the space of the room. In Steinbach’s case, the maxi-
mum transformation from plain old objects on any old 
shelf into… what? Into maximally resonating objects on 
a shelf? Into maximally receding objects on a shelf? Into 
objects on a shelf with the maximal discrepancy between 
what they seem to be doing and what they are actually do-
ing? It is hard to say exactly. On the process of addition 
via removal, Irwin invokes Wortz’s law: “Each new whole 
is less than the sum of its parts.”9 From a minimalist the-
oretical perspective, this law applies to Steinbach’s work 
as well.
Both Irwin and Steinbach are meticulously precise. 
The shadows that the trash cans and lava lamps cast in 
00:02 are perfectly symmetrical and can’t help but be 
read as intentional. The minimalist sculptural approach 
to precision and detail is always present and palpable in 
Steinbach’s shelf/object ensembles. Also, in a home, no 
7 Lawrence Weschler, Seeing Is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One Sees: 
A Life of Contemporary Artist Robert Irwin (Berkeley: University of Cali-





one would put a trash can on a shelf at chest height; by 
doing this, 00:02 forces us to feel the scale and volume of 
that trash can in implicit proprioceptive relation to the 
volume of our own chests. Such a move is straight from 
Donald Judd’s playbook.
And of course, there are the shelves themselves, which 
are perfectly milled, seamlessly joined, and precisely fin-
ished. As with many of Steinbach’s shelves, the shelves 
of 00:02 are triangular when viewed from the side, and 
the raised triangular shelf eases into the base-level trian-
gular shelf in a proportional relationship appreciative of 
fundamental geometric forms. If 00:02 were simply the 
shelves without the objects, it might still hold its own in 
the post-1980 sculpture room at the Stedelijk. Regarding 
Steinbach’s shelves, sculptor Lisa Lapinski proposes, “The 
shelf works are fractions: the things in the world divided 
by the minimalist object.”10
And yet Steinbach and Robert Irwin are, in many 
ways, worlds apart. Whereas Irwin’s sculptures achieve 
their less-ness by receding yet remaining, Steinbach’s 
object ensembles achieve their lessness by exceeding yet 
remaining. Steinbach’s objects give everything away in 
plain sight. Instead of being subtle and shrouded, they 
are utterly denuded and presented. Irwin’s materials are 
shadow and light. Steinbach’s materials are shadow, light, 
and Yoda heads. Steinbach takes maximal, wacky, incon-
gruous objects from contemporary pop capitalism and 
displays them with all the care, precision, attention, and 
concern of a Donald Judd cube. The results are strange and 
jarring. Steinbach’s presentations seem to monumental-
ize and Platonize his otherwise banal objects. Steinbach 
is not a minimalist sculptor per se, but he applies the tac-
tics of minimalist sculpture to the contents of the Sears 
Catalog in order to display an array of mass-produced 
10 Bruce Hainley, “Haim Steinbach: Sonnabend Gallery, New York,” 
Artforum 46, no. 4 (December 2007): 339.
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objects as phenomenally profound. Is Steinbach reveal-
ing these objects as phenomenally profound (this would 
be the claim of minimalist phenomenological sculpture), 
or is he merely staging them to seem phenomenally pro-
found? Or… is he throwing these objects into an aporetic 
toggling apparatus that perpetually flips them back and 
forth between profound object and banal object until we 
start to question what it is to “display” something in the 
first place? My money is on this last interpretation.
Suitor #4: Pop Art
Steinbach’s work incorporates objects from popular cul-
ture, but he treats them in decidedly non-pop art ways. 
Regarding his choice of objects, Steinbach says, “What’s 
most important is that all of these objects are in the world; 
they are part of our language. And they overlap.”11 Stein-
bach selects objects from popular culture not because he 
wants to celebrate pop culture, or critique it, or use it to 
critique 1960s minimalism. He selects objects from popu-
lar culture because he is interested in the world and the 
ways in which humans are in the world. The creation, use, 
circulation, sale, and resale of objects is a primary way 
that contemporary humans are in the world. Given this 
broader interest in the mass production, consumption, 
and circulation of objects themselves, if Steinbach is a 
pop artist, he is a quite heady and conceptual one. One 
obvious difference between Steinbach and pop artists 
proper is that Steinbach uses actual objects from contem-
porary mass consumer culture rather than making copies 
of them. Andy Warhol makes his own Brillo Boxes. Such 
weak mimeticism is Warhol’s strong conceptual move. 
Steinbach doesn’t make his own Yoda heads. He just buys 
11 Steinbach, “Haim Steinbach in Conversation with Tom Eccles, Bea-
trix Ruff, and Hans Ulrich Obrist,” 369.
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them off of eBay. Incidentally, Pope.L’s Black Factory in-
corporates Yoda heads as well (albeit shrink wrapped to 
racist literature and sold from a mobile truck). But the 
mere use of Yoda heads does not make one a pop artist. 
Even compared to apparently similar work like Jeff 
Koons’s stacked vacuum cleaners in plexiglass (which are 
actual vacuum cleaners), Steinbach’s ensembles are ex-
ploring different territory. I find Koons’s vacuum clean-
er stacks beautiful and monumental (they are the only 
works of his I like), and that seems to be Koons’s objective 
with them – to reveal a mass-produced commodity item 
as aesthetically beautiful in a classical sculptural sense. 
Whereas Steinbach is not primarily interested in celebrat-
ing the hidden beauty of his objects by recontextualizing 
them in a museum setting. Instead, Steinbach is more 
interested in the implicit (human-inferred?, human-
imbued?) resonances of the objects within the ensemble, 
and the potential conceptual connections that suddenly 
materialize in the space around the objects when they are 
removed from their commodity contexts and given some 
breathing room. Also, some of Steinbach’s shelf objects 
(like rocks, and even our two black trash cans) don’t really 
come from “pop” culture. They just come from the world.
Suitor #5: Marxism
Marxism (of the art criticism variety) arrives hard on the 
heels of the pop art suitor to scold the object ensembles 
for not shunning pop art altogether. Apparently, even a 
weekend fling with pop art is enough to label you Mrs. 
Pop Art in the eyes of the Marxist suitor. The object en-
sembles should have publicly declared their intentions 
toward Pop Art early on. If they were not serious about 
Pop Art, they should have properly distanced themselves 
from him via irony. They should have at least made some 
overt protestations (if not in the work itself, then at least 
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in an accompanying artist statement)! Otherwise, Stein-
bach’s work risks complicity endorsing and celebrat-
ing its objects (which are obviously from contemporary 
popular culture); and by proxy, endorsing and celebrating 
the capitalist system that produces these popular com-
modities. Shame on you, object ensembles, for allowing 
yourselves to be seduced by the lascivious charlatan of 
Pop Art!
This Marxist critique might be valid if the object en-
sembles weren’t also simultaneously giving themselves 
over to every legitimate suitor who passes through the 
door. And, of course, the object ensembles give them-
selves over to the Marxist suitor as well. But it is at best 
an awkward blind date (with your ex-boyfriend’s activ-
ist uncle). The Marxist suitor does all the talking without 
taking the time to really get to know the object ensem-
bles. What’s a nice apophatic art apparatus to do?
Regarding Steinbach’s approach to his objects, Germa-
no Celant explains, “[His] orientation is inclusive in na-
ture and incorporates in the work the greatest quantity 
of things and information, of corporeal and mass-media 
traces, with an open and unbiased attitude.”12 This open-
ness to capitalist culture disturbs the Marxist suitor, but 
it is precisely this same broad openness that lures multi-
ple and even competing theoretical interpretations into 
Steinbach’s work.
Furthermore, and as mentioned above in regards to 
their relationship with pop art, the object ensembles 
don’t always incorporate mass-produced contemporary 
objects. A wonderful example of this is a piece called Un-
titled ( jugs and mugs), Number 1 from the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art’s permanent collection. The piece consists 
of two shelves, one above the other, whose materials are 
listed as “Laminated plywood, ceramic mugs, and ancient 
12 Germano Celant, “An Existential Building Site,” in Steinbach, Ruf, et 
al., Haim Steinbach, 389.
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pottery.” The top shelf supports four ancient, handmade, 
earthenware vessels. The bottom shelf supports three 
contemporary, mass-produced ceramic mugs, one of 
which displays Milton Glaser’s “I heart ny” logo. Yes, the 
ceramic mugs are products of contemporary popular cul-
ture, but like the earthenware jugs, they are also vessels 
for gathering (to reference late-era Heidegger). jugs and 
mugs consists of seven ceramic vessels created by humans 
to hold liquids. The earthenware jugs are antique arche-
ological objects, quite pre-capitalism. The point of this 
and other object ensembles, then, is to engage with all 
of human culture, throughout history, via the display of 
objects. An engagement with “capitalism” is necessarily 
part of that overall project, but not an exclusive part of it.
Furthermore, the object ensembles are not above cel-
ebrating certain aspects of capitalism. Steinbach tells of 
growing up, going to the dry goods store, knowing what 
you wanted, but having to ask the clerk to retrieve it for 
you, because all of the objects were behind the counter. 
He describes his first visit to a supermarket as a positive 
experience: “There was the supermarket, which was sup-
posed to be the modernism that you were against, but I 
liked it. You could walk down the aisles, and there were 
all the things on the shelves in front of you.”13 There is 
something inarguably wondrous about having row upon 
row of objects displayed on shelves within one’s grasp.
Of course, Steinbach’s object ensembles put the ob-
jects back behind the counter, so to speak; but not ex-
actly. There is something important about the fact that 
the objects are not affixed to the shelves. It mattered to 
the boy who stole the shoes off the shelves at the gal-
lery opening. And it matters to the collectors who display 
the object ensembles in their own homes. Each collector 
has the very real option of putting her own objects on 
13 Haim Steinbach, interview with the author at Steinbach’s New York 
studio, April 21, 2017.
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the shelves, creating a collaborative work with the art-
ist. The Marxist suitor complains that the work fetishiz-
es the objects by separating them from their use value. 
But Steinbach points out that, once collected, the digital 
clocks and boom boxes in the ensembles may be left on 
in one’s home,14 providing the use value of music and the 
current local time. And although a docent at the Stedelijk 
would have surely objected, there was nothing physically 
prohibiting me from using the trash cans in 00:02 as trash 
cans.
Suitor #6: Formalism
Although Steinbach is not primarily interested in the 
aesthetic beauty of his objects from a classical, beaux 
arts perspective; he is interested in their formal aesthetic 
qualities (shape, color, volume, materiality, opacity, re-
flectivity, scale, balance, symmetry/asymmetry, mobility/
stability, serial progression) from a modernist or formal-
ist perspective. His objects appear beautiful not because 
they are inherently beautiful, but primarily because of 
the way in which he arranges and displays them. Koons 
couldn’t lose with his stack of vacuum cleaners. They 
were already beautiful on the Sears showroom floor. But 
Steinbach has his formal aesthetic work cut out for him 
with a box of Fruit Loops cereal. Steinbach’s eye for for-
malist aesthetics transforms his objects into something 
much more beautiful than they were on the grocery store 
shelf. This transformation is part of what it is to “display” 
something.
The shelf arrangements all have formal properties. The 
shelves themselves are triangular volumes. The objects 
on the shelves are always formally related to one another. 




bach says, “I am dealing with the same angles at differ-
ent scales and proportions. Then I am amplifying them 
by extending them horizontally. And I am playing with 
color throughout.”15 This attention to formal aesthetic 
principles comes through implicitly and explicitly in the 
work. The object ensembles are always well-proportioned 
and beautiful.
Still, these formal aesthetic qualities are a means 
rather than an end. They display (help us recognize?) the 
objects as having not just popular connotative qualities, 
but also formal aesthetic qualities. Steinbach’s formal-
ism and minimalism concurrently make the objects seem 
profound. Simultaneously, the ordinary historical usage 
of the objects (the trash cans and lava lamps of 00:02, for 
instance) often make the objects seem banal. This tog-
gling back and forth between banal and profound is one 
of 00:02’s major apophatic tactics. Steinbach’s shelf/ob-
ject ensembles court, use, and employ formalism to help 
achieve their desired apophatic effects; but they are wise 
enough not to begin and end with formalism alone.
Suitor #7: Psychology
As far as a psychological explanation of the poetic ways 
in which humans relate to objects – mnemonically, em-
pathetically, and affectionately – I trust and enjoy Peter 
Schwenger’s excellent The Tears of Things: Melancholy and 
Physical Objects. Via nostalgia and sentimentality, objects 
act for humans as unwitting mnemonic horcruxes (my 
analogy, not Schwenger’s), storing parts of our memories 
inside themselves for our later involuntary retrieval. I 
also find Schwenger’s own interpretation of Steinbach’s 
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But no one tops Proust in evocatively describing the 
psychological, subjective relationships that humans de-
velop with the objects of their own personal histories. 
Here is a selection of relevant excerpts from À la recherche 
du temps perdu: 
Love, and suffering which is one with love, have, like 
intoxication, the power to alter for us inanimate 
things.16 
Only imagination and belief can differentiate from the 
rest certain objects, certain people, and can create an 
atmosphere.17 
With the sandwiches of cheese or of green-stuff, a 
form of food that was novel to me and knew nothing 
of the past, I had nothing in common. But the cakes 
understood, the tarts were gossips.18 
We exist only by virtue of what we possess, we possess 
only what is really present to us […]. A simple crescent 
of bread, but one which we are eating, gives us more 
pleasure than all the ortolans, young rabbits and bar-
bavelles that were set before Louis XV.19 
16 Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff 
(1925; Paris: Feedbooks, 2014), 145, http://www.feedbooks.com/
book/1449/the-guermantes-way.
17 Ibid., 27.
18 Marcel Proust, Within a Budding Grove, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff 
(1924; Paris: Feedbooks, 2014), 430, http://www.feedbooks.com/
book/1448/within-a-budding-grove.
19 Marcel Proust, The Sweet Cheat Gone, trans. C. K. Scott-Moncrieff 




All impression is two-fold, half-sheathed in the object, 
prolonged in ourselves by another half which we alone 
can know.20
Wonderful as Proust is, Steinbach is not fully convinced. 
Regarding Proust’s conception of objects, Steinbach ob-
serves, “We put our life into objects, and we leave, and 
others come in and find us in the objects, or so we believe 
when we meet objects. But we are fooling ourselves.”21 
My own problem with the psychological explanation of 
Steinbach’s work is that it presumes a hard and fast sub-
ject–object divide. It would be very uncomfortable with 
Whitehead’s dissolution of the subject–object divide 
via his concept of the superject – the idea that during 
the concrescences of actual occasions, “human” entities 
and “non-human” entities are both subject and object si-
multaneously. Regarding Steinbach’s object ensembles, 
if I had to place a wager on which of these two entities 
(human or non-human) was doing most of the prehend-
ing (in other words, which one was acting most “subject-
like”), my bet would definitely be on the human. (And 
I say this not just because I am a human!) This is why 
I’m not terribly bothered by the psychological account of 
Steinbach’s work, an account which posits humans as the 
main agents in these encounters between humans and 
shelf/object ensembles. But again, there is more going on 
in these apparatal intra-actions than human subjectiv-
ity merely psychologically imputing characteristics into 
otherwise passively inert object receptacles.
20 Marcel Proust, Time Regained, trans. Stephen Hudson (1931; Paris: 
Feedbooks, 2014), 157, http://www.feedbooks.com/book/1453/time-
regained.
21 Haim Steinbach, interview with the author at Steinbach’s New York 
studio, April 21, 2017.
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Suitor #8: Process Philosophy
I put Whitehead’s own process philosophy explanation at 
#8 because I don’t want to give it the last word (since my 
argument is that no suitor gets the last word); but also 
because, in the case of the shelf/object ensembles, I don’t 
intuitively and affectively feel that process philosophy is 
the most convincing explanation of what is happening. 
The trash cans and lava lamps of 00:02 sure seem solid 
enough. Viewing them, I sure seem like a discrete hu-
man subject. It doesn’t seem like the objects and I are in-
volved in an ongoing series of occasions whereby we are 
prehending each other. 00:02 is not displayed to draw my 
attention to present-tense time and immediate process. 
On the contrary, my attention is drawn away from the 
idea of an ongoing series of events, and toward the quite 
hermetically sealed, removed, pristine, idealized, static, 
Platonic presentation of the objects.
But, of course, this is simply how the encounter seems 
to me. Henri Bergson explains what might actually be 
happening: 
Does not the fiction of an isolated material object im-
ply a kind of absurdity, since this object borrows its 
physical properties from the relations which it main-
tains with all others, and owes each of its determi-
nations, and, consequently, its very existence, to the 
place which it occupies in the universe as a whole?22 
According to Bergson, my very act of reckoning the ob-
jects as separate from me, is itself a kind of intra-action 
with the objects: “Perception, in its pure state, is, then, 
in very truth, a part of things.”23 By stepping back, reflec-
22 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and 




tively scratching my chin, and trying to think detachedly 
about the nature of subject and object, I only seem to in-
crease the subject–object divide. When in reality, accord-
ing to Karen Barad’s reading of Niels Bohr, “We are a part 
of that nature that we seek to understand.”24
As one would expect, Whitehead has more to add on 
the matter of our own detached perception of objects:
Reaction to environment is not in proportion to clar-
ity of sensory experience […]. The specialist in clarity 
sinks to an animal level – the hound for smell, the 
eagle for sight. Human beings are amateurs in sense 
experience. The direct, vivid clarity does not dominate 
so as to obscure the infinite variety involved in the 
composition of reality.25 
Perhaps there is another, less abstractly generalized, more 
viscerally specialized way of encountering these object 
ensembles? Whitehead suggests there is: “The subject-
object relation can be conceived as Recipient and Pro-
voker, where the fact provoked is an affective tone about 
the status of the provoker in the provoked experience.”26 
Applying this model to my own situation at the Stedelijk, 
00:02 provokes an affective tone about its status which 
I receive in our shared occasional experience. I am no 
longer a removed subject over here, perceiving 00:02 as a 
separate object over there, and then detachedly contem-
plating the object I am perceiving.
In truth, whether or not I ever achieve the mental state 
of “becoming object,” I am always already entangled with 
the objects of 00:02. Whitehead explains: “Every indi-
24 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 26.
25 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free 
Press, 1968), 113.
26 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 
1967), 176.
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vidual thing infects any process in which it is involved, 
and thus any process cannot be considered in abstrac-
tion from particular things involved. Also the converse 
holds.”27 Furthermore, “The group of agitations which we 
term matter is fused into its environment. There is no 
possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence. 
The environment enters into the nature of each thing.”28 
I don’t have to consciously attend to this moment by mo-
ment process of concrescence in order to make it happen. 
It is always already happening.
It is important to understand that the actual occa-
sions in which 00:02 participates, although intended by 
Steinbach to include a human audience, are by no means 
contingent upon human participation in those occa-
sions. Much of what 00:02 contributes to its occasions 
is negatively prehended (or minimally prehended) by 
entities other than humans (i.e., the rest of the objects 
in the sculpture room), but 00:02 presents its contribu-
tions nonetheless. Affect is actual, and not solely human-
psychological. Humans don’t manufacture affect in their 
psychological, “subjective” minds. 
Does this mean that all of the objects in the sculpture 
room of the Stedelijk are picking up on all the affect the 
other objects are exuding? No. Does it mean there is an 
excessive surplus of noun-ish affect stored within the hid-
den molten core of each object? No. It means that affect 
is produced and contributed when apparatal entangle-
ments occur (i.e., when actual occasions occur), and they 
are occurring all the time. As Karen Barad asserts, “Real-
ity is composed not of things in-themselves or things-
behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena.”29 Are 
these actual occasions contingent upon human pres-
ence? No.
27 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 97–98.
28 Ibid., 138.
29 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 140.
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With that said, something is happening between 
me and 00:02 well beyond me looking at it and think-
ing about it, and well beyond it displaying itself to me. 
Are the (actual occasions that comprise the enduring) 
objects of 00:02 prehending me in the same way and to 
the same degree that (the actual occasions that comprise 
the enduring object called) I am prehending them? No. 
As I continue to argue, the trash cans and the lava lamps 
are mostly negatively prehending me. Were they mostly 
negatively prehending Steinbach when he was arranging 
and re-arranging them in his studio? No. They were more 
actively attending to those arrangement intra-actions. 
Were the trash cans negatively prehending the metal ex-
trusion machine at the factory which molded them into 
shape? Again, no. Those formational, transformative ac-
tual occasions “meant” more to the enduring object that 
was to become known as “trash can” than the subsequent 
actual occasions of me standing in the Stedelijk gazing 
upon it. By “meant more,” do I mean anything like what 
the word “mean” means to a human? No. According to my 
understanding of Whitehead, all objects “experience” (in 
their own thingy ways), but only human objects experi-
ence in humany ways.
Thus, according to process philosophy, all of the en-
tities in the Stedelijk sculpture room (myself included) 
are prehending and prehended by each other moment by 
moment as usual, all in our own well-decided and deco-
hered, macrocosmically scaled, thingy or humany ways. 
But the most remarkable intra-active encounters in the 
sculpture room are occurring not amongst the shelf ob-
jects themselves, nor amongst the other artworks in 
the room, but amongst the artworks and the enduring 
objects in the room known as humans. This is because 
all the artworks in the room are apparatuses specifically 
designed by humans to intra-act with humans; and also, 
because humans are, in truth, quite remarkable and pe-
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culiar enduring objects. (And I say this not just because I 
am a human!)
00:02 allows this process philosophy interpretation, 
but doesn’t exactly foreground it. Our process philosophy 
suitor is invited to the theory party, but 00:02 doesn’t go 
out of her way to dance with him. Which suits process 
philosophy just fine, because (according to process phi-
losophy) he and 00:02 were always already dancing any-
way.
The Suitor Du Jour:  
Object-Oriented Ontology
Object-oriented ontology is the theoretical dandy cur-
rently courting Steinbach’s object ensembles; and indeed, 
courting contemporary art in general. The genealogy 
of its popularity may be traced back to a conference in 
2007 at Goldsmiths College in London called Speculative 
Realism where four philosophers spoke (Ray Brassier, Ian 
Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillas-
soux). Subsequently, these philosophers discovered that 
they didn’t really have all that much in common, but the 
conference spawned academic discussion and helped 
popularize the philosophy of Graham Harman known 
as object-oriented philosophy. This philosophy in turn 
spawned its own broader flavor of thought known as 
object-oriented ontology (whose main propagators are 
Harman, Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, and Timothy Morton).
A decade from now, the amount of time that I devote 
to object-oriented ontology (hereafter ooo) and object-
oriented philosophy (hereafter oop) will likely seem scat-
ological, dated, and all very two-thousand-teenish. But 
here we are. I will focus most of my attention on Harman’s 
oop. It is the progenitor of broader approaches to ooo; it 
makes the most daring claims of positions within ooo; 
and it is the position within ooo that proves the most 
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fruitful foil to Whitehead’s process philosophy. Rather 
than begin with oop’s goals, motivations, and challenges, 
I will skip to the end and explain the cosmology it wound 
up proposing. This explication is based on Harman’s first 
two books (Tool-Being and Guerilla Metaphysics), and his 
2011 book The Quadruple Object.
What Does OOP Claim?
oop proposes that all real objects are withdrawn and can-
not be directly accessed by other objects. (Humans are 
objects too.) Real objects store a reserve of excess poten-
tial within themselves that can never be exhausted by 
other objects or the world. Real objects are divided from 
their own real qualities. Real objects are also divided 
from sensual objects, which are themselves divided from 
their own sensual qualities. When we feel we are coming 
into contact with real objects, we are in fact only contact-
ing sensual objects. These four parts (real objects, real 
qualities, sensual objects, and sensual qualities) make 
up the world. These four parts are able to influence each 
other, but only obliquely and via indirect causation. The 
particular way in which this indirect causation occurs is 
aesthetic, a kind of poetic encounter made possible via 
(something akin to) metaphor and (something akin to) 
humor. Indirect causation is not a metaphorical encoun-
ter (per se), but an actual encounter that takes place via 
something like metaphor, where one object encounters 
another object obliquely, and the first object is changed 
via that indirect encounter. I encounter (the sensual in-
stantiation of) a cypress tree, it seems like the ghost of a 
dead flame, and I am changed. I’ll never look at a cypress 
tree the same way again. It becomes a different entity for 
me. How this aesthetic encounter changes the (real in-
stantiation of the) cypress tree itself, and what the ex-
act mechanisms of that change are, remain unclear and 
speculative in oop’s explanatory cosmology. Presum-
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ably, the real cypress tree has similar (but less human, 
more thingy) metaphor-ish encounters with (the sen-
sual instantiations of) other objects, and it too is (really) 
changed.
These poetic, metaphor-driven change encounters 
are the weak link in the oop cosmology for me. Whereas 
Whitehead provides a detailed account of the concres-
cence and emergent self-becoming of actual occasions 
(one that has the benefit of correlating with the way in 
which quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses happen 
to work), oop provides oblique descriptions of oblique 
encounters. Whitehead understands the world primarily 
in terms of processes (verbs). oop understands the world 
almost exclusively in terms of hermetically sealed ob-
jects (nouns). Karen Barad’s quantum-based cosmology 
(akin to Whitehead’s) understands the world primarily in 
terms of relationships (prepositions, although she would 
say “intra-actions”). To Barad, relations precede relata. In 
other words, the contextual relations that objects have 
with one another constitute the very object-ness of those 
objects. To oop, relata precede relations, so much so that 
one can hardly even call them relata, and one has diffi-
culty concretely explaining what relationships even are.
Why Invent OOP?
Why even propose such a speculative cosmology of her-
metically sealed objects? What does it solve? And by what 
means could one ever verify that it was actually so? oop 
sets out to solve a human-philosophical problem. Here 
is an uber-brief summary of the problem: Kant asserted 
that humans couldn’t directly access objects. (This asser-
tion came to be known as “correlationism.”) Kant’s argu-
ment was pretty convincing, and it bothered lots of peo-
ple. How to respond to his assertion?
Perhaps humans can access objects and Kant was 
wrong. But then, how to prove it? (Husserl tried, failed, 
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limited his attempt and tried again, and still pretty much 
failed. Heidegger further limited his attempt, got pretty 
close, and also failed.) Perhaps Kant’s problem was mere-
ly a problem of false premises, in that he wrongly as-
sumed a divide between humans and objects that is really 
not there. But again, how to prove this? (For my money, 
Whitehead’s process philosophy comes pretty close.) Per-
haps Kant had an unduly philosophical understanding of 
what “access” is. Perhaps we do have a kind of direct ac-
cess to objects; it’s just that this access doesn’t reduce to 
philosophy. If that is the case, we’ll never be able to prove 
the existence of this kind of direct access philosophically, 
but we could still prove it (or at least experience it) sci-
entifically, affectively, aesthetically, mathematically, or 
via any number of other means. Or perhaps we are more 
stuck than even Kant realized, and the human language 
which constrains our philosophical access to the world 
also permeates and thus constrains all the other (scien-
tific, affective, aesthetic, mathematic) ways we have of 
accessing the world. This is Derrida’s position. To me, 
Derrida’s position is more or less unassailable within 
the historical game of philosophy, because you always have 
to use philosophical language to dethrone his position, 
which then opens you up to Derrida’s ingenious critiques 
of philosophical language.
Which brings us to oop. Derrida’s reign in contempo-
rary philosophy was becoming boring to those within the 
historical game of philosophy, so Harman made a move 
(within the game) to change the game. Perhaps (and here 
is Harman’s move) the problem is not that humans lack 
direct access to objects via philosophy, but that all ob-
jects lack direct access to all other objects via any direct 
means of encounter whatsoever. The problem is not with 
humans. The problem is with the world. Although this 
“solution” seems more like a resignation or an abdica-
tion, it appeals to (some) people for several reasons: it 
purports to make humans nothing special and to start 
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taking objects more seriously; it absolves humans of hav-
ing to overcome a centuries-old philosophical problem; 
it makes aesthetics important again (but in a weird way); 
and it is something new in continental philosophy be-
sides deconstruction. Ironically, however, rather than de-
centering humans and overcoming correlationism, oop 
winds up making the world more anthropocentric than 
ever before.
Despite oop’s opposition to Derrida and the “semiotic 
turn” that followed him, oop takes Derrida’s suspicion of 
knowability two steps further. To Derrida, we can only 
indirectly access the world beyond us via language, and 
pretty much all of our human forms of access are entan-
gled with language. To oop, not only are we barred from 
directly accessing the world beyond us by any means 
at all, but all the other real objects in the world are in 
this same hermetically sealed state. One of the moti-
vating factors of oop’s theory of universally withdrawn 
real objects is to be un-anthropocentric. We humans are 
ourselves just objects amongst other objects, all equally 
barred from direct access to each other. But in fact, this 
theory of universally withdrawn real objects is the ulti-
mate act of anthropocentric hubris, because it theoreti-
cally extends our own human-thinking, solipsistic, philo-
sophical psychosis (the correlationist suspicion that we 
can’t directly access the world) to the rest of the world. 
Our human-specific desire to overcome the (human-in-
vented) human-specific condition of correlationism mo-
tivates Harman to theoretically imbue all other objects in 
the world with our same human-specific condition. Cor-
relationism is overcome(?) via its universal distribution. 
Objects, you’re welcome. Sincerely, your fellow objects, 
thinking humans. It is a bit like patting yourself on the 
back for sharing your virus with everyone else at the of-
fice party.
From the perspective of a (fairly orthodox) Whitehead 
adherent like myself, correlationism is a human-invented 
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problem existing within the historical game of philoso-
phy. It need only be “overcome” by those humans want-
ing to make the next historical move within the game of 
philosophy, but it doesn’t need to be overcome in the ac-
tual world. Rocks don’t existentially struggle with their 
lack of direct access to other rocks.
Even within the game of philosophy, oop gives rise 
to more problems than it solves. If we have no direct ac-
cess to real objects in the world, then how is Harman 
able to access the rest of the real objects in the world in 
order to discover and verify that none of them have di-
rect access to each other either? By speculative, indirect, 
oblique causal contact with their sensual object counter-
parts, of course. But labeling one’s philosophy “specula-
tive” doesn’t excuse it from being tautological. oop is like 
picking up your phone, discovering that the line is dead, 
and poetically inferring that everyone else’s phone line is 
dead as well. How are you able to connect with everyone 
else and verify this fact? Via the indirect access you have 
to them through your own dead phone line. Yikes.
What’s the Problem with OOP’s Aesthetics?
Any cosmology that posits aesthetics as a fundamental 
universal force is bound to be received as validating and 
exciting by artists, curators, and art critics. The problem 
with oop’s aesthetics is that they are redundant and re-
gressive. Whitehead’s cosmology already includes a quite 
nuanced explanation of what might be called object aes-
thetics. Deleuze and Guattari have also developed a so-
phisticated aesthetics of ethology, geology, and the entire 
immanent universe. In comparison, Harman’s model of 
object aesthetics is vague, blunt, and late to the game. 
Worst of all, it fails to connect explanatorily with the ac-
tual world of objects.
To take just one example, oop uses the term “allure” to 
describe the oblique connection between real objects and 
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sensual qualities. But Whitehead also uses the term “al-
lure” to describe the prehending affinities which actual 
entities have toward one another, and Deleuze and Guat-
tari incorporate into their philosophy an explanation of 
natural selection via aesthetic attraction (“a lure”).
Whitehead and Deleuze have been accused of the 
same kind of anthropomorphism of which I am accus-
ing Harman, so what is the difference between Deleuze 
and Guattari’s “lure,” Whitehead’s “allure,” and Harman’s 
“allure”? Whitehead begins with his understanding of 
mathematics and quantum physics, and uses human lan-
guage to describe quantum behavior as rigorously as pos-
sible. Whitehead’s writing includes poetic, “extra-scien-
tific” language to describe novel (to humans, at the time) 
but natural quantum behaviors, behaviors that the “ob-
jective” Newtonian scientific language of the time lacked 
the vocabulary to articulate. Whitehead doesn’t claim 
that human affective allure is the direct result of our be-
ing fundamentally made up of photons. It is simply that 
both photons and humans exist in a world functionally 
driven by allure. Whitehead isn’t anthropomorphically 
imposing human behavior onto electrons. Indeed, it 
could be argued that prior Newtonian physics was a kind 
of anthropomorphic imposition of the observed behav-
ior of well-decided, decohered macrocosmic entities (like 
rocks) onto less decided, pre-cohered microscopic enti-
ties (like photons). It was only via Whitehead’s “listen-
ing” to quantum-behavior-measuring apparatuses and 
what they had to say, that some of our prior scientific and 
philosophical anthropomorphisms began to be undone.
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari don’t project human 
aesthetics onto the animal kingdom as much as they 
recognize a kind of behavior in the animal kingdom that 
functions in the same way as human aesthetics. Female 
birds are lured into mating by the appearance and behav-
ior of male birds. In the case of bower birds, this behav-
ior involves a kind of performative treatment of objects 
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and materials that exploits aesthetic attraction. Similar 
to Whitehead’s position, Deleuze and Guattari aren’t sim-
ply saying that humans appreciate aesthetics because we 
evolved from animals, who themselves fundamentally 
evolved via aesthetic appreciation. Instead, Deleuze and 
Guattari are saying that humans and animals both exist 
in a world functionally driven by aesthetic allure.
In Deleuze and Guattari’s own words: 
We can then say that the musician bird goes from sad-
ness to joy or that it greets the rising sun or endangers 
itself in order to sing or sings better than another, etc. 
None of these formulations carries the slightest risk of 
anthropomorphism, or implies the slightest interpre-
tation. It is instead a kind of geomorphism. The rela-
tion to joy and sadness, the sun, danger, perfection, is 
given in the motif and counterpoint, even if the term 
of each of these relations is not given. In the motif and 
the counterpoint, the sun, joy or sadness, danger, be-
come sonorous, rhythmic, or melodic.30 
When “we” come to attend to our own flow and entangle-
ment with “the rest of the world,” this entanglement is 
not anthropomorphic simply because we begin attend-
ing to it. Indeed, this entanglement, flow, or pulse pre-
dates humans and even geological strata. It is baked into 
the behavior of the cosmos.
My critique of Harman’s “allure” is that it is arrived at 
deductively rather than inductively. Indeed, according to 
oop, the concept of allure could never be arrived at induc-
tively, since we have no direct access to real objects, but 
only speculative, oblique, or indirect access to them. Har-
man develops his concept of allure by beginning with an 
30 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 318–19.
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analysis of the way in which metaphor and humor work 
in human language systems,31 and then speculatively 
imposes this type of behavior onto the world.32 Whereas 
Whitehead and Deleuze and Guattari each begin their 
understanding of allure with the (largely) human-indif-
ferent world (Whitehead with slit-selecting electrons and 
Deleuze and Guattari with mating birds), Harman begins 
his understanding of allure with the way that metaphors 
and humor within human language systems represent 
the world. This seems a backwards place to begin for 
someone intent on overcoming anthropocentrism. Har-
man linguistically speculates the existence of a world 
wherein the only means of real change (aesthetic allure) 
functions according to speculative linguistic slippage. It 
all seems a bit too tidily self-confirming and tautological.
oop achieves its self-referential, hermetically sealed, 
unassailable neatness at the cost of failing to access the 
complex, ongoing becomings of the actual world. Grant-
ed, pure evolutionary ethology and pure quantum phys-
ics fail to wholly access the ongoing becomings of the 
actual world, but at least they more courteously attend to 
the things themselves (although oop would say that they 
are only attending to mere sensual things). Whitehead’s 
incorporation of physics into his cosmology and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s inclusion of evolutionary ethology into 
their cosmology doesn’t guarantee them direct access to 
the actual world, but it gets them deeper into actual ob-
jects than Harman gets.
Why Does the Contemporary Art World Love OOP (and OOO)?
Why then have oop and (its less daring spawn) ooo been 
so embrace in contemporary art circles? I don’t believe 
31 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Car-
pentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), ch. 8–9. 
32 Ibid., ch. 10–11.
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Object Oriented Ontology has been embraced for its epis-
temological rigor, or for its ability to most satisfactorily 
explain the actual functioning of the actual world. On 
the contrary, I believe it has been embraced precisely be-
cause it is a daring and beautiful (if slightly harrowing) 
speculative fiction that engages with the relevant con-
temporary topic of overcoming anthropocentrism. ooo 
serves as a speculative provocation for launching subse-
quent speculative art-curatorial provocations. And (dare 
I say it), ooo also serves as a kind of self-justification 
for the less socially relevant, hermetically sealed, white 
cubed, contemporary art scene. “All we have here in our 
gallery are objects (you see), only obliquely and indirectly 
connecting to the world outside these walls. But don’t 
blame us; blame the world. Direct connections between 
objects are simply not possible.” The hermetically sealed, 
intellectually contemplatable, idealized aesthetic art ob-
ject and ooo are a match made in Plato’s heaven of pure 
forms. As a point of radical contrast, consider how utterly 
out of place Pope.L’s object-pulverizing, world-connect-
ing, community-modulating Black Factory would be in a 
white cube gallery show about Object Oriented Ontology.
Why Does OOO love 00:02?
Writing about Proust (and his iconic madeleines), Sam-
uel Beckett observes, “When the object is perceived as 
particular and unique and not merely the member of a 
family, when it appears independent of any general no-
tion and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and 
inexplicable in the light of ignorance, then and then only 
may it be a source of enchantment.”33 Steinbach’s object 
ensembles meet Beckett’s requirements, and thereby en-
chant ooo – hook, line, and sinker.
33 Samuel Beckett and Georges Duthuit, “Proust,” in Proust and Three 
dialogues with Georges Duthuit (London: John Calder, 1987), 22–23.
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And of course, the shelf ensembles welcome their lat-
est suitor unreservedly (but never ultimately or even ex-
clusively). 00:02 takes objects out of their usual networks 
and leaves them suspended (via minimalism, formalism, 
and the gallery’s inherent hermeticism) in a strange kind 
of Platonic netherspace. All of their former connections 
have been temporarily severed. All of the ways in which 
they were plugged in and refracting with the world have 
been disconnected, unplugged. And those empty sockets 
remain open to new, imaginative, speculative connec-
tions. ooo imagines these sockets are open to connec-
tions with a litany of other objects (all in the sensual 
realm, of course). But actually, in their gallery setting, 
these non-human shelf objects aren’t connecting with 
other non-human objects that much. Instead, these open 
sockets act as lures to draw out and connect with human 
theories.
Object-oriented ontologists imagine these empty ob-
ject sockets being filled by a million sensual object plugs 
obliquely reaching out and plugging in via allure. In actu-
ality, these empty sockets are being filled by the human-
invented theories of object-oriented ontologists (and 
a host of other human-invented theories). Steinbach’s 
ensembles lure and trap human cosmological theories 
via the same mechanism that clothing store window dis-
plays lure and trap customers. The clothes on the man-
nequins exist in an isolated and ideal Platonic world (the 
world of pure “display”). They don’t really belong to the 
mannequins. Instead, the clothes are open to an infinite 
possibility of owners, and thus I am lured into imaging 
that the clothes could (one day) belong to me. ooo ima-
gines that 00:02 suits its explanatory theories. ooo can 
see itself in 00:02.
In truth, the trash cans and lava lamps of 00:02 aren’t 
really connecting all that much with other objects in the 
Stedelijk sculpture room. Most of the non-human, non-
00:02 objects in the room are mostly not intra-acting 
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with the trash cans and lava lamps (and vice versa). A 
good work of art is able to hold its own in a group show 
without getting conceptually hijacked by the other work 
in the show. Holding one’s own is particularly challeng-
ing in a group show based around the very loose them 
of “sculpture made in the 1980s.” Many art apparatuses, 
with many different conceptual functions, are all pulling 
in different directions. The weak apparatuses risk getting 
hijacked and munged up by the strong ones. In the Ste-
delijk room, 00:02 holds its own amongst the other appa-
ratuses (although the minimalist in me thinks that Stein-
bach’s shelves are flirting with the Donald Judd chairs). 
By “holding one’s own,” I don’t mean to imply that the 
art apparatuses actively resist each other all night long 
in the room while no humans are present. I simply mean 
that each of the art apparatuses in the Stedelijk sculp-
ture room are designed to intra-act with humans in 
one unique way or another. “Holding one’s own” as an 
art apparatus means continuing to fulfill your intended 
function of intra-acting with humans (in whatever your 
intended way) without that function being modulated 
by another nearby apparatus’ intended function of intra-
acting with humans. 
00:02 is there to intra-act with humans, and it does. 
Passersby just making the rounds through the Stedelijk 
collection, checking off the artwork one by one, frequent-
ly stop and stare at 00:02. It is too elegant to be a mere 
anti-art joke, but too pop-object-ish to be minimalist 
sculpture. Even for the casual viewer, aporia is (however 
temporarily) invoked. And of course, the theorizing art 
patrons (like myself) get good and mired in 00:02’s yield-
ing, theory-invoking, theory-provoking quicksand facade. 
It is important to note that the art of Steinbach’s trap 
does not reside in his objects alone; his apparatal trap is 
set and sprung by a deftly orchestrated interplay between 
his minimalist shelves, his formalist arrangements, the 
gallery setting, and Steinbach’s own intuitive feel for ob-
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ject display. As a point of comparison, consider this im-
age of my middle daughter staring at some of Steinbach’s 
pre-ensemble objects, stored on shelves in his studio, all 
(patiently?) awaiting inclusion into future object ensem-
bles (See Fig. 2).
I spent a good while surrounded by these shelves of 
objects in Steinbach’s studio. Although the objects were 
odd and evocative, and many of their incidental arrange-
ments evoked me to make mental connections between 
the objects, this room full of objects did not cause me 
to experience anything like what the trash cans and lava 
lamps of 00:02 caused me to experience in the Stedeli-
jk. According to 000, the studio room should have been 
teeming with sensual allure between the objects them-
selves, and between the objects and me (as one more 
object in the room). But the room was not teeming with 
such allure. Or at least it didn’t seem to me as if it was. 
Fig. 2: A photograph I took of my middle daughter staring at a shelf of 




Maybe the sensual objects were connecting with each 
other, and I just wasn’t in on their allusive chatter! Maybe 
I’m just an object dolt who lacks the nuanced subtlety of 
an attuned object-whisperer. Of course, who could “re-
ally” know? But about that which one cannot justify, one 
can always speculatively assert.
In Steinbach’s studio on the day that I visited, I was 
even able to see a few objects in the transitional state 
between the storage shelves and the gallery shelves. On 
the floor of the studio were a selected group of objects 
that Steinbach was in the process of arranging and re-
arranging. There was not yet any shelving (the shelves 
are custom-built and out-sourced, so that is the last step); 
but even just sitting on the floor without their minimal-
ist shelves, not yet in their final ensemble arrangements, 
this proto-ensemble in proto-arrangement mode already 
seemed to me much more resonant and full of implicit 
meaning than the objects on the storage shelves. The 
fewer the objects, the more removed from their ordinary 
contexts, the more purposefully displayed by Steinbach 
to ensnare me, the more the apophatic art apparatus was 
beginning to work its mojo.
As an even more refined point of comparison (an even 
more rigorously controlled case study), that large Crea-
ture from the Black Lagoon object on the studio storage 
shelves was also famously featured in Steinbach’s 2011 
solo show (Creature) at the Tanya Bonakdar Gallery in 
Chelsea. In that show, the Creature object alone occupied 
a single, room-length shelf in a large upstairs room of 
the gallery (see Fig. 3). On Steinbach’s studio shelves, the 
Creature object looked comic, goofy, and awkward. In the 
Creature show, the Creature object looked commanding, 
epic, and revelatory. It stole the show, so to speak.
It was the same object in both spaces, so what was 
the difference? Of course, the context made all the dif-
ference. In the gallery, I was rigorously and meticulously 
lured into an apophatic apparatus designed to elicit spec-
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ulation from me. In the studio, I incidentally observed 
a studio apparatus (a series of shelving units) designed 
to store objects. Whitehead’s cosmology of concrescence 
and Barad’s theory of apparatuses both readily explain 
this difference. ooo has to perform all sort of schematic 
gymnastics to explain this difference.
But (and here is the particular trap that Steinbach’s 
work sets for ooo), in the gallery alone, without a point of 
extra-gallery comparison, properly seduced theorists may 
imbue all sorts of qualities and withdrawn essences into 
these helplessly receptive shelf objects. Then those same 
objects, once imbued with this new (human-theoretical) 
essence, may be used as object oriented poster children 
(poster objects?) – proof positive that all objects in the 
universe behave like Steinbach’s shelf objects. ooo would 
contend that Steinbach’s work gives us oblique insight 
(albeit not direct access) into the essence of objects, an 
Fig. 3: The Creature from the Black Lagoon figure standing on a big shelf 




essence that was there all along. Process philosophy (as 
I’m employing it) would contend that Steinbach’s work 
creates an event which entices humans to have undeni-
ably resonant, poetic feelings of allure toward an ensem-
ble of objects; feelings to which the objects themselves, 
alas, are almost utterly indifferent. ooo would say that 
the Creature object in the gallery is the same as the Crea-
ture object in the studio, and the gallery just helps hu-
mans realize more of what it already is. Whitehead would 
say that the Creature object in the gallery and the Crea-
ture object in the studio are not the same object. They are 
both enduring objects made up of an ongoing series of 
related actual occasions, changing from occasion to oc-
casion as they prehend (or negatively prehend) the rest 
of the world. But the actual occasions in the gallery are 
not at all the same as the actual occasions in the studio.
00:02 entices OOO with its (Apparently) Flat Ontology
Flat ontology is the broad idea that all objects are objects 
in their objectness, and that there is no real hierarchy of 
objectness. Flat ontology is not unique to ooo. A form 
of flat ontology is (arguably) found in actor–network 
theory, the sociological model of Bruno Latour. Actor–
network theory (hereafter ant) is designed to help hu-
mans think properly about objects in situ in the world. 
According to ant, objects are indeed connected, with 
each other and with humans, at microcosmic and mac-
rocosmic scales, and we humans should better attend to 
these objecty connections, this democracy of objects (of 
which we ourselves are just one part). For Actor Network 
Theory, objects have meaning in relation to other objects, 
as nodes in a broader and reconfigurable network. The 
network is flatter and not as hierarchical as we humans 
had originally supposed. Latour’s flat ontology has led to 
a literary trope amongst ooo writers called the “Latour 
litany,” where incongruous objects (incongruous from 
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the perspective of humans, one supposes) are listed one 
after the other, indifferent to any hierarchy (indeed, they 
are implicitly required to not seem hierarchical). These 
litanies are meant to indicate (by force of repetition and 
alliteration) that objects are objects are objects, regard-
less of scale, material, complexity, animality, etc.
But once objects in situ have been removed from their 
networks and placed with their open and empty sockets 
in a gallery on Steinbach’s shelves, ant has less to say 
about the nature of these curious, pragmatically disentan-
gled objects. This is because Steinbach’s objects are not 
actively connected to the world in their ordinary use ca-
pacities (the lava lamps are not enticing hippies to have 
trippy trips; the trash cans are not receiving trash). And 
ant is a tool for dealing with objects actively situated in 
networks.
To put it another way, Steinbach seems to have thrown 
the brakes on the intra-active becomings that create 
time. With time seemingly frozen, objects begin to feel 
much less verb-y and much more noun-y. And noun-y ob-
jects are ooo’s raison d’être. At this point, ooo is enticed 
to rush in and fill in the metaphysical gaps about which 
ant would otherwise hesitate to speculate. Because of 
their superficially apparent incongruity, Steinbach’s shelf 
objects initially seem to be ideal illustrations of the flat 
ontology that Latour litanies are meant to illustrate. But 
from a formalist theoretical perspective, the objects are 
not at all incongruous. They have all sorts of formal volu-
metric, scalar, color, shape, and material relations. And 
even from a Marxist perspective, the objects still retain 
their own unique production histories and prior use 
functions in the historical context of human economic 
markets. And from a theatrical perspective, the objects 
are always facing outward toward their human audi-
ences. They never face each other. They are on display for 
us. Similar to characters in a stage play, the objects are 
staged to perform the fiction of their implicit relation-
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ships and dialogues with each other for us. And so, once 
again, the object ensembles willingly yield themselves up 
to be used as proof positive of the explanatory prowess 
of their latest theory suitor, while still remaining poly-
amorously faithful(?) to all of their prior theory suitors. 
Why Am I Still Talking about OOO?
Like Steinbach’s object ensembles, Object Oriented On-
tology sets its own kind of trap. It is a purposeful provo-
cation that trolls other theorists into interminable de-
bates about its own speculative assertions. I don’t intend 
to have the final word on ooo in this brief subsection of 
a chapter in a book about art. I only mean to engage with 
ooo long enough to illustrate that it doesn’t get the final 
word about 00:02. To Steinbach’s shelf/object ensembles, 
ooo is just the latest in an increasingly long series of 
illicit affairs. As with all its other theory suitors, Stein-
bach’s work entices ooo, lures it out into the open, yields 
to it, and then has to go because it has a call on the other 
line.
The Most Ardent Suitor: Semiotics
Semiotics has been attracted to Steinbach’s object en-
sembles from the beginning, in part because both were 
coming to prominence in the United States during the 
late 1970s. There are all sorts of flavors of semiotics, but 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s is the easiest to digest, which 
is no doubt why it has become so popular. According 
to Saussurean semiotics, a signifier signifies a signified. 
Both signifier and signified together constitute a sign. A 
signifier can be the word “dog” signifying a physical dog, 
or it can be a physical dog signifying all other dogs. Saus-
sure discovered that chains of signification are infinite 
(they never arrive at any core or grounding signified [like 
408
some ways of making nothing
God] that would act as the foundational, bedrock guaran-
tor of meaning for the chains of signification leading up 
to it). He also discovered that semiotic signifiers (words) 
are arbitrarily coupled to their signifieds (in other words, 
the word “dog” is no more or less inherently “doggy” than 
the word “chien” or the word “perro”). Derrida took these 
two discoveries and ran with them into the wilds of de-
construction. To me, Charles Sanders Peirce has a much 
more robust and grounded tri-part semiotic system made 
up of sign, object, and interpretant (compared to Saus-
sure’s merely bi-part system of signifier and signified), 
but Peirce’s system never gained the popularity of Saus-
sure’s system.
Semiotics is seduced by Steinbach’s shelf/object en-
sembles because they look like sentences made out of ob-
jects and shelves. The shelf sections act like sentence dia-
grams, indicating the grammatical sentence parts. This 
object must be the subject, and that object must be the 
predicate. Steinbach’s objects are often repeated, and more 
or less interchangeable because of their mass-produced 
nature, so they seem like common nouns. To semiotics, 
there is nothing different about the following two words 
– “lamp” and “lamp” – other than the context in which 
they are used (and in this particular sentence, there is not 
that much difference between their two contextual us-
ages). I could swap the first “lamp” for the second “lamp,” 
and you would not be able to tell the difference. For this 
reason, to the semiotic suitor, 00:02 “reads” like a kind of 
physically instantiated sentence. 00:02 is purposefully 
designed to give itself over to this semiotic “reading.” As 
already mentioned, the objects in Steinbach’s ensembles 
are prepared with an overt understanding of formalism 
and minimalism. These approaches combine with the 
hermetic, Platonic idealism of the white cube gallery to 
ontologically sterilizes and de-individualize Steinbach’s 
objects, preparing them for easy assimilation into the se-
miotic regime of interchangeable signifiers.
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But of course, there is a problem. If the phrase “trash 
can” points to some physical object that functions as a 
garbage receptacle, then what does an actual physical 
trash can point to? Also, the two trash cans in 00:02 are 
not interchangeable – the light of the gallery reflects dif-
ferently off of one than off of the other. Are we meant 
to bracket these “surface” differences and solely focus on 
the “essence” of the object-noun-ness of the trash cans? 
Are the different light reflections from the trash cans 
simply incidental to their trash-can-ness, like the same 
word set in two different typefaces? Are typefaces sim-
ply incidental? Incidental to whom, and in what ways? In 
what ways are object-signifiers different than word-signi-
fiers? When an object becomes a signifier, to whom does 
it become a signifier? When an object is placed beside 
another object, do they become “signifiers” to each oth-
er? Or is signification solely a human phenomenon? Is 
there any way for an object to fully resist being “read” as a 
signifier? What would such a non-signification cloaking 
device look like? Would it “read” as “unreadable?” Would 
its non-significance even be able to signify? Such are the 
questions that have provided the erotic fuel which has 
stoked the flames of the liaison between the semiotic 
suitor and Steinbach’s object ensembles for decades. Let 
us briefly open up a few of these worm cans.
An Emphasis on the Space between the Nouns  
(Alas, for Naught)
Because Steinbach’s object signifiers are so semiotically 
vague, we are forced to concentrate on the space between 
his objects and on their own implicit signification. Like 
translating a foreign language where we don’t know the 
meaning of the nouns, perhaps a proper understanding 
of the articles and prepositions between the nouns will 
give us some clue. As if we somehow have a better chance 
of gaining a semiotic purchase on the spaces between the 
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trash cans and the lava lamps than we do of gaining a 
semiotic purchase on the trash cans and the lava lamps 
themselves.
This shift of emphasis from nouns to articles and 
prepositions occurs in the work of Samuel Beckett, Ger-
trude Stein, and Emily Dickinson. Here is Samuel Beck-
ett’s (implicit) mission statement as a writer, age 26: 
The experience of my reader shall be between the 
phrases, in the silence, communicated by the intervals, 
not the terms, of the statement, between the flowers 
that cannot coexist, at the antithetical (nothing so 
simple as antithetical) seasons of words, his experi-
ence shall be the menace, the miracle, the memory, of 
an unspeakable trajectory.34 
But, whereas Beckett and Stein often leave semantic re-
lational structures intact while omitting (or obscuring, 
via pronoun-ization) the nouns which these structures 
relate (relations preceding relata, so to speak), Steinbach 
does something even more confounding. He allows com-
mon “nouns” (trash can, lava lamp) to remain as com-
mon nouns (albeit physical-object-nouns), but he makes 
them so minimalistically concrete that they refuse to 
operate explicitly as semiotic signifiers and merely seem 
like plain old objects (they are what they are). So, we are 
forced to turn our attention to the shelves in an attempt 
to try and find some more concrete prepositional or 
grammatical meaning to these object sentences. But we 
are stymied there as well. If the ensembles are sentences, 
they are indeed written in a foreign language. Perhaps 
we are discovering the hidden language of objects! More 
likely, we are discovering the failure of semiotics to ex-
34 Samuel Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women, eds. Eoin O’Brien 
and Edith Fournier (London: Calder, 1993), 138. The main character 
Belacqua muses these lines.
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clusively and reductively interpret Steinbach’s work. And 
of course, displaying this failure of the semiotic suitor to 
“make an honest woman” out of the object ensembles is 
the goal of the object ensembles.
A Surrealistic Language of Objects
Unable to properly nail down any specific semiotic mean-
ing, our human imaginations run wild in an affectively 
rich play of multiple, supra-semiotic possibilities. Such 
free and refracting imaginings are properly understood as 
surrealistic. Plenty of theorists have noticed the power of 
uncanny objects to trigger surrealistic connections. Fou-
cault on Magritte: “It is in dream that men, at last reduced 
to silence, commune with the signification of things and 
allow themselves to be touched by enigmatic, insistent 
words that come from elsewhere.”35 Derrida: “The dream-
er invents his own grammar.”36 Even Whitehead: 
An inhibition of familiar sensa is very apt to leave 
us a prey to vague terrors respecting a circumambi-
ent world of causal operations. In the dark there are 
vague presences, doubtfully feared; in the silence, the 
irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon 
us; in the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an 
August woodland, the inflow into ourselves of feelings 
from enveloping nature overwhelms us; in the dim 
consciousness of half-sleep, the presentations of sense 
fade away, and we are left with the vague feeling of 
influences from vague things around us.37
35 Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, trans. and ed. James Harkness 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 49.
36 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 262.
37 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 176.
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I would argue that Steinbach’s object ensembles are uber-
surrealistic precisely because of their bald-faced realism. 
The objects in 00:02 trigger all of the surrealistic connec-
tions and imaginings that vague and hazy liminal ob-
jects invoke, while still remaining utterly clear and plain. 
Germano Celant calls Steinbach’s objects, “resolutely 
palpable.”38 The stage magician’s trick is all the more har-
rowing when there is no smoke and there are no mirrors; 
everything is plain as day, and yet still the magic occurs. 
The object ensembles have nothing up their sleeve. We 
should be able to figure this out. How are they tricking us?
Whitehead’s observations give us a clue. Via mini-
malism, formalism, and the white cube gallery, the ob-
ject ensembles shut down the ordinary noise of objects 
in functional situ, and our own thoughts rush to fill in 
this vacuum. We are not hearing the withdrawn essence 
of real objects (or even the clamoring of their sensual ob-
ject counterparts), and we are not hearing a new form of 
object language (objects calling out to other objects via 
semiotic signification). We are hearing ourselves theoriz-
ing that we are hearing these things.
Semiotics Plus X 
Jenny Jaskey suggests that the object ensembles are both 
semiotic and caught up in situational networks some-
what similar to the ones described by ant: 
Steinbach cares about how cultural valuation gets al-
tered through language and about how the stuff of 
everyday life has its own rich material interchange in 
excess of what might be said about it by us […]. His 
works are invested in revealing how objects gain or 
lose different kind of significance for humans […], but 
that they are at the same time undeniably material 
38 Celant, “An Existential Building Site,” 383.
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aggregations of a human–inhuman matrix that con-
tinue to gather momentum as they take on new forms 
over time.”39 
Her interpretation is not so much that Steinbach’s ob-
ject ensembles are interpretable neither by semiotics nor 
by ant, but that they are simultaneously interpretable 
both. I agree with this. I would only add that they are also 
simultaneously interpretable as minimalist, formalist, 
psychological, and phenomenological. Furthermore (and 
here is the main point of this chapter, in case you some-
how missed it), by purposefully being simultaneously 
interpretable from all of these theoretical perspectives, 
Steinbach’s object ensembles are primarily apophatic art 
apparatus for capturing human theories.
My Favorite Suitor: Artist as Master Craftsman
If I had to choose which of all the suitors I find most con-
vincing, I would choose the Artist as Master Craftsman 
suitor. I agree with those who think that Haim Steinbach 
is a master craftsman of displaying objects on shelves. 
He is idiosyncratically and uniquely skillful at displaying 
objects that confound human interpretation. His chosen 
medium is the display of objects. If you think anyone can 
do this as well as Steinbach, try it on a shelf in your own 
home. The results are virtually guaranteed to be much 
less enticing and much less disturbing than 00:02. Stein-
bach’s object ensembles are so confoundingly evocative 
because he is really, really good at displaying objects, and 
he’s had a lot of practice. Steinbach is the Michelangelo 
of obfuscatory object display. That is my contention, in 
an era where the artist as craftsman is beyond passé, and 
39 Jenny Jaskey, “The Unstatic,” in Steinbach, Ruf, et al., Haim Stein-
bach, 399.
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arranging found objects hardly qualifies as a craft or a 
medium. Steinbach is so good at displaying objects, he 
got bored with it and went on to master the meta-craft of 
displaying display itself.
Perhaps Steinbach is a kind of object-whisperer after 
all. He is able to discern object relationships that are 
particularly resonant in a number of simultaneous ways: 
formally, phenomenologically, art-historically, pop-cul-
turally, humorously, ironically, functionally. When we 
feel as if we hear the voice of the objects calling to us 
and to one another, we are really experiencing traces of 
the idiosyncratic hand of the master craftsman coming 
to us through his medium. Steinbach has spent time sit-
ting with these objects. When we ourselves sit with the 
objects in the gallery, we are also sitting with his prior 
sittings with the objects. Steinbach is in the room with 
us and the objects.
Steinbach himself describes the objects in his ensem-
bles not like words in sentences, but like pieces on a game 
board: 
The thinking around the object […] starts with the 
concept of the game board, because for me it is like 
[…] a blueprint of the thinking of the arrangement of 
the pieces. Also, while a game involves a scheme and a 
strategy, it also consists of aspects of chance. There is 
engagement as well as the unpredictable.40 
And elsewhere, “I do not ‘curate’ objects, but put them 
into play.”41 In Steinbach’s game, the pawns are the Kong-
40 Steinbach, “Haim Steinbach in Conversation with Tom Eccles, Bea-
trix Ruff, and Hans Ulrich Obrist,” 368.




brand rubber chew toys.42 Maybe the giant Hulk hands 
are the rooks? In Steinbach’s own words:
Each [object ensemble] is a study in different rela-
tions, like [ Joseph] Albers with colors and squares. He 
kept doing the color studies to see what would hap-
pen when you put the different colors in play, their af-
finities with each other in different contexts, within 
a constrained system. I am doing a similar thing with 
these objects.43 
According to Steinbach, the object ensembles are also 
about math, number relations, repetition, and the differ-
ence between one and many.44 Perhaps the next theoreti-
cal suitors will be game theorists and number set theo-
rists.
From another perspective, Steinbach has described 
the ensembles as musical compositions. “When I arrange 
these objects, I am looking for new sounds. Sometimes 
something will sound too familiar, and I will move on. 
Sometimes something will sound foreign, and I am in-
trigued. I ask, why is that foreign to me? Why am I both-
ered by it?”45 The goal is not necessarily to create the most 
“harmonious” compositions, but to create compositions 
with new and uncanny frequencies.
So, is Steinbach an object composer, an object game 
player, or a displayer of display? Of course, he is all of these 
and more. According to the Artist as Master Craftsman 
theory, Steinbach is simply an artist who has mastered 
the idiosyncratic and peculiar rules of his own self-de-
vised art game, the same way other great artists (Rem-
brandt, Klee, Duchamp) have mastered the idiosyncratic 
42 Haim Steinbach, interview with the author at Steinbach’s New York 
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and peculiar rules of their own self-devised art games. 
Duchamp’s king was a sideways urinal; Steinbach’s king 
is the Creature from the Black Lagoon.
Conclusion 
Which theoretical suitor will “get the girl?” All of them 
to greater or lesser degrees, but none of them exclusively. 
Is my own meta-theoretical interpretation just one more 
theoretical interpretation destined to take its place in the 
suitor line? In order for my interpretation to be self-con-
sistent, it has to be; and I’m fine with that. I don’t want to 
reduce 00:02 once and for all. I simply want to show the 
ways in which it functions as a particularly wily apophat-
ic art apparatus. 00:02 is a theory trap. It lures theories 
out, and then paradoxically resists their exclusive theo-
retical interpretations by simultaneously yielding to all 
of them. It makes nothing of human theories. Even now 







Toward an Ethics of Nothing
 
“Nothing is more frowned upon than nothing.” 
– Eugene Thacker1
“Sometimes nothing is a real cool hand.”
– Cool Hand Luke
The goal of this book has been not simply to explain and 
demonstrate some ways in which artworks function as 
apparatuses. Instead, I have specifically focused on art-
works that make nothing – artworks that function as 
apophatic apparatuses. Why nothing? If all artworks 
function as apparatuses, then all one has to do to partici-
pate in the ongoing becomings of the universe is to keep 
making works of art. The problem is, the universe doesn’t 
always tend toward becoming better, beneficial, good, or 
even decent. So how to co-modulate the universe’s be-
comings so that the universe becomes something better? 
I will go ahead and bracket the following questions: What 
is “better?” Better according to what criteria? Better for 
whom? etc. I don’t mean to establish a universally agreed 
upon definition of “better” in this chapter. My interest 
1 Eugene Thacker, “Three Questions on Demonology,” paper present-
ed at Hideous Gnosis: Black Metal Theory Symposium 1, Brooklyn, ny, 
December 2009, 219.
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is more in the logistical pragmatics of becoming. What-
ever your definition of “better,” understanding the ways 
in which the universe becomes anew is bound to aid you 
in co-steering the universe toward a future that might be 
better. The ability to make nothing of becoming (how-
ever temporarily) is an important tool for the practicing 
artist who hopes to make the universe better.
We should really abandon the term “better” (which 
reeks of linear progressivism and teleology) for a “bet-
ter” way of describing “better.” My own ethical goal for 
writing this book is that more people would make more 
art that matters more. What does “matters” mean? Mat-
ters according to what criteria? Matters to whom? These 
are questions that each artist must answer for herself. If, 
according to Whitehead, the universe is becoming new 
every moment, then the simple avant-garde goal of mak-
ing art that is new is not enough. Just by making art at all, 
we are already making art that is new (even if only slight-
ly new). If, according to Whitehead, everything matters 
somewhat, to something, somewhere; then it is not even 
enough to make art that simply matters, because every-
thing made always already matters (even if only a little 
bit). The problem is, most things hardly matter at all. So 
how to make something that matters more than a little 
bit? And, returning to Robert Irwin’s question, “How to 
achieve the maximum transformation with the mini-
mum alteration?”
The ability to make nothing is simply one tool that an 
artist can use in her quest toward making something new 
that matters. The ability to brake (however temporarily) 
a part of the universe from becoming is a useful ability 
to have for a number of reasons. Braking becoming can 
reveal the contours of becoming in a way that simply 
becoming-along-with-becoming cannot. Discovering 
the fissures, mechanisms, and holes of becomings could 
lead to more rigorous, adept, and efficacious ways of be-
coming. Hard-braking (i.e., making nothing) also allows 
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us a chance to steer radically on ice, “ice” being the slip-
pery contemporary pace of our technological and media-
saturated era. Rather than hurtling forward with every 
new capitalist-driven becoming, desperately pumping 
our brakes, sliding along and turning our wheels left and 
right without gaining any real purchase on the path to-
ward our desired becomings; the hard-braking of making 
nothing gives us the ability to gain some purchase, to 
make turns on ice that would simply not be possible with 
ordinary turning, or even with gradual braking.
When using an emergency brake to steer on ice, not all 
hard-braking tactics are exactly the same. At what speed 
do you throw the brake? Where are your wheels point-
ing while the brake is thrown? How long do you leave the 
brake engaged? How quickly do you accelerate once the 
brake is released? All of these decisions modulate quali-
tatively different turnings and qualitatively different 
new directions. Likewise, not all apophatic apparatuses 
make the same kinds of nothing, and not all nothings 
lead to the same kinds of new becomings. Some noth-
ings leave you pointing west, some leave you pointing 
east, and some leave you spinning your wheels in a ditch. 
Hence, there is nothing particularly magic or inherently 
ethical about simply throwing the brakes on becoming. It 
all depends on how you implement the hard-braking tac-
tic. Yours could be an ingenious move that leads to a new 
way out of rote and cyclical becomings, or it could be a 
disastrous move that makes things worse than when you 
began. The trick is in learning how to deftly use the abil-
ity to make nothing in conjunction with other apparatal 
ways of making something.
It is worth emphasizing that the ethical goal of mak-
ing nothing is not to bring the universe (or even part of 
it) to a grinding halt forever, just as the goal of hard-brak-
ing a car on ice is not to wind up at a dead stop, spinning 
your wheels in the same place forever. For one thing, it is 
impossible to permanently halt the ongoing becomings 
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of any part of the universe. Even decay and dementia 
are kinds of becoming. For another thing, even if a per-
manent dead stop were possible, there would hardly be 
much ethical about permanently freezing the universe, or 
even our own little Earth-scaled part of it.
In this chapter, I want to accomplish a few things. 
First, I want to distinguish the rigorous nothings that 
apophatic art apparatuses make from a few other kinds 
of nothings with which they might accidentally be con-
fused. Second, I want to suggest some ways that mak-
ing nothing might reveal the contours of the process by 
which the new is actually made. Third, I want to propose 
that making nothing can be a way of braking rote and 
cyclical becomings. Fourth, I want to explore some ways 
that nothings might be used to more purposefully acti-
vate new becomings which might come to actually mat-
ter. Fifth, I want to confess that making nothing (when 
done properly) is a pure wager which could actually make 
things worse. And finally, I want to explain that although 
making nothing (when done properly) cannot be guaran-
teed to lead anywhere in particular, it is always guaran-
teed to lead somewhere at all.
Some Nothings That Apophatic Art 
Apparatuses Do Not Make
Apophatic art apparatuses are not purposefully nihilistic. 
Nor are they purposefully misanthropic. They don’t mean 
to bring an end to all human civilization so that we may 
be succeeded by post-humans, dolphins, cephalopods, al-
iens, or artificial intelligences. To desire any of these out-
comes is already to desire something much more specific 
than apophasis allows. The goal of apophatic art appara-
tuses is to brake rote becomings so that eventually quali-
tatively new somethings may emerge. The goal is not to 
attain some permanent state of nothingness, whether on 
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a global human scale (your apparatus leads to the extinc-
tion of human thought), or on an individual human scale 
(everyone who encounters your apparatus instantly dies). 
As Deleuze and Guattari caution, once an individual hu-
man dies, she loses a large amount of agency.2 The noth-
ings that apophatic art apparatuses make are meant to 
tweak humans, not to delete them.
Neither are apophatic art apparatuses iconoclastic. 
They do not mean to remove the visual until nothing re-
mains. Indeed, the five apophatic art apparatuses exam-
ined in this book all employ the visual in order to make 
their nothings. Besides, the mere removal of something 
is not yet the creation of nothing. Removing something 
creates an absence, and an absence is simply another 
kind of something.
Apophatic art apparatuses are not the same as apo-
phatic literary apparatuses, just as art is not the same as 
literature. The two different kinds of apparatuses make 
different kinds of nothings. I am not saying that language 
is merely denotative, mimetic, or semiotic. Far from it. 
Language itself is a force in the world. Both literary appa-
ratuses and art apparatuses work with humans to create 
bodily affect. But there is something different about the 
way in which Arakawa and Gins use language in Mecha-
nism of Meaning and the way in which Pseudo-Dionysius 
uses language in Mystical Theology. In general, Mechanism 
of Meaning and other apophatic art apparatuses engage 
humans more holistically and bodily than apophatic lit-
erary apparatuses. According to Elizabeth Grosz, this type 
of holistic engagement is a particular strength of art. 
“[Art] is culture’s most direct mode of enhancement or 
intensification of bodies, culture’s mode for the elabora-
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 162.
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tion of sensations, and thus culture’s most intense debt 
to the chaotic forces it characterizes as nature.”3
Apophatic art apparatuses are not really “postmodern.” 
They don’t mean to freeze the current era of art (“the con-
temporary”) in order to reflectively analyze it and critical-
ly contemplate it forever. To do so would not be to make 
nothing, but rather to make a perpetual state of contem-
plation. This move toward perpetual reflection and criti-
cal self-analysis is often driven by an ethic of hesitation, 
skepticism, and doubt – a postmodern ethic born out of 
the sour grapes of modernism’s heroic failures. This re-
flective postmodern ethic is not the ethic I am proposing. 
Apophatic art apparatuses perform pragmatic brakings 
that open ways for qualitatively new becomings. From 
the perspective of apophatic art apparatuses, an ethics of 
permanent braking and perpetual wheel-spinning would 
be a true ethical failure.
Apophatic art apparatuses do not merely refuse to par-
ticipate in some particular aspect of contemporary com-
modification. In this sense, they are not really Bataillean. 
Instead, apophatic art apparatuses are more like Melville’s 
Bartleby: they would prefer not to participate in anything 
and everything. Their apophatic “refusals” are less refus-
als to participate in some specific kind of becoming which 
they find distasteful, and more a holistic braking of the 
process of becoming in general.
The nothings made by apophatic art apparatuses can-
not be achieved via willy-nilly, slipshod, or haphazard 
craft. Apophatic art apparatuses must always be inten-
tional, well-considered, and rigorous. True, these apo-
phatic nothings can’t be manipulated to lead anywhere 
in particular, but unless they are ingeniously crafted, 
they will always wind up leading somewhere rote. Any 
old result at all is not the same as a heretofore unknown 
3 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the 
Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 23.
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result. Yes, both results are unknown, but for completely 
different reasons. The former result is unknown because 
we don’t know which of several already-known things it 
will be like. The latter result is unknown because we don’t 
know what new thing it will be at all. A kind of meticu-
lous wagering is required. Derrida speaks of a way of pro-
ceeding “as gaily and scientifically as possible.”4 Gregory 
Ulmer describes Derrida’s own process as “so rigorously 
irresponsible.”5 And Deleuze and Guattari admonish, 
“How necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since over-
dose is a danger. You don’t do it with a sledgehammer, 
you use a very fine file.”6 Nothings worth making won’t be 
made haphazardly.
Finally, this book really is meant to lead to the actual 
creation of more (and more effective) apophatic art ap-
paratuses. If an increased appreciation of apophatic art 
apparatuses also occurs, all the better. But my ethical goal 
in writing this book is not merely to make some sort of 
academic, intellectual, theoretical move in the micro-
community of art theorists and experimental curators. 
This book is primarily intended for art educators and 
practicing artists. For art educators, hopefully the ideas 
shared in this book will suggest ways of moving students 
beyond the mere creation of images and objects (which 
incidentally happen to function as apparatuses), and on 
toward the purposeful creation of apparatuses (which 
incidentally happen to incorporate images and objects). 
For artists, hopefully the close readings of the selected 
artworks in this book will inform your conceptual and 
material practices and processes. It would be a shame if 
all that resulted from this book was that an increasing 
4 Jacques Derrida, “Entre Crochets: entretien avec Jacques Derrida,” 
Digraphe 8 (1976): 112, translated by Gregory Ulmer in Applied Gram-
matology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 59.
5 Ulmer, Applied Grammatology, 145.
6 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 160.
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amount of artist statements began including the term 
“apparatus” without any of the art work actually chang-
ing much. And specifically, for those artists whose prac-
tices tend toward the apophatic (or whose work could 
benefit from a modicum of hard-braking every now and 
then), hopefully this book inspires and equips you to de-
velop increasingly ingenious braking traps. The world 
needs more rigorous and purposeful nothings so that 
new, heretofore unknown, and (hopefully) worthwhile 
somethings might (eventually) emerge.
Making Nothing Reveals the Ways in 
Which Somethings Are Made
Making nothing is a kind of limit-case of making some-
thing. It puts the brakes on ordinary becomings in such 
a way that the contours of those becomings become 
more readily apparent. Revealing the contours of becom-
ing is not all that making nothing does, but it is one of 
its advantages. A better understanding of the ways in 
which becomings occur leads to a more adept and nu-
anced ability to purposefully tweak becomings so that 
new, mattering somethings might emerge more often. It 
is not enough to merely claim that becomings happen. 
Of course they do. In order to ethically and effectively 
modulate becomings, it is necessary to get in and mess 
with the material flows of actual occasions to discover 
the specific contours of how becomings happen in par-
ticular instances and contexts.
Chapters 3–6 analyze five unique apophatic art ap-
paratuses in order to understand a variety of ways that 
becoming may be braked. Each of these apophatic art ap-
paratuses are ethical wagers of their own. Each change 
the world and make it something other than what it was. 
They are not solely or even primarily meant to be case 
studies or explorations of becoming. Nevertheless, they 
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do serve as useful lenses through which to understand 
the mechanisms of becoming, and they serve as models 
for the construction of new apophatic art apparatuses.
The way to the truly new always begins with an un-
derstanding of the past, because historical material deci-
sions have been made in the actual world via countless ac-
tual occasions which have resulted in our contemporary 
present world of well-decided, well-decohered, enduring 
objects. These material histories must be taken into con-
sideration. Ahistoricism in art movements inevitably 
leads to rote historical reenactments of prior ahistorical 
art movements. Regardless of what many of the early-
twentieth-century avant-garde art manifestos claimed, 
we are never able to begin at square one. Not every part of 
the universe exists in a quarantined, prepared, quantum-
behaving state. Not all things are possible. What is cur-
rently possible is contingent upon (although not wholly 
predetermined by) prior decisions that have already been 
made. According to Whitehead, insofar as we remain in 
our current cosmic epoch, the mechanisms of becoming 
are themselves constant – the ways in which the new 
emerges are not themselves emergent. These ways of 
emergence may be investigated, understood, and exploit-
ed. Making nothing doesn’t re-set the entire universe to a 
disintegrated, primal state. It simply exposes the current 
contours of becoming.
There are some ethical dangers in misunderstanding 
the mechanisms of becoming and the role that humans 
play in becoming. At one incorrect extreme, I may im-
agine myself having much more agency than I actually 
do. This results in a kind of fantasy ethics where every-
thing I do matters a great deal. I flap my wings in North 
America, and the great wall of China is blown down. This 
is nothing more than an impotent faux-agency, causing 
me to waste my time on ineffective modulations of the 
world. Yes, everything matters; but lots and lots and lots 
of things matter hardly at all, at any scale, to any one 
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or any thing, at any time, more or less ever. Unless I am 
willing to own that fact, I will waste an awful lot of time 
modulating an awful lot of things and claiming that I am 
having an awful lot more affective influence than I actu-
ally am, instead of spending my time figuring out how to 
most effectively modulate that which matters most.
It is indeed radical to want to undo all accreted con-
crescent histories and return to a zero-state of pure po-
tentia. Fortunately, this is simply not possible. Merely 
ignoring historical accretions and entanglements will 
not undo them. Yes, my human decisions matter; but I 
also have to respect the fact that the historical decisions 
of other entities (human, non-human, part-human) also 
matter, and that my current decisions are in some ways 
contingent on their prior decisions. Bashing away at the 
well-decided, decohered world as if it were the cohered 
quantum world is a futile exercise in impotent faux-
agency. To acknowledge this fact is to escape from ideal-
ized solipsism into true intra-active accountability.
Another ethical problem with such radical, zero-state, 
reset agendas is the loss of valuable accretions, ingres-
sions, and glommed-up complexities that have come to 
matter a great deal in the contemporary world. One such 
valuable accretion is human consciousness (whatever 
that actually is). Prepared photons in a double-slit ap-
paratus are radically unique because they begin with a 
kind of direct, pre-cohered access to pure potentia. But 
human consciousness is also unique, because speculative 
human thought has achieved a radical wildcard agency at 
well-decided and decohered states that rocks simply do 
not possess. A rock is not going to up and take itself for 
a walk; a human may (skipping as she goes). A prepared 
photon may be a wildcard in quantum-behavior-measur-
ing apparatuses, but as a photon increasingly decoheres, 
it necessarily loses its pure potential agency (for loca-
tion, momentum, spin, etc.). Whereas well-decohered 
429
toward an ethics of nothing
humans still retain all sorts of wildcard agency (for good 
and for ill).
At another incorrect extreme, the realization that my 
own agency is always contingent upon the prior decisions 
of other entities can lead to a kind of defeatist determin-
ism (the lie that my decisions are totally pre-determined). 
This is to misunderstand the co-creative (intra-active) 
nature of becoming. Yes, the prior decisions of other en-
tities matter, but they do not solely pre-determine and 
pre-define a world “out there” apart from me, a world 
which I may only subjectively interpret from “in here.” To 
acknowledge this fact is to escape from (the fictions of) 
correlationism and into (an awareness of) intra-action.
Apophatic art apparatuses provoke and lure human 
entities into an awareness of the creative propensity of 
the universe, and into a more accurate understanding of 
their own agency within the universe. By braking becom-
ings, by luring humans and other enduring objects into 
actual occasions that stymie and trouble their becom-
ings, apophatic art apparatuses invite humans to feel the 
contours of becoming itself, and to imagine other ways 
in which humans and the universe might become. This 
more accurate feel for the contours of becoming should 
lead in turn to a less quixotic, less defeatist, more effica-
cious exercising of human agency.
By examining in detail these five specific apophatic art 
apparatuses, my goal is not just to help humans get a bet-
ter feel for the contours of universal becomings, but to 
help them get a feel for the ways in which human-made 
art apparatuses may purposefully modulate these becom-
ings. Elizabeth Grosz observes, “Art allows the difference, 
the incommensurability of subject and object to be cel-
ebrated, opened up, elaborated.”7 This is only half right. 
Karen Barad clarifies what is actually happening with ap-
paratuses: “It is not merely the case that human concepts 
7 Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art, 75.
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are embodied in apparatuses, but rather that apparatuses 
are discursive practices, where the latter are understood 
as specific material reconfigurings through which ‘ob-
jects’ and ‘subjects’ are produced.”8 Art apparatuses don’t 
simply explore the pre-existing differences between pre-
existing objects and pre-existing subjects. Art appara-
tuses actually produce what Whitehead calls superjects, 
entities that both prehend and are prehended by each 
other in intra-active becomings. All art apparatuses do 
this. Apophatic art apparatuses brake these becomings.
Making Nothing Brakes Rote 
and Cyclical Becomings
By refusing to move straight through the ordinary mech-
anisms of default becoming in general, apophatic art ap-
paratuses brake rote and cyclical becomings, opening up 
the opportunity for new, more novel, less rote becomings 
to emerge. Describing literary apophasis, William Franke 
speaks of “words that negate themselves in order to evoke 
what is beyond words.”9 Similarly, apophatic art appara-
tuses contrive becomings that arrest themselves in order 
to evoke what may otherwise become.
My use of “apparatus” differs from Vilém Flusser’s use 
of the term, but his observations are nonetheless rel-
evant here. To Flusser, the technological devices upon 
which we rely are apparatuses programmed to keep us 
sleeping and needy: “These idiotic objects, these ‘gadg-
ets’ that surround us, program us in two different ways. 
We are programmed so that we can no longer live with-
8 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 148.
9 William Franke, “Apophasis as a Mode of Discourse,” preface to On 
What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Lit-
erature, and the Arts, Volume 2, ed. William Franke (Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 2.
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out them and we are programmed in order not to notice 
their stupidity.”10 Apophatic art apparatuses might then 
be seen as sabotaging antidotes to Flusser’s dependen-
cy-inducing, awareness-numbing technological appara-
tuses. Apophatic art apparatuses throw the brakes on the 
rote and cyclical becomings of contemporary capitalism. 
Pope.L’s Black Factory is an exemplary, multi-scalar case 
in point. The hard-braking of apophatic art apparatuses 
breaks technological dependencies and awakens self-
awareness (however temporarily). Such apparatal sabo-
taging is in line with Flusser’s own ethics: “We can no 
longer be revolutionaries, which means to be opposed to 
the operative program through other programs. We can 
only be saboteurs, which means to throw sand on the 
apparatus’ wheels. With effect: every current emancipa-
tory action is, when intelligent, a subversive action.”11 
Apophatic art apparatuses are not quite as reactionary as 
Flusser’s model proposes, but they do mung-up and sabo-
tage rote becomings while avoiding the purposeful rein-
stitution of equally diabolical rote becomings.
Making Nothing Is a Tool to More 
Purposefully Activate New Becomings
Although making nothing is not guaranteed to activate 
new becomings that matter, it prepares the way for a 
more purposeful activation of new becomings that might 
matter. I am not proposing that pure nothing in and of 
itself is an achievable state of endlessly fecund potential. 
According to my usage of the term, “making nothing” 
puts the brakes on becoming something. It does not cre-
ate a noun called “nothing.” Making nothing is an ethi-
10 Vilém Flusser, Post-History, trans. Rodrigo Maltez Novaes (Minne-
apolis: Univocal, 2013), 123.
11 Ibid., 127.
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cal wager that heads toward a kind of less-than-specific-
something. According to poet Alice Fulton, “Nothing will 
unfold for us unless we move toward what / looks to us 
like nothing.”12 “Making nothing” doesn’t achieve a state 
so much as defer a process. The “nothing” made is a verb 
rather than a noun. Emily Dickinson conjures nothing 
aright:
By homely gift and hindered Words
The human heart is told
Of Nothing —
“Nothing” is the force
That renovates the World —13
Gordon Bearn comes close to my understanding of “mak-
ing nothing” when he describes Derrida’s infamous dif-
férance as “a place holder for what may come.”14 Making 
nothing doesn’t create what may come, but it leaves the 
side door open for something else to come vs. that same 
old something which was already coming through the 
front door. By deferring inevitable becoming (however 
briefly), making nothing lingers in an open moment, giv-
ing ordinarily hesitant (shy?) potentia a bit more chance 
to become actual. Following Deleuze and Bergson, Eliza-
beth Grosz explains, “Duration entails an open future, it 
involves the fracturing and opening up of the past and 
the present to what is virtual in them, to what in them 
12 Alice Fulton, “Cascade Experiment,” quoted in Barad, Meeting the 
Universe Halfway, 39.
13 Emily Dickinson, from Poem 1563, The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Read-
ing Edition, ed. R.W. Franklin (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 1999).
14 Gordon C.F. Bearn, “Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze,” Continen-
tal Philosophy Review 33 (2000): 451.
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differs from the actual, to what in them can bring forth 
the new.”15 Later, Grosz elaborates: 
[Life’s] becomings are contingent only on its capacity 
to link with, to utilize, and transform, that is, to unbe-
come, the apparent givenness and inertia of material 
objects and to give to these objects new virtualities, 
new impulses and potentials. It needs to unbecome, to 
undo its actuality as fixed givenness in order for its 
virtualities to be capable of a new or different elabo-
ration.16 
Apophatic art apparatuses extend the duration of actual 
occasions, shaking loose calcified actual givens, giving 
hesitant potentia some extra time to actualize anew.
Deleuze uses the term “expression” to mean something 
akin to Whitehead’s concrescence. Following Deleuze, 
Brian Massumi writes:
To tend the stretch of expression, to foster and inflect 
it rather than trying to own it, is to enter the stream, 
contributing to its probings: this is co-creative, an aes-
thetic endeavor. It is also an ethical endeavor, since it 
is to ally oneself with change: for an ethics of emer-
gence.17 
Apophatic art apparatuses extend the stretch of expres-
sion, holding the door open (however fractionally longer) 
for what (otherwise) may eventually decide to emerge.
There is more than one way to make nothing, and the 
way in which one makes nothing in some sense (obliquely, 
15 Elizabeth Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecom-
ing,” parallax 11, no. 2 (2005): 4.
16 Ibid., 10–11.
17 Brian Massumi, “Introduction: Like a Thought,” in A Shock To 
Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi 
(London: Routledge, 2005), xxii.
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indirectly, abstractly, affectively) affects the subsequent 
something that may eventually arrive. Making nothing 
doesn’t determine the subsequent something that will 
arrive, but it paves the path along which the subsequent 
something may arrive. And certain somethings prefer 
certain paths over other paths. Setting a squirrel trap 
doesn’t guarantee I’ll catch a squirrel, but it precludes me 
catching an elephant. 
Of course, apophatic art apparatuses don’t simply leave 
open side doors, pave paths, and set squirrel traps. These 
are all over-simple analogies for what is actually happen-
ing. Apophatic art apparatuses are propositions that lure 
intra-active actual occasions into temporary aporias, mo-
mentary hesitations. The qualitative ways in which these 
aporias are created obliquely (but actually) influence the 
quality of the becomings which may finally emerge from 
these occasions. That description is less poetic, but more 
accurate.
Apophatic art apparatuses create aporias by rendering 
irrelevant certain “ordinary” functional behaviors of hu-
man and non-human objects, freeing both to function 
in heretofore undetermined ways. Apophatic art appa-
ratuses don’t directly try to make new humans and new 
materials. Instead, they free old humans and old materi-
als from their old obligations so that both may perform 
new (heretofore unimagined) functions. Put another 
way, apophatic art apparatuses don’t merely slow down 
the chunking mechanisms of becoming; they actually 
invite becoming to chunk otherwise. And since humans 
are always purposefully included in art apparatuses (by 
definition and design), apophatic art apparatuses invite 
humans to begin chunking their own post-apparatal oc-
casions otherwise and anew.
Arakawa and Gins challengingly assert, “We have de-
cided not to die.” What do they mean by this? They mean 
they have decided not to organism. They have decided 
not to person. They have decided to hold the door of 
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becoming open for as long as possible in order to see 
what other ways of (alter-, part-, post-)human becom-
ings might emerge. Like Arakawa and Gins, apophatic art 
apparatuses have decided not to become (just yet). Like 
Bartleby, they would prefer not to (just yet). What might 
happen in the meantime?
Making Nothing Is a Wager 
(Things Could Get Worse)
There is no guarantee that something beneficial will 
come from making nothing. Indeed, if you are doing 
it right, there can be no guarantee, by definition. Mak-
ing nothing could ultimately make the world worse. Or 
(more likely) it could not change the world all that much 
one way or another. To make nothing is to make some 
extra time in the immediate event of becoming, in order 
that something extra or unforeseen may emerge. If you 
already have in mind what is going to emerge, then you 
haven’t really made nothing. Apophatic art apparatuses 
prolong and defer becomings. This prolongation is hard 
enough to achieve in and of itself without the added re-
sponsibility of guiding whatever emerges to some spe-
cific end. 
Apophasis is not a tactic of resolutions and conclu-
sions. Contrary to popular understanding, the goal of 
theological apophasis is not to create an experience of 
ecstatic union with God. Theologian Edmund Rybarczyk 
explains, “The apophatic approach is misunderstood if 
one envisions its goal as some kind of spiritual or ethe-
real experience. The Orthodox consistently warn both 
those whom seek some kind of phenomenological mani-
festation and those whom merely want to experience 
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what an encounter with God might be like.”18 Theologi-
cal apophasis may indeed clear the way for some future 
encounter with God – but it will always be a God known 
via his own revelation to humans, unbound by our onto-
logical categorizations of him. Perhaps this self-revealing 
God will be utterly harrowing and terrifying. Or perhaps 
theological apophasis will lead to demon possession. Per-
haps it will lead to an acute awareness of a godless abyss. 
Perhaps it will lead to nothing at all.
Whatever the case, if done properly, apophatic artmak-
ing entails a perpetual risk. This is because apophasis 
necessarily involves what Michael Sells calls an “anarchic 
moment.” He writes, “To attempt to place a guarantee 
within the [apophatic] anarchic moment is to transform 
apophatic discourse into non-apophatic discourse.”19 
Without any guarantee, when the truly new arrives, how 
will we recognize it? Derrida suggests, “The future can 
only be anticipated in the form of an absolute danger. It 
is that which breaks absolutely with constituted normal-
ity and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a sort of 
monstrosity.”20 Well and good, but what exactly does an 
emergent monstrosity look like? It can’t always resemble 
the same grotesque, Cronenbergian–Lovecraftian horror 
creatures, because we have already seen those forms of 
the monstrous.
One possible outcome of the apophatic wager is the 
emergence of an entirely new cosmic epoch. Arguably, in 
the 1900s, this happened twice in art (with Duchamp’s 
Fountain and Cage’s 4’33’’) and once in physics (with 
quantum mechanics). Brian Massumi describes such an 
18 Edmund J. Rybarczyk, “Reframing Tongues: Apophaticism and Post-
modernism,” Pneuma: The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies 
27, no. 1 (2005): 87–88.
19 Michael A. Sells, The Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1994), 213.
20 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 5.
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epochal shift in his Parables for the Virtual: “If feedback 
from the dimension of the emerged re-conditions the 
conditions of emergence, then it also has to be recog-
nized that conditions of emergence change. Emergence 
emerges. Changing changes.”21 Karen Barad suggests that 
such meta-changes are indeed possible: “The very na-
ture of change and the possibilities for change changes 
in an ongoing fashion as part of the world’s intra-active 
dynamic.”22 In Writing and Difference, Derrida implies the 
possibility of such epochal shifts: “This hollow space is 
not an opening among others. It is opening itself, the 
opening of opening.”23 And Deleuze and Guattari suggest 
a kind of cosmic, artisanal experiment that “may go be-
yond all assemblages and produce an opening onto the 
cosmos.”24
Such epochal shifts which change the very mecha-
nisms of change itself remain the holy grail goal of the 
cosmic artisan. But even with radical epochal shifts, 
things could still get worse (and exponentially so). For 
example, we could shift from an epoch of rapid techno-
logical acceleration to an epoch of the extinction of hu-
man thought from the universe via the extinction of hu-
mans from the world. This would definitely constitute a 
new epoch, but (arguably) not a better one.
Making Nothing Always Leads to Something,  
But No Particular Something Is Ever Guaranteed.
Regardless of what does eventually emerge from mak-
ing nothing, something eventually has to emerge. Just as 
21 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 10.
22 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 179.
23 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 103.
24 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 333.
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making nothing can never guarantee that something par-
ticular will emerge; neither can it guarantee that nothing 
will ever emerge. Indeed, something always emerges. Even 
the Derridean game of perpetual deferral is an emergent 
something (namely, a game of perpetual deferral). As C.S. 
Peirce observes, “The vague always tends to become deter-
minate, simply because its vagueness does not determine 
it to be vague […]. It is not determinately nothing.”25 And 
elsewhere, “It must be by a contraction of the vagueness 
of that potentiality of everything in general, but of noth-
ing in particular, that the world of forms comes about.”26
The goal of making nothing is not to perpetually freeze 
becoming. Indeed, freezing becoming is not only impos-
sible but also undesirable. Instead, the goal of apophat-
ic art apparatuses is, via hard-braking, to modulate the 
flows of becoming in such a way that something which 
matters might eventually emerge. Theological apophasis 
is often criticized for beginning with the implicit desire 
to encounter God. But if you’re doing it right, no such 
encounter is ever guaranteed. A similar critique could be 
leveled against those who desire a new kind of pagan or 
atheistic apophasis which inherently precludes an en-
counter with God. If you’re doing apophasis right, you 
can’t preclude anything. A similar critique could be lev-
eled against deconstruction. Derrida admirably desires to 
keep presence and ontotheological assertions from rear-
ing their kataphatic heads for as long as possible, but this 
ethic of resistance to closure can easily transition from 
perpetual non-commitment into an adamant commit-
ment to the non-committal. To enact apophasis properly, 
25 Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 
vol. 2 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1998), 323–24, 
quoted in Brian Massumi, The Principle of Unrest: Activist Philosophy 
in the Expanded Field (London: Open Humanities Press, 2017), 144.
26 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Volume VI: Scientific Metaphysics, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), 196.
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it necessarily must be ephemeral and temporary. It must 
be open to eventually emerging into all sorts of possible 
actual outcomes. Indeed, proper apophasis must always 
expect its own eventual becoming.
Apophasis is ultimately about rigorously yielding one-
self to whatever may come. As Eugene Thacker rightly 
discerns, “The admission of divine possession seems to 
entail the minimal admission of demonic possession.”27 
Indeed, openness to possession by a monstrously new 
other which one does not currently control is at the core 
of the apophatic wager. Making nothing (hard-braking 
on ice) is a kind of losing control to see what may emerge. 
It always leads to something. Apophatic art apparatuses 
make nothings that may eventually lead to new some-
things that matter (for better or worse). Then again, they 
may lead to nothing much at all. That is the wager.
27 Eugene Thacker, “The Shadows of Atheology: Epidemics, Power and 
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